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The historiography of local government in mid-nineteenth century Canada West/Ontario 
is divided on the question of municipal autonomy. The more dominant thesis asserts that the 
Municipal Corporations (Baldwin) Act of 1849 ushered in a period of freedom for 
municipalities. The second depicts the Act as oppressive of autonomy in the interests of 
economic development. Both interpretations are based largely on extrapolation from earlier and 
later periods; there have been no direct examinations of local governance in Canada 
West/Ontario for what may be considered its formative period, from 1850 to 1880. In addition, 
much that has been written has been conceptually anachronistic, conflating ‘local’ with ‘urban’ 
in an era when the province was primarily rural. And, significantly, the legal dimension of the 
subject has been ignored or relied on uncritically. 
I begin with an examination of the Act and its consolidations to determine whether it was 
essentially permissive or mandatory, concluding that it can best be described as a constitution for 
‘low’ governance. I then consider case-law, focussing on enforcement of municipal duties by 
mandamus, restriction on municipal action by quashing of by-laws, and the imposition of 
liability for negligence. Next, I consider the communication of official sources of law to local 
government actors through commercial publications, all of which emphasized the lack of local 
autonomy. Because counties were the most populous local units, I use the archival records of the 
United Counties of Leeds and Grenville to scrutinize the activities of one such local government 
‘in the shadow of the law.’ I then discuss the supervision of local government by the old-regime, 
‘soft law’ grand jury, and the new-regime ‘hard law’ prison inspectorates. I investigate whether 
the newly created township councils were able to express community norms through the property 
tax appeal process. Finally, I consider the influence of municipal councils over their legal 
environment by means of petitions to the provincial legislature.   
I conclude that local governments in Canada West/Ontario during the years 1850 to 1880, 
while not without agency, were both too integrated in and too integral to the low governance of 







Any dissertation has numerous contributors. The number of years in the writing and research has 
a multiplier effect, so that a dissertation which has taken as many years this one has should 
include so many expressions of gratitude that the length of the acknowledgments might rival that 
of one of the chapters. Everyone who believed in me and my project has my gratitude, but I have 
had to restrict these acknowledgements to those who have provided the greatest degree of 
assistance, inspiration and encouragement.  
My supervisor, Eric Tucker, and supervisory committee members (and former teachers) 
Paul Craven and Doug Hay, have been insightful and patient mentors. Paul Craven also provided 
the data management programme I use for everything, and helped me learn how to use it. I have 
benefitted immensely from the guidance and compassion of Liora Salter and other Graduate 
Programme Directors at Osgoode Hall Law School during my time there, as well as the graduate 
programme staff, especially Lisa Bunker and Chantel Thompson. The law librarians and staff at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, especially Judy Ginsberg, Balfour Halévy, Wayne Mah, Monica 
Perot, and Marianne Rogers, have been unfailingly obliging, 
Constance Backhouse and Jim Phillips provided references which re-opened the doors of 
the academy I thought I had shut forever, and both have continued to encourage and inspire me.  
Jim Phillips also provided me with opportunities to present drafts of all my substantive chapters 
to the Osgoode Society (formerly Toronto) Legal History Workshop, and together with other 
members of the group gave me useful feedback. The late Graham Parker first sparked my interest 
in legal history. My first supervisor, David Flaherty, hired me as his research and editorial 
assistant and introduced me to the legal history world. J.J. (Jack) Quinn suggested municipal law 
as a promising topic for legal-historical inquiry. The directors of the Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History awarded me the R. Roy McMurtry Fellowship, a psychological as well 
iv 
 
as material boost; I thank them and Roy McMurtry and the donors. The society also provided a 
research grant to travel to Ottawa. Osgoode Hall Law School and York University have my 
gratitude for various scholarships and the opportunity to teach several subjects in law and socio-
legal studies.  
Other teachers and fellow travellers in law, history, and legal history made the path 
smoother and/or the journey more enjoyable, including (but not restricted to!): Harry Arthurs, the 
late Blaine Baker, the late John Beattie, Blake Brown, Lyndsay Campbell, Lori Chambers, 
Michael Cross, Adam Dodek, Shelley Gavigan, Philip Girard, Roger Hall, Sarah Hamill, Allan 
Hutchinson, Elizabeth Koester, Trish McMahon, Jeff McNairn, Brad Miller, Mary Jane 
Mossman, Christopher Moore, James Muir, the late Peter Oliver, Bruce Ryder, Karen Schucher, 
A.I. Silver, Lorne Sossin, Jennifer Stephen, Almos Tassyoni, Mariana Valverde, and Peer 
Zumbansen. Thank you to all.  
Finally, I am grateful to many friends for their moral support over the years, especially 
the late Viera Barta, Charlotte Goldfried, the late Stan Greben, Heather Sampson, and Donna 
Williams; and to my family: my husband, John Legge, my children, James, Elizabeth, and 
Rosemary Legge, my sister, Barbara Stokes, my late father, F.C. Stokes, and my late mother-in-
law, Laura Legge. All have been understanding, uncritical and kind. My daughter Elizabeth also 
helped immeasurably by transcribing, proof-reading, editing, and formatting. 
Most generous of all with material and emotional support was my late mother, Doris 
Gertrude Stokes, née Brown, who instilled a love of history in me from an early age, and who 
never stopped believing in me. I’m sorry she is not here to see me reach the end. This 









Table of Contents........................................................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................................................vi 
Chapter 1:  Toward a Legal History of Municipal Corporations in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880 ........................ 1 
Chapter 2:  A Low Constitution: Municipal Acts and Local Government Autonomy in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-
1880 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 40 
Chapter 3:  Municipal Corporations in Court: Canada West/Ontario 1850-1880 ........................................................ 79 
Chapter 4: Municipal Law Books: The Legal Environment for Municipal Corporations in Canada West/Ontario, 
1850-1880 .................................................................................................................................................................. 119 
Chapter 5: The Agency of Local Government: The Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds and 
Grenville in the Shadow of the Law, 1850-1880 ....................................................................................................... 160 
Chapter 6:  Soft Law, Hard Law, and Supervision: Grand Juries, Prison Inspectors, and Local Government 
Autonomy in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880 ....................................................................................................... 197 
Chapter 7: A Sphere of Autonomy: Taxation Appeals in Three Townships of Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880 .. 230 
Chapter 8:  The Legislative Agency of Local Governments: Petitions from Municipal Corporations to the Legislative 
Assembly of Ontario, 1867-1877............................................................................................................................... 271 
Chapter 9:  Conclusion: Law, Autonomy, and Local Government in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880 ................. 309 





List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Cases in which a Municipal Corporation was a party .................................................... 85 
Table 2: Defendants in cases in which Municipal Corporations were plaintiffs .......................... 85 
Table 3: Arbitration award concerning expropriation loss of Andrew Smail ............................. 187 
Table 4: Cases brought to Court of Revision, Front of Leeds and Landsdowne ........................ 244 
Table 5: Cases brought to Court of Revision, Augusta Township ............................................. 253 
Table 6: Tax Petitions to Township Council, Front of Leeds and Landsdowne ......................... 258 
Table 7: Tax Petitions to Township Council, Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne .......................... 259 








In such histories of municipal governance as there have been in Ontario, the leitmotif has been 
local autonomy. Indeed, the presence or absence, increase or decrease, of municipal 
independence has been a pervasive theme in local government studies in general. Autonomy has 
a certain a priori value; some degree is necessary if local government is to be both local and 
government.1 The question also has political import: local autonomy interests those concerned 
with the robustness of contemporary local democracies and their alleged potential for advancing 
goals of environmentalism and social justice.2 These critics have often used history to bolster the 
normative argument that local (by which they almost always mean urban) governments should 
have autonomy because they are best placed and/or most likely to advance a progressive agenda.  
Ironically, the perceived lack of local autonomy in present-day Ontario is often decried 
by progressives by means of a conservative narrative, as a derogation from a system that was 
ostensibly designed to prioritize local community decision-making. For urban historians, the 
premise that Ontario local governments were designed to be independent by the Municipal 
Corporations (Baldwin) Act of 1849 is also a basis for implicit and explicit criticisms of mid-
Victorian municipal councils as pro-business and anti-welfare, on the supposition that this 
orientation was a matter of (impliedly poor) choice.3 These assumptions are mostly extrapolated 
                                                          
1 See inter alia, George Jones and John Stewart, The Case for Local Government 2nd ed. (London, Boston: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985), especially 6.  
2 For one such plea for greater local autonomy for progressive social purposes see Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde, 
"Freedom of the City: Cities and the Quest for Governmental Status," Osgoode Hall Law Journal 44, no. 3 (2006): 
409-59. For a contrary (and contrarian) view see Andrew Sancton, The Limits of Boundaries: Why City Regions 
Cannot be Self-Governing (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008). 
3 Municipal Corporations (Upper Canada) Act, 12 Vic. c.81 (1849) [hereafter Municipal Act]. This act was/is also 
known as the Baldwin Act after its main proponent, the moderate reformer Robert Baldwin; see for example 
Stephen Speisman, "Munificent Parsons and Municipal Parsimony: Voluntary vs. Public Poor Relief in Nineteenth 
Century Toronto," Ontario History 65 (1973): 32-49; Eric James Jarvis, Mid-Victorian Toronto: Panic, Policy and 
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from research on earlier and later periods. There have been no direct examinations of local 
governance in Canada West/Ontario for what may be considered its formative period, the thirty 
years beginning in 1850, the effective date of the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, to 1880, 
the start of the period of progressive urban reform.4 In addition, much that has been written has 
been conceptually anachronistic, conflating ‘local’ with ‘urban’ in an era when the province was 
overwhelmingly rural. And, most significantly, the legal dimension of the subject has been either 
ignored or incorporated uncritically.  
Many years ago, political theorist W. Hardy Wickwar recognized that “the political 
theory of local government is to a large extent identical with its legal philosophy,” but scholars 
have not always pursued the implications of this when examining local governance in its 
historical context.5 In the case of Upper Canada/Canada West/Ontario, that philosophy is legal 
positivism grounded in concepts of constitutional sovereignty.6 This sovereignty may be divided, 
as it has been in Canada at least since the advent of responsible government, between 
colony/province and imperial centre and/or nation. It may not be surrendered but may be 
delegated to subordinate, non-sovereign units such as local governments. In mid-Victorian 
                                                          
Public Response, 1857-1873 (Ph.D. diss., University of Western Ontario, 1979); Gilbert Arthur Stelter, "Urban 
Planning and Development in Upper Canada," in Urbanization in the Americas: The Background in Comparative 
Perspective; Proceedings of Section VII, The Process of Urbanization, ed. Woodrow Wilson Borah, Jorge Enrique 
Hardoy and Gilbert Arthur Stelter (Ottawa: History Division, National Museum of Man, 1980), 143-54. 
4 The urban reform period in Ontario is held by one of its historians to have begun in 1880, by another not until 
1890. Paul Rutherford, "'Tomorrow's Metropolis': The Urban Reform Movement in Canada, 1880-1920," in The 
Canadian City: Essays in Urban and Social History, ed. Gilbert Arthur Stelter and Alan F. J. Artibise (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press, 1984), 203-1920; Paul Rutherford, Saving the Canadian City, the First Phase 1880-1920: 
An Anthology of Early Articles on Urban Reform (Toronto; Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1974); see also 
John C. Weaver, "'Tomorrow's Metropolis' Revisited: A Critical Reassessment of Urban Reform in Canada, 1890-
1920," in The Canadian City, ed. G. A. Stelter and A. F. J. Artibise, 456-77.  
5 W. Hardy Wickwar, The Political Theory of Local Government, 1st ed. (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1970), vi. 
6 On the union with Lower Canada in 1841, the colony of Upper Canada became legally Canada West, part of the 
Province of Canada, but continued to be referred to as Upper Canada. With confederation in 1867, it became 
Ontario, but was often still referred to as Upper Canada. The literature on sovereignty is vast; a good introduction is 
provided by Winston P. Nagan and Aitza M. Haddad, “Sovereignty in Theory and Practice,” San Diego 
International Law Journal 13 (2012): 429-519. 
3 
 
Canada West/Ontario these were fashioned as municipal corporations—a particular legal 
format—and their autonomy, or lack thereof, must be understood in this context.7 As elected 
governments with democratic legitimacy but without constitutional sovereignty, Ontario 
municipal governments since 1850 have had an indeterminate politico-legal status that must 
inform and complicate any assessment of their autonomy. 
In the settler society of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Upper Canada, the 
template for local government generally followed the contemporary English county model. A 
few towns secured corporate status by intermittent special acts, but as a general rule locally 
based justices of the peace combined legislative and administrative roles with their judicial 
duties when they came together in Courts of General or Quarter Sessions to pass local 
regulations, set property tax assessment rates, and supervise subordinate officials.8 Much of this, 
the ‘old regime’ of law and local government, changed significantly at mid-century.9 The advent 
of responsible government and union of the Canadas transformed governance at the provincial 
level, while the District Councils Act of 1841, and ultimately the Municipal Act, 1849, achieved 
a comparable degree of change at the local level by transferring legislative and administrative 
                                                          
7 Municipal corporations are a subset of public corporations. In common law, public corporations shared with 
private corporations the trait of juristic personhood whereby a group is recognized as an undying individual separate 
from its membership. All corporations are confined to the objects, rules and parameters set out by their constituting 
documents (originally charters, later statutes). The public corporation is set apart by its public (i.e. not commercial) 
purpose and by its membership, which in the case of municipalities was and is defined by geography and other 
demographic characteristics, rather than by investment: see Walter Wheeler Cook, Municipal Corporations 
(Chicago: publisher not identified, 1914), 1-9. 
8 See generally James K. Anderson, “The Court of General Sessions of the Peace: Local Administration in Pre-
Municipal Upper Canada” (M.A. thesis, McMaster University, 1991), 78; David Eastwood, Governing Rural 
England: Tradition and Transformation in Local Government 1780-1840 (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press, 1994). 
9 Margaret Banks declared 1849 the annus mirabilis of institutional legal reform in Canada West: Margaret A. 
Banks, “The Evolution of the Ontario Courts, 1788-1981,” in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, ed. David H. 
Flaherty, vol. 2 (Toronto: The Osgoode Society, 1983), 492–572, 511. The terminology of old and new regimes has 
been used effectively to explore nineteenth century Canadian institutional legal change by both John C. Weaver and 
Donald Fyson: John C. Weaver, Crimes, Constables and Courts: Order and Transgression in a Canadian City, 
1816-1970 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995); Donald Fyson, Magistrates, Police and People: 
Everyday Criminal Justice in Quebec and Lower Canada, 1764-183 (Toronto; Buffalo: Published for the Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2006).  
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functions from the Courts of Quarter Sessions to elected councils.10 By the latter act, Canada 
West adopted a comprehensive scheme of mandatory municipal incorporation, the first Anglo-
American jurisdiction to do so.11    
  In this introductory chapter I first address issues of the autonomy of local governments 
in Canada West/Ontario during the years 1850-1880 that are raised directly or indirectly by the 
historiography, together with relevant scholarship pertaining to local government autonomy in 
the United States and England. Second, I review the analytic framework offered by political and 
feminist theory, and introduce the terminology of ‘legal environment’ and ‘low governance.’  
Thirdly, I outline the various components of the project. Throughout, I make the argument that 
local autonomy is a complicated concept and its evaluation a problematic endeavour.  Local 
government autonomy cannot and should not be separated from its historical and legal context. 
To say that local governments lacked autonomy from the passage of the Municipal Act has the 
effect of obscuring their agency and their importance as essential institutions of low governance; 
that is, the observation that municipal corporations were not autonomous in Canada 
West/Ontario during the period 1850-1880 is at once correct and misleading.  
 
Historiography  
English-Canadian historiographer Carl Berger castigated urban history as “the most lacking in 
coherence” of all areas of the (then) ‘new’ social history.12 Berger diagnosed the problem as one 
                                                          
10 The British North America Act, 1840, 3 & 4 Vic. c.35 [Act of Union]; An Act to provide for the better internal 
Government of that part of this Province which formerly constituted the Province of Upper Canada, by the 
establishment of Local or Municipal Authorities therein, 4 & 5 Vic. c.10 [District Councils Act, 1841]. See 
generally J.M.S. Careless, The Union of the Canadas: The Growth of Canadian Institutions (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1967). 
11 Zack Taylor, “If Different, Then Why? Explaining the Divergent Political Development of Canadian and 
American Local Governance,” International Journal of Canadian Studies 49, no. 2 (2014): 53–79. 
12 Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, 2nd 
ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 316. Australian urban historian David Hamer anticipated the 
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of indiscriminate inclusivity.13 The phenomenon was not confined to Canada; according to 
Australian historian David Hamer, “urban history was about everything and about nothing,” 
giving rise, in his apt paraphrase of G. M. Trevelyan, to “social history with the rural areas left 
out.”14 However, despite this extended disciplinary reach, the history of local government in 
Ontario was “an obscure realm,” as Bryan Palmer stated the case in 1994.15 And so it has 
remained. Many Ontario localities have had their chroniclers, especially the cities. But place has 
trumped power, and the particular has been preferred to the general.  Two periods of broad 
change—the development of municipal government from the founding of the settler colony to 
the passage of the Municipal Act, and the late nineteenth and early twentieth century progressive 
era—have attracted a number of studies, but other than a general picture of politicians committed 
to local ‘boosting,’ especially in competition for railways, and uncommitted to assisting the poor, 
we have scant information on local government during the thirty years following the passage of 
the Municipal Act.  A topic one would have expected to be of central concern is remarkable for 
its absence under the “capacious umbrella” of urban history.16 
 Nor is this lacuna due to a lack of recognition of its importance. A number of historians 
of the political and social history of the province have attested to the significance of local 
government to the province, if only in passing. As far back as 1984, urban historians A.F.J. 
Artibise and Paul-André Linteau identified ‘control of the city’ as one of four major but 
                                                          
premature demise of his field: “a relatively new sub-discipline, urban history… [has begun] to collapse under the 
weight of its own popularity:” D. A. Hamer, New Towns in The New World: Images and Perceptions of The 
Nineteenth-Century Urban Frontier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 3. 
13 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 316-7.                                                                                                                                                                              
14 Hamer, New Towns in The New World,  3. G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London, New York and 
Toronto, 1942), vii. (Social history being “history…with the politics left out.”) 
15 Bryan D. Palmer, "Upper Canada," in Canadian History: A Reader's Guide, ed. M. Brook Taylor (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press,1994), 230. 
16 Hamer, New Towns in The New World, 3. 
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inadequately studied themes.17 The observation was repeated two years later by Artibise, this 
time with co-editor Gilbert Stelter, in the last of their several compilations of articles in urban 
history, Power and Place.18 The editors did include three essays on the subject of local 
government in this volume; two dealt almost exclusively with the twentieth century. The third, a 
slightly revised reprint from an earlier collection, is by default still the leading work on the 
immediate post-Baldwin Act period.  John H. Taylor’s article “The Evolution and Decline of 
Urban Autonomy in Canada” includes some three pages on the mid-nineteenth century, thereby 
amply, if unwittingly, illustrating Stelter and Artibise’s assessment of paucity of material on the 
subject and its basis in the lack of interest by researchers.19 
 For the social historians who have dominated Canadian historiography for the last half 
century or so, history in the city is simply more interesting than history of the city.20 As for non-
urban communities, as rural Canadians have become more and more of a demographic minority, 
their history has similarly been marginalized; despite the efforts of Donald H. Akenson, rural 
history as a genre has never really captured the academic imagination.21 It might have been 
thought that the recent turn to the political would ignite interest in the history of local 
governance, but to a great extent the new politics of identity and the history it has inspired has 
been racial, gendered, and ethnic; trans-national and diasporic rather than infra-nationally 
focussed.  Moreover, the predilection of historians to identify communities as urban or rural, 
                                                          
17 Alan F. J. Artibise and Paul André Linteau, The Evolution of Urban Canada: An Analysis of Approaches and 
Interpretations (Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg, 1984), 46. 
18 Gilbert Arthur Stelter and Alan F. J. Artibise, eds., Power and Place: Canadian Urban Development in The North 
American Context (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986). 
19 John H. Taylor, "Urban Autonomy in Canada: Its Evolution and Decline," in Power and Place: Canadian Urban 
Development in the North American Context, ed. Gilbert Stelter and Alan F. J. Artibise (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1986), 478-500. 
20 See for example, Stelter and Artibise, eds, Power and Place. 




categories that are socio-geographic rather than politico-legal, has tended to obscure the subject 
of local governance per se. Thus, municipal and urban have generally been treated as 
synonymous terms.  
For the nineteenth century at least, this is an ahistorical elision. Despite the undeniable 
fact that urbanization out-stripped population growth throughout the nineteenth century, the 
majority of Ontarians lived in rural areas until well into the twentieth century.22 In 1851 the 
population of the province was approximately 86% rural, in 1881, 70 % rural.23 It is also a 
distortion of a legal reality. With the exception of First Nations, and unincorporated districts in 
the sparsely settled northern reaches of the province, since 1850 all local governments in 
Ontario, whether rural or urban, have been municipal corporations.  Though it may exist in 
different gradations—i.e. city, county, town, township and incorporated village, and more 
recently Regional Municipality—the municipal corporation, a hybrid of representative 
government and ‘fictitious person’—is a singular type of legal entity.  Any exemptions or 
modifications for a particular place are considered procedurally and doctrinally to be exceptions 
to the general rule. From a legal perspective, a history of Ontario local government ‘with the 
rural areas left out’ is a contradiction in terms.    
 On the question of local autonomy, the urban historians, political scientists and 
geographers who have turned their attention to municipal government in mid-nineteenth century 
Ontario can be divided into two main camps. The first, those who suggest that the period 
                                                          
22 J. M. S. Careless, “Some Aspects of Urbanization in Nineteenth Century Ontario,” in Aspects of Nineteenth 
Century Ontario, ed. F. H. Armstrong (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 65–79. 
23 The population of the province at 1851 was approximately 86% rural; in 1881, 70 % rural: Statistics Canada, 
Population Urban and Rural, by Province and Territory (Ontario), 
http://www40.statcan.ca/101/cst01/demo62g.htm. The question of what counts as urban is legally defined, but 
arguable: See journalist Roy MacGregor on the shifting meaning of ‘urban’: “Can we really call a town without a 
stoplight ‘urban'? Globe and Mail, 10 December 2007; Roy MacGregor, “This country: ideas: distance, density and 
the psychology of the metropolis,” Globe and Mail, 24 November 2007. 
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immediately following the Baldwin Act was a golden age of local independence, have generally 
done so straightforwardly. Those whose work raises doubts have tended to do so indirectly. 
Although they may differ as to the indicators, the degree, the causes, and the ramifications of this 
autonomy, both groups share a degree of reliance on law, generally assumed to be evidenced by, 
and entirely composed of, the text of the municipal acts. 
The first professional historian to consider the subject was Adam Shortt.24 Writing in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, Shortt was in the vanguard of the liberal constitutional 
school of Canadian history, preoccupied with the development of jurisdictions and institutions.25  
His meticulous chronological summaries of legislation relating to early Ontario local government 
form a substantial part of the literature on the subject to date.26 Shortt’s conclusion, that the 
passage of the Municipal Act of 1849 government was the apogee of the provincial struggle for 
responsible government, was a reasonable one, given that the act’s originator, Robert Baldwin, 
was a leader of the so-called moderate reformers who worked to bring responsible government to 
the colony as a whole.27  
As noted by J. W. Aitchison in a much cited dissertation written several decades later, 
this interpretation was supported by the rhetoric of Baldwin and others surrounding its passage.28 
                                                          
24 Amateur historians such as John George Bourinot and S. Morley Wickett had previously written to extol (the 
former) and denigrate (the latter) autonomous local government: John George Bourinot, Local Government in 
Canada: An Historical Study (Baltimore: Publication agency of the Johns Hopkins University, 1887), Samuel 
Morley Wickett, Municipal Government in Canada (Toronto: Librarian of the University of Toronto, 1907). For a 
discussion of early writers on municipal government in Canada see Engin Isin, “Rethinking the Origins of Canadian 
Municipal Government,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 4, no. 1 (1995):73-92.  
25 Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, 21-27.  
26 Shortt was author or co-author of a number of pamphlets and book chapters on the subject. See inter alia, Adam 
Shortt, "Municipal History, 1791-1914," in Canada and Its Provinces: A History of the Canadian People and their 
Institutions, vol. 17, ed A. Shortt and A. G. Doughty (Toronto: Brook and Co., 1914), 405-52. 
27 J. M. S. Careless, "Robert Baldwin," in The Pre-Confederation Premiers: Ontario Government Leaders, 1841-
1867, ed. J. M. S. Careless (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 89-147; Michael S. Cross and Robert L. 
Frasier, “Baldwin, Robert,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/009004-
119.01e.php?&id_nbr=3762&interval=25&&PHPSESSID=mg4k89hbbbsct5ehdc2ppj7l64. 




Aitchison explicitly credited “strong democratic breezes from the south” as the reason for the 
enactment.29 He found it particularly persuasive that the Baldwin Act’s dual omission of limits 
on local government taxing power and centralized management made for a clear rupture with the 
system set up by Lord Sydenham’s District Councils Act of 1841. Sydendam had begun the 
process of reform by replacing the administrative and governmental functions of the quarter 
sessions with a system of elected councils under a centrally- appointed Warden.30 Shortt 
preferred this less democratic version, and stressed the continuities of the Baldwin Act with its 
predecessor. However, Aitchison’s glowing celebration of the later act as the “culmination of a 
long struggle for ‘home rule’ at all levels of government” has ultimately been the more 
influential point of view.31 
 That “the high water mark” of local autonomy allegedly achieved by the Baldwin Act 
was not destined to last was given only vague recognition by Aitchison, who traced the 
beginnings of an “inevitable recession” to the first restrictions on taxing levels in 1866.32 The 
first scholar to give explicit expression to the idea that local government in Ontario has been 
“more and more circumscribed” since the mid-nineteenth century was a  contemporary of 
Aitchison’s, political scientist K. Grant Crawford.33 By tracing incursions into local autonomy 
back to the advent of administrative boards and tribunals set up in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, especially the Ontario Railway and Municipal Board (later the Ontario 
Municipal Board). Crawford, who assumed that previous lack of such controls betokened 
                                                          
29 Aitchison, The Development of Local Government in Upper Canada," J. W. Aitchison, "The Municipal 
Corporations Act of 1849," Canadian Historical Review 30 (1949): 107-22; Michael S. Cross, A Biography of 
Robert Baldwin: The Morning-Star of Memory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 
30 For the Benthamite inspiration for this act, see Ian Radforth, "Sydenham and Utilitarian Reform," in Colonial 
Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Canada, ed. Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992), 64-102. 
31 Aitchison, "The Municipal Corporations Act of 1949," 122. 
32 Ibid. 
33 K. Grant Crawford, Canadian Municipal Government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).  
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independence, did much to reinforce the notion that the Baldwin Act had indeed created 
independent local governments. Crawford’s work provides much of the basis for the most 
forceful statement of this position, the article of urban historian John H. Taylor referred to above, 
the title of which, “The Evolution and Decline of Urban Autonomy in Canada,” foretells his 
characterization of the history of local power vis à vis the province as a linear model of progress 
and regress.34 
 Whereas Crawford’s argument is essentially negative—autonomy is demonstrated by 
absence of restriction—Taylor added a positive strand by emphasizing the many powers 
delegated to municipalities by the Baldwin Act, after the passage of which “urban centres were 
left free….to pursue their policies of growth and physical and social amelioration.”35 Like 
Crawford, Taylor argues that modern (i.e. late twentieth century) urban governments have little 
independence, but his conclusion that there has been a linear decline beginning with, and in 
consequence of, administrative tribunal oversight is less than convincing, due to a flawed 
methodology. Counting the mandatory (what he calls the ‘must’ clauses) and comparing them to 
the permissive (‘may’) clauses, Taylor infers that because many more of the provisions of the 
Baldwin Act were permissive than mandatory, the Act was necessarily designed to be and in fact 
was conducive to local autonomy.36 Taylor’s belief that there were no other ‘encroachments’ by 
the legislature on local government’s decisional turf, on the basis that there were no acts on such 
major matters as public welfare, ignores the legal-historical context.  The common law is, after 
the fashion of non-legal historians used to an administratively and legislatively ordered society in 
                                                          
34 John H. Taylor, "Urban Autonomy in Canada."  
35 Ibid, 272. 
36 Ibid. The impact of an act—its interpretation by courts, auditors, politicians, officials, lawyers and citizens—can 
never be predicted by the text alone. See Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, 
Mass., USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993). 
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matters of governance, simply ignored, as is the role of courts in construing and applying the 
‘may’ and ‘must’ clauses. Nor is there any consideration of the numerous statutes, private and 
public, that also trenched on powers and proscribed duties to municipal corporations and their 
officers, or any attempt at analysing the relative significance of the may and must clauses.  As 
American legal historian Lawrence Friedman observed of nineteenth-century municipal acts in 
the U.S., inclusion of a “miscellany of mismatched powers,” may have been mere persiflage.37  
Additionally, and ironically, it may be noted that Taylor’s contention that the act was designed to 
give the local governments all the authority they might wish is contradicted by none other than 
the author himself in an article on fire, health and water in nineteenth century Ottawa, wherein he 
attributes many of the community’s difficulties in providing services to the lack of enabling 
legislation.38 
 Though marred by reliance on secondary sources, a greater sensitivity to the law and 
legal context is apparent in the overview of the history of local governance in Canada by political 
scientist Warren Magnusson that serves as the introduction to City Government in Canada, co-
edited by Magnusson with Andrew Sancton.39 In this, and in later works, Magnusson takes the 
non-romantic view that local liberty has often meant freedom to succour dominant interests, and 
cautions that the regime established by the Baldwin Act was “not the ideal of direct legitimacy” 
generally associated with the concept of political autonomy.40  He concedes that the principle of 
                                                          
37 Lawrence M. Friedman, The History of American Law, 3rd ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 529. 
38 John H. Taylor, "Introduction: Fire, Disease and Water in the Nineteenth Century City," Urban History 
Review/Revue d'Histoire Urbaine 8, no. 1 (1979): 7-38. 
39 Warren Magnusson, "Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government," in City Politics in 
Canada, ed. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 3-42. This is 
Magnusson’s most explicitly historical treatment of municipal autonomy, but these ideas are foundational and 
pervasive throughout his later work; Warren Magnusson, "The Local State in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives." 
Canadian Public Administration 28, no. 4 (1985):575-99, Warren Magnusson and R. Walker, "De-centring the 
State: Political Theory and Canadian Political Economy," Studies in Political Economy 26, no. 1 (1988): 37-71, 
Warren Magnusson, "Are Municipalities Creatures of the Provinces?" Journal of Canadian Studies 39, no. 2 (Spring 
2005): 5-30. 
40 Magnusson, “Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government,” 4. 
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legislative supremacy was fully established and enforced by the English courts through judicial 
review and the concept of ultra vires, whereby the powers given by the legislation were strictly 
construed so as to deny the locality the benefit of any doubt.41 However, according to 
Magnusson, although the court’s theoretical role in determining the scope of municipal law was 
restrictive and anachronistic, this was disregarded in practice, and in actuality “local councils 
were protected from unwanted burdens” until “the close administrative control” of the twentieth 
century.42 In any event, he contends, the province and municipalities had similar goals (economic 
growth) and abhorrences (social welfare spending). ‘Boosters’ clashed with ‘cutters’ as bonuses 
to industry depleted budgets and ratepayers protested.  The restrictive property franchise 
exacerbated conservative tendencies. Limitations on autonomy, then, there were, but these are 
depicted as economic and ideological, rather than legal and structural. 
 Despite the agreement of Crawford, Aitchison, Taylor, and Magnusson on the perception 
of local autonomy following the passage of the Baldwin Act, consensus is replaced by confusion 
when it comes to assessing the Ontario experience in an internationally comparative perspective. 
Crawford saw the attenuation of local autonomy by administrative tribunals as following an 
earlier trend in the United States, but does not advert to the ‘home rule’ movement which 
seemingly reversed the trend away from local autonomy in many American cities at the same 
time it was seemingly under attack here. American urban historian Jon C. Teaford altered his 
initial ideas on central-local relations when he investigated the contextual reality behind the 
surface of the legislative record.43 Originally convinced that the constraints on localities apparent 
                                                          
41 Ultra vires (beyond the powers) is a central concept in the Anglo-American jurisprudence of administrative and 
constitutional law, known as judicial review: see inter alia the definition at https://thelawdictionary.org/ultra-vires/.  
42 Magnusson, “Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government,”” 4. 
43 Jon C. Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America: Origins of Modern Urban Government, 1650-1825 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 152; Jon C. Teaford, City and Suburb: the Political Fragmentation of 
Metropolitan America, 1850-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 231; Jon C. Teaford, "Special 
Legislation and the Cities, 1865-1900," The American Journal of Legal History 23 (1979): 189; Jon C. Teaford, 
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in state law and constitutions hobbled local councils, Teaford subsequently relied on an 
examination of numerous private or “special” acts to contend that councils were effectively able 
to commandeer the state legislatures to create exceptions by means of their influence with local 
delegates to state congresses.44 Stelter and Artibise, uncritically comparing Taylor’s less 
substantiated findings with those of Teaford, submit that local autonomy was indeed stronger in 
the United States. Magnusson, on the other hand, asserts (without the benefit of empirical 
research and without providing the basis for his conclusion) that “Canadian municipalities had a 
narrower range of functions than [those in] the United States but are believed to have had more 
essential municipal power.”45 Even with regard to the present, or at least the less remote past, the 
comparative situation is far from clear: writing in the 1980s, political geographer Gordon Clark 
used Ontario as an example of a jurisdiction which has traditionally allowed its municipalities 
almost no autonomy, citing the extensive powers of the Ontario Municipal Board, but to date no-
one has done a comprehensive empirical study to determine whether, or how often, these have  
been used to thwart municipal policy. 
 This depiction of mid-nineteenth century local autonomy has been accepted by social 
historians and political scientists even as they turn up inconsistencies. S.J.R. Noel subscribes to 
the view that provincial control over localities in the period under review was weak and 
intermittent, but places the terminal limit on local independence much earlier than did Crawford 
and Taylor, citing the administrative revolution of the Mowat regime, commencing with the 
                                                          
"State Administrative Agencies and the Cities, 1890-1920," The American Journal of Legal History 25 (1981): 225-
48; Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, City Government in America, 1870-1900 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1984); Jon C. Teaford, "New Life for an Old Subject: Investigating the Structure of Urban Rule," 
American Quarterly 37, no. 3 (1985): 346-56; Nancy Burns and Gerald Gamm, "Creatures of the State: State 
Politics and Local Government, 1871-1921," Urban Affairs Review 33, no. 1 (1997): 59-96.  
44 Teaford, "Special Legislation and the Cities, 1865-1900," 189. For an investigation of this phenomenon in Britain, 
see John M. Prest, Liberty and Locality: Parliament, Permissive Legislation, and Ratepayers' Democracies in the 
Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
45 Magnusson, "Introduction: The Development of Canadian Urban Government," 3-42. 
14 
 
Municipal Loan Act of 1873, as trenching considerably on local freedom of action.46 Premier 
Oliver Mowat, writes Noel, “projected the powers of the Ontario Government directly and 
finally into the local constitution on a scale previously unknown … [through] provincially 
appointed councils, agents and trustees…many replacing municipal offices.”47 Leo A. Johnson, 
on the other hand, projects a certain ambivalence toward the issue: he says on one page of his 
History of the County of Ontario, 1615-1875 that “the only check on municipal legislation was 
the judicial test…within the areas given they [municipal councils] were supreme” but on another, 
that by the passage of the Education Act of 1871 “…the autonomy won by the rural society in 
the Baldwin Acts of 1849-50 was again [my emphasis] eroded in a significant way.”48   
Historians of education, one of the better studied aspects of mid-nineteenth century 
Ontario, have come to question the latter assertion, although they have not related their findings 
to the larger municipal picture. The currently accepted position as advanced by R.D. Gidney and 
various co-authors is that local communities had considerable clout in stymieing the centralizing 
zeal of Egerton Ryerson.49 Much of this work, especially Bruce Curtis’s explication of the 
development of the educational inspectorate as a part of these struggles, is sophisticated and 
helpful, but the issue of local autonomy, even in the narrower sphere of education, remains in 
doubt.50 Given the focus of these studies on the centre, the effect on the localities is unclear. It 
                                                          
46 S. J. R. Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1990), 329. 
47 Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers, 282. 
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7 (1972): 33-47; R. D. Gidney and D. A. Lawr, "Egerton Ryerson and the Origins of Secondary Education in 
Ontario," Canadian Historical Review 60 (1979): 442-65; R. D. Gidney and D. A. Lawr, "Bureaucracy vs. 
Community? The Origins of Bureaucratic Procedure in the Upper Canadian School System," Journal of Social 
History 13 (1980): 438-57. 
50 Bruce Curtis, "Preconditions of the Canadian State: Educational Reform and the Construction of a Public in Upper 
Canada, 1837-1846," Studies in Political Economy 10 (1983): 99-121; Bruce Curtis, Building the Educational State: 
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seems possible that communities could well have had considerable impact, especially of a 
negative sort, on education policy and in particular on its implementation, without this being 
indicative of a more general autonomy. Since the education historiography is only peripherally 
concerned with the question of local government autonomy it is perhaps not surprising that it has 
not modified the received wisdom on the autonomous nature of the mid-nineteenth century 
municipal council. However, there are a number of studies much more directly on point that 
challenge the Shortt/Aitchison/Crawford/Taylor school.  
Those whose work tends to undermine the vision of mid-nineteenth century local 
autonomy have concentrated on the causes of municipal law reform.  Earliest of these was 
political scientist George Anderson, who attributed the development of ‘independent’ local 
polities to the forces of economic modernization: “…a functional response to the need for greater 
public investment to support the building of the infrastructure.”51 Anderson’s thesis was echoed 
and extended by historical geographer C.F. J. Whebell, who argued that municipal devolution 
was less a Canadian political achievement than an imperial administrative policy. In two articles, 
“Robert Baldwin and Decentralization” and “The Upper Canada District Councils Act of 1841 
and British Colonial Policy,” Whebell examines the origins of municipal reform, identifying two 
trends, the decentralized/democratic and the centralized/authoritarian. While colonial policy and 
ideology clearly favoured the latter, practical considerations, including geography and the 
legislative calendar, did not. When changes occurred at the imperial level, including 
parliamentary and municipal reform in Britain, the Colonial Office was prepared to introduce 
modifications in structure in Upper Canada. Upper Canadian reformers were ambivalent about 
                                                          
Government by Choice Men: Inspection, Education, and State Formation in Canada West (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1992). 
51 George Douglas Anderson, "A Comparative Study of Local Government Development in Canada, 1620-1870" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Saskatchewan, 1974), 75. 
16 
 
some of these plans, as the earlier District Councils Act seemed to serve their opponents both 
administratively and by providing opportunities to increase their power through additional 
patronage in the appointments of district wardens. Eventually in power courtesy of a coalition 
with Lower Canadian reformers made possible by the 1841 Act of Union, reform leader Robert 
Baldwin was able to secure the 'democratic' (i.e., elective, though not based on universal 
manhood suffrage) transformation of the councils. Overall, political decentralization is seen by 
Whebell as pragmatic and partisan in motivation, though at least partially ideological in form.52 
Whebell’s interpretation of reform as a ‘top-down’ imperial project has been given 
indirect support by Allan Greer and Ian Radforth in the introduction to their co-edited volume on 
nineteenth-century Canadian state formation, Colonial Leviathan.53 However, Greer and 
Radforth’s conjecture that the centre may have been strengthened at the expense of the periphery 
by the greater legitimacy accorded to the provincial government by the transfer of power (as 
‘responsibility’) must be subject to their dual caution; first, that attention to legal frameworks 
and institutions is necessary to address these issues, and secondly, that the process of state 
formation is cultural, and the ways in which central authority became “progressively pervasive in 
society” should not be assumed to mirror precisely the development of liberal institutions.54  
Rather, a study of power “that seeks to give recognition to …the constellation of agencies and 
officers sharing the sovereign authority”—in which we can undoubtedly include, indeed 
foreground, municipal councils –demands scrutiny of actual practices and relations.55  
                                                          
52 C. F. J. Whebell, "Robert Baldwin and Decentralization 1841-9," in Aspects of Nineteenth Century Ontario, ed. F. 
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53 Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, "Introduction," in Colonial Leviathan, ed. A. Greer and I. Radforth, 3-16. 
54 Ibid, 8. 
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 Appearing in the same volume of essays on Upper Canada as Whebell’s essay, G.P. de 
T. Glazebrook’s survey of the trial-and-error development of democratic municipal institutions 
in Upper Canada also does not extend to the period after 1849, but in challenging the ‘rise of 
democracy’ thesis of Shortt and Aitchison, Glazebrook raises doubts about the eventual 
independence of the councils which emerged as a result of this process.56 Glazebrook takes a 
jaundiced view of Lord Durham’s condemnation of pre-reform government as inefficient, 
corrupt and wasteful of valuable legislative time, which he feels was probably exaggerated in 
order to present the strongest case for reform: in fact, he argues, “[t]he one city and nearly all the 
towns had municipal government not essentially different than modern forms. The provincial 
government did not manage ‘the private business of every parish’” as Durham had claimed.57  
Eschewing presentist judgmentalism, Glazebrook stresses the demographic and geographic 
challenges to effective, or indeed any, administration in a struggling province comprised of 
isolated communities and marginal settlers. 
An even more decided assault on the Shortt-Crawford-Atichison-Taylor thesis has come 
from the work of Engin Isin.58 Though Isin’s evidence and logic are occasionally somewhat 
distorted by his polemical purpose, much of his argument is persuasive.59 Isin is more pointed 
than Whebell and Glazebrook in his thesis that the liberal discourse of self-rule was belied by the 
reality of central control. Far from being the pinnacle of the struggle for local democracy, the 
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57 Ibid, 46. 
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Baldwin Act is denigrated as embodying a “restrictive, calculating, and centralized mode of 
municipal government.”60 Isin does not go into detail about the characteristics of the act, 
however, merely noting, like Magnusson, that the restrictive franchise aided the control of local 
governance by the central elite, and more dubiously, arguing that the corporate form signified the 
“separation of the city…from its inhabitants.”61 Again like Magnusson, his major concern seems 
to be with the lack of constitutional recognition for urban units of governance.62 Isin assumes 
that theory directed reality; he does not explicitly refer to the operation of the legal principle of 
strict statutory interpretation of (municipal) corporate powers (known as Dillon’s rule to 
Americans, and increasingly to Canadians) which is what gives legal effect to this arrangement, 
much less speculate whether this rule was more honoured in the breach, or about the actual 
brokering of power between the localities, the province, and, most critically, the courts.  
As is the case with Whebell and Glazebrook’s articles, none of Isin’s work deals directly 
with local government in to the period after 1849; rather, post-Act ramifications are extrapolated 
from textual analysis and pre-Act policy. One study that does venture slightly into this period 
using empirical research also calls the ‘rise of local democracy/municipal autonomy’ thesis into 
question, albeit tangentially. In his unpublished Ph.D. dissertation “By and for the Large 
Propertied Interests: The Dynamics of Local Government in Six Upper Canadian Towns During 
the Era of Commercial Capitalism, 1820-1860,” W. Thomas Matthews takes a Marxist-inflected 
approach to his subject, painting a picture of the locality as a site of inter-class power struggles, 
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and local office as a hotly contested prize.63 The pre- and post-Baldwin Act incorporations, he 
posits, were very much a top-down, capitalist exercise, initiated by the Colonial Office in 
London and carried out by its appointees in the province. Incorporation of colonial local 
government was a non-partisan issue, with a widely subscribed goal of economic growth, to be 
achieved by means of local boosterism, which was both expected and encouraged. But within 
these parameters, Matthews maintains, the new corporations did not lack for power to carry out 
their mission: in contrast to the courts of quarter sessions which preceded them, the municipal 
councils “enjoyed a secure tax base and sweeping legislative prerogatives.”64 Like the other 
historians canvassed here, however, Matthews does not see the law as a problematic or 
continuing factor in the development of these towns. The elites made choices in directing local 
activities and were in turn served by these activities. Restrictions and duties play no part in this 
narrative, and the courts are a negligible factor. In spite of his recognition that “disgruntled” 
politicians were not above laying formal charges, acknowledgment of conflicts of interest, and 
the occasional scandal, Matthews sees the press as the only arbiter of political probity and the 
ballot box as the only check on local power.65A similar conclusion is reached by Andrew 
Holman in his monograph A Sense of their Duty: Middle Class Formation in Victorian Ontario 
Towns, although his depiction is one of hegemony and consensus rather than conflict.66 
 The most illuminating views of control of the locality by the province in the decades after 
the passage of the Baldwin Act are to be found in the works of two authors dealing with the 
development of the administrative state, rather than local government. The earlier of these is 
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Richard Splane’s pioneering Social Welfare in Ontario, 1791-1893: A Study of Public Welfare 
Administration.67 One of Splane’s major themes is the inadequacy of municipally based poor 
relief, health, and criminal institutions. Yet even in his criticism, he does grudgingly admit that 
“limited in their resources…the municipalities have never been able to give equal attention to all 
the functions assigned them.”68 
 The province’s use of the municipality to fund and administer welfare and other functions 
of the modern state is given even more explicit expression by J. E. Hodgetts in two studies of the 
development of Canadian bureaucracy. 69 A political scientist, Hodgetts’ narrative is overtly 
teleological—centralized, professional bureaucracy is very much seen as the norm and the end—
but is instructive for anyone seeking to understand central-local relations in the union and post-
confederation periods. Along with providing enabling grants to voluntary organizations, 
Hodgetts discovers, the government applied coercive legislation to municipalities to further 
central policies. The system relied heavily on the production of statistical reports, and 
municipalities provided captive field officers for this purpose, while the provincial secretary 
maintained “a loose surveillance that involved the collection and collation” of these.70 Indeed, 
the fact that provincial headquarters remained small is attributed “to the heritage of organized 
governing bodies with their own array of local officials.”71  
Left in some doubt is whether this theoretical structure was always operational.  If the 
litany of complaints by the continually frustrated inspector of public institutions chronicled by 
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Hodgetts is any indication, some municipalities resorted to passive resistance in the face of 
externally imposed requirements. However, there may have been advantages accruing from their 
importance to the system: because municipalities were not much use if they were penniless due 
to borrowing for railways and other improvements, Premier Mowat was compelled to provide a 
distribution of funds. Any idea that the centre was in any position to be very strict in its 
supervision of these is negated by the fact there was no central auditing of municipalities until 
1896.72 
Intriguingly, despite the cumulative cogency of these incursions into the narrative of a 
golden age of local autonomy as the goal and immediate consequence of the Baldwin Act, the 
latter has remained the received wisdom. Caroline Andrew’s 1995 article “Provincial-Municipal 
relations; Or Hyper-Fractionalized Quasi-Subordination Revisited” ignores an article by Isin 
challenging the thesis in the same collection, as well as his other contributions to the debate, 
including his 1992 monograph.73 Although she accepts the Whebell-Glazebrook contention that 
the colony “set up municipal governments…as a way of increasing public expenditure without 
increasing the provincial debt” she then somewhat contradictorily switches to Taylor’s argument 
that municipal discretion was not limited until administrative tribunals were implemented at the 
turn of the twentieth century.  
That a focus on the judicial would add to the discussion is evident in several studies by 
American legal academics, most notably Lawrence Friedman, Gerald Frug, Joan C. Williams, 
and Hendrik Hartog, as well as work by the British scholar Martin Loughlin, and Canadians Ron 
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Levi and Mariana Valverde.74 Friedman contends that the popularity of Judge John F. Dillon’s 
treatises on the law of municipal corporations signifies the economic importance of the issue in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century, as did the frequency of challenges to municipal action, 
mostly on the basis of ultra vires, by ratepayers and others.75 He observes that such cases could 
have serious consequences: “[o]ne disgruntled landowner who attacked a sewer assessment, 
might, if he won, shatter a whole scheme of urban sanitation.”76  
Of the other American legal academics to turn their attention to municipal matters, 
Critical Legal Studies scholar Gerald Frug is perhaps the best known. In two articles, “The City 
as Legal Concept” and “A Legal History of Cities,” Frug traces the conflicts over urban 
autonomy to the corporate character of the urban polity formed in the middle ages.77 Turning to 
nineteenth-century America, he discovered a “process of working a solution to the status of cities 
within liberal theory… [which] has to a large part been carried out by the development of 
doctrine.”78 Judge Dillon is the villain of Frug’s account; Dillon, Frug argues, erred in 
conceptualizing the city as a public entity that needed to be constrained in order to protect the 
individual, as opposed to a private corporation that needed to be protected to serve the 
individual. Dillon’s eponymous ‘rule’ that municipal corporations were the mere ‘creatures’ of 
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the state, constituted a (to Frug unnecessary and harmful) legal paradigm for the hobbling of 
local activism.  
In his study of New York City in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hendrik Hartog 
acquits Dillon of this responsibility. Dillon’s treatise, he suggests, merely gave expression to a 
new form, created by the judiciary as a group due to a collective distrust of municipal power and 
urban politicians, especially those of the metropolis, New York City.79 Hartog infers a 
breakdown of shared ‘republican values,’ which manifested itself in an antagonism between 
judges and politicians at every level.80 The judiciary was sceptical of the ability and probity of 
urban politicians, and, by imposing constraints attempted to influence public action indirectly by 
forcing the municipality back to the legislature. Dillon’s rule was hence “a way of compelling 
the legislature to take responsibility for the actions of an errant child….The law would compel 
the legislature to superintend its charge.”81 Hartog does suggest that this strategy may have been 
in vain, and that powerful cities like New York might have been able to get what they wanted by 
lobbying law makers.82 Doctrine, he seems to argue, is far from omnipotent, but does have 
power, if only to hinder and hamper, and in this instance to produce ‘partially’ autonomous 
public entities. 
Hartog’s argument in this respect has been challenged by Joan C. Williams.  In one of 
two articles on the subject, Williams tracks the development of the law of municipal corporations 
in the United States to the towns of New England.83 While New York courts were still “mired in 
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confusion,” Massachusetts courts, less bound by English precedent, developed a form of public 
quasi-corporation and presaged Dillon’s rule by several decades. Williams does not deny a class 
aspect to this vision, but speculates that a greater underlying cause was ideological, concerning 
“the proper scope of government power when the exercise of such power threatened private 
property interests.”84 This conclusion, she finds, is supported by a close reading of Dillon, as 
many of the cases he cited dealt with the authority of towns to tax individuals in order to finance 
railroads and similar projects.  Williams’ interpretation is supported by the findings of David 
Millon, looking at judicial review of private commercial corporations in the United States, which 
he contends were far from autonomous in the nineteenth century, and William D. Popkin, writing 
on the history of American statutory interpretation.85 The latter contends that the judiciary as a 
group ceased being deferential and became more aggressive in all aspects of judicial review, just 
as general enabling legislation for incorporation became the norm in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. 
All these arguments are marked, and marred somewhat, by American exceptionalism. 
The judicial ideology Williams identifies she describes as ‘republican,’ even on occasion 
‘Jacksonian.’86 Yet British legal academic Martin Loughlin comes to much the same conclusion 
in his discussion of the emergence of the doctrine of ultra vires as the pre-eminent principle in 
the judicial review of municipal action occurring at about the same time in England.87 As the 
cash nexus became more critical, Loughlin finds it was “not surprising that the courts took the 
view that they should seek to ensure that an appropriate balance was maintained” between public 
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and private interests, and municipalities were treated as fiduciaries for the growing public 
purse.88  The better question, he submits, should be why parliament did not grant more expansive 
powers, if the restrictive interpretation caused problems for local governments attempting to 
benefit the public.89 The clearest difference lies in his attitude to this phenomenon. While the 
American scholars referred to all rue judicial intervention in municipal affairs to a greater or 
lesser degree, Loughlin seems to condone this juridification. Canadians Mariana Valverde and 
Ron Levi, on the other hand, enthusiastically adhere to the American perspective. They assume 
that the Canadian trajectory mirrored that of the States, and that ‘Dillon’s rule,’ accepted by an 
unthinking Canadian judiciary, is to blame for the current anemic state of local government 
autonomy in Canada.90  
Another Canadian, Zack Taylor, the only scholar to have taken a sustained comparative 
approach to what he agrees is Ontario municipalities’ unfortunate lack of autonomy, is similarly 
discouraged by this state of affairs, but sees the legislative framework, not the judiciary, as the 
culprit.91  Taylor argues that by homogenizing local government, replacing all existing charters 
and treating all as the same type of legal entity (subject to differences in gradation), the province 
was able to exert greater control, with the result that the ‘home rule’ movement and the 
opportunities that empowered American cities’ entrepreneurial creativity did not take root in 
Ontario’s comparatively non-autonomous municipalities. 
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Theory and Terminology 
The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines Autonomy “of a state, institution, etc.: as “[T]he 
right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs,” but adds a 
qualifier: “(sometimes limited by the adjs. local, administrative, when the self-government is 
only partial; thus English boroughs have a local autonomy, the former British colonies had an 
administrative autonomy; ‘political autonomy’ is national independence).”92 Writers on the 
subject who base their studies on a twentieth-century perception of the nature of local 
government as quintessentially ‘popular’ and of its primary function as a provider of services, 
tend to define autonomy in terms of participation, communication and efficiency, while noting 
that these qualities may be contradictory. Michael Goldsmith notes that the normative attachment 
to the ideal of local government is peculiarly Anglo-American, and possibly illusory, but 
nonetheless important, because “autonomy is at the heart of the very justification of local 
government.”93 Less tautological is Harold Wolman, who extols the opportunity for 
experimentation and diversity that decentralization allows, arguing that “[t]he structure of 
political decision making is not value neutral.”94 
Those studies which are more analytical and philosophical and as a result more divorced 
from the contemporary experience lend themselves to definitions that may be more helpful to a 
historical analysis. These range from the broad—the extent to which local governments’ 
“presence and activities have independent impacts on anything important”—to the narrow—“the 
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capacity…to act in terms of their interests without fear of having their every decision scrutinized, 
reviewed and reversed by higher tiers of the state.”95 Common denominators are the existence of 
some choice, either in what to do or how to do it, including the choice to make changes, and 
some degree of fiscal independence, which in combination may be said to distinguish local 
government from decentralized administration.96 That no organization and no person is ever 
entirely free is a given, but as one observer has commented, present routine may denote (and 
indeed obscure) past choice.97 Hence a perceived current lack of discretion may, paradoxically, 
be a manifestation of autonomy at some greater level of abstraction. 
 In addition to definitions, a few theorists have attempted a more precise theoretical 
deconstruction. Most methodical is this regard has been Gordon L. Clark.98 Borrowing from 
Bentham, Clark identifies two major elements of governmental autonomy, namely initiative and 
immunity. The power of the latter, to act without supervision or veto, he argues, though 
important, is less so than the power to initiate, including the power to regulate.  From these, 
Clark constructs a four-fold typology ranging from local government with both elements of 
autonomy, which he doubts has ever been approximated except possibly by some medieval city 
states, to those with neither, mere elected bureaucracies.99  
Using concepts originated by political scientist W.P.L. Mackenzie, Edward C. Page has 
written a complex comparison of central-local relations in seven European countries without ever 
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adverting to autonomy.100 In its place, he offers related concepts of ‘localism’ and ‘centralism,’ 
each measured on a ‘legal’ and a ‘political’ scale.  In the ‘legal scale,’ Page includes both 
initiative and immunity, though not in these terms, and further details the various signifiers of 
these, including mandatory duties (and their relative costs), court supervision, the range of 
powers and functions performed, central control by administrative procedures and routines and, 
most important to his mind, “the degree to which the local political elite can raise revenue 
locally” or depends on central grants.101 At one end of the scale are cases of ‘legal localism,’ 
wherein central supervision is performed “by remote control”—primarily through legislation and 
court supervision—and at the other, ‘legal centralism,’ marked by bureaucratic procedures 
whereby it is ‘hard to undertake major action without involvement by the centre at an early 
stage.”102 
 The political scale refers to the “influence that local political elites have in national 
decision-making arenas so far as these affect the locality.”103 Political localism can function 
through municipal associations acting as pressure groups, party politics, or private, direct 
brokering. Page points out that the political scale requires careful scrutiny: the apparent 
dependence of a local government on central subsidies, which many observers take as a sign of 
central control, may in fact signify the reverse, a successful exercise of local political power.104  
He finds localism is strongest where executive power is most concentrated, and conversely, a 
link between legal localism and powerful local professional bureaucracies. Further, he 
hypothesizes that political localism is an “inherently defensive and conservative influence in the 
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political system” and ultimately that “local political elites have little to gain from greater legal 
localism, and might even suffer from the greater demands on their time and skills that legal 
localism might bring.”105  
The applicability of these models to the historiography canvassed above is clear.  
However, there are clearly elements missing in both. Neither makes allowance for the controls 
that may be exerted by courts or boards on the initiative of another legal actor through the 
application of the general law and doctrines other than ultra vires. And because they are 
independent functionaries, it is difficult to see judges as ‘higher tiers of the state’ in Clark’s 
sense.106 Partly, the disregard of the legal system as a collateral and perhaps competitive facet of 
government may be a function of the fundamentally a-historical nature of these theories. What 
might constitute remote control during the twentieth century in Page’s estimation might well 
represent the greatest possible control under nineteenth-century conditions.  As Foucault argues 
with regard to power, autonomy should not be seen as static and absolute, but dynamic and 
variable with time and place.107 Autonomy, indeed, can be seen as the mirror or obverse of 
power. Both are often defined in terms of an ‘other,’ power being the positive ‘power over’ the 
other, and autonomy the negative, ‘freedom from’ the other.108 The idea of resistance, which is 
often seen as central to power, is also often seen as central to local government autonomy, 
especially by those who work within the European historical context, and trace the concept of 
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local autonomy to the medieval city state.109 Concepts of power and resistance converge in 
creative, enabling power, the ‘power to.’110 
 All formulations of autonomy have, as political scientist Jennifer Nedelsky first pointed 
out in her landmark article “Reconceiving Autonomy,” a de-contextualized, liberal-rationalist, 
‘masculinist’ quality.111 This is problematic for the consideration of the autonomy of the female 
self, which concerned Nedelsky, but also, I would argue, for the consideration of the autonomy 
of institutions and government units. Nedelsky and other feminist scholars have dealt with the 
shortcomings of liberal theory in two ways, first by developing a notion of ‘relational autonomy’ 
and secondly by the concept of feminist agency. Both are also appropriate for theorization of 
institutional or governmental autonomy, particularly in the case of municipal corporations that fit 
neither the notion of government as a unit of sovereignty, nor either of the standard 
contemporary models—private and public—of the corporation, itself a “legal hybrid.”112   
Both the concepts of ‘relational autonomy’ and ‘agency’ entail the avoidance of the 
assumptions that there is a pre-social, non-contextual, atomistic ‘individual,’ and the 
hierarchical, bifurcated model of the self and the other.113  No woman is an island, these scholars 
contend, alone within her patriarchal society or family unit. Similarly, it can be argued that the 
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relationship of a municipality with the centre cannot be seen in isolation from the relationships of 
municipalities with each other and the relationships of the others with the province. Competition 
among as well as solidarity with other units may complicate the autonomy of any one. In post- 
Baldwin Act Canada West/Ontario, municipalities existed and continue to exist as part of a 
network or ‘family’ of local governments and other institutions of low law. In their use of 
creative, facilitative ‘power to’ we see the municipal counterpart of feminist agency. 
Another lesson feminist theory provides for the student of local government autonomy is 
that apparent choice may not be indicative of freedom. Choices—powers in the language of 
municipal law—may be themselves limited by their very categorization, and by extra-legal 
economic, political or ideological constraints. There may be a pre-determined menu of the 
possible. On the other hand, the belief that a local government had power and freedom to 
exercise it may be misleading if its members and their constituents had no interest in, or even 
idea of, doing so.114 Not only the system and operation of the law, then, but the entire legal 
environment of local government must be considered as part of an evaluation of the autonomy 
experienced and agency engaged in by mid-Victorian Ontario municipal corporations.115 
By legal environment I do not mean legal culture alone.116 The latter term has been 
variously defined as “the ideas, attitudes, values, and opinions about law held by people in a 
society…as network…which determined when and why and where people turn to law or turn 
away,” and as “the matrix of values, attitudes and assumptions that have shaped both the 
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operations and the perception of law.”117 A related notion is that of the ‘shadow of the law,’ the 
perception of law as a factor in the behaviour and thought of non-lawyers that may or may not be 
legally “correct.”118 Legal environment includes these, together with law in books—statutes, case 
law and manuals—and law in action ‘from above’ and ‘from below.’119 The idea of legal 
environment seeks to avoid the dichotomy of lawyer’s and non-lawyer’s law at the heart of many 
of these concepts. By legal environment I have in mind a holistic notion of law in books, in 
action, in custom and in shadow, law from above and below.  
My definition of the ‘law of municipal institutions,’ as it was known to mid-nineteenth 
century Ontarians, and now more commonly referred to as ‘municipal law,’ is a correspondingly 
broad one. A municipality is both public—a government—and private, a corporate entity, albeit 
(and somewhat confusingly) now known to the law as a ‘public’ corporation, a distinction which 
was embryonic at the time.120 It is a ‘fictitious’ creation of statute, but is also the embodiment of 
real ratepayers and residents, whose political lobbying in the period before the comprehensive 
incorporating and enabling provisions of the Baldwin Act, and whose physical presence 
thereafter was a pre-condition of this legal status. Absent statutory immunity, a corporation is 
subject to the common law of tort, contract, and agency, as well as the law of corporations in 
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general, and other statutes. As a quasi-legislative body, it may enact its own by-laws; as an 
administrative body it may enforce them. It may enter into contracts, sue and be sued, but its 
ability to do so—along with its other actions—may be subject to judicial review. All these 
aspects were included under the rubric of ‘municipal law’ by the lawyers who indexed statutes 
and case reports and by the writers and publishers who wrote the manuals and periodicals 
marketed to municipal institutions and their personnel in the period under review, and are 
consequently considered as (partly) constituting the municipal legal environment.  
Needless to say, it would be impossible to study these sources in their entirety or to 
produce a definitive statement of the law of municipal institutions in mid-Victorian Ontario, even 
if the latter were a worthwhile goal. Rather, I speculate on aspects of the ecology of central-local 
relations (and local-local relations) during these thirty years with reference to the concepts of 
initiative and immunity, localism and centralism on the political and legal scales, and 
institutional agency.  By the use of the terms ‘ecology’ and ‘environment’ I do not wish to imply 
that the various elements of municipal law necessarily worked together coherently or 
purposefully. Nevertheless, I contend that local government was part of an interconnected legal 
system of ‘low’ governance and public administration, and its autonomy and agency must be 
understood in that context.  
I use the terms ‘low government/low governance’ to denote non-sovereign elected local 
governments, as well as the related terms ‘low legislature/legislation.’  I have analogized these 
from the now well established legal-historiographic concept of ‘low law.’ This concept originally 
described the peculiar status of justices of the peace of early modern England, who were at once 
the most inferior and powerless members of the judicial hierarchy, but paradoxically appeared 
among the most independent; it has been extended to include the administrative and executive 
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roles of JPs in Quarter Sessions, and to other ‘low’ officials of the state.121 In each case, it is 
central to the concept that while these functionaries were theoretically subordinate, they 
exhibited an independence resulting from their very ubiquity, resulting in a lack of visibility 
within the system and the condonation of their (occasionally rogue) actions by their ‘high law’ 
superiors. In this dissertation, I speculate whether the same can be said of municipal corporations 
in Canada West/Ontario after the Baldwin Act disaggregated low governance from low law.  
 
Outline and Methodology 
Municipal legislation extended far beyond the Municipal Act of 1849. The 1859 Municipal 
Manual of Robert A. Harrison listed some 316 acts or excerpts of acts as relevant to 
municipalities, as well as private acts relating to specific corporations.122 Still, it was the Baldwin 
Act and its three consolidations during this period that were clearly the foundation of the 
municipal law; indeed, I argue that they functioned as a ‘low constitution’ for the province.  In 
Chapter 2, I take these statutes and collateral legislation seriously, taking a closer look at the 
‘may’ and ‘must’ clauses to consider questions of power, responsibility and liability.  
Case law relating to municipalities was similarly abundant. According to R.C.B. Risk, 
‘municipal law’ cases made up the fifth largest category of reported cases in the jurisdiction in 
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the union period.123 Chapter 3 concerns the indirect supervision of local governments by judges 
and juries. I look beyond the ‘municipal’ classification to all reported cases from 1850 to 1880 
that named a municipal corporation as a party. These include cases of statutory interpretation and 
judicial review, tort, contract, agency, trust, crime, arbitration, expropriation, drainage, and the 
general law of corporations. I focus on reported cases relating to mandamus, as indicative of 
judicially enforced legal duties, the judicial quashing of by-laws, as evidence of restriction on 
local government action, and civil cases of negligence and nuisance whereby judges and juries 
could impose damages for liability on local governments.124 
This ‘high’ law of legislation and reported cases from superior courts was the basis, but 
not the entirety of the legal environment of mid-Victorian municipal corporations. In Chapter 4 I 
explore the ways these sources of law were filtered and communicated to local governments. I 
examine in particular numerous private commercial publications in the form of municipal 
manuals, municipal case reports and journals, and consider the messages concerning their legal 
status likely to have been received by municipal councils and their personnel.125 
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Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 are based primarily on archival records. Because the law-related 
records of municipal corporations are not subject to client confidentiality, that bugbear of legal 
historical research, I have been able to examine locally documented and collated evidence of the 
law as experienced ‘from below,’ or at least from the middle, as I do not aim to include a 
discussion of the impact of municipal regulation on the citizenry in this study.  Various aspects 
of law-related behaviour by legal and non-legal actors—the corporations, their officers, 
councillors, solicitors, auditors, and contractual partners, claimants and ratepayers—can be 
recovered using archival material recognizable as belonging in what Robert Gordon famously 
called the “boxful of distinctive appearing legal things” such as by-laws, contracts, claims, 
solicitors’ letters, arbitration awards and reports, petitions to and from council, as well as 
material not so obviously in the “law box” such as budgets, motions, vouchers, committee 
reports, and correspondence.126  
Most of the locally generated records I use in these chapters are from the United Counties 
of Leeds and Grenville Fonds at the Archives of Ontario.127 I have chosen to look closely at rural, 
rather than urban, municipalities, partly on account of relative populousness; the Journals of the 
Legislative Assembly in 1859 stated the population of Leeds County to be 30,280, about the same 
as the city of Toronto at the time.128 The population of Grenville County was 20,707. Also relevant 
to this decision is the fact that in an agriculturally-based market economy, the hinterland was the 
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locus of economic growth; the development of the transportation network that connected it to 
distribution centres and served its growth was a—if not the—major preoccupation of the legislative 
assembly.129 The successor to the Johnstown District in the (relatively) long-settled southeastern 
part of the province bordered by the Rideau River, Lake and Canal to the north and the St. 
Lawrence River to the south, the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville were reasonably 
prosperous,  especially in the area closest to the river, though already beginning what was to be a 
long economic and demographic decline.130 I have not examined the occupational breakdown of 
the population of the two counties, but if the data respecting the make-up of juries referenced in 
Chapter 6 is an indication, the local political class was comprised of established farmers, merchants 
and small businessmen.  
Like all counties under the Baldwin Act, the united counties (which maintained separate 
status for non-municipal purposes such as land registries and elections) were a federated 
jurisdiction. The municipal council of the combined counties consisted of the reeves and deputy 
reeves of fifteen townships, three towns, and more than a dozen incorporated villages. The United 
Townships of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne and the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne and the 
Township of Augusta are the primary junior jurisdictions studied, since their records are the most 
                                                          
129 Urban centres in Canada West/Ontario were concentrated on trade and commerce rather than manufacturing. The 
process of industrialization that would soon diversify and skew this economy was in its infancy, as was the urban 
labour force that would accompany it. See Douglas McCalla, Planting the Province: The Economic History of 
Upper Canada, 1784-1870 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), Michael Piva, “Government Finance and 
the Development of the Canadian State," in Colonial Leviathan, ed. A. Greer and I. Radforth, 257-83; Peter A. 
Baskerville, “Transportation, Social Change and State Formation, Upper Canada 1841-1864,” in Colonial 
Leviathan, ed. A. Greer and I. Radforth, 230–56; Andrew Burghardt, “Some Economic Constraints on Land 
Transportation in Upper Canada/ Canada West” Urban History Review 18, no. 3 (1990): 232–36. 
130 Peter A. Baskerville, Sites of Power: A Concise History of Ontario (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 81. The original colonists in the area were mainly American loyalists, whose conservatism was augmented by 
Protestant immigrants from the rural north of Ireland. See Donald H. Akenson, The Irish in Ontario: A Study in 
Rural History (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Livio De Matteo, "The Wealth of the Irish in 
Nineteenth-Century Ontario," Social Science History 20, no. 2 (1996): 209-34. 
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complete and comprehensive for this period.131 Although they cannot be said to be typical, these 
jurisdictions were not atypical, at least in their interests, which centred on transportation and 
education.132    
Chapter 5 is concerned with the low government of the Municipal Council of the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville in the shadow of high law. I consider the legality, illegality and 
extra-legality of municipal action and by-laws, reliance by the council on solicitors, clerks and 
other personnel for legal input, and evidence of the co-option of these mini-bureaucracies by the 
province, as well as the possible effect on local autonomy of litigation and claims, contracts and 
arbitrations. Chapter 6 deals with the indirect supervision of municipal councils by other ‘low 
law’ components of the system, such as provincial inspectors and grand juries, again with a focus 
on the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville.133 In Chapter 7 I look at the operation of courts 
of revision (committees of five councillors to adjudicate appeals from property taxation) in three 
townships in Leeds and Grenville, namely the Townships of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, 
the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne, and Augusta, as a case study of local government agency. 
                                                          
131 AO, F1668, Township of Front of Leeds and Lansdowne fonds, includes Council Minutes, 1851-1960; By-laws, 
1862-1960; Assessment and Collectors Rolls, 1853- 1960; Clerk-Treasurer's Records, 1850- 1960; F1889 Township 
of Rear of Leeds and Lansdowne fonds includes Council Minutes, 1850-1963; By-laws, 1850-1954; F1523 
Township of Augusta fonds, includes Council Minutes, 1850-1902; By-laws, 1836- 1902; Assessment and 
Collectors Rolls, 1851-1917; Clerks Files, 1850-1900;  F2021, Township of Wolford fonds includes Minutes and 
By-laws, 1850-1893; F1672 Town of Gananoque fonds, includes Council Minutes, 1863-1966; By-laws, 1863-1960; 
Assessment and Collectors Rolls, 1863- 1952; Cash Books, 1856-1960; F 1558, Town of Brockville Fonds 
including Council Minutes, 1832-1960 (gaps); By-laws, 1854- 1959 (gaps); Assessment and Collectors Rolls, 1895-
1959 (gaps); Clerk-Treasurer's Records, 1851-1938. 
132 See Glenn J. Lockwood, The Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne: The Making of Community on the Gananoque 
River Frontier, 1796-1996 (Lyndhurst, Ont.: Corporation of the Township of Rear of Leeds and Lansdowne, 1996) 
on the dangers of extrapolating social and economic data from one township to the province as a whole (viii), but he 
does not question its political representative-ness. On the importance of transportation and education as local as well 
as provincial issues, see Baskerville, “Transportation, Social Change and State Formation,” 230–56; also Curtis, 
Building the Educational State. 
133 A version of this chapter is published as Mary Stokes, "Grand Juries and "Proper Authorities": Low Law, Soft 
Law, and Local Governance in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880," in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, 
vol.XI: Quebec and the Canadas, ed. G. Blaine Baker and Donald Fyson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for 
the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2013), 538-70. 
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 Because attempts to alter their legal environment are the best evidence of how the 
municipal corporations saw their legal environment, what they found undesirable and wanted 
removed, or what they saw as desirable and wanted included, Chapter 8 is devoted to exploring 
municipal attempts at political agency by means of petitions to the provincial government in the 
decade 1867-77, and the place of inter-municipal cooperation and competition in the petitioning 
process. This chapter is based primarily on the records kept by the provincial secretary held at 
the Archives of Ontario.134 
In the concluding chapter I discuss whether and in what ways municipal corporations in 
Canada West/Ontario in the period 1850-1880 can be described as autonomous; the usefulness of 
concepts of autonomy and agency to understanding the historical experience of local 
government; and what the legal dimension of local government in mid-Victorian Ontario can tell 
us about the interrelationship of local autonomy and low governance.  
  
                                                          
134 An early version of this chapter is published as Mary Stokes, "Petitions to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario 









In a 1984 review essay, “Thinking about Statutes: Hurst, Twining, Calabresi and Miers,” Janet 
Lindgren and John Henry Schlegel decried the tendency of legal academics to pay lip service, 
but little more, to the centrality of statute law in the common law world: "It is virtually 
impossible to get a lawyer...to take statutes seriously—that is, to take them on their own terms 
without immediately running to the cases to see what they really mean.”135 The exception 
proving the rule was American legal historian James Willard Hurst, who spent a long and 
productive career attempting to rectify the overwhelming and, to his mind, inapt attention paid 
by his colleagues to judge-made law. According to Hurst, the nineteenth century was the 
beginning of the era of the statute, when legislatures came to be the predominant lawmakers, and 
the most significant legal interpreters were as likely to be administrators as judges.136    
More recently, in the introduction to Masters, Servants and Magistrates, two members of 
a later generation of legal historians, Doug Hay and Paul Craven, wrote that the aim of their 
project, a comparative study of master and servant statutes over several centuries and continents, 
is to “take the statutes seriously.”137 In so doing, they are careful to disclaim any intimation that 
this means taking them as descriptive of systemic reality: “Taking the statutes seriously is not to 
hold them out as mirrors of what masters, servants and magistrates were doing on the ground.... 
                                                          
135 Janet S. Lindgren and John Henry Schlegel, "Thinking About Statutes: Hurst, Calabresi, Twining and Miers," 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 1984, no. 2 (1984): 458-68, 462. 
136 James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965). 
137 Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, "Introduction," in Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 
1562-1955, ed. Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 1-58. 
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[T]he statute law was sometimes ignored, sometimes wilfully misapplied, and often stated in 
terms so broad as to allow the judges an almost infinite discretion.”138  
To take statutes seriously is to accept them as a product of politics, and the legislature as 
a place for the contestation of power and influence. The legislation that results from political 
compromise, partisan posturing and the vagaries of the drafting process may be toothless, 
internally contradictory, unrealistic, cynical, incoherent, ignored, or distorted in practice or by 
interpretation by judges. Nor should law ever be reduced to legal texts. Yet statutes were (and 
are) nonetheless recognized as prima facie legitimate and authoritative by contemporaries, and as 
such are as worthy of sustained and careful historical inquiry. As Richard Corrigan and Derek 
Sayer put it, “States…state”; in mid- nineteenth century Canada West/Ontario state statements 
on local government and related subjects took the form of provincial legislation.139 In a 
subsequent chapter, I examine the indirect dissemination of this corpus of statutory law to local 
government actors through the filter of commercial publications. In this chapter, however, I 
consider municipal legislation as stated state policy, not as the essence or totality of ‘municipal 
law’ for this particular time, place, and set of actors, but certainly a key, indeed foundational, 
element.  
Since the aim of this dissertation is to consider the bearing municipal law had on local 
autonomy, I focus particularly on the questions raised by the literature discussed in Chapter 1. 
That is, the ‘intent’ of the original drafters aside, does centralized provincial/imperial control of 
municipal corporations in the service of economic growth appear to have been the guiding 
principle promoted by the content of the act, as posited by Isin (strong version) and Whebell and 
                                                          
138 Ibid, 1-58, 52. 
139 Richard D. Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution (Oxford; 
New York, Blackwell, 1985), 3. Legislation that applied to Canada West/Ontario could be provincial or imperial, 
and after 1867, federal, but all municipal legislation was provincial. 
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Glazebrook (weaker version)? Or was the legislation a facilitative framework for the devolution 
and decentralization of power as Aitchison, Crawford, and Taylor et al. contend? Is there indeed 
a coherent policy to be deduced at all?  
 Before considering the content of these statutes, it is worth noting that if an important 
factor in autonomy is absence of intrusion, the legislative record belies any such conclusion. The 
public statutes in force from time to time from 1850 to 1880 which include the term ‘municipal’ 
in their title were numerous. No year between 1850 and 1880 went by without some legislative 
intervention in the sphere of low governance. Seventy acts appear in the indices to the official 
statutes under this rubric, and many others were identified as pertaining to municipal affairs by 
the authors of contemporary municipal manuals. Not all, but many, of these acts were lengthy. 
The original ‘Baldwin Act,’ the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, appears to have been the 
most extensive and complex act passed by the legislature of the United Canada to that date and 
for some years thereafter, running to sixty-eight pages and 429 sections. The three consolidations 
passed during the period 1850 to 1880 (in 1858, 1866 and 1873) are even longer. Despite evident 
efforts by drafters of the later versions to reduce repetition and redundancy, the 1873 version 
runs to 154 pages and 515 sections.  
Though they are generally ignored by historians concerned with local government 
autonomy, other major acts were clearly central to the freedom and powers of municipal 
councils.140 Included among these were those dealing with assessment (municipal taxation) and 
education. The latter system was locally based and organised, administered by elected Boards of 
Trustees, but mostly funded by taxes raised by municipal councils. Many minor acts which 
clearly affected municipal law and administration also dotted the sessional indices. These 
                                                          
140 The recognition of acts relevant to municipal administration varied according to the authors of contemporary 
municipal manuals, but all agreed on the centrality of assessment and education acts: see Chapter 4. 
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included so-called private acts that were curative or clarifying in nature; these legalized by-laws 
and other actions by municipal councils which were suspected to be ultra vires or had been so 
found by a court of record.141 When a council was in trouble because of defects in a by-law or its 
process, such as insufficient notice, the legislature could usually be counted on for an act to 
remedy the scheme, especially when the mistake was a technicality resulting in no real harm to 
anyone, or when it could lead to a breakdown in civic affairs generally, as in the case of an 
invalid rate-setting by-law.142 On occasion unforeseen but unassailable social desiderata 
triggered remedial legislation; for instance the patriotic but technically illegal contributions of 
municipalities to a fund for assistance of the imperial war effort in the Crimea.143 Other 
amending acts were remedial of the main statute. After every consolidation or major act at least 
one amending act was passed to fix errors or omissions. For example, in 1850 an act was passed 
to clarify that the right of townships to licence taverns was subject to British legislation and 
duties.144 
 The frequency of legislating on the subject and the physical dimensions of these acts 
attest to the importance accorded municipal law in Canada West/Ontario during this period. 
Given this volume, it would be impossible to chronicle the entirety of the legislation or map all 
the changes in the space of this chapter.  Nor would such an exercise be very helpful to the 
purpose of this study.  It is my contention that too much faith has been put in the Municipal Acts 
as representing municipal law, but paradoxically too little attention paid to them.  As I have 
argued, simply counting permissive or restrictive provisions—the ‘must’ and ‘may’ clauses—
which form the basis of Taylor’s conclusions about local autonomy, is inadequate. A more 
                                                          
141 I discuss the distinction between public and private acts in Chapter 8. 
142 See Chapter 3. 
143 See Chapter 8. 
144 13 & 14 Vic. c.65 (1850).  
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nuanced and legally conscious assessment is required. While I emphasize features connoting 
power and control, I look beyond the numbers, first looking at the statute as a text, then to the 
nature and degree of the expressly granted powers—Taylor’s may clauses—and finally to the 
explicit restrictions on these, along with clauses setting out duties, liabilities, enforcement 
provisions—the ‘must’ clauses.      
 
Taking the Municipal Act Seriously 
Taking a statute seriously should involve parsing it with consideration to language, structure and 
the context. There is no preamble to the Municipal Act of 1849,  but the first section states that 
its rationale is “to provide, by one general law, for the erection of Municipal Corporations, and 
the Establishment of Regulations of Police, in and for the several Counties, Cities, Towns, 
Townships and Villages in Upper-Canada.”145 By this statement, and especially the phrase “one 
general law” the legislature gives implicit notice that by this act it was expressly continuing in 
the Benthamite footsteps of Lord Sydenham’s District Councils Act of 1841, rejecting the 
piecemeal, Band-Aid approach of the English Municipal Corporations Act of 1835.146 The latter 
statute, while setting out a mandatory uniform content for the low legislation of all the 
jurisdictions covered by its mandate, applied only to (some) urban communities that were 
already incorporated, and did not set up a general incorporation mechanism or general 
incorporation scheme. In fact, the English Municipal Corporations Act, 1835 reads as nothing so 
much as a codified, compound, multi-jurisdictional by-law.147 The Baldwin act, in contrast, 
                                                          
145 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.1. 
146 Radforth, "Sydenham and Utilitarian Reform," 64-102; The Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, 5 & 6 Wm. IV., 
c.76 [U.K], sometimes known as the Municipal Reform Act. See generally, G. B. A. M. Finlayson, "The Politics of 
Municipal Reform, 1835," The English Historical Review 81 no. 321 (October 1966): 673–92. 
147 The Local Governments of English Counties were not standardized by legislation until 1888: The Local 
Government Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vic. c.41 (UK). On the movement in nineteenth century drafting from the ad hoc to 
the planned, see Roderick A. MacDonald “The Fridge Door Statute,” McGill Law Journal 47 (2001): 11-38.  
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tended to eschew detailed prescriptive content, except in the case of unincorporated police 
villages, discussed below. It plunges directly into the parameters for each level of municipality, 
omitting formal preliminaries of definition and interpretation provisions. A rudimentary 
interpretation section, dealing with issues of gender and number, appears near the end of the act; 
later municipal consolidations included more sophisticated definition clauses where modern 
readers would expect to see them, at the beginning of the statute. The names and boundaries of 
all municipal corporations, and unions of townships and counties, were set out in schedules to 
the act (a major omission from which resulted in the first of the many amendments to the act.148) 
Counties, though given pride of place in the preamble, are not the first unit to be set out 
in the statute; Part I deals with the township, which previously had been a unit of administration 
and land surveying and registration rather than governance.149 The township was made the 
default unit—every (settled) part of the province not part of an incorporated village, town or city 
(or Indian reserve) was to be part of a township.150 Where numbers were scarce, townships were 
united, but clearly the government was attempting to avoid the large units of the District 
Councils Act which had made governance difficult, if not untenable.151  
Consequently, all rural settlers were residents of townships, and also of the counties in 
which these were located. Set out in Part II of the act, counties had no direct electoral or fiscal 
                                                          
148 13 & 14 Vic. c.64 (1850). 
149 Township meetings were allowed for the limited purposes of electing township officials. 
150 First Nations’ reserves are not specifically excluded by the act, but are not included in the schedules setting out 
the various incorporations. For a chronology of the pre-confederation ‘Indian’ acts, see John F. Leslie, "The Indian 
Act: An Historical Perspective," Canadian Parliamentary Review (summer 2002): 23-27, 24. Leslie writes that by 
the Act to Protect Crown Lands from Injury and Trespass, 2 Vic. c.15 (1839), Indian lands were to be counted as 
Crown lands (and hence expressly not available for settlement). In 1850, by An Act for the Protection of Indians in 
Upper Canada from imposition, and the property occupied or enjoyed by them from trespass and injury (13 & 14 
Vic. c.74), Indian lands were further exempted from the general system. The act required Crown approval for any 
dealing with Indian Lands, and gave explicit exemption to Indians from taxation, judgment and seizure and 
prohibited the sale of liquor to Indians. See also John S. Milloy, “The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy 
and Constitutional Change” in As Long as the Sun Shines and the Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native 
Studies, ed. Ian A. L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1983), 56-64. 
151 Aitchison, “The Development of Local Government in Upper Canada," 38 ff. 
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base. They were mini-federations, composed of the representatives (reeves and deputy reeves) of 
the sub-units within their borders (except for the three cities, which although each part of a 
county for judicial and administrative purposes, were independent of the county councils).152 
Parts III, IV, V, and VI dealt with Police Villages (unincorporated ‘urban’ entities for which an 
administrative structure and by-laws were provided, but no democratic apparatus was conferred), 
Incorporated Villages, Towns, and Cities, respectively. Part VII, ‘Miscellaneous,’ is 
appropriately named but particularly illuminating in assessing the overall character of the 
legislation; I return to the consideration of this part below.  Rules specific to each level were 
included in each part. The powers of the urban corporations (incorporated villages, towns, and 
cities) were cumulative; that is, the powers of the larger units included and augmented the 
powers of the smaller. Later acts would be cumulative by design for all levels; that is, the first 
level (the township in all cases) provided the template, and the rules for other levels added to or 
subtracted from those assigned to the township. Thus the initial grant of corporate powers in the 
later consolidations is repeated for each gradation only implicitly.  
Although the term ‘power’ is always used to define Anglo-American corporations, it is 
somewhat of a misnomer, being a designator of legal status rather than a distinction within the 
classification; consequently, it is not appropriate to include the general corporate powers clauses 
among the ‘may’ clauses. The recognition that a specified group of people may act as a legally 
competent, ever-living ‘person’ through the medium of a corporate name and seal, with ‘powers’ 
to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts, and to buy, sell, and deal with property, is definitional, 
the essence of a corporation, but though so expressed these are not ‘powers’ in the usual lay or 
                                                          




political sense, being as much restrictive as facilitative.153 Even in the grant of general corporate 
powers the act includes some interesting modifications, which could be considered restrictive, or 
at least directive. For instance, the ability of municipal corporations under the act is not to hold 
real property simpliciter as is/was the general rule for corporations, but rather to hold it within 
the boundaries of the municipality.154 Similarly, the stipulation that the property owned is to be 
“for the use of the inhabitants thereof” can be seen as analogous to the practice of restricting a 
business corporation’s activities to its corporate objects, but is also suggestive of an attitude of 
suspicion, or at least caution, on the part of the drafter. The implication is that municipal real 
property should be for direct use by residents, not for indirect use by way of corporate 
investment or speculation.155  
The inaugural corporations in each gradation were listed by the schedules as I have 
indicated, but the act assumed that new units would qualify at each level as the province grew, 
and included a general incorporation procedure, at the time a still a relative novelty.156 Each 
gradation had its own variations of constitutional and electoral rules for existing and new units. 
The first clauses of each part set out these superstructural rules: how to divide a town into 
electoral wards, when and where and how elections and inaugural meetings should be held, the 
continuation of boundaries, and a process for the initial appointments of officers.  
                                                          
153 The classic work on the history of the corporate concept is John P. Davis, Corporations: A Study of the Origin 
and Development of Great Business Combinations and of Their Relation to the Authority of the State, 2 vols. (New 
York, London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905). See also Colin Arthur Cooke, Corporation, Trust and Company; An 
Essay in Legal History (Manchester, Eng.: University of Manchester Press, 1950) and David Millon, “Theories of 
the Corporation,” Duke Law Journal 1990, 2 (1990): 201-62. 
154 Later, exceptions were granted for cemeteries, and industrial farms and the like which could be owned by urban 
entities a certain distance outside their borders. 
155 The United Counties of Leeds and Grenville rented out several properties during this period. Investments in other 
corporations were personal property and thus not covered by this restriction. 
156  See R. C. B. Risk, “The Nineteenth Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario,” University of 
Toronto Law Journal 23 (1973): 270-306; Henry Butler, “General Incorporation in Nineteenth Century England: 
Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Process,” International Review of Law and Economics 6, no. 2 (1986): 
169-88. As I noted in Chapter 1, Canada West/Ontario seems to have been the first jurisdiction of the anglosphere to 
apply the general incorporation model to municipal corporations: Taylor, “If Different, Then Why?, 58. 
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Further framework and systemic rules are set out in Part VII, “Miscellaneous.” If the act 
is apportioned by number of clauses, rather than inches of print, this part, consisting of sections 
107 to 211, comprises almost half the statute. There are no sub-rubrics in Part VII, and the 
sections are seemingly random in their order. Along with electoral rules, rules for arbitrations, 
the procedure involved in the judicial quashing of by-laws, the measure of damages in assessing 
damages arising from road widening, the effect of personal bankruptcy, and the prohibition on 
monopoly, can be found many provisions relating to the transition of functions between the 
defunct District Councils, the Quarter Sessions (which retained some administrative functions 
under the District Councils Act and a few after the advent of the Baldwin Act), and the newly 
formed or newly configured corporations. Thus, for example, section 109 provided that heads of 
corporations should be JPs ex officio, and section 114 that existing corporations would continue 
until replaced under the new statutory mechanism.  
 Most of the ‘must’ clauses in the act appear in Part VII, but at first glance these do not 
seem to have much to do with the stated purpose of the preamble. The rule that a Recorder had to 
be a barrister of five years standing, and the rules for eligibility for and exemption from grand 
jury service in cities, for instance, do not relate directly to local government.157 However, these 
provisions make sense if the Act is looked at as a constitution, a bible of ‘who does what’ in 
local governance and also ‘what to do, what might be done, and how to do it.’ The Part VII 
clauses are predominantly managerial and directory, concerned with delineating the parameters 
and relationships of the various ‘low’ governments, jurisdictions and institutions with one other. 
The power relationships which emerge most clearly from this part are between siblings (other 
                                                          
157 The Recorder was an urban magistrate. 
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municipalities) or cousins (the institutions of low law such as courts of quarter sessions and 
grand juries), rather than parent (province) and child (municipal corporation). 
 
The Municipal Act as Facilitative: The Permissive Clauses 
What may be thought of as the ‘true’ powers sections, the powers to make by-laws in respect to 
specified subjects, comprise only one section for each gradation of municipality in the 1849 act. 
But while consequently not numerous at the sectional level, each of these sections was 
substantial, containing multiple—and significant—subsections. The township by-law section, 
section 31, includes thirty-three subsections, that for counties (section 41) twenty-three, for 
incorporated villages (section 60) twenty-four, for towns (section 61) ten, in addition to those of 
incorporated villages, and for cities (section 107) six, in addition to those exercised by towns. 
Unincorporated ‘Police Villages’ had no power to enact their own by-laws—they were covered 
by the by-laws of the township in which they were situated and by the by-law-like provisions 
included in Part III of the act. 
Looking at section 31 setting out subjects on which townships could pass by-laws as an 
example, it is notable how these ‘powers’ lists differ markedly from the general ‘heads’ of 
jurisdiction used less than two decades later by the drafters of the British North America Act. 
Granted, a few of the powers are set out in a relatively succinct manner, similar to sections 91 
and 92 of the BNA act, such as subsection 4 of section 31, which allowed for by-laws to 
establish pounds and settle the fees therefor, subsection 21 for destroying or suppressing weeds 
detrimental to good husbandry, and subsection 25, for settling the height and description of 
lawful fences. However, some which appear relatively short and general should be seen in 
conjunction with others on the same subject. Thus subsection 28, “for enforcing the performance 
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of Statute or Road Labour, or payment of commutations in money therefor,” is given a separate 
section, but could as easily have been included in the more detailed and less discretionary 
subsection 27, which allowed for by-laws “empowering the landholders in such Township, to 
compound for the Statute labour by them respectively performable, for any term not exceeding 
five years, and any rate not exceeding two shillings and six pence for each day’s labour, and at 
any time before the labour compounded for ought to be performed, and by such regulations to 
direct to what officer in each Township such commutation money shall be paid, and how such 
money shall be applied and accounted for, and to regulate the manner and the divisions in which 
the Statute Labour shall be performed.” 
Most of the powers provisions tend to the latter type, both complex (in the grammatical 
sense), and verbose. Hence we find section 31 subsection 19 allowing the passage of by-laws 
against “the running at large of horses, cattle, sheep, goats, swine and other animals, geese, 
turkeys and other poultry, and to impound or provide for the impounding...and for fixing the time 
of year during which such animals or poultry shall be permitted to run at large.” The itemization 
of the animals which could be the subject of such a by-law may speak to a lack of trust in the 
councils’ ability to make such by-laws, or recognition of the tradition of judicial requirement for 
explicit derogation of a common law right to allow animals to roam, or to an anticipation of 
judicial ‘narrowing’ of general powers, or a mere copying of precedent clauses, or some or all of 
these. Even more modifiers and qualifiers are included in subsection 20, empowering the council 
to make by-laws for “preventing, restraining and regulating exhibitions of wax figures, wild 
animals, puppet shows, wire dancing, circus riding and other idle acts or feats which common 
showmen, circus-riders, mountebanks or jugglers usually exhibit, practise or perform and 
requiring the payment of a sum not exceeding five pounds to the Township treasurer....imposing 
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a fine...in case they shall exhibit without such payment, and for the levying thereof by summary 
distress....whether the owners shall be known or not, or for the imprisonment of the parties 
offending, for any time not exceeding one calendar month and for the appropriation of such sums 
and may be received or recovered under any regulation or Bylaw....”158 
The provisos in the latter ‘power’ seem both indirectly and directly restrictive. Both 
forms of restriction abound in the act, usually incorporated in the grant of power itself. Indirect 
restrictions, arising from the use of adjectives and adverbs inviting subjective judgment, are 
ubiquitous. The use of the adjective ‘idle’ modifying ‘acts or feats’ may be merely idiomatic, a 
product of legislative drafting which still was conducted on a semi-amateur basis. Drafting was a 
task performed by lawyers, or by lawyers who were also legislators (Baldwin was both) but was 
not yet the methodical, systematizing speciality performed by in-house draftsmen it would 
become several decades later.159    
Many of the powers sections were likely copied from previous acts and charters, but 
whether or not the drafters originated the terms, they had the opportunity to include, exclude or 
modify. Whether the abundance of adjectives and adverbs may be taken as consciously inviting 
judicial second-guessing, they could have this effect. According to Peter Tiersma, notoriously 
vague and subjective qualifications like ‘wilfully/wilful’ and ‘recklessly/reckless,’ make statutes 
unworkable as stand-alone tools of governance.160 The act bristles with the qualifier ‘reasonable’ 
(usually of punishment) but there are many other examples; for instance, animals impounded for 
                                                          
158  Contemporaries used both spellings, ‘bylaw’ and ‘by-law,’ and often capitalized the first letter.  
159 The historiography on drafting is slight. See Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), George Coode, On Legislative Expression, Or, The Language of the Written 
Law (London: B.W. Benning, c1845, n.d.), Jeremy Finn, “Legislative Drafting in Nineteenth Century Australia and 
the First Permanent Parliamentary Draftsmen,” Statute Law Review 17, no. 3 (1996): 90–114. It is unclear whether 
Baldwin was the sole drafter, or whether he had help, perhaps from frequent drafting collaborator William Hume 
Blake: private email from Michael Cross, 14 April 2013. 
160 Tiersma, Peter M., “The Rule of Text: Is it Possible to Govern Using (Only) Statutes?” NYU Journal of Law & 
Liberty, Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2011-11 (9 March 2011), SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782130. 
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trespassing “if not claimed in a reasonable time” could be sold (subsection 24). We have already 
seen that weeds ‘detrimental to good husbandry’ might be suppressed by by-law, not just any 
weed (or any husbandry). The power to “regulate driving and riding on or over any bridge” 
(section 13), on the other hand, seems to take the inherent dangerousness of this activity as 
understood. In other cases, the act seems to be accepting of local knowledge. By-laws regulating 
“pits, precipices and deep waters, or other places dangerous to travellers” (subsection 15) may be 
included in this category, or it may be merely directory, inviting councils to use their 
imaginations in this regard. In any event, it is noteworthy for our purposes that even without the 
modifiers inviting judicial discretion, the powers are framed narrowly; that is, there is no power 
to regulate agricultural practice, driving, or hazards per se.  
More explicit restrictions appear within the subsections of the township ‘powers’ by-law 
as subordinate clauses. Many are clearly designed to protect the property rights of settlers vis à 
vis the corporation. Thus for example subsection 11, permitting the township to require 
proprietors of land adjacent to highways “which shall pass through a wood” to cut down and 
remove the trees “for a space not exceeding twenty-five feet on each side” or in default of 
compliance permitting an overseer to arrange the removal and sale of the timber to defray 
expenses, included a proviso that no such by-law “shall authorize or compel the cutting down of 
any orchard or shrubbery or of any trees planted expressly for ornament or shelter.” Similarly, 
by-laws concerning public roads—the building, maintaining, and altering of which were the 
mainstay of local government activity—could not authorize encroachment on any building, 
orchard, “pleasure ground” or garden without consent of the owner (subsection 10).  
Other subsections of section 31 refer to the actual or potential over-riding authority of 
other statutes: subsection 7 allowed the council to provide for the remuneration of all municipal 
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officers “in all cases where the same is not or shall not be settled by Act of the Legislature....” 
The right afforded townships (and also incorporated villages, towns and cities) to licence taverns 
“where spirituous liquors or oysters, clams, fruit and victuals were to be drank or eaten therein” 
was also available only “when there exists no other provision by law” for the licensing of them, 
although municipalities were entitled to limit numbers. Similarly, by subsection 18 the 
municipality could (with a by-law) take stock in or lend money to “any incorporated Road or 
Bridge Company to which such Municipality shall have granted a licence to proceed with such 
work in accordance with the requirements of the Statute in that behalf” provided that the 
municipality should be “sufficiently interested to warrant them...taking such stock,” and also 
provided that the proceeds “go in reduction of the rates required to be levied for such purposes.”  
In the 1849 act, for the first time in the jurisdiction, there was no cap placed on the 
amount of property taxes that could be levied.161 This right was given even to the most junior 
councils (township and village) and was rightly considered by most commentators at the time 
and since to be a most significant addition to local autonomy. But even in this case it was 
thought necessary to spell out a prohibition on sub-regional favouritism in setting the rate, which 
was to apply equally to the entire jurisdiction.162 
Subject to unspecified laws of the province, as well as to the by-laws of the county in 
which the township/incorporated village/town was situated, a residual power to make such by-
laws “as the good of the inhabitants of such Township may in [the council’s] opinion require” 
appeared in the 1849 act. The inclusion of this power, similar to the general peace, order and 
good government (POGG) power granted the federal government by the British North America 
Act, afforded to first level incorporated municipalities (i.e. all except counties) with slight 
                                                          
161 For a history of assessment and taxation in Upper Canada, see Shortt, “Municipal History, 1791-1867.”  
162 An exception to this rule was later made for ‘local’ improvement projects, discussed below. 
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variations in wording, bolsters the argument that the act was originally intended to empower 
local governments. However, the power was short-lived; it did not appear in the 1858 re-
enactment or in subsequent consolidations. It is unclear what the legislature expected township 
councils to do with this power. Townships were given no express power to legislate for the relief 
of the poor in the 1849 act, so perhaps this was meant to be covered by the residual clause 
without the overt suggestion that it was a suitable activity for this level of municipality. Possibly 
mere internal matters of administration were presumed; the later consolidations that omitted the 
residual section did include a more specific power to regulate meetings and the conduct of 
members. 
The powers of counties included county-level versions of those granted to townships, that 
is, to build county roads and county bridges, erect and maintain county buildings (court houses, 
gaols, houses of industry), and to borrow for these and other county purposes. County councils 
levied their own ‘county rate’ but were not given the right to collect taxes directly; instead they 
were to be allocated a share from the collections performed by junior municipalities within their 
boundaries.163 Specifically granted to counties were: the ability to build grammar schools, to 
endow scholarships and subsidize impecunious students who were recommended by their 
teachers to attend the University of Toronto, to erect drains and watercourses (major projects 
presumably thought beyond the resources of townships), and to pay councillors for their 
attendance at meetings (albeit only prospectively, to take effect two years in the future).164 The 
latter innovation was presumably due to chronic problems of non-attendance at district meetings 
under the District Councils Act and before that at Quarter Sessions. For councillors or justices of 
                                                          
163 The spellings ‘gaol’ and ‘jail’ were both used during this period, although the former tended to appear more 
often, and was used in the statutes. I have used ‘gaol, ’except when quoting primary sources that used ‘jail.’ 
164 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.41. 
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the peace living at some distance from the district seat, the challenge of leaving one’s farm four 
times a year to travel on poor roads and pay one’s board and lodging without remuneration had 
been one of the chief reasons given for the implementation of township government in the 1849 
act.165 Other jurisdictions were given the right to compensate their members later in the period. 
Any understanding of local autonomy must include the possibility that the jurisdiction 
impinging on the preferences and scope of action of any given township, village, or town would 
be as likely to be a sibling government, that is, a municipal corporation at a similar or different 
level, as to be the province. Many of the powers vested in county councils related to the roads 
and bridges spanning or connecting two jurisdictions that might otherwise have been neglected 
no-man’s lands. Others revolved around the perceived need to mediate between the interests of 
adjacent townships, and between townships and villages or towns located within their borders. 
Counties were to have a supervisory function in respect to inferior units vis à vis each other and 
with regard to any ambitions these might have in aspiring to a ‘higher’ level of incorporation.166  
The greater trust accorded the county councils by the legislature is also hinted at by a 
differentiated penalty structure. Whereas townships were restricted to imposing fines of £5 and 
twenty-day prison terms for offenders (section 31 subsection 29), counties were allowed to fine 
up to £10 for the breach of any county by-law (section 42 subsection 20); the act was silent as to 
a county’s ability to imprison those in breach of its by-laws. Both levels were allowed to levy 
rates and require tolls, again “according to any law which shall be in force in Upper Canada 
concerning rates and assessments” (subsection 23). 
                                                          
165 Aitchison, “The Development of Local Government in Upper Canada,” 179-80. 
166 This began with the original act, 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.41 (17) whereby the county council could unite new 
Townships with older ones if it was felt there were insufficient numbers. In later acts these powers over the status of 
inferior units became much more elaborate. For cities and counties, the government retained this function. 
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The local knowledge of the county councillors was also entrusted with the designation of 
police villages. Alone of all the municipal categories, there was no minimum number of 
households associated with the police village. On the petition of an unspecified number of 
residents of an unincorporated village, the county council could decide “that it may be expedient 
that the provisions of this Act....should be applied to such Village.”167  
The mere fact that a hamlet did not have the number of eligible (i.e. propertied adult 
male) householders to incorporate, or those who were eligible had no interest in petitioning to be 
recognized as an incorporated village, did not exempt a place from the issues attending 
population density. The rules included in the act for non-incorporated (police) villages tell us a 
great deal about the drafter’s (and likely society’s) ideas about the dangers inherent in urban-
ness. The provisions can be traced to the rise of medieval towns and the concept of the salus 
populi.168 Thus the act stipulated the height and composition of chimneys, the requirement that 
each household maintain a ladder and bucket, and other anti-conflagration measures. The only 
non-fire related provision for unincorporated villages was a prohibition against throwing “filth or 
ordure” in streets or public places in the village. Varying penalties for initial and subsequent 
breaches of each of these regulations were stipulated by the act, ranging from five to twenty 
shillings. Many fines were stated to be for each week of non-compliance.169 
Once a hamlet became a police village by the edict of the county council, it was to elect 
three police trustees, one of whom was to be the inspecting trustee.  The act uses the permissive 
language that it “shall and may be lawful” for the resident freeholders and householders to hold 
                                                          
167 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.42.  
168 Salus populi means health (or welfare) of the people. See William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and 
Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Friedman, The 
History of American Law, 3rd ed.  400-3. 
169 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.51. 
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an election, but the election is treated as a fait accompli. There is no apparatus to object, the date 
is set by the act, and the limits of the village and the place of the election are to be set by the 
county council. The collector of the township was ordered to provide the roll to the presiding 
officer, and if the nominees were not present, the voters might elect someone in absentia who, if 
found in neglect of his office, would be subject to penalties.170 
Extant incorporated villages (set out in one of the several schedules to the act) and those 
that could become incorporated by following the administrative procedure set out, were 
governed by Part IV. These councils were invited to make their own regulations for fire 
prevention under a lengthy sub-clause which does not announce that purpose, but itemizes a 
number of actions which are clearly directed to this end. The effect of some of these—forcing 
inhabitants to suppress fires or pull down adjacent houses—could trench substantially on the 
liberties of the subject.171 In addition, incorporated villages (and the towns and cities which 
piggy-backed on these jurisdictions) could pass regulations (in their discretion) concerning 
chimneys, ashes, buckets, ladders and scuttles, as well as the keeping and transporting of 
gunpowder. They were permitted to set up a municipal magazine for storing arms and compel 
such storage, to proscribe the use of carriage lights in liveries or carpentry shops, regulate 
manufactories “in danger of causing or promoting fire,” purchase hook and ladder equipment, 
give medals for “persons who shall distinguish themselves at fires” and assist the widows and 
orphans of persons killed by fire-related accidents, as well. A subsequent subsection allowed for 
by-laws authorizing the entering of dwelling houses, appointing fire wardens and regulation of 
such fire companies “as may be raised with the sanction of the Corporation of such Village.”172  
                                                          
170 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), ss. 42-47. 
171 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (13). William Novak notes that such regulations run counter to the American ‘master 
narrative’ of liberty: Novak, The People’s Welfare, 7. 
172 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (14). 
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The likelihood that an incorporated village would possess an existing market is adverted 
to, with the concomitant “assize of bread,” prohibition of forestalling, and other weights and 
measures provisions.173 Other expectations of urban life—the necessity of a lockup (for fewer 
than ten days imprisonment), the possibilities that the village might include a harbour, wharves 
and/or a ferry, and experience ‘immoderate’ drivers or riders on bridges, or fishing in public 
waters—are all provided for. Taverns were to be licensed and taxes levied, though the number of 
taverns and amount of taxes were to be in the village councillors’ discretion, as was the loan of 
money to counties.174  
Some other suggested subjects for village by-legislation might have been grouped under 
the heading of public health or nuisance, if the legislation had been so structured. These include 
provisions for clean (or at least ‘unfouled’) public sources of water, for the erection and 
maintenance of public cemeteries (with penalties on physicians and sextons for failure to keep 
mortality records or for improper burial), for the abatement of public nuisances such as privy 
vaults, slaughterhouses, gas works, distilleries, ‘manufactories,’ vagrancy, fire-crackers, public 
bathing, charivaris, “obscene or indelicate language” and loud noises.175 Similarly, one 
subsection gave permission for by-laws concerning what we might call morals offences, without 
the use of this term (or any other heading or generalization). But the tenor of the clause is 
unambiguously moralistic. The assumption that villages (but apparently not townships) might be 
interested in enforcing the Sabbath, preventing cruelty to animals and the sale of alcohol to 
children, licensing or preventing gambling, horse-racing and bowling alleys, and regulating 
public drunkenness, circuses and theatres, speaks to Victorian concerns and expectations 
                                                          
173 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (6), (8). See Lawrence Friedman on the mindless copying of charter precedents that led 
one state to refer to the “size” of bread; Friedman, The History of American Law, 401.  
174 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (11), (7), (17), (18), (19), (5). 
175 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (12), (16), (15), (10). 
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regarding urban life.176 Subsection 20, a stand-alone anti-vandalism provision for prevention of 
injury to shade or ornamental trees and sign-boards, can be seen as a harbinger of future urban 
aesthetic concerns.  
Some of the powers stipulated for villages anticipate conflicts between the citizen and the 
low state. I have already made note of the rights of the corporation to enforce expropriation and 
cooperation in the case of firefighting and fire prevention. But where there was no emergency, 
the powers of the corporation to adversely affect the property rights of residents were even more 
strictly curtailed for villages than for townships. The power to lay out streets, which might be 
considered an essential function of urban governance, is not only made subject to the rights of 
citizens not to have their property encroached on, as was the case in townships, but additionally 
made subject to the consent of the owners in writing.177  
Another possibly significant, but also possibly coincidental, difference in wording is to be 
found in the clause setting out the residual power for villages (and for the larger urban units), 
which is more detailed than that set out for townships. By section 60 subsection 23 villages are 
given authority for “making such other by-laws for the peace, welfare, safety and good 
government of such village....as are not repugnant to this or any other Act of the Parliament of 
the Province [of Canada] or of the Parliament of Upper Canada or to the general law for that part 
of the province.” Provisos are added: that no person should be subject to a fine of more than £5 
exclusive of costs or more than thirty days for the breach of any by-law, and that no person 
should be compelled to pay a fine greater than £10 for refusing or neglecting to perform the 
                                                          
176 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (9). 
177 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.60 (1). 
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duties of any Municipal office when duly elected or appointed thereto.178 In keeping with the 
functional approach of the legislation, the extra powers granted to towns and cities in Parts V and 
VI (in addition to those appointed to villages) do not differ in degree of generality. Thus 
provision is made for towns to enact by-laws for alms houses, houses of refuge and industry, an 
industrial farm (of no less than two hundred acres and within ‘convenient’ distance of the town), 
to pay for gas lighting, for street cleaning and livery stables.179 
The only deviations from the model set for townships and villages are two interesting 
precursors of municipal zoning. Towns and cities were are given the right to assess “owners as 
may be immediately benefitted,” for upgrades to their own streets and sidewalks, which later 
became known as local improvement projects (subsection 5). However, councils did not receive 
the right to initiate such projects themselves until quite late in the period; originally all such 
projects were to be commenced on at the initiative of the affected ratepayers.180 The proportion 
of the benefitted consenting owners and the amount of property value they represented was also 
set out by the act, so that the council would in theory at least have little discretion in making such 
improvements. The entitlement allowing council to determine density and building materials in 
selected areas of a town (or city), another embryonic zoning power, for “preventing wooden 
buildings from being erected in thickly built parts of such Town” is somewhat vaguely (and 
oddly) bundled in with the section allowing for institutions for the poor (subsection 1). Initially 
cities were given only one unique right, that of regulating the erection of buildings and 
prohibiting wooden buildings and fences entirely.181 Clearly, mere concentration of population 
                                                          
178 There was no such thing as the parliament of Upper Canada at the time, even under the name Canada West, 
which the legislature tended not to use during this entire period. For a discussion of the terminology of dualism, see 
Careless, The Union of the Canadas, 210. 
179 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.107. 
180 29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866), s.301, s.302, and s.303 set out the procedure in detail. 
181 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.107. 
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was not seen as triggering a greater claim to tools of self-governance, only as generating 
additional issues that council was permitted to address if it wished.  
 Between consolidations, acts were passed to give one or more levels of municipality 
piecemeal powers to address certain specified issues. These were often subject to restrictions and 
included a level of detail that reinforces the established pattern of top-down direction. For 
example, in 1853 the legislature permitted municipal councils to licence peddlers and hawkers, 
retail shops selling wine, and billiard tables. The same year, townships and counties gained the 
right to assess for local improvements for drainage and other measures that promised to 
positively affect some but not all property values, on the condition that a request was made by 
ratepayers, limits were described and notices given, and had the approval of two-thirds of the 
affected residents.182 The latter act also gave townships the explicit right to levy a poor rate, but 
only if a request was made in advance by a majority of voters, with notice, to last only for the 
year in which it was made. This act also extended to towns and cities the ability to fix annual 
rents for drainage, to subscribe to gas and water companies by rates or debentures by by-law to 
be signed and countersigned, with four public notices and on the consent of a majority of 
qualified electors.183 A clause clarified a right of hearing for anyone challenging the signatures 
required for any by-law requiring consent.184 Presumably because it was a health-related issue, 
town and city councils could pass by-laws to expropriate private property for common sewers, 
subject to compensation to be determined by arbitration.185  
                                                          
182 Consolidated Municipal Loan Fund Act, 16 Vic. c.181 (1853), s.1 (1), s.14.  
183 16 Vic. c.181 (1853), s.5. The mayor of any municipality subscribing £2500 was to be an ex officio director and 
vote the shares of the municipality 
184 16 Vic. c.181 (1853), s.37. 
185 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.195. 
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As we have seen, most of the powers clauses included internal restrictions, setting prior 
limits or conditions on the scope of the by-law. What might be called external restrictions, 
necessary pre-requisites or co-requisites to the passage of a by-law, are most often to be found in 
provisions relating to financial matters. The requirement for an initiating petition, as in the case 
of a local improvement levy, was this type of external restriction.  In the later municipal 
consolidations, mandatory arbitration processes for claims against municipalities for 
compensation arising when by-laws had the effect of expropriation were prescribed in great 
detail. The 1849 act also prohibited municipalities acting as bankers. By-laws for raising money 
had to meet rules for recitals, and repayment procedures, including sinking funds, were to be 
expressly included in the by-law.186 These rules became even more detailed and stringent in later 
versions of the act. The Municipal Loan Fund Acts added another obstacle to councils wishing to 
raise funds for capital projects, including aid to railways and road construction companies, 
requiring the prior approval of the ratepayers and Governor-in-council before a by-law could be 
legally promulgated.187 One requirement—cabinet approval—was dispensed with a few years 
later, but the requirement to hold a poll of ratepayers was retained.188 
The first consolidation of the municipal act, in 1858, while making some stylistic changes 
(the acts start to look more ‘modern’ to the 21st century observer) continued the overall 
particularizing techniques of the 1849 act.189 Some limitations were lifted and new powers were 
granted according to the circumscribed pattern already established. As I have already noted, the 
residual powers clauses disappeared in 1858. However, all municipalities were henceforth able to 
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aid agricultural societies, compel commutation of statute labour (at no more than $1 per day), to 
take a census, and to fine any elected person up to $50 for the neglect of his duties.190 Cities and 
towns could legislate to licence intelligence offices, regulate gas inspection and appoint a 
commissioner for gasworks and require residents to remove snow.191 Indecent exposure was 
added to the section dealing with public morals.192 Townships and villages could henceforth pass 
by-laws to tax dogs and destroy any found running at large.193 Also in 1858,  a few 
municipalities interested in attracting transit companies were permitted (on the petition of three-
quarters of ratepayers) to grant bonuses, “inasmuch as the construction of Railways and of other 
roads has been found to enhance to the largest amount the value of property within easy access to 
these lines of traffic.”194 A few years later a crop failure in Upper Canada prompted an act to 
allow county councils to pass by-laws to purchase up to $20,000 of seed.195 The act stipulated 
that the amount so raised could be used for no other purpose, and the by-law was required to 
include rules for repayment. 
In the 1866 consolidation some tepid trust was placed in the councils, allowing them to 
make regulations for their own conduct and proceedings if not otherwise specified by the act and 
not contrary to any other law.196 Explicit permission was given to urban councils to number 
houses.197 By an amending act in 1868 city councils lost their right to supervise their police 
forces to appointed boards of police; however the right to dissolve such boards was restored with 
                                                          
190 22 Vic. c.99 (1858), s.263, s.212, s.317. 
191 22 Vic. c.99 (1858), s.290 (1-5), s.291 (8, 9, 12). 
192 22 Vic. c.99 (1858), s.275. 
193 22 Vic. c.99 (1858), s.258. 
194 Bruce and Wellington Counties, their sub-municipalities and nearby municipalities were singled out for this 
exception, presumably with a particular but unnamed railway company in mind: 22 Vic. c.39 (1858), s.350. 
195 An Act to enable County Councils to raise money for assisting persons in certain cases to seed their land, and for 
other purposes: 26 Vic. c.1 (1863). 
196 29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866), s.191. 
197 29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866), s.296 (48-9). 
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the third consolidation, in 1874.198 The 1868 act also provided for the sale of mineral rights (by 
public auction, with the proviso that public travel be respected), and allowed municipalities to 
regulate tire widths—on macadamized roads only.199 Factories and companies building public 
works and facilities were eventually added to the list of businesses for which municipalities (with 
the assent of electors) could establish bonuses.200  
This pattern continued throughout the rest of the period. Though more ‘powers’ were 
added than subtracted, it is difficult to see these changes as significantly expanding local 
autonomy. The legislature was not averse to doling out incremental powers to municipalities to 
address particular problems or approved projects, but in many cases the rights were 
circumscribed, usually within the ‘may’ clauses themselves.  
 
The Municipal Act as Compulsory: The Mandatory Clauses 
As discussed in Chapter 1, John H. Taylor found relatively few instances of ‘must’ clauses—
duties and requirements—in the Municipal Act of 1849.201 As with the ‘may’ clauses, Taylor did 
not seek to determine the weight of the ‘must’ clauses he counted. He did not consider the modes 
of enforcement, nor whether these can be considered to amplify the burdens. He is correct that 
there are few direct duties and requirements of corporations to be found in the act (if this is 
indeed what he had in mind as ‘must’ clauses), but there are many which were designed to work 
indirectly, by placing a personal legal duty on a clerk or other surrogate. Both direct and indirect 
duties encroached on the freedom of action and the funds of local governments. 
                                                          
198 31 Vic. c.30 (1868); 37 Vic. c.16 (1873). 
199 31 Vic. c.30 (1868), s.37, s.45. 
200 34 Vic. c.30 (1871) 42 Vic. c.31 (1879). 
201 Taylor, “Urban Autonomy in Canada," 478–500. 
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In the Municipal Act of 1849 the first corporate duties mentioned were the requirements 
for every former district council to set up townships and begin the process of holding elections 
and meetings according to the provisions of the act.202 It would appear these were meant to be 
directory—no enforcement procedures were included, although a process was set out for 
inhabitants of a township to take matters into their own hands if necessary. Each municipality 
was to hire a clerk and treasurer, who were to be paid twice a year from municipal funds. The 
amount of the clerk’s remuneration was left up to the council—presumably it was assumed the 
amount would be adequate to attract a competent functionary, as a council could not realistically 
carry on operations otherwise, as Robert A. Harrison noted in his Municipal Manual.203 The 
treasurer’s salary was originally based on a percentage of funds under his control and specified 
by the province; later municipal councils were allowed to substitute a fixed stipend or salary.204  
Other duties were more pointedly mandatory, especially for counties. County councils 
were required to maintain the “Shire Hall, Court House and Gaol and any house of corrections,” 
the expenses of which were “chargeable upon the County,” implicitly at the initiative of the 
sheriff, judges or other administrators of the justice system.205 Similarly, county roads: once 
‘assumed’ by the county council as a road in which more than one township has an interest, it 
was the duty of the council to cause such road to be built “in a good and substantial manner.”206 
No specific remedy was given for default, but it is evident from other provisions of the act that 
the legislature assumed that the prerogative writ of mandamus would be available. There was no 
                                                          
202 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.3. 
203 Harrison, The New Municipal Manual, 1859, 116, note k: “It appears to be imperative on the Council to appoint a 
Clerk. Convenience, if not duty, however, will at all times render one necessary.” 
204 In 1858 councils were permitted to pay the Treasurer by salary or percentage: 22 Vic. s.174 (1858). 
205 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.41 (2). 
206 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.37. 
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provincial oversight for roads, and it was presumably expected that this type of duty would be 
brought to the attention of the courts by individual residents or other parties who had an interest.  
The common law quasi-criminal remedy for failure to maintain roads was not referred to 
in the 1849 act, but was expressly inserted into the 1858 consolidation. By section 324 of this 
act, all councils could be fined for the misdemeanour of failing to maintain public roads, the 
amount to be in the court’s discretion. The drafter added that this remedy was not to be in lieu of 
civil damages for injury sustained by reason of the default, but did give the municipality some 
relief in the form of a limitation period—any such civil action was to be brought within three 
months of the date the plaintiff sustained the damages. The next consolidation gave the 
municipality a further loophole, clarifying that the section did not apply to roads laid out without 
the consent of the corporation expressed by by-law.207 
Taylor did not itemize his ‘must’ clauses (nor indeed his ‘may’ clauses). It would be easy 
to overlook the less obvious mandatory clauses that appear sporadically throughout the act(s). 
Several involved a liquidated sum as penalty that could be summarily sued for if not provided by 
the municipality whose duty it was to arrange its payment. Hence by the consolidation of 1866 
every county council was required to provide by by-law that a “sum not less than twenty dollars 
shall be payable as a reward to any person or persons who shall pursue and apprehend...a horse 
thief.” 208 The puzzle here is why the intermediate step of a by-law was included. The meta-rule 
was that all municipal actions required a by-law; perhaps it was because there was latitude to 
increase the amount of the reward that the legislation declared the provision was to be expressed 
by-legislatively. When the ballot was introduced in 1874, the act setting out the process 
stipulated that the clerk was to cause the ballots to be printed at the expense of the municipality. 
                                                          
207  29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866), s.339. 
208  29-30 Vic. c.51, s.354 (26). 
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The duty here is implied, as is the remedy; if not reimbursed, the clerk could rely on the statute 
to sue the municipality to cover his expense.209  
By an act to amend the Municipal Loan Fund (MLF) act, passed in 1857 at the height of a 
depression that led to a rash of municipal defalcations, repayment of sums borrowed by 
municipalities from the crown was also made recoverable by the province, at least in theory.210 
The problem of the non-exigibility of corporate assets, which, after all, belonged to the public 
not to the council, was dealt with by exempting schools, gaols, fire-fighting equipment and court 
houses, but making other municipal property subject to execution. Since there was likely little 
property other than that which was exempted, this would not be terribly helpful, but the 
possibility was left open. More likely to be effective was the subsequent clause which allowed 
the government to withhold a defaulting municipality’s share of the proceeds of the sale of the 
Clergy Reserves until it brought its MLF account into good standing. The Town of Brockville 
was caught by this provision, and struggled to restore its Clergy Reserve funding with pleas to 
the province for years.211  
Also likely to have an impact were indirect duties, whereby the legislature would assign 
the responsibility for enforcing municipal duties to salaried officers or elected politicians 
personally, either alone or in addition to the corporation. In England, the practice of imposing 
personal legal duties to sustain local governance was a long-standing one, although confined to 
providing personnel for parish offices, rather than ensuring statutory edicts were carried out.212 
This enforcement had never been applied to the position of justice of the peace, which was 
                                                          
209 Dominion Elections Act, 38 Vic. c.28 (1874). 
210 See Baskerville, “Transportation, Social Change and State Formation, Upper Canada, 1841-1864,” 233-56, 238.  
211 AO, Town of Brockville Fonds, Council Minutes, F1558-1, MS 610, Reel 2.  
212 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Potter Webb, The Development of English Local Government, 1689-1835, vol. 1 The 
Parish and the County, Book 1 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1906; reprinted London; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1963). 
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presumed to be a sought-after honour, rather than a disliked civic chore. Any nonfeasance by the 
rulers of the county might result in non-renewal of the office; malfeasance, reviewable by the 
superior courts in theory, might be tolerated in practice.213  
Whether local politicians in Upper Canada were to be given the respect accorded to JPs 
or the more harsh command and control considered suitable for English parish officers was a 
question resolved more or less in favour of the latter. By the 1849 act, those elected to municipal 
office could be fined for refusing to serve; a refusal to take office or take the oath of office 
within twenty days of the election or refusal to administer an oath to a councillor-elect could 
result in a fine between two and twenty pounds.214 Elected politicians were also made 
specifically subject to section 123, whereby false swearing under the act was punishable by the 
“pains and penalties of wilful and corrupt perjury,” and to section 125, requiring them to deposit 
the oaths they swore on behalf of others (as ex officio JPs) in the appropriate place, presumably 
the clerk’s office, within eight days or be guilty of a misdemeanour. However, though these 
requirements and penalties were continued, a more forgiving attitude to members of councils was 
soon apparent in amendments allowing for resignations during an elected term, albeit subject to 
the consent of the majority of the council.215 No doubt the expectation was that the fellow 
councillors of the would-be former-member would be the best judges of the bona fides of his 
request and, indeed, of the benefit to the council of a resignation (which they technically might 
even instigate under the amendment which allowed a council to determine its own rules for 
proceeding mentioned above). As well, since all elected offices were for one term only with no 
                                                          
213 See Norma Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), Hay, 
"Dread of the Crown Office” 19-45. JPs in Upper Canada/Canada West had even greater invulnerability; the worst 
that could happen to a habitually invisible or poorly performing JP was non-renewal of his commission, which in 
any event had much less social value in the colonial context: Aitchison, “The Development of Local Government in 
Upper Canada,” 33.  
214 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.130. 
215 16 Vic. c.181 (1853), s.9 (38).  
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limit on re-elections, the electoral process might have been trusted to take care of any problem 
councillors fairly quickly.  
Council heads—mayors for cities and towns, reeves for townships and villages, and 
wardens for counties—were assigned more legal responsibilities than were their colleagues on 
council. They were commanded to counter-sign by-laws (with the clerk); but, perhaps since 
failure to do so did not invalidate the by-law, no penalty was specified for their failure to do so. 
Carelessness with by-laws for Municipal Loan Fund loans added imprisonment as a disincentive 
for anyone involved.216 A head of council could also be caught by section 10 of the Act to 
Provide for the Registration of Debentures issued by Municipal and other Corporate Bodies, 
which provided for imprisonment between three and twelve months with no option for a fine.217 
In 1866, heads of council were also given the duty of overseeing the operations of the 
corporation. It is not specified what this meant exactly, but presumably they were to see that the 
committees and perhaps the staff performed their tasks.218 Because this was such a vague 
requirement there would probably have been little likelihood of being fined for insufficient 
oversight, though a clause that appeared in the same consolidation in the miscellaneous part that 
provided for fines or imprisonment for any breach of duty by anyone could have been employed 
against a negligent head of council. 219  
The one elective office that did not follow this model was that of Police Village Trustee. 
This post had more in common with the parish impressments of the English past than the elected 
(and soon to be at least partly remunerated) membership on councils of incorporated local 
                                                          
216  29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866), s.207. 
217  22 Vic. c.91 (1858). 
218  For example, 29-30 Vic. c.51 (1866) s.123.  
219 12 Vic. c.81 (1849). 
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governments.220 Not only was the trusteeship an unpaid post until very late in the period, but its 
duties were backed up by monetary penalties. The trustee was charged with enforcing the fire 
and health regulations set out in the act to the extent of actively prosecuting offenders, and could 
be fined twenty shillings by a justice of the peace at the request and on the evidence of any of his 
neighbours who had standing as “inhabitant householders.”221  
Some local officials—gaolers, path masters, constables, surveyors, auditors, tavern 
inspectors, overseers, and pound keepers—are referred to in the act, but their duties and the 
enforcement thereof are mostly left up to the councils that appointed them and to whom they 
reported. One exception to this general rule was the constable.  Evidently this was expected to be 
an unpopular task; section 158 provided that anyone liable to serve could be sued, and the sum of 
five pounds could be granted to anyone who would sue him, as an added incentive.222 At the next 
level of importance were assessors and collectors, whose duties were set out in other acts, but 
whose activities could likely be covered by the general penalty provision mentioned above in 
regard to elected members having a statutory duty to supervise. The appointment of auditors 
(two per corporation) was to be one of the first actions of any council. These part-time officials 
were to examine the accounts and “publish a detailed statement of receipts and expenditures in 
two newspapers” in the jurisdiction or nearby, and to file the same in duplicate within one month 
with the clerk, where they were to be open to inspection by any inhabitant.223  
                                                          
220 By-laws for per diem remuneration for township councillors in this subsection were allowed, provided these 
would not take effect until after the next election: 16 Vic. c.181 (1852) s.9 (4). 
221 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.48. There were property qualifications for trustees, and it is quite possible that there was a 
social status associated with the position. Unlike most private prosecutions under the act, there was no qui tam 
financial incentive of half the fine to the informer/witness; the entire fine, recoverable by distress if necessary, was 
payable to the village. 
222 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.158. 
223 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.144. 
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The sheriff, although locally based, was a provincial appointee, and most of his duties 
were dealt with by the statutes concerning the administration of justice. With regard to municipal 
matters, the sheriff was in some respects adversarial to the council, a variation on his general 
assignment to provide for execution in debt collection matters, complicated by the status of 
municipalities as public corporations. According to section 179 of the Municipal Act, if a sheriff 
were to receive a writ of execution against a municipality, he was to deliver it to the treasurer 
with a statement of fees and calculation of the amount due at the date of service. If the debt was 
not paid within a month of receipt of the writ, the Sheriff was to examine the assessment rolls on 
file in the office of the Clerk, strike a rate of his own initiative, then direct the collectors to 
include a column on their rolls for this rate. The collectors and assessors, though contract 
employees of the council in vied-for positions without any security of tenure, were thus to be co-
opted to assist in this proceeding. They could cavil only at their own risk, as the statute stated 
they could be proceeded against by attachment or otherwise to ensure the completion of these 
duties.   
The most important of the employees were the clerks and treasurers.224 Some of the 
duties attached to these roles were also set out in other acts, but those included in the Baldwin 
Act indicate their centrality to municipal, and indeed provincial governance. I have already noted 
that it was incumbent on all incorporated municipalities to appoint officers for these roles—who 
would continue in their office until replaced—and pay them “what is just and reasonable.”225 The 
primary duty of the treasurer was, as might be expected, to keep the books (stipulated to be in 
accounts separate from his own), to give security by means of a bond guaranteed by himself and 
                                                          
224 Treasurers of cities were called chamberlains. 
225 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.169. 
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another ratepayer, do “all assigned duties,” and hand over books and money when requested.226 
It was felt advisable to include an assertion that the corporate books “are chattels belonging to 
the corporation” and that any failure to hand over chattels or money when demanded should be 
held to be fraudulent embezzlement, a felony for which the treasurer could be convicted, such 
conviction not to replace any other civil remedy.227 Treasurers of counties were responsible not 
only to the county, but also to its sub-corporations, for whom they performed a supervisory role 
at times.  
As was the case for members of council and collectors, but most likely to apply to those 
keeping ultimate track of the funds, treasurers faced additional liabilities under the Municipal 
Loan Fund Acts: anyone “wilfully neglecting or refusing to perform or concur in performing any 
official act requisite for the Collection of the said rate, or misapplying [the funds] shall be held 
guilty of a misdemeanour, and any such Treasurer...and his sureties shall moreover be personally 
liable for any sum which, by reason of such neglect....shall not be paid over to the Registrar 
General at the time required.”228 Furthermore, after December 1, 1859, if a treasurer paid out any 
amount before the sum owed the Receiver General was paid, “he shall be deemed guilty of a 
misdemeanour, and shall moreover be liable for every sum so paid....”229 With the peril of 
incurring civil and criminal penalties the government presumably hoped to make the treasurers 
their local watchdogs, in effect spying on their employers in order to prevent municipal councils 
from playing fast and loose with the Province’s money. 
For clerks, a job description—the ‘general duty’—was set out in the statute: “to record in 
a book to be provided for that purpose all the proceedings...and to make regular entries of all 
                                                          
226 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.171, s.172  
227 12 Vic. c.81 (1849), s.174. 
228 22 Vic. c.15 (1858) s.4. 
229 22 Vic. c.15 (1858) s.3 (4). 
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resolutions and decisions and to record the vote of every person present entitled to vote if 
required by any member and preserve and file all accounts...and to keep the books [and] 
records...which shall be open to all without fee or reward...at all seasonable times and hours.”230 
The clerk was further bound to furnish copies of by-laws on request at the rate of six cents per 
hundred words (or lesser sum if the council so ordered).231 The clerk was also to certify and 
apply the corporate seal to all by-laws (which were also to be signed by the head of council). The 
act and its consolidations and amendments and collateral legislation entailed duties for the clerk 
in the running of elections, municipal, provincial and eventually federal. He was also obliged to 
carry out the statutorily mandated procedures for notices of those by-laws which would affect the 
rights of residents, such as road openings and closings. All of these were added to and clarified 
as time went on. In most cases the penalty for non-compliance with these duties was a fine on 
conviction before two justices of the peace. Clerks also had numerous duties (with their own 
similar penalties) under the assessment, jury and other acts. 
 The most onerous duties for clerks arising from the municipal acts related to information 
gathering and management.232 By section 180 of the 1849 act, the clerk, on behalf of the 
municipality, was to send to the Provincial Secretary every year before the 31st of January an 
annual account of the corporation’s debts with particulars of the original debt, interest, payments 
and current balance. In 1852 this requirement was expanded significantly, when the government 
presumably realised the goldmine of information available at no direct cost to itself that could be 
wrung from and paid for by municipal jurisdictions by means of a statutory command and the 
                                                          
230 12 Vic. c.81 (1849) s.170. 
231 22 Vic. c.15 (1858) s.199. 
232 See Bruce Curtis, "Canada Blue Books and the Administrative Capacity of the Canadian State, 1822-67" 
Canadian Historical Review 74, no.4 (1993): 535-65, also Bruce Curtis, The Politics of Population: State 
Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). 
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threat of personal punishment for non-compliance. Within one week after the first day of 
January, the clerk of a township, incorporated village or town, was obligated to make an 
information return to the clerk of the county in which the municipality was situated for the past 
year. A sense of the magnitude of the information gathering duties is evinced by the particulars 
required in 1853: 
1. Number of persons assessed. 
2. Number of acres assessed.  
3. Total of rentals of real property. 
4. Total of yearly value other than rentals of real property. 
5. Total actual value of real property.  
6. Total of taxable incomes.  
7. Total value of personal property. 
8. Total yearly value of personal property. 
9. Total amount of assessed value of real and personal property. 
10. Total amount of taxes imposed by By-laws of the Municipality. 
11. Total amount of taxes imposed by By-laws of the County. 
12. Total amount of taxes imposed by By-laws of any Provisional County Council 
13. Total amount of Lunatic Asylum or other Provincial tax. 
14. Total amount of all taxes as aforesaid. 
15. Total amount of income collected or to be collected from assessed taxes for the use of 
the Municipality. 
16. Total amount of income from licenses. 
17. Total amount of income from public works. 
18. Total amount of income from shares in incorporated Companies. 
19. Total amount of income from all other sources. 
20. Total amount of income from all sources. 
21. Total expenditure on account of roads and bridges. 
22. Total expenditure on account of other public works and property 
23. Total expenditure on account of stock held in any incorporated Company. 
24. Total expenditure on account of schools and education, exclusive of School Trustees 
rates. 
25. Total expenditure on account of the support of the poor or charitable purposes. 
26. Total expenditure on account of Debentures and interest thereon. 
27. Total gross expenditure on account of Administration of Justice in all its branches. 
28. Amount received from Government on account of Administration of Justice. 
29. Total net expenditure on account of Administration of Justice. 
30. Total expenditure on account of salaries, and the expenses of Municipal Government 
31. Total expenditure on all other accounts. 
32. Total expenditure of all kinds. 
33. Total amount of liabilities secured by Debentures. 
34. Total amount of liabilities unsecured. 
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35. Total liabilities of all kinds. 
36. Total value of real property belonging to Municipality. 
37. Total value of stock in incorporated Companies owned by Municipality. 
38. Total amount of debts due to Municipality. 
39. Total amount of arrears of taxes. 
40. Balance in hands of Treasurer. 
41. All other property owned by Municipality. 
42. Total assets.233 
 
The county clerk was to compile all this information by the first of February for all the 
jurisdictions within its purview for the provincial secretary, whose own duty to lay the 
information before Parliament was consequently greatly eased. City clerks were to furnish the 
same information directly. Items were added to the list as time went on; the only subtraction 
came with the abolition of the Lunatic Tax.234 In 1855 a second annual return was demanded 
from the clerks, this time to the Receiver General, for the appropriation of moneys arising from 
the clergy reserves.235 And again, in case of default of transmission of the information by sworn 
affidavit in the obligatory form the clerk was to be personally liable to a penalty of twenty 
dollars, to be paid to the Receiver General for the use of the Province.236 Similar requirements 
were set out by the Assessment Act. Later the Voters’ List Acts and Tavern Licence acts 
mandated returns related to those subjects with concomitant penalties for non- or misfeasance.237 
In effect, by using criminal sanctions, the provincial government pierced the municipal 
corporate veil with a vengeance, co-opting the mini-bureaucracies who were both mandated and 
                                                          
233 16 Vic. c.163 (1853). 
234 20 Vic. c.8 (1857). 
235 19 Vic. c.1 (1855) s.157. 
236 19 Vic. c.1 (1855) s.158. 
237 An Act Respecting Voters Lists, 37 Vic. c.4 (1873) s.12: “…for every name erroneously inserted in or omitted 
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And Consolidate The Law for the Sale of Fermented Or Spirituous Liquors, 37 Vic. c.32 (1873), s.10 (clerk’s 
penalty to be not less than $40 and not more than $100). 
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directed by statutory fiat. Historians have emphasized the importance of statistics and the fact-
finding process in mid-nineteenth century state formation. By these provisions, local 
governments were forced to provide and pay for much of the clerical manpower required to fuel 
the province’s economic and political agenda. 
 
Conclusion: A Low Constitution 
Many, perhaps most, major acts serve more than one purpose. One as extensive and 
comprehensive as the Baldwin Act should not be reduced to only one. It is not only possible, but 
indeed likely, that both the schools of thought outlined in Chapter 1 are correct—the act was 
intended to bring democracy and responsible government to the community level by extending 
the elective principle downwards, and it was meant to facilitate economic growth. There is plenty 
of evidence in the ‘must’ and ‘may’ clauses to support both arguments. The two functions may 
indeed be complementary. If the populace was likely to support market expansion and economic 
growth, the empowerment of local government would serve that end, as well as be an end in 
itself. 
 But the intention(s) of the designers are moot for the purposes of this legal historical 
inquiry. A principle of literary criticism for twentieth century poetry, notorious for its obscurity, 
is to look not at what the poet means, or, as a second level of abstraction, what the poem means, 
but rather what the poem does.238 A text-based analysis of a statute can profitably emulate this 
perspective. Looked at as a whole, as the sum of ‘may’ clauses, ‘must clauses’ and miscellaneous 
clauses, the Municipal Act can be seen as essentially constitutional.239 It was, of course, not 
                                                          
238  An insight (with regard to poetry) I owe to my former English professor, the late Professor Michael Lynch of St. 
Michael’s College in the University of Toronto. 
239 This is also attested to by the titles the act’s later consolidations were given: instead of the Municipal Act, the Act 
became one concerning “Municipal Institutions.” 
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considered as such by contemporaries, and functioned only as a partial constitution at that, 
confined to the ‘low’ aspects of governance and administration.240 The act and its successors 
provided a jurisdictional framework for low governance and administration, with some 
prompting as to appropriate agenda, augmented by collateral legislation and tweaked by frequent 
amendments.  It presumed interrelationships between municipalities of the same or other 
gradations, and between municipalities and other entities, and that there would be conflicts 
between them. The (subordinate) relationship of municipal corporations to the province, though 
fundamental, was implicit. In Chapter 8, I consider the ways municipal councils attempted to 
provide input into shaping the legislation which governed them, but the legislation itself allowed 
little leeway for creativity, and none for dialogue with or participation by local governments. 
But to say that the Municipal Act approximated a low constitution is not to suggest it was 
basically just a template, a tabula rasa for municipal action. It is true that the act gave fiscal 
freedom to municipal councils, and for the most part suggested, rather than insisted on, matters 
on which property taxes could be spent. In this sense there was scope for local government 
agency. But there was clearly little autonomy. Even in the facilitative sections, it is evident that 
the options of municipal councils were legally constrained, both as to subject, and by means of 
internal and external conditions. The political menu was set, and especially after the deletion of 
the general powers clause, no ordering à la carte was to be allowed, other than by legislative 
amendments or special legislation. As for the mandatory clauses, the provincial priorities 
manifested by the Municipal Acts were no doubt associated with larger goals of economic and 
social development, but were in themselves rudimentary: first, honest and effective local 
                                                          
240 The province did have two formal constitutions prior to Confederation: The Act of Union (The British North 
America Act, 1840, 3 & 4 Vic. c.35) and the Constitutional Act of 1791 (officially The Clergy Endowments 
(Canada) Act, 1791, 31 Geo. 3 c.31), both acts of the British Parliament, covered most of the ‘high’ aspects of 
jurisdiction and governance. 
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administration and second, assistance in the province’s information gathering process. The 
expenses of these were charged to the locality, and supported by civil forfeiture against the 
corporations and by criminal liability placed on the municipal officers and politicians personally. 
A further significant means of enforcement, the general mechanism of the legal system, only 





Chapter 3:  Municipal Corporations in Court: Canada West/Ontario 1850-1880 
 
The legal historian must approach research based on case reports with some trepidation. Since 
the advent of the ‘new’ or ‘critical’ legal history in the nineteen-eighties, such narrowly-sourced 
research has often been denigrated as antiquarian at best, an inaccurate and misleading formalist 
representation of a messy and indistinct legal reality.241 The recognition of a need for caution in 
using reported cases to understand the legal past increased with the contributions to the field of 
the schools of legal pluralism and ‘low law,’ both of which are inherently sceptical of the 
concept of legal doctrine as essentially equivalent to ‘law.’  
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this dissertation are based on archival records, which confirm that 
the reported cases do not comprise the totality of the experience of the municipal corporations 
selected for this study with the court system. The surviving minutes of the councils of the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville, the Townships of Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, Rear of 
Leeds and Landsdowne and Augusta, the Village of Gananoque, and the Town of Brockville all 
disclose myriad instances of council involvement in the lower levels of the judicial system in the 
County and Division Courts during the years 1850-1800. The minutes of the municipal council 
of the Town of Brockville also show extensive involvement of the council in a suit in the court of 
Chancery (in concert with several other municipal corporations) against the Brockville and 
Ottawa Railway, which litigation spanned several years and involved frequent trips by the Mayor 
to Toronto to retain and consult with equity counsel.242 This chapter, on the other hand, is based 
on the premise that there is a place for the province-wide ‘high law’ of reported cases in the 
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understanding of the legal environment of these corporations as legal actors and the evaluation of 
local government autonomy during this period.  
While some of the cases I will discuss were leading cases, cited and followed by lawyers 
and judges during the period, the ‘legal archaeology method,’ focussed on one or a few such 
cases, is inappropriate for my purposes.243 First, as I noted in the previous chapter, municipal law 
in mid-nineteenth century Ontario was overwhelmingly statutory; hence many lines of judicial 
interpretation were highly technical, mired in procedural concerns and frequently truncated by 
amendments. Secondly, the course of Ontario municipal law bears out Blaine Baker’s 
observation that a significant disconnect in Upper Canadian legal doctrine occurred in the late 
nineteenth century.244 With the exception of a couple of decisions involving the interpretation of 
the British North America Act, there are no municipal cases from mid-nineteenth century 
Ontario with which current practitioners or academics would be even vaguely familiar.245 
Finally, and most importantly, I am employing a non-legalistic perspective on reported cases as 
historical record.  
What does it mean to take a non-legalistic approach to the study of cases? The 
conventional parameters of what I consider a legalistic caselaw-based study are those set by the 
original case reporters. The legalistic approach has the merit of respect for the contemporary 
compilers and their intended audience; what the reporters indexed as ‘municipal law’ was what 
                                                          
243 See Debora L. Threedy, “Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing Context,” Tulsa Law Review 80 
(2006): 1197-238. 
244 Baker, "The Reconstitution of Upper Canadian Legal Thought in the late-Victorian Empire,"  Baker argues that 
the in the late nineteenth century, lawyers began to ignore Canadian or American precedent where there was a 
British case to the same or similar effect. Certainly, many home-grown municipal law precedents from the mid-
Victorian period tended to disappear from the case reports with around the turn of the twentieth century, replaced by 
English cases. See the 1900 edition/revision of Harrison’s Municipal Manual, The Municipal Manual, Part I: 
containing the Municipal Act, (R.S.O. c.223) and the amending acts of 1898, 1899 and 1900, viz. 61 v. c23, 62 V. 1st 
session, cc.2 and 5, 62 v. 2nd session, cc. 26 and 30, and 63 V. cc. 9, 33, 35, 36 and 37: with notes of cases bearing 
thereon, by C.R.W. Biggar (Toronto: Carswell, 1900).   
245 Slavin and Orillia (Village) (Re), [1875] O.J. No. 7, 36 U.C.R. 159 (Ont. QB); Leprohon v. Ottawa (City), [1877] 
O.J. No. 152, 40 U.C.R. 478 (OCA). 
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they and other actors within the legal system—lawyers and judges—would have considered 
municipal law. But I do not purport to be writing a retrospective treatise.246 I am indeed less 
interested in ‘municipal law’ per se, than in the ways that law may have affected municipal 
corporations as institutional, non-professional legal actors. In other words, the focus is on the 
parties as much as the law. There is considerable overlap, of course, and as will be seen I do rely 
to a great extent on legal concepts and categories, and discuss changes and trends within these.  
In order to attempt to separate the legal experience of municipal actors from the 
reporters’ doctrinal filters I searched the LexisNexis Quicklaw digitized database of all Canada 
West/Ontario judgments published from 1850 to 1880 by keyword rather than by conventional 
legal rubrics.247 The search function of the database allowed me to avoid those cases which 
might be categorized as ‘municipal’ in the index to the reports and headnote subject-tags, but in 
which municipal corporations had no direct interest, and to access cases which may not have 
been seen by the reporter as essentially ‘municipal,’ but to which a municipal corporation was a 
party. Examples of excluded cases indexed as municipal are numerous contested local elections 
and several concerning mortmain (the municipality or one of its subsidiaries happened to be a 
beneficiary under a will) and ejectment (the municipality happened to be a landlord).248 In such 
cases the municipal character of the corporation was more or less incidental to the case.249  
By using the database to search for cases with ‘city’ ‘towns,’ ‘township,’ ‘village’ and 
‘county’ in the style of cause, I was able to identify reported cases in which municipal 
corporations as parties were directly engaged with the ‘high’ legal system during the years 1850-
                                                          
246 In my opinion, it would be impossible to do so without a mastery of the changing structures and civil procedures 
of the courts during this period. 
247 This database may be found at http://www.lexisnexis.com/ca/legal/. 
248 The ‘municipal’ nature of the corporation in these cases was not considered legally significant, and did not 
appear to have affected the outcome in any of these. 
249 Although not the corporate character in the case of mortmain. 
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1880. I do not claim that the search results are necessarily definitive or representative of the 
‘high law’ of municipal corporations, but rather that they are illustrative and illuminative of the 
range of legal issues and problems which impacted municipal institutions and constituted their 
legal environment, directly or indirectly. In the first section of this chapter I discuss the utility 
and limitations of this data generally. I then proceed to examine three subsets of the sample that 
in my estimation shed light on local government autonomy during the period 1850-1880. The 
first group are cases dealing with the prerogative remedy of mandamus, wherein the claimant 
alleged a municipality was subject to judicial enforcement of legally prescribed duties on a 
summary process. The second group deals with judicial restrictions of local government power 
by means of the quashing of by-laws, another summary procedure. Reports dealing with jury 
trials (and appeals therefrom) concerning the imposition of liability for damage to persons and 
personal property arising from municipal negligence or nuisance make up the final group. 
 
The Cases: Municipal Corporations as Litigants 
While ultimately fruitful, this methodology did present some challenges. The style of cause 
search did not unearth every case that met the search criteria.250 In addition, the search resulted in 
a large number of false positives. Over two hundred duplicates appeared in the initial return of 
more than 700 hits. There were also numerous irrelevant instances in which the individual 
litigant’s name was “Town,” or the place name was a descriptor in the litigant name. I also 
excluded a number of cases in which the municipality was named as a third party but had little 
real interest in the cause, for instance as a garnishee or as the jurisdiction involved in an election 
challenge.  Relevant to the legal environment, but not included in the final sample were cases in 
                                                          
250  There is at least one case that was not caught by the search because the municipal level was missing from the 
style of cause: Castor v. The Corporation of Uxbridge, [1876], 39 U.C.R. 113. 
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which an individual sued or was sued in his official capacity, for instance as Mayor, Treasurer, 
or Collector of a particular municipality, but to which the municipal corporation itself was not a 
party. These cases do not fit very easily into the categories used for analysis, and any bearing on 
the activities of the corporation would have been either minimal or indirect, although admittedly 
they may have contributed to the creation of a ‘chill’ among municipal counsellors or their 
employees.  
Once purged, the sample yielded 448 discrete case reports. Some of these are reprises of 
the same lis, either because the case was sent back for a second (or third) hearing and re-
appealed to the court en banc, or because they were re-introduced as a different cause of 
action.251 Most of these are the reports of cases which either originated in the court of Queen’s 
Bench and the Court of Common Pleas (which had identical jurisdiction in civil matters 
throughout almost all this period) or progressed to the higher levels of court from a county 
court.252 It appears that all Court of Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas en banc and Court of 
Error and Appeal decisions were reported as a matter of course.   
Some cases seem to have arrived at the superior courts as a matter of first impression; 
however, most had progressed from a successful show cause motion by the defendant at nisi 
prius (the superior court judges on circuit for civil matters) and were thus in the nature of 
appeals, though not so styled. The first instance judgments on the show cause hearing seem 
rarely if ever to have been reported, although some of the reports include a summary of the 
arguments and judgment of the originating hearing as part of the report of the final disposition. 
                                                          
251 Lis is a legal term referring to a discrete dispute; en banc refers to the court hearing a case as a group, as opposed 
to a single judge. 
252 See Banks, “Evolution of the Ontario Courts,” for a detailed exposition of the court structure during this period. 
For the evolution of the appeals process, see Christopher Moore, The Court of Appeal for Ontario: Defining the 




Twelve reports are from the Court of Chancery, twelve from interim motions in Practice 
Court/Chambers and twenty-six from the Court of Error and Appeal/Court of Appeal. No cases 
involving municipal corporations as parties were appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada (in 
existence only in the last five years covered by this study). Only one was appealed to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council.253  
The first thing to be noted about the reported cases involving a municipal corporation as a 
party is how few they are. There is no reason to doubt R.C.B. Risk’s calculation that cases 
indexed as ‘municipal law’ made up the fifth largest group of reported cases in the union 
period.254 Nevertheless, 448 reported cases in which a municipal corporation was a party over 
thirty years is not sufficient to brand municipalities as a group as especially litigious. This 
finding is all the more marked by the fact that in 373 of the cases, a municipality was the 
defendant. (This number includes twenty-eight in which municipalities were being sued by other 
municipalities.) So the cases in which municipalities initiated a suit which came to be reported at 
the superior level numbered only seventy-five. Of these seventy-five, nineteen were launched by 
municipalities against Railway companies, and another seven against other commercial 
corporations such as waterworks, canal and road companies.  
  
                                                          
253 The appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not included in the statistical sample since it was 
not reported in the Upper Canada Reports, although its iterations in the Court of Chancery and Court of Error and 
Appeal are included: Hamilton and Milton Road Company v. The Corporation of the Town of Dundas (1873) 
U.K.P.C. 16, appeal from an Order of the Court of Error and Appeal of Ontario in Canada, dated 7 September 1870, 
varying a Decree of the Court of Chancery for the Province of Ontario, dated 26 January 1870. 
254  Risk, "The Law and the Economy in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Ontario," 88-131, 92. Risk states that the five 
largest groups of cases were internal management of the works of the courts (i.e. civil and criminal procedure, 
broadly defined), property, the market, enforcement of claims against debtors, and municipal institutions (including 
“elections and the power of municipalities”). In my selection, election cases are excluded, but some of the cases 
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Of the 373 cases in which the municipality defended, only twenty-three were at the suit 
of commercial corporations or non-municipal institutions.255 The reasons for this discrepancy 
could be many, but we can speculate that municipalities rarely felt the need to assert themselves 
to the degree of litigating or appealing (without resorting to settlement) at the superior court level 
except where the opponent was of a similar or greater economic power or standing.  Cities were 
parties in ninety-three reported cases, counties in 137, towns in eighty-seven, villages in twenty-
six, and townships in 111.256 Cities and towns were consequently considerably over-represented.     
                                                          
255 Including the Law Society of Upper Canada, suing for an overpayment of property tax: The Law Society of Upper 
Canada v. The Corporation of the City of Toronto, [1866] O.J. No. 58, 25 U.C.R. 199. 
256 Note that the total is different from the number of cases in which municipalities were litigants because there were 
multiple municipalities in several cases, as co-plaintiffs and defendants, or as both plaintiff and defendant. 
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Within these categories as well there were significant differences: for instance, the 
metropolis, Toronto, was a party in fifty-four cases, whereas Kingston, which also had city status 
for the entirety of the period, was a party in only fourteen. Non-municipal opponents were 
varied. Those who repeated as parties appeared in insufficient numbers to form a significant 
pattern, although the number of cases involving railways is worth noting. Nine railway 
companies were opposing parties: of these, the most frequently appearing was the Great Western 
Railway, with nine appearances. The causes of action in these cases ranged from issues of 
contract formation to specific performance (to build a station) to injury to property. The lion’s 
share—still a mere five—dealt with property tax assessment.257 
 Among the municipalities which were part of, or were located within, the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville (the corporation of the united counties itself, one town, 
Brockville, which withdrew from the united counties in 1858, two villages which attained 
corporate status during this period, Gananoque and Prescott, and thirteen townships/united 
townships), only a few appear as parties to litigation in the published reports. The United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville and one of its constituent townships, Augusta, were opposing 
parties in two iterations of the same case (one a procedural motion), which arose from an 
application for mandamus by the township concerning a road the township council alleged the 
county council had a legal duty to construct.258 This case, In re The Municipality of The 
Township of Augusta and The Municipal Council of The United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, 
demonstrates the ways in which the ‘high’ legal record could reflect political and practical 
                                                          
257 See Chapter 7 on the sometimes colourable attempts of municipal corporations to collect as much revenue as 
possible from railway companies. 
258 In re The Municipality of The Township of Augusta and The Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, [1854] O.J. No. 98, 12 U.C.R. 522.  
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conflicts, but is also a cautionary illustration of the inter-corporation conflicts which complicate 
any inference of judicial respect or disrespect for local government autonomy.  
In this instance, the county council had passed a by-law in 1850 to macadamize or 
otherwise improve a road, to be paid for partly (it was hoped) by tolls. In 1853, the county 
reneged on the project. Only after the reeve of Augusta had raised the issue several times with 
his colleagues on the county council to no avail did he turn to the law. It was clear to the judges 
that Augusta was in the right, but they were stymied by the institutional character of the 
parties.259 Although they did not elaborate, their unease seems to have related to concern about 
the applicability of a remedy which had been traditionally personal, to force a particular officer 
to do his duty—and hence enforceable against an identifiable and punishable human being—to a 
corporation, and not about the ramifications for the principles of local democracy. In the end, 
they decided on a mandamus nisi to allow a more thorough consideration at a later date, and the 
matter was eventually resolved out of court.260 
The reports include only two cases involving urban municipal corporations within Leeds 
and Grenville. The Town of Brockville was sued by the town’s school board when the former 
tried to evade payment of the entire amount mandated by statute on a technicality.261 The village 
of Gananoque was the loser in an application to quash a by-law by reason of a clerk’s error in 
publishing the necessary advertisements preliminary to the prerequisite plebiscite for a 
temperance by-law.262 Aside from Augusta, the only Leeds and Grenville Township represented 
                                                          
259 In re The Municipality of The Township of Augusta and The Municipal Council of The United Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville, [1854] O.J. No. 98, 12 U.C.R. 522 (UCCB), para. 9. 
260 The records of the two corporations do not give any direct information as to the agreement, but as the road was 
eventually macadamized, it would appear that the move to the law assisted the township’s position, although of 
course it may be that the counties’ council’s position changed for other reasons. 
261 The Board of School Trustees of the Town of Brockville v. The Town Council of Brockville, [1851] O.J. No. 122, 
9 U.C.R. 302 (UCQB). 
262 Brophy and Gananoque (Village), [1876] O.J. No. 193, 26 U.C.C.P. 290. 
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in the reports was the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, which appears courtesy of the suit of a 
ratepayer, one Mr. Richmond.  Richmond successfully challenged a by-law by which the 
township council attempted to impose a dog tax solely on the inhabitants of the (at that time 
unincorporated) village of Gananoque. Legally speaking the village was an undifferentiated part 
of the township, and while Chief Justice Robinson saw no reason why a council should not be 
able to customize its by-laws for urban areas, the by-law fell afoul of the statutory prohibition on 
asymmetric taxation. 263  
 
Enforcement of Legal Duty: Mandamus Cases 
The inconclusive character of win/lose statistics is clearly borne out by the cases in which 
municipal corporations faced a legal challenge to their freedom of action by means of the 
prerogative writ of mandamus.264 During the period under review there were thirty reported cases 
involving a writ of mandamus brought against a municipality. In seventeen of these the 
municipality fended off the challenge. In two there was a mixed result; in the Augusta Township 
case, discussed above, because the case was both brought and defended by a municipal 
corporation, and in the other because there were two matters on which a mandamus was sought; 
one was granted while the other was refused. In three others a mandamus nisi was ordered with 
costs reserved. In other words, applicants had a less than 50% success rate. But the odds were not 
                                                          
263 In re Richmond v. The Municipality of the Township of the Front of Leeds and Lansdowne, [1851] O.J. No. 49, 8 
U.C.R. 567. In its submission the township tried to make use of the early general ‘peace, welfare and good 
government’ catchall provision for townships, which was to disappear from the statute book shortly thereafter.  
264 For the development of the writ see Edith G. Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law: Certiorari 
and Mandamus in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963); D. C. Yardley, 
“The Purpose of Mandamus in English law," Juridical Review 4 (1959): 1-6. 
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in their favour from the outset. The writ had been developed by decades of judicial interpreters to 
be difficult to obtain, a principle the Upper Canadian bench showed little interest in altering.265 
For an application to be successful, a three-part test was to be met: a ‘clear’ demand, a 
‘clear,’ statutorily imposed duty, and a ‘clear’ failure to comply.266 These requirements allowed 
some room for judicial discretion, but tended to be strictly construed, especially at the beginning 
of the period. In these years superior court judges rarely gave the moving party the benefit of the 
doubt, even where it was clear that its position was correct on the merits. Later, their successors 
relaxed these conditions somewhat, allowing demands that had been posed to the council, rather 
than to the clerk, in contravention of the strict terms of the statute, or that could be cured by the 
excision of an incorrect part of the demand. Other glosses on the prerequisites were added during 
the period, and in 1875 the legislature moved to codify the procedure, specifically giving 
statutory approbation to a further condition which had been argued from time to time, namely the 
absence of an alternative remedy in law or equity.267 
In pronouncing their decisions, judges occasionally gave as their rationale for the 
strictness with which they applied the tests the fact that mandamus was a summary procedure, 
which required only the filing of affidavits.268 Judges seem to have preferred the comfort of live 
                                                          
265 For the attitudes of union era judges toward precedent and principle, see Risk, "The Law and the Economy in 
Mid-Nineteenth-Century Ontario," 93. 
266 “Remedy by mandamus...goes only when the defendant is clearly competent to do of his own accord and without 
a command what it would be the object of the writ to compel him to do, and when it is clear also that it is his duty by 
law to do the act, and that he has been in due manner called upon, and yet has refused”: In re William Dickson and 
the Municipal Council of the Village of Galt, [1852] O.J. No. 8510 U.C.R. 395 (UCQB), para. 10, per Robinson, 
C.J. 
267 The interaction of the law of mandamus with the precepts of equity and common law was canvassed by a number 
of judges: In re Stratford and Huron Railway Company and the Corporation of the County of Perth, [1876] O.J. No. 
338, 38 U.C.R. 112 (OCA), wherein one of the issues was whether there were alternative remedies available, and 
whether the plaintiffs were required to avail themselves of these regardless of cost and convenience. 
268 In re Stratford and Huron Railway Company and the Corporation of the County of Perth, [1876] O.J. No. 338, 38 




witnesses and juries provided by the standard processes of civil action.269 In a number of cases 
the judges announced that the appropriate remedy to enforce a municipal duty was by indictment 
(a quasi-criminal remedy received from English law and enshrined in the municipal acts of the 
period), and expressed annoyance that initiating parties preferred to proceed by mandamus. 
Though the application does not appear to have been inexpensive in absolute terms, the initiating 
parties appear to have preferred the procedure as relatively so, and also for its relative 
speediness.270 In R. v. Haldimand County, for instance, the village council of Cayuga had opted 
for a mandamus application (via the crown as nominal moving party) instead of choosing 
indictment “or some other mode” of resolution to dispute the liability of county council for road 
repair “avowedly on the ground of being more speedy;” the court elected to punish them “for 
having chosen to try an experimental action” by ordering costs against them.271 Even in many of 
the cases that the municipality ‘won,’ it is clear that the victory would be fleeting, as the bench 
made it clear that the challenger was in the right as to his (or its, in the common event of inter-
institutional contests) interpretation of the law, even if a mandamus absolute could not be 
granted on the facts before the court. Either a mandamus nisi was granted, or it was made clear 
                                                          
269 See In re Stratford and Huron Railway Company and the Corporation of the County of Perth, [1876] O.J. No. 
338, 38 U.C.R. 112 (OCA). 
270 In Thurston and Verulam (Township) (Re), [1876] O.J. No. 93, 25 U.C.C.P. 593 (UCCP),Wilson J. was unmoved 
by the applicant’s argument that a by-law opening a road which made his ingress and egress to his residence difficult 
and dangerous due to stumps and deviations should be quashed, and suggested that the parties should put the dispute 
into a “proper form for trial” by way of mandamus, but reflected that “....the expense of such a procedure, which 
would have to include a surveyor’s report, would be out of all proportion to the sum of money which would, even in 
the applicant’s estimation, be required to make the [substituted] road sufficient for his use.” (para. 22). Note the 
preamble of The Prerogative Writ of Mandamus Act, of a few years earlier (1872) which refers to delays in 
obtaining mandamus leading to injustice: 35 Vic. c.14.  
271 R. v. Haldimand County, [1861] O.J. No. 113, 20 U.C.R. 574 (UCQB). Sometimes parties (or their advocates) 
seem to have opted for greater expense than the court considered appropriate: costs were also reduced when a 
successful municipality indulged in “an extravagant exuberance of....useless affidavits: IN THE MATTER OF The 
Public School Trustees of Section No. 6 in The Township of South Fredericksburgh in The County of Lennox and 
Addington, and The Corporation of The Township of South Fredericksburgh, [1876] O.J. No. 43, 37 U.C.R. 534, 
(Ont. QB), paras. 17 and 18, per Hagarty, C.J.C.P. 
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that a second attempt which rectified previous errors in the form of the demand, for example, 
would be successful.272  
The courts commonly gave thinly veiled advice to unsuccessful applicants. In Port Hope 
School Board v. Port Hope (Town) for example, Macaulay J. decided in favour of the 
municipality:  
In exercising the large powers vested in the Board of Trustees when a direct taxation to 
so large an amount to be imposed upon the inhabitants, not by the Board directly, but 
through the Municipal Council upon their requisition, we must see that the terms and 
substance of what the statutes and the law required have been correctly complied with....  
 
Nevertheless, he pointedly added that there was no doubt that “if properly made, it is the duty of 
the Municipal Council to provide the moneys in the manner desired, and that if refused, a 
mandamus may be moved.”273 
The second reason for looking behind win/loss statistics is that the outcome of the writ 
might have significant repercussions irrespective of a legal victory or defeat. In the 
aforementioned Augusta Township case, as well as many others, it is apparent that interpretation 
of the law and the affirmation of the duty was not the sole objective of both or either parties. One 
particularly clear example of an application with political ramifications was Upper Canada v. 
Bruce (County) wherein a legal demand for a large sum for new public buildings arose out of a 
more general dispute over the selection of a county town on the separation of the counties of 
Huron and Bruce.274 Chief Justice Draper confessed himself to be particularly troubled that the 
application was at the initiation of “a private individual merely in his capacity of a resident 
                                                          
272 In the case of a mandamus nisi, the order was a provisional one: nisi (unless) meant that the municipality was 
given the opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made permanent. 
273 Port Hope School Board v. Port Hope (Town), [1854] O.J. No. 170, 4 U.C.C.P. 418. 
274 The Municipal Council of Bruce, [1861] O.J. No. 227, [1861] O.J. No. 227 (UCCP). 
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ratepayer in Walkerton, and consequently interested in the selection of that village as the county 
seat.”275  
On occasion, there are hints that the writ may have been resorted to as a reference, agreed 
on by the parties in a genuine attempt to settle the legal obligations of the parties which were 
legitimately obscure.276 In an early contest between the Port Hope School Board and the Town of 
Port Hope, the Court of Common Pleas awarded no costs to the successful party (the town) when 
the board overstepped its jurisdiction by ordering the council to hand over a stated sum 
immediately, without providing an opportunity to view the estimates and decide on the best 
means of satisfying the demand.277 Often it is apparent that the council’s decision to refuse the 
request at issue had not been a unanimous one, and it may well have been that the courts were 
used either to prevent an impasse or to allow one side to gain advantage. In many of the cases it 
is obvious that the duty involved a significant charge on the public purse, resulting in 
understandable vexation of municipal politicians that they were being forced to pay for decisions 
with which they might or might not agree but regarding which they had no right even to consult, 
and for which they might be politically accountable.  
There are signs that judges chafed at the idea that the parties were attempting to use the 
procedure—and in effect the judges themselves—to avoid sticky political problems, in effect 
passing the buck of unpopularity to those who were not vulnerable to electoral chastisement. In 
Dickson (estate) v. Galt (village), Chief Justice Robinson made this irritation explicit. After 
stating the conclusion that the case was not an appropriate one for the issuance of a mandamus 
                                                          
275 The Municipal Council of Bruce, [1861] O.J. No. 227, [1861] O.J. No. 227 (UCCP), para. 17. 
276 One of the few municipal law cases from this period to still be cited in Canadian courts, Leprohon was a stated 
case, brought to determine the rights of the province vis à vis the dominion. In this case, the municipality, whose 
rights to tax a ratepayer who was a dominion employee was at issue, seems superfluous to the arguments: Leprohon 
v. Ottawa (City), [1877] O.J. No. 152, 40 U.C.R. 478 (OCA). 
277 Port Hope School Board v. Port Hope (Town) [1854] O.J. No. 170, 4 U.C.C.P. 418.  
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order, Robinson went on to proclaim obiter his reluctance to use the opportunity to help 
councillors interpret the legislative scheme:  
It was rather pressed upon us [that]....it might be extremely useful, if we were to express 
our opinion on the soundness or unsoundness of the principle on which the Court of 
Revision under the assessment law acted.....Upon consideration, we feel it is more proper 
to forbear....It is a question of which the legislature has not made us the judges, either in 
the first instance or by way of appeal...and where we have not the authority to control, we 
think we ought not to throw out opinions from that which has been generally acted upon, 
and might unsettle what has been hitherto acquiesced in, and lead to much public 
inconvenience. We are restrained too from giving an extra-judicial opinion in this matter 
by another consideration. The question of what is the proper principle of valuation is one 
extremely general in its application; it affects the pecuniary interests of almost everyone, 
not excepting the judges themselves....278 
 
The Dickson case was one of the few in which the applicant was an individual; in most of 
the mandamus cases the dispute was inter-corporate or at least inter-institutional. Thirteen of the 
cases arose from conflicts between the two lowest units of governance—municipal corporations 
and school boards. Two cases arose at the complaint of a county registrar, a low law functionary 
not responsible to council, but whose needs, like those of the school boards, the councils were 
obliged to meet; the records of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville indicate continuing 
friction on this account.279 A couple of mandamus cases arose from disagreements between 
municipalities, usually to determine which of them would bear the expense of a road or bridge.  
In Re Augusta (Township) v. Leeds and Grenville (United Counties), referred to above, 
Chief Justice Robinson expressed his disinclination to rule against a local government, even in 
                                                          
278 In re William Dickson and the Municipal Council of the Village of Galt, [1852] O.J. No. 8510 U.C.R. 395 
(UCQB). 
279 Upper Canada v. Northumberland and Durham (United Counties), [1860] O.J. No. 250, 10 U.C.C.P. 526 
(UCCP). Wrote Chief Justice Draper: “I cannot understand why so much irrelevant matter has been introduced into 
[the argument]. The court have only to deal with the legal question, and the return should have been confined to that, 
The duty of building fire-proof offices and vaults does not depend upon their approval by the council of there being 
a new registry office, or of the place selected for it.” (para. 24). The legal squabble over financial responsibility for 
the registry offices continued, resulting in another judgment two years later: Ward v. Northumberland and Durham 
(United Counties), [1862], O.J. No. 104, 12 U.C.C.P. 54. The council lost the second round as well. 
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the cause of another. The implied conflict between political considerations arising out of changed 
circumstances and arbitrary legal rules is made clear in his judgment:  
We do not at present see that there is not a duty plainly incumbent on the united 
counties....to make the road they are desired to make. It may be that by reason of 
there having been a railway lately constructed in that section of the county the 
prospect of a remunerating revenue from such a road may have become impaired; 
but that has not been set up as a reason, nor could, as we supposed, be accepted as 
a valid one. Neither is it shown that for want of funds, or the legal authority to 
raise them, a compliance with the statute is impossible.  
If the defendants should appear to be without any legal excuse... then the case 
would be one of a duty imposed by act of Parliament remaining unperformed. 
And if there should appear to be nothing unreasonable in insisting upon 
performance, why should it not be enforced?  
It could only be on account of some difficulty in extending the remedy by 
mandamus to a municipal body, and in rendering it effectual. At present we do not 
see that there is such difficulty when there appears to be no other remedy. But we 
think it clearly proper that we should award only a mandamus nisi at present, in 
order that any question of law or fact that may be raised upon the return may be 
disposed of formally....280 
 
Municipalities and their challengers were undeterred by this judicial spinelessness and continued 
to seek resolution of their conflicts in court. Robinson was soon impelled to stray from the 
disinterest he articulated in Dickson, and his successors showed a greater acceptance of the role 
of advisor, at least to the extent of providing statutory interpretation.  
One reason why the superior courts may have been moved to begin to provide helpful 
hints in the form of dicta was that they could not help but observe that frequently the relevant 
statutes were confusing in their construction and contradictory in their application. Exasperation 
with poor legislative drafting was often expressly stated; Chief Justice (and municipal law 
expert) Robert Harrison being especially prone to ex cathedra denunciations of “careless” 
                                                          
280 Augusta (Township) and Leeds and Grenville (United Counties) (Re), [1854] O.J. No. 98, 12 U.C.R. 522, 
(UCQB), para. 9. 
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statutes resulting in “needless” suits.281 The various school acts in particular were found to be 
frustrating for boards, councils and courts alike because of their inconsistent regulations, a 
problem which persisted throughout the period. To take just one example, one set of rules and 
procedure for making demands of councils was provided for grammar schools and a divergent 
set for elementary schools.282 The messy interface between the boards’ rights to funding and the 
municipalities’ rights to control their budgets was complicated by the reality that both were 
institutions of low governance blessed with the legitimacy of democratic election. Though judges 
did usually hold school boards to a high standard of proper process, they ultimately sided with 
the trustees, in deference to the will of the legislature, but also in recognition that stable funding 
for education and the role of the latter in provincial progress had as much value as the right of 
democratically elected councils to control tax revenue. Stated Chief Justice Robinson: “The 
interests of the common schools are too important in a large city to admit of a sudden suspension 
of their proceedings, from any dispute between the two authorities, if it can possibly be avoided. 
It would produce the utmost inconvenience.” 283 One concession to local autonomy and the 
democratic principle was allowed in the courts’ refusal to allow school boards to dictate the 
manner in which their requests would be fulfilled. As long as the funds were forthcoming, the 
                                                          
281 For instance, in Niagara High School Board v. Niagara (Township), [1876] O.J. No. 132, 39 U.C.R. 362, 
(Ont.QB): “It is to be regretted that the Legislature has not in each section used precisely the same words to denote 
precisely the same thing. We do not, however, look upon the difference in language as indicating anything more 
than the carelessness of the framers of the Act. But we regret to say that the carelessness of the framers of the Act is 
still more obvious the further we proceed in the reading of the Act.” (paras. 44, 45, 46). 
282 This was especially confusing in the case where single board managed both school levels. See Perth Board of 
Education v. Perth (Town), [1876] O.J. No. 102, 39 U.C.R. 34 (Ont.QB). Once he had disentangled the statutes, 
Chief Justice Harrison ordered a mandamus nisi in this case “...in the hope that the parties will come to an 
understanding which will meet the demand of the joint board without being oppressive to the ratepayers...” He 
added the warning that “... if not, that the legal questions involved may be formally raised by demurrer or plea and in 
the event of the joint board being ultimately successful, a peremptory writ shall be issued, which the council must 
obey under pain of attachment.” (para. 81) 
283 Toronto School Board v. Toronto (City), [1860-1869] O.J. No. 151, 20 U.C.R. 302, 2 Chy. Chrs. 304. 
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courts refused to permit school trustees to force a recalcitrant council to issue debentures or 
institute a dedicated rate.284 
 
Restrictions on Power: Quashing By-laws 
The corporate form chosen by the legislature for local governance meant that municipal councils 
were in law merely agents of the municipal corporation, and could act only by resolution or by-
laws.285 The courts made it clear early in the period that a resolution was insufficient to exercise 
the powers granted by the legislature, though if the legislation specifically allowed for a 
resolution (as, for example in choosing a county seat), or if there was a statutory duty to act, a 
resolution would suffice.286 Summary jurisdiction was given to the superior courts by s.163 of 
the Municipal Act (1849) to quash municipal by-laws for illegality. Again, we cannot speculate 
too much on the number of cases as indicative of the likelihood that a corporation might face a 
quashing application. Without a doubt most by-laws passed into law uneventfully. However, it is 
clear that the danger of a challenge was present until the deadline, after the legislature restricted 
the time for bringing such applications.287  
The legitimacy of the of the courts’ right to quash as granted by the statute was such that 
even the competing ideal of local democracy could not compete. As Chief Justice Harrison noted 
in Baird v. Alamonte (Village), the quashing procedure guaranteed that the rights of the 
individual could not be extinguished, no matter how overwhelming the support for the by-law in 
                                                          
284 Port Hope School Board v. Port Hope (Town), [1854] O.J. No. 170, 4 U.C.C.P. 418 (UCCP). 
285 Per Burns J. in Municipality of East Nissouri v. Horseman, [1858] 16 U.C.R. 583: “The members or councillors 
composing the council are not the corporation; they are the agents of the corporation for the management of the 
affairs and funds of the corporation.” This leading Ontario case was cited in a number of American works, including 
John Forest Dillon’s treatise, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations, (3rd ed.) vol. 1 (Boston: Little 
Brown and Co.) 260, 902. 
286 U.C. v. Bruce (County), [1861] O.J. No. 227, 11 U.C.C.P. 57; Croft v. Peterborough (Town), [1855] O.J. No. 
102, 5 U.C.C.P. 35 (UCCP).  
287 See Chapter 2. 
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council, or even by the ratification of the electors, “....so long as there remained a single 
dissatisfied rate-payer, his right to invoke the aid of the Courts for the carrying out of the law is 
not to be lost because the majority of the rate-payers is disposed to acquiesce in a breach of the 
law.” 288 The determination of such ‘dissatisfied rate-payers’ was responsible for eighty-five 
applications to quash that resulted in reported judgments during this period. These provide 
abundant examples of the range and character of activities which could bring a council to court 
to defend itself, and the willingness of the courts, within the limits they felt were set out by the 
statutes, to indulge challenges to municipal authority.  
 The first thing to be noted in reviewing the quashing cases is how few manifest any bona 
fide desire by local governments to truly extend their autonomy. Not surprisingly, many cases 
quashed for extra-jurisdictional experimentation involved obvious self-interest on the part of the 
council members. Judges had little sympathy for councillors who put their own interests ahead of 
those of the ratepayers by straightforwardly voting themselves salaries in clear contravention of 
the statute, or by more roundabout methods, such as covering the expenses of a colleague’s 
(unsuccessful) election challenge defence or attempting to interpret the rights of county 
councillors to travel expenses liberally.289 Reimbursement for actual travel was permitted; the 
court refused to extend this statutory indulgence to expenses of accommodation. Similarly, the 
attempt of one town to vote an honorarium to a long-serving mayor on his retirement was 
quashed as ultra vires the corporation.290 Per diems were allowed, but allowances were not, and 
the council was not allowed to do indirectly what it could not do directly. Still, there are hints 
                                                          
288 Baird and Almonte (Village) (Re), [1877] O.J. No. 108, 41 U.C.R. 415 (Ont.QB), para. 86. 
289 See In re Wright and the Municipal Council of the Township of Cornwall, [1852] O.J. No. 100, 9 U.C.R. 442 (no 
right to pass by-law remunerating council members); In re Henry Bell v. The Municipality of the Township of 
Manvers, [1853] O.J. No. 210, 3 U.C.C.P 400 (no right to indemnify a candidate for costs of a contested election 
challenge; Patterson and Grey (County), [1859] O.J. No. 55, 18 U.C.R. 189 (UCQB) (no right to pass by-law re 
reimbursement of travel expenses). 
290 McLean v. Cornwall (Town), [1871] O.J. No. 60, 31 U.C.R. 314 (Ont.QB). 
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that this action might not have attracted the ire of one or more ratepayers, and the disapproval of 
the court, had it not been so “extravagant and unreasonable, and out of all proportion to the 
revenue of the town:” taxes for the year were $3324, the rejected honorarium $1600.291  
But reported cases resulting from attempts to increase the number or categories of powers 
allowed to municipal councils, whether made in good faith or bad, were few. In Bell v. Manvers 
(Township) [no.2,] the same council that had attempted to indemnify a losing candidate for his 
election challenge was (successfully) attacked by the same ratepayer for an attempt to change the 
qualification of voters.292 The accommodating dicta of Chief Justice Robinson in Richmond to 
the effect that townships should be allowed to legislate asymmetrically under the residual good 
government power did not herald an era of liberal interpretation of this section.293 The chief 
justice began the trend to restrictive interpretation himself when he refused to allow delegation of 
corporate responsibility over roads to commissioners in another early case..294  
One case that did show a municipality’s interest in exercising the general power in order 
to legislate for a unique problem was Davis v. Clifton (Town).295 The town council of Clifton 
(now Niagara Falls) sought to use the clause to justify a by-law prohibiting “persons calling 
themselves runners” from soliciting visitors and acting as guides within the limits of the town.296 
Chief Justice Draper, while expressing sympathy with the council’s “good sense and practical 
experience,” in dealing with this somewhat sui generis urban problem, found that the “general 
                                                          
291 McLean v. Cornwall (Town), [1871] O.J. No. 60, 31 U.C.R. 314, (Ont.QB), para. 25.  
292 In re Henry Bell v. The Municipality of the Township of Manvers, [1853] O.J. No. 209, 3 U.C.C.P 399 (UCQB).  I 
have added the “no.2” in the text above: the original reports did not distinguish the identical styles of cause of the 
two discrete proceedings. 
293 See Chapter 2 regarding the repeal of the municipal PWGG clause. Note, however, that the Temperance Act 
(1864), 27 & 28 Vic. c.18, included a general power to regulate and govern. 
294 In re W.S. Conger and Peterboro' Municipal Council, [1851] O.J. No. 16, 8 U.C.R. 349 (UCQB). See also The 
Canada Company v. The Municipal Council of the County of Middlesex, [1852] O.J. No. 13, 10 U.C.R. 93 (UCCB) 
(council cannot delegate the calculation of a sum to be raised by a by-law to the clerk ex post facto). 
295 Re Davis v. Municipality of Clifton, [1858] O.J. No. 265, 8 U.C.C.P. 236 (UCCP). 
296 Presumably this was enacted in good faith. But since local innkeepers were exempted, it may be that one or more 
individuals from this profession was on or connected to council and sought to reduce competition. 
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power to make by-laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of a town” could not extend 
to the “absolute prohibition of any occupation, not in itself unlawful, and only a nuisance from 
its abuse.”297 The general power itself was dropped from the act shortly thereafter, and judges 
continued to refuse to read in powers for municipalities to regulate either occupations or 
categories of trade.298 On several occasions the court suggested remedial legislation as the 
solution, and in one case it appears that the remedial act was actually passed before the quashing 
application reached the Queen’s Bench.299 The by-law to provide for ‘coloured’ school sections 
attacked in Simmons v. Chatham was quashed, sadly not as against public policy, but because its 
operation was by definition uncertain.300 The education and municipal acts were conceptually 
                                                          
297 Re Davis v. Municipality of Clifton, [1858] O.J. No. 265, 8 U.C.C.P. 236 (UCCP), para. 6. 
298 IN THE MATTER OF Hagaman and Chisholm, and the Corporation of the Town of Owen Sound, [1861] O.J. 
No. 114, 20 U.C.R. 583 (UCQB) by-law authorised individuals to erect wharves; and also to remunerate themselves 
by charging tolls on goods, part of which were directed to be paid to the treasurer of the municipality); Farquhar et 
al. v. The Corporation of the City of Toronto, [1860] O.J. No. 217, 10 U.C.C.P. 379 (UCCP) (act did not authorise 
the imposition of a tax per cord upon wood brought into town and not placed in the public wood market for sale); In 
re Campbell and the Corporation of the City of Kingston, [1864] O.J. No. 169, 14 U.C.C.P. 285 (UCCP) (quashed a 
“by-law which imposed tonnage dues on scows, craft, rafts, railway cars, etc. coming into the city... containing 
firewood to be exposed or offered for sale or marketed for consumption within the city); IN THE MATTER OF 
Charles Fennell and The Corporation of the Town of Guelph, [1865] 24 U.C.R. 238 (UCQB) (by-law, whereby “no 
person should expose for sale any meat, fish, poultry, eggs, butter, cheese, grain, hay, straw, cordwood, shingles, 
lumber, flour, wool, meal, vegetables, or fruit (except wild fruit), hides or skins, within the town, at any place but 
the public market, without having, first paid the market fee thereon, as therein provided, except all hides and skins 
from animals slaughtered by the licensed butchers of the corporation holding stalls in the market,” (quashed); 
Kinghorn and Kingston (City), [1866] O.J. No. 24, 26 U.C.R. 130 (UCQB)( by-law prohibiting any person bringing 
produce, articles, commodities or things to a city market, from selling or offering the same for sale within the city 
limits, on their way to market, or without having paid market toll, and before offering such things for sale in the 
market (quashed); Re McLean and The Corporation of The Town of St. Catharines, [1868] O.J. No. 86, 27 U.C.R. 
603 (UCQB)( by-law enacted that no butcher, huckster, or runner, should buy or contract for any kind of fresh meat, 
provisions, &c, such as were usually sold in the market, on the roads, streets, or any place within the town, or within 
one mile distant therefrom, between certain hours in the day, quashed as act restricted to butchers living within one 
mile of town); Snell and Belleville (Town), [1870] O.J. No. 44, 30 U.C.R. 81 (UCQB) per Wilson J:“The power to 
prevent or regulate the buying and selling of articles exposed for sale or marketed is more extensive than the 
Legislature could probably have intended to give, and would, if literally exercised, cover almost any enactment.” 
(para. 31). 
299 IN THE MATTER OF Hagaman and Chisholm, and the Corporation of the Town of Owen Sound, [1861] O.J. 
No. 114, 20 U.C.R. 583 (UCQB). The court took note that the remedial legislation had been passed, but proceeded 
with the judgment in any event.  The judges declined to explain, but presumably the action continued so a costs 
order could be made, and the court and/or parties could avail themselves of an opportunity to interpret the statute for 
future guidance.  
300 Simmons v. Chatham (Township), [1861] O.J. No. 17, 21 U.C.R. 75 (UCQB). See Robin W. Winks, The Blacks 
in Canada: A History, 2nd ed. (Montreal; Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 373-75. 
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based in property not persons; whether or not permitted by statute, any attempt to regulate using 
personal attributes as a proscribed class could not help but be problematic for the drafter.301  
Another initiative, an attempt by a municipal council to vote a bonus in the form of 
exemption from taxation to ‘new’ manufacturing, was quashed as a prohibition on trade (that is, 
an infringement of the rights of rival manufacturers).302 Concerns for prohibition of trade and the 
creation of monopolies were also the deciding factor in several cases involving by-laws 
restricting the number of taverns permitted in a jurisdiction to none or one. Although professing 
inability to go beyond the statutes in many other situations, the judges had no qualms invoking 
the common law to restrict the powers of municipal councils bent on ensuring temperance by 
means of restricting supply (and more importantly, suppliers). In these cases, the liberal virtue of 
freedom of commerce trumped all else, including the court’s evident agreement with the 
council’s temperance goals.       
Chief Justice Harrison, proclaiming the principle that “there must not be any unnecessary 
interference with trade” cited only American cases in support.303 Indeed, Harrison was masterful 
in professing to follow Upper Canadian cases, while drawing on American precedent to suppress 
local government autonomy. For instance, in the case involving the restriction of liquor shop 
licences, In re Thomas Brodie and the Corporation of the Town of Bowmanville, Harrison cited 
the dicta of Chief Justice Robinson in a similar case, Barclay v. Darlington, to the effect that 
judges are the stand-ins for the legislature in controlling the actions of municipal councils, which 
duties must be exercised responsibly, but then segued into a far stronger expression of the court’s 
                                                          
301 Mariana Valverde makes this point in Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 26. 
302 Pirie and Dundas (Town), [1869] O.J. No. 48, 29 U.C.R. 401 (UCQB). 




right to supervise than anything Robinson or his peers ever claimed.304 Again citing American 
precedent, Harrison left no doubt as to his lack of respect for the inherent legitimacy of local 
democratic governance, opining that  
[a] superintending power of a judicial character is necessary to be exercised in order to 
keep municipal bodies within legal and reasonable limits in the exercise of the powers 
delegated to them by the Legislature.... [M]unicipal powers are not only limited, but must 
be reasonably exercised and not only strictly within the limits conferred by the 
Legislature, but in perfect subordination to the law of the land.305  
 
Somewhat unconvincingly, he pre-emptively countered any suspicion that this was due to any 
self-aggrandizing impulse on the part of the bench, thereby implicitly reinforcing the subtext that 
municipal councils could not be trusted: “It is a description of control from which any Court to 
whom it is committed would rather be relieved.”306 
Many cases in which by-laws were called into question were more prosaic, and revolved 
on form as much, or more than substance. While the earlier court of Robinson and his colleagues 
was not interested in ‘reading in’ powers or giving them expansive meaning, they were 
remarkably sanguine about those ‘errors on face of the by-law’ which seemed to be bona fide 
mistakes, rather than devious or self-interested power grabs. One reason given for this leniency 
was the lack of legal sophistication of many of the rural councils. Judges were also conscious of 
the labyrinthine character of the intersecting statutes which governed municipalities, especially 
in regard to raising money by taxation or debentures. In one early case, Grierson v. Ontario 
                                                          
304 In re Thomas Brodie and the Corporation of the Town of Bowmanville, [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 
(Ont.QB); Barclay v. Darlington (Township)(Re), [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 (Ont.QB).  
305 In re Thomas Brodie and the Corporation of the Town of Bowmanville, [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 
(Ont.QB); Barclay v. Darlington (Township)(Re), [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 (Ont.QB), paras. 8, 11. 
306 In re Thomas Brodie and the Corporation of the Town of Bowmanville, [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 (Ont. 
QB); Barclay v. Darlington (Township)(Re), [1876] O.J. No. 366, 38 U.C.R. 580 (Ont.QB), para. 9. 
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(County), Robinson C.J. listed twenty-nine discrete sections and schedules found in seven acts 
that were relevant to a by-law imposing a county rate.307       
Certainty was required where property was affected, as in expropriation cases, wherein 
the court insisted on clear metes and bounds description of the road to be laid out or altered as 
well as its course.308 Reference to collateral documents would not be allowed in this context. 
With regard to taxation by-laws, however, the courts tended to give the by-law the benefit of the 
doubt, assuming a second by-law could cure any confusion created by imperfect wording. 
However, they were also careful to remind councils that a by-law, even if allowed to stand, could 
still be called into question when enforced against an individual or other institution, exposing the 
corporation to civil liability.  
Concerning the express statutory requirement that a by-law must be under seal, the 
absence of which might have been expected to be an unforgiveable error, the courts gave 
municipalities the benefit of the doubt by allowing an imperfect format, subject again to 
warnings about the potential consequences of acting under an illegally constituted power. The 
motivation in these cases seems to have been practicality and a desire to keep local government 
functioning. Several cases mentioned concerns that by-laws that had been acted on could not be 
allowed to fail merely because the seal or the appropriate signature was missing. Funds derived 
from an ineptly drafted rate, for example, could hardly be easily reimbursed by the municipality; 
the embryonic bureaucracies and their pen and ink record keeping would have been severely 
challenged by such a finding. The conclusion that judges were bending over backwards to 
support the council as proxy for the public, especially in its taxpaying capacity, is supported by 
the fact that judges showed much less compunction in contract cases, often siding with the 
                                                          
307 Grierson v. Ontario (County), [1852] O.J. No. 139, 9 U.C.R. 623 (UCQB). 
308 See for example, Brown v. York (County), [1851] O.J. No. 60, 8 U.C.R. 596 (UCQB). 
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incompetent clerk or deceitful council against the honest party attempting to recoup for services 
or goods tendered. Though exceptions were carved out over the period for contracts where the 
goods or service had been accepted, contracts within the power of corporations, part of their 
‘ordinary expenditure’ or concerning which they had a duty to perform, at the end of the period 
municipalities were still pleading restrictive English case law, often disingenuously, to avoid 
paying contractors with whom they were dissatisfied. In 1877, Justice Wilson explained this 
judicial pro-municipal bias:  
A municipal body is, by law, protected from many claims for which a private person 
would be liable and it is right for the sake of those whom the councils of such bodies 
represent that it should be so, otherwise the ratepayers would be exposed to many 
unreasonable and extortionate demands.309 
 
Possibly due to the courts’ willingness to overlook them, or the gradual improvement of 
drafting practices and use of professional drafters, challenges to by-laws on account of defects of 
form lessened throughout the period.310 What remained constant were challenges that sought to 
introduce so-called ‘extraneous matters,’ such as pre-requisites of ratepayer petitions, newspaper 
notifications, council quorums and votes, and ratification or initiation procedures which failed in 
varying respects to meet the criteria mandated by statute, as grounds to strike down a by-law. 
None of these met the test of appearance on the face of the record, and thus were not appropriate 
issues for an application for summary judgment. But as much as they paid lip service to this self-
denying doctrine, the judges of Canada West and then Ontario found themselves unable to avoid 
                                                          
309 Gibson v. Ottawa (City), [1877] O.J. No. 61, 42 U.C.R.172 (Ont.QB), para. 33. The courts were even stricter 
when contracts were entered into when the council had not passed a by-law, or did not have power to so contract. 
Judges put contractors on strict notice that it was up to them to determine whether the council had power to enter 
into the transaction, without regard for the fact that if that was often difficult for the council, it would be doubly so 
for the party seeking to do business. For judicial treatment of contracts not under seal for corporations generally, see 
Risk, "The Nineteenth Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario," 284. 
310 For the development of drafting of zoning by-laws in nineteenth-century Toronto, see Raphaël Fischler, 
"Development Controls in Toronto in the Nineteenth Century," Urban History Review / Revue d'Histoire Urbaine 
36, no. 1 (2007): 16-31. 
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dealing with these questions. The alternative, to wait until the illegality of a by-law was raised in 
a civil or quasi-criminal proceeding at some possibly distant and certainly unforeseeable point in 
the future, thereby throwing the operation of municipal affairs and local law into doubt and 
confusion, undermining the legitimacy of prosecutions, tax collection, destabilizing debentures 
and municipal creditors, was not an attractive prospect.  
The first reported case to address the problem of raising the corporate veil in regard to a 
by-law after the passage of the Baldwin Act was In re Hill and Walsingham (Township). The 
point was not necessary to the outcome, but the court pondered the arguments which had been 
raised by the applicant:  
Whether we ought not merely to hold a by-law void when brought before us in support of 
any act done under it, by reason of its having been in some measure irregularly passed; 
but also to entertain a motion on such a ground for setting it aside, is a question of much 
importance. If we should feel it incumbent upon us in any case to interfere, it would not 
be.... under the.... statute...but on the general principles of the common law, that it is 
necessary to the validity of a by-law that the mode of passing it prescribed by its charter 
should be strictly pursued....311 
 
The next year Chief Justice Robinson set out the rule in Grierson v. Ontario (County) that the 
court was only “bound” to quash by-laws appearing illegal on their face, but it was discretionary 
on them under the common law to quash where illegality was proved by extraneous evidence.312 
Once again diffident about creating such a significant precedent, he allowed that “[he] would 
have taken more time to make up [his mind] upon this application, if [he] were not apprehensive 
that considerable public inconvenience might arise from the county being kept long in 
suspense.”313 
                                                          
311 Hill and Walsingham (Township) (Re), [1851] O.J. No. 126, 9 U.C.R. 310 (UCQB), per Robinson C.J, para. 7. 
312 Grierson v. Ontario (County), [1852] O.J. No. 139, 9 U.C.R. 623 (UCQB). 
313 Ibid, per Robinson C.J, para 12. 
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Grierson became the leading case in challenges to by-laws based on defects of their 
passing. The courts did use their discretion by examining, often in detail, what had gone on 
behind the record. When the deficient procedures were not taken in bad faith (good faith being 
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary) and no-one was deprived of opportunities 
to oppose the by-law by reason of inadequate notices, by-laws arising from unorthodox processes 
were generally allowed to stand. This laissez-faire attitude was not conducive to legal certainty 
and the ability of solicitors to properly advise councillors, but judges were increasingly 
comfortable with the practice. As Mr. Justice Gwynne put it “these [are the] days...of amendment 
of mere formal and technical irregularities.”314 
The legislature was seemingly unfazed by councils ignoring procedural strictures with the 
blessing of the courts, and indeed introduced a weak privative clause into the Temperance Act of 
1864. By section 37, the act decreed that by-laws made under the statute should not be quashed 
for reasons of defects in form or procedure.315 In spite of his earlier preference for certainty, as a 
judge Harrison was fervent in his dislike of legislative attempts at curtailing judicial discretion, 
and hence judicial power. The saving clause in the Temperance Act barely gave him pause. In Re 
Malone v. Grey (County), he refused to strike down a temperance act by-law for the early closing 
of a poll where it did not appear to have affected the result of the mandated plebiscite, but 
expressed a “doubt” that several previous cases dealing with the section had given “full effect” to 
it. “It is possible,” he warned, “that the decisions under the statute may be distinguished as to 
avoid any actual inconsistency between them, but...it is not necessary to make the attempt to 
reconcile them.”316  
                                                          
314 Brophy and Gananoque (Village), [1876] O.J. No. 193, 26 U.C.C.P. 290 (UCCP), para.10. 
315 Temperance Act, 1864, 27 & 28 Vic. c.18, s.37. 
316 Malone and Grey (County) (Re), [1877] O.J. No. 82, 41 U.C.R. 159 (Ont.QB). 
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Several months later, in Re Mace and Frontenac (County), Chief Justice Harrison found 
no such saving grace in an illegally passed by-law, even for the admirable purpose of “repression 
of these evils.”317 The fact that the by-law included a penalty (a fine, with imprisonment on 
default), with no right of certiorari or appeal (provided the conviction had been made by a 
stipendiary magistrate, recorder, justice of the peace, sheriff, or police magistrate) was for him 
the deciding factor, and he found it was the court’s duty to quash. He distinguished the 
precedents and invoked “the natural liberty of the subject” to trump the social goal of 
temperance.318 Questioning what appeared to him to be a tendency to uncritical judicial 
acceptance of municipal errors, the Chief Justice pondered whether there could be any 
justification: 
It is illegal.... But it is argued that it ought not to be quashed, because its quashing would 
unsettle the new state of things created by the by-law. This argument, if admitted, would 
render it needless to quash any by-law, however oppressive, or prevent the amendment of 
any law, however vexatious. It was an argument to which, obviously, little effect was 
given when the by-law was supposed to have been carried, and is entitled to as little 
consideration now as then. Cases where, after the money authorized to be raised by a by-
law has been expended, and the municipality has obtained the benefit of the expenditure, 
and the by-law itself has become effete, afford no analogy for the decision of this case.319 
 
The privative clause, he ruled, had no effect because the by-law was a void proceeding. And as 
far as the option of waiting to strike it down when challenged after enforcement was concerned, 
that alternative was merely a waste of time. As he put it in another by-law case, Re Revell and 
Oxford (County), “the sooner [the void by-law] is out of the way the better for all, except those 
interested in the maintenance of imposture.”320 
                                                          
317 Mace and Frontenac (County) (Re), [1877] O.J. No. 54, 42 U.C.R. 70 (Ont.QB). Harrison was joined in the 
decision by Wilson and Armour JJ., though less zealously: per Wilson, J. “I rather concur with than dissent from the 
judgment just pronounced.” (para. 121). 
318 Mace and Frontenac (County) (Re), [1877] O.J. No. 54, 42 U.C.R. 70 (Ont.QB) para. 95. 
319 Mace and Frontenac (County) (Re), [1877] O.J. No. 54, 42 U.C.R. 70 (Ont.QB) para. 106. 




Liability: Cases of Nuisance and Negligence Resulting in Personal Injury  
The Municipal Act of 1849 preserved the English quasi-criminal remedy of indictment of a body 
entrusted with road maintenance for the misdemeanour of non-repair, and I have already referred 
to the mention of this remedy by several judges as a (preferable) alternative to a mandamus 
application.321 Although there are only a couple of reported cases arising directly from an 
indictment, it seems to have been a healthy remedy during the period.322 There were significant 
distinctions between the English law on the subject and Upper Canadian statutes. First, while 
English law allowed courts to fine the responsible road commissioners or members of a 
corporation or parish as individuals for their neglect of roads, the Municipal Act provided only 
that the corporation should be fined, with the payment to come out of the general funds.323 
Another significant deviation from the English system was the addition of a civil remedy 
(with the first amendment to the act), which permitted an individual to sue the corporation for 
damages caused by failure to maintain roads or bridges.324 During the period 1850-1880, 
nineteen reported judgments (including two appeals of previously reported cases) dealt with 
                                                          
321 An instance of legal inertia: the influence of the indictment tradition on the procedure of at least the earlier cases 
is manifest by the plea of not guilty, or not guilty per statute, which was appropriate to a quasi-criminal proceeding, 
but not a purely civil one. See, for example, McCarthy v. Oshawa (Village), [1860], [1860-1869] O.J. No. 27, 19 
U.C.R. 245, 2 Chy. Chrs. 41 (UCQB). 
322 R. v. Haldimand (County), [1861] O.J. No. 113, 20 U.C.R. 574, moved back to Queen’s Bench by way of 
certiorari after an unsuccessful mandamus application. The standard of repair that would lead to a successful 
indictment was also at issue in contract disputes between municipalities and the road companies who contracted to 
build or maintain roads in exchange for the right to exact tolls, revealed in the archival records to have been a 
common practice. 
323 The English law of indictment for non-repair is discussed in several case reports, including Colbeck v. Brantford 
(Township), [1861] O.J. No. 53, 21 U.C.R. 276 (UCQB) paras. 9, 11. See also Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Statutory 
Authorities for Special Purposes: With a Summary of the Development of Local Government Structure, (London: F. 
Cass, 1963).  
324 In Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in 19th Century America (North Carolina Press, 1997) Peter 
Karsten argues that statutes opened the door to findings of negligence against municipal corporations in England, 
and then also in North America. See also James Muir “Instrumentalism and the Law of Injuries in Nineteenth 
Century Nova Scotia” in From Imperial Bastion to Provincial Oracle: The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, 1754-
2004 ed. Philip Girard and Jim Phillips (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for The Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, 2004), 361-391, 373. 
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municipal liability for injury to persons arising from negligence (and nuisance), fewer than the 
number of reported mandamus cases and much fewer than the number of quashing cases. The 
cases of municipal liability for damages to persons are also much less evenly distributed across 
the years than the mandamus and quashing cases. There are no reported cases on the liability of 
municipal corporations for damages to persons at all during the 1850s. Possibly due to reforms to 
the court system and rules of civil procedure, three cases appeared during the 1860s, and the 
remainder during the 1870s.325    
Reported cases regarding municipal liability for personal injury, relatively few within the 
overall set as they may be, were clearly considered legally significant, as evidenced by the 
generally greater number of separate written opinions within the judgments, together with the 
copious amount of research manifest by these; one judge alluded to the ‘exhaustive’ 124 
paragraph opinion of his colleague.326 Moreover, damages awarded by juries against municipal 
corporations for negligence resulting in personal injury could be sizeable, in the thousands of 
dollars.327 With so much money at stake, it is no wonder that parties were still willing to appeal 
and occasionally re-appeal to have these judgments sent back for re-trial. 
Not surprisingly, the earliest cases decided under the act examined the legal bases for of 
this new type of civil action at length. Colbeck and Wife v. The Corporation of the Town of 
                                                          
325 It does appear, however, that there were contract cases involving the standards of upkeep required of road 
companies which included as a factor the responsibility of municipalities civilly and by indictment. 
326 Toms v. Whitby (Township), [1874] O.J. No. 58, 35 U.C.R. 195 (Ont.QB) per Richards, C.J., para. 172. The 
opinion of Wilson J. was 124 paragraphs. That of Chief Justice Richards, partly concurring, was about half that 
length. 
327 The highest amount at issue in the personal injury cases was $4000.00, awarded by a jury in Toms v. Whitby 
(Township), [1874] O.J. No. 58, 35 U.C.R. 195 (Ont.QB). It was agreed by the judges that this was too high. Awards 
of damages to property cases, of which there were eleven during this period, were much lower. The award of 
$325.00 against the City of Toronto in nuisance/negligence for damages to a house from a backed-up drain, the 
installation of which by the corporation’s contractors was mandated by by-law, was considered reasonable by the 
Court of Queen’s Bench in 1861: Reeves v. Toronto (City), [1861] O.J. No. 32, 21 U.C.R. 157. Damages to real 
property arising from common law nuisance claims tended to be in the hundreds of dollars. For the conflation of 
nuisance and negligence in Ontario law see Michael A. Jones, "The Historical Development of Tortious Liability for 
Public Nuisance" (LLM thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1980). 
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Brantford, decided in 1861, focused on the statutory nature of the remedy. The defendants 
attempted to use English common law to excuse the evidently poor state of the road in question, 
arguing that they were exempt from liability because they had appointed an overseer and passed 
a by-law. Chief Justice Robinson was unswayed; these defences would be fine, he agreed, if only 
there were not a statute to the contrary. In addition, he remarked, “[i]f the fact of the township 
having passed proper by-laws, and appointed overseers, would exempt them from liability, the 
traveller would, in many cases, perhaps in most, fail to receive the redress.”328 
This emphasis on the statutory foundation of the claim was a constant theme throughout 
the cases. The object of the relevant clauses was identified in Castor v. The Corporation of 
Uxbridge as the protection of the populace, and the concomitant rule of statutory interpretation 
applied: “We should...give to the Act such, fair, large and liberal construction as will best ensure 
the attainment of the object.”329 The fact that statutory powers were given to municipalities to 
maintain streets and sidewalks was considered a relevant factor in determining duty in several 
cases, Ringland v. Toronto (discussed below) to the contrary being an exception.330 The statute-
given ability to raise money from the public to carry out repairs was also adverted to in Colbeck 
to counter the English common law defence of insufficient funds. The inclusion in the statute of 
the power of municipalities to legislate to protect travellers from pits and precipices was given as 
another such clue as to legislative purpose, called “a special ground of obligation and 
responsibility.”331 
                                                          
328 Colbeck v. Brantford (Township), [1861] O.J. No. 53, 21 U.C.R. 276 (UCQB), para. 11. 
329 Castor v. The Corporation of Uxbridge, [1876], 39 U.C.R. 113, para. 47. 
330 Ringland v. Toronto (City), [1873] O.J. No. 100, 23 U.C.C.P. 93 (Ont.CP). 




While the common law could not be employed to excuse a municipal corporation, it was 
held in Harrold v. Simcoe County that it could be employed to augment liability. The defendant 
corporations in Harrold tried to rely on the absence of counties from the statutory list of levels of 
municipal corporations impressed with a duty of road repair to no avail; road maintenance, the 
court ruled, was mandated by statute and also by common law.332 This is not to say that common 
law defences and factors could never be used in the corporations’ favour. The law around the 
concept of notice could be and was used in defence of neglectful municipalities. For example, in 
Ayre v. The Corporation of Toronto the court found that the city was not liable for the damage 
caused by rubbish piled in the street on a particular occasion due to lack of notice, even though 
there was evidence the council had previously sanctioned the general practice.333  
Also useful to municipal defendants were the inter-related (and conflated) concepts of 
proximate cause and contributory negligence.334 That the damage complained of must have been 
‘caused’ by the defendant’s neglect was at the heart of the claim. In the first few cases neither 
proximate cause nor contributory negligence is mentioned explicitly. Causation in regard to the 
plaintiff’s actions, rather than the defendant’s neglect, was key: for example, did the plaintiff 
take a shortcut over a ditch on a plank he had placed there instead of walking around the 
obstacle? Where the plaintiff had actual notice of a hazard and failed to take a path to safety, the 
                                                          
332 Harrold v. Simcoe (County), [1865] O.J. No. 120, 16 U.C.C.P. 43 (UCCP). 
333 Ayre v. The Corporation of The City of Toronto, [1879] O.J. No. 285, 30 U.C.C.P. 225. 
334 Note that the concept of proximate cause was not used in the contemporary sense of remoteness. Rather, the 
proximate cause was the factual cause.  In his history of the development of tort law in the United States, Edward 
White refers to this as the ‘legal’ cause. Unfortunately, his discussion of causation pre-Palgraf is somewhat sparse: 
G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: an Intellectual History (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 314-17. James Muir finds that because it was a complete defense to negligence, contributory negligence was 
a “potent defence” for the city of Halifax in nineteenth century personal injury suits, but that the doctrine offered 
“little protection from subsequent suits;” Muir, “Instrumentalism and the Law of Injuries in Nineteenth Century 
Nova Scotia,” 377. 
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courts felt this, as much as the hazard, had ‘caused’ the mishap, whether the street was in repair 
or not.335 
The first mention of ‘proximate cause’ comes in 1874 in Toms v. Whitby.336 Mr. Justice 
Wilson, in the lengthy opinion referred to above, struggled with the problem of choosing whether 
the reason that the horse and carriage carrying Mrs. Toms and her son ended up in the river was 
that the horse was frightened, or that there was no fence to stop the fall (a combination of the two 
factors was not contemplated). After a review of seemingly every Canadian, British and 
American authority on the point, he concluded in favour of the ‘New Hampshire’ rule, which 
held that where there were two or more necessary but not sufficient causes for an accident, the 
cause attributable to some sort of wrong doing should be found to be the proximate cause of the 
injury. Since two juries had absolved the wife and son of poor driving, Wilson J. found the lack 
of a fence was to blame, seemingly by a rationale of res ipsa loquitur.337 Chief Justice Richards 
concurred, but Mr. Justice Morrison described himself as doubtful, preferring the rule followed 
in the State of Maine to the effect that the corporation should not be liable if another cause could 
possibly have been to blame, but not so much as to register a dissent. 
The Maine rule was nevertheless followed in a case decided in the same year, Hutton v. 
Windsor (Town).  Mr. Hutton, a feeble elderly man, had (it was presumed) tripped on a board 
and been killed by a fall into a ditch. The court felt that since the deceased had had the 
opportunity to see the obstruction earlier in the day, it could not be said he was not partly 
culpable, and ordered that the case be sent back to the jury to determine if he had contributed at 
all to the fall by his negligence, in which case his estate’s claim should fail. The defendants 
                                                          
335 McCarthy v. Oshawa (Village), [1860], [1860-1869] O.J. No. 27, 19 U.C.R. 245, 2 Chy. Chrs. 41 (UCQB); 
Ringland v. Toronto (City), [1873] O.J. No. 100, 23 U.C.C.P. 93 (Ont.CP). 
336 Toms v. Whitby (Township), [1874] O.J. No. 58, 35 U.C.R. 195 (Ont.QB). 
337 Ibid.  
112 
 
appealed to the Court of Appeal, which upheld the trial judgment.338 The next few cases skirted 
the issue, merely declaring that the issues of ‘contributory negligence’ of the plaintiff and the 
connection between the alleged default and the accident were both questions for the jury.  
The conflict between the two schools of thought was supposedly resolved by Chief 
Justice Harrison in favour of the New Hampshire rule in Sherwood v. Hamilton in 1875. 
Although Harrison confessed that he personally preferred the Maine rule, which he had 
championed as counsel for the corporation in Toms, he considered himself bound by the Court of 
Appeal’s acceptance of the reasoning of the lower court. Nevertheless, the supposed triumph of 
the New Hampshire rule did not spell the end of the use of contributory negligence as a 
successful answer to a presumptive finding of negligence. In 1878, Harrison re-visited the rule 
from a different angle, ruling that plaintiff had the burden of proving that the accident—a slip on 
another icy sidewalk—was the ‘sole cause’ of her fall and that it could not have been avoided by 
greater attention on her part, since she had knowledge of the iciness.339  
Concepts of proximate cause and contributory negligence were clearly attractive to a 
series of judges who were able to use them to rule against plaintiffs if they thought these were 
unworthy of rate-payer funded largesse, while still issuing dicta holding municipalities to a high 
standard of maintenance. The rhetoric concerning the standard of repair expected, though often 
not the deciding factor in the outcome of the claims, was a clear communication of the judge’s 
view of appropriate municipal obligation. It was a standard that can be seen to rise over time, 
despite the shortness of the period and the relative paucity of cases.  
                                                          
338 Samuel Toms and Elizabeth Toms, his wife, plaintiffs in the Court below, respondents v The Corporation of The 
Township of Whitby, defendants in the Court below, appellants, [1875] O.J. No. 53, 37 U.C.R. 100, (Ont. E & A). 
339 Burns v. Toronto, [1878] O.J. No. 143, 42 U.C.R. 560 (Ont. High Ct). 
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At first the courts relied on a standard of repair that could theoretically give rise to an 
indictment. This was made explicit in Ringland v. Toronto (City). Mr. Justice Gwynne discussed 
the law of various jurisdictions, focussing especially on the “states of the American Union,” 
which he explained were “more in point than any English case can be in a case of this nature, by 
reason of the similarity of our Acts and the climate....” 340 The principle as set out in cases from 
Maine was adopted as it “seems to us reasonable, namely that such a state of repair as would 
exempt the City from liability on an indictment will also exempt them from liability in a civil 
action.”341The standard of repair likely to exempt a municipality from indictment was never 
given more definition than the term itself, but it can be assumed it was not a high one.  
The next year, Toms began a series of arguments which sought to raise the threshold of 
non-actionable repair: “it is reasonable the public should be protected from all danger on the 
highways, if possible...but at any rate from all danger that is very great.”342 Later, while still 
professing to follow Ringland, judges continued to erode the test until finally Chief Justice 
Harrison in Burns v. Toronto reduced it to the narrow holding (with which he agreed) that “a 
mere presence of ice” did not equal negligence. The Chief Justice went on to distinguish an older 
case involving a road company wherein Chief Justice Robinson said that it was not negligent to 
leave snow on a macadamized road. Arguing that the statutory language had changed since both 
these cases had been decided, and citing a string of exclusively American decisions, Harrison 
declared that if Ringland stood for the proposition that indictable neglect was the test of 
appropriate repair then he would “respectfully dissent.”343 His Burns test prescribed a level of 
extreme care: “If the highway be from any cause, whether of nature or man, in view of the 
                                                          
340 Ringland v. Toronto (City), [1873] O.J. No. 100, 23 U.C.C.P. 93 (Ont.CP), para. 22. 
341 Ibid. 
342 Toms v. Whitby (Township), [1874] O.J. No. 58, 35 U.C.R. 195, para. 73. 
343 Burns v. Toronto, [1878] O.J. No. 143, 42 U.C.R. 560 (Ont. High Ct.), paras. 58, 60. 
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season, situation and other attendant circumstances, in such a condition that it cannot be 
pronounced reasonably safe and convenient, it may be said to be out of repair.”344 Two 
components of this definition are noteworthy: first, as had been more or less explicit in earlier 
cases, the standard was to be understood in context, and second, what had been more implicit, 
that nuisance rather than just negligence was to be included.  
A couple of cases of nuisance as a ground of non-repair had already made their way to 
the superior courts with differing results. In Castor, the presence of contributory negligence by 
the plaintiff negated what would otherwise have been responsibility of the township for telegraph 
poles left at the side of the road (by a third party) that had disturbed a horse.345 In Rounds v. 
Stratford, a wagon (perhaps including a red board or perhaps not) that had been left in the road 
for a month was presumed to have frightened a horse, causing a spill and injury.346 In the latter 
case, the issue of causation was fatal to the plaintiff’s case when the court saw no connection 
between the length of time the wagon had been allowed to remain there and the horse’s 
reaction.347 In neither case did the court claim that liability could not be based in nuisance in a 
proper case. In 1876, overhanging trees were accepted as a hazard equivalent to non-repair 
without much comment.348 
Clearly the standard of road repair municipalities were expected to provide was rising. 
But the Burns test also allowed for mitigating circumstances. Judges had been careful from the 
outset to stipulate that the level of acceptable repair was to be relative to the geographic, 
                                                          
344 Ibid, para. 31. 
345 Castor v. The Corporation of the Township of Uxbridge, [1876] O.J. No. 107, 39 U.C.R. 113. 
346 Rounds v. Stratford, 19 U.C.R. 245, 2 Chy. Chrs. 41 (UCQB). The red board was considered a significant factor 
as one of the reasons a horse might be spooked. 
347 McCarthy v. Oshawa (Village), [1860], [1860-1869] O.J. No. 27 (UCQB); Rounds v. Stratford, 19 U.C.R. 245, 2 
Chy. Chrs. 41 (UCQB). The judge also wondered how the horse would manage in a city, with colours of all kinds 
and consulate flags flapping. 
348 Gilchrist v. Corporation of Carden, [1876] O.J. No. 161 (UCCP). 
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economic, climatic and demographic context. Hence the long-established roads of populated 
districts were presumed to be of better quality than rural tracks used mostly by sleighs in winter. 
The wealth of the community was therefore a relevant factor, but it was one which could serve 
both sides. In Boyle v. Dundas, the judge expressed great sympathy for a town of 4,000 residents, 
with taxes assessed at $11,000.00, of which more than half was spent on streets and sidewalks, 
faced with a jury award for damages totalling over $900.00.349 Although the legislation did not 
provide a ceiling, Chief Justice Hagarty observed that practically speaking, the power to assess 
was not unlimited, and such an award was “wholly disproportioned to their means and 
resources.”350  
Severe, changeable weather and the freeze-thaw cycle were considered especially 
relevant to sidewalk cases, including Boyle. However, the situational excuses available to rural 
roads were not extended to urban sidewalks. For some reason, judges seemed to feel all 
sidewalks in a particular urban place had to meet the same (lowest) level of repair. 
Unsurprisingly given this mindset, they did not find for the plaintiff in any reported sidewalk 
negligence case during this period. Sidewalks, they implied, were, if not a luxury, at least a 
comfort, and councils were to be thanked for their efforts rather than harassed about their 
failings. In the countryside, council-built drains were similarly to be appreciated, not 
condemned:  
The outcry is not that the drains are not fenced, but that the roads are not drained.... If all 
the ditches in the county, and every county are to be guarded because an accident may 
happen....it would impose upon the municipalities an intolerable burden, the performance 
of an almost impossible burden, and the fences put up....would be a nuisance worse than 
the ditch itself.351 
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Judges were highly conscious of the reception their judgments would receive from municipal 
councillors, whom they contemplated would be paying attention. In McCarthy v. Oshawa, Chief 
Justice Robinson proclaimed that “[w]e should be making a decision which would take all 
municipalities, both in town and country, by surprise, if we held that the defendants were 
chargeable with the accident which the plaintiff unfortunately met with.”352 The County of York, 
defendant in this case, would no doubt have been relieved that the jury award of $400.00 in the 
case was overthrown by an order of non-suit; whether they were heartened by the sympathetic 
words that accompanied the order seems likely as well.  
In Chapter 4 I look at the ways the law—both statute and case law—was communicated 
to the councils of Canada West/Ontario by municipal law manuals and other publications. 
Assuming councillors were aware of the cases reviewed here, what would have been the general 
messages received? Probably the most important was that all their activities could be monitored. 
The legislation by which they were established as “creatures of statute,” in conjunction with the 
received forms of the common law, included a number of ways rate-payers and other parties 
could invoke the power of the courts to scrutinize and pronounce on the legality of their deeds 
and their omissions. They could be forced to act (and, more importantly, spend considerable 
amounts of money) by an order of mandamus. Their legislation could be quashed, or at least 
judicially questioned, at the complaint of any dissatisfied ratepayer. If a horse was particularly 
sensitive or steps were slapdash, they might be sued by a resident or passerby who might be 
richly compensated by a sympathetic jury. Of course, if they could show they had acted in good 
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faith, a court might well be predisposed to aid them, or the ratepayers they represented; I have 
noted the ways the court could manipulate the outcome it thought most appropriate in these 
scenarios. But the discretion that the judges jealously guarded and indeed occasionally worked to 
expand could be just as easily used to the corporations’ favour as to their detriment. Robert 
Harrison’s lawyerly conviction that councils and their lawyers might prefer to encounter more 
clarity and certainty, and less equity and discretion from their judicial overseers as well as from 
legislative overlords, may well have been correct.  
For the historian, the cases as a whole and the three subsets lead to the same conclusion. 
Judicial oversight was random and rare, but was always a possibility. Judges might commiserate 
with councils over the challenges posed by complicated statutes, demanding school boards, and 
frightened horses, but they maintained their suspicions of incorrect expropriations, sharp practice 
in by-law voting, and conflicts of interest. The mandamus, quashing and liability cases are all 
evidence that W. Thomas Matthews’ contention that the ballot box was the only real check on 
municipal power in this period is overstated.353 We can also infer that although preservation of 
power and the tax base were priorities, increasing municipal power (as opposed to personal 
political power) was not a goal for municipal councils at this time, or that if it was, it was not 
generally expressed by testing the law in ways that would attract the attention of ratepayers and 
the censure of high court judges.  
Throughout the cases surveyed here, municipal corporations and their councils are 
implicitly defensive even when not explicitly so. The law they encountered, part of the legal 
system which created them and in which they operated, required them to know their place. The 
reported cases are evidence that while municipal councils did generally accept the system and 
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their place in it, they were also ready to exploit it, if not for autonomy vis à vis the province, then 
for the enhancement of their agency to achieve short term legal goals of victory in court, as well 









Just as they have concentrated on state ‘high’ law, so legal historians have generally restricted 
their discussion of legal publishing to ‘high’ publications aimed at judges and lawyers. In spite of 
the burgeoning ‘history of the law book’ field, there has been little research on the history of 
legal publications geared to laymen.354 This has had a restrictive effect on our knowledge of the 
legal culture of the non-lawyer. As Robert C. Berring and his successors have persuasively 
argued, the legal environment, the “world of thinkable thoughts” is constituted by the various 
means of communicating legal information which the thoughts and their thinkers produced and 
by which they were reproduced.355 
In this chapter I argue that municipal law books contributed to the creation of a discrete 
legal environment for municipal councillors and their clerks in mid-Victorian Ontario. These 
                                                          
354 See A.W.B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature,” 
University of Chicago Law Review 48, no. 3: 632-79. See also the essays in Angela Fernandez, Markus Dirk Dubber, 
and Philip Girard, eds., Law Books in Action: Essays on the Anglo-American Legal Treatise (Oxford; Portland, Or.: 
Hart, 2012). Justice of the Peace Manuals, which have received a fair amount of attention, occupy a middle ground 
between treatise and layman’s law publication: JPs, usually laymen, were clearly part of the judicial system. For the 
history of JP manuals in Canada see Jim Phillips, "A Low Law Counter Treatise? 'Absentees' to 'Wreck' in British 
North America's First Justice of the Peace Manual," in Law Books in Action ed. Angela Fernandez et al., 202-19. 
Coroners were similarly situated between the lay and the legal professional: see Myles Leslie, "Reforming the 
Coroner: Death Investigation Manuals in Ontario, 1863-1894," Ontario History 100, no. 2 (2008): 221-38. See also 
John A. Conley, "Doing it by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in Eighteenth Century 
America," The Journal of Legal History 6, no. 3 (1985), 257-98; Larry M. Boyer, "The Justice of the Peace in England 
and America from 1506 to 1776: A Bibliographic History," Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress 34 no.4 
(1977): 315-26; Norma Landau, The Justices Of The Peace, 1679-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), especially 334-43. On the beginnings of the business press generally, see John J. McCusker, "The Demise of 
Distance: The Business Press and the Origins of the Information Revolution in the Early Modern Atlantic World," 
American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (2005): 295-321.  
355 Robert C. Berring, "Legal Research and The World of Thinkable Thoughts," Journal of Appellate Practice and 
Process 2, no. 2 (2000): 305-18; Richard A. Danner, "Legal Information and the Development of American Law: 
Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law" Law Library Journal 99 no. 3 (2007): 193-227; Richard 
A. Danner, "Influences of the Digest Classification System: What Can We Know?" Legal Reference Services 
Quarterly 33, no. 2-3 (2014): 117-36. 
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publications, which depended for their success on an actual or anticipated market of lay 
customers, are the best source for determining what the latter could reasonably be assumed to 
want to know: as book historian Robert Darnton has argued, “...the reader influences the author 
both before and after the act of composition.”356 I am not concerned with what a lawyer or judge 
would have said the municipal law was at this time, but rather how the official sources of law 
were re-constituted by commercial legal publications designed for a suddenly numerous group of 
potential customers of the law that defined the scope of their activities and jurisdiction, indeed, 
their figurative existence.     
In addition, these publications may be considered evidence of what the purchaser would 
consider constituted the scope of relevant law, once the investment had been made. But the legal 
environment is more than the sum of selected law or laws. As well as what publishers and editors 
thought their potential purchasers wanted to know, these communications include a normative 
dimension, as they indicate what the authors thought their audience should know, think, and 
perhaps ultimately do.357 The municipal legal environment created by the reconstitution of 
positive municipal law by commercial media was indeterminate, varying with the author, the 
format and the date of publication, but, I argue, increasingly legalistic and prescriptive. 
 Some formats of publications for the municipal market emerged as more successful than 
others. Even as publishers adapted to the market, the market itself changed. The model for 
successful municipal law publishing began to favour the legal over the lay author, and the 
specific over the general presentation. In the process, municipal actors were colonized as 
                                                          
356 Robert Darnton, "What Is the History of Books?" in Books and Society in History: Papers of the Association of 
College and Research Libraries Rare Books and Manuscripts Preconference, ed. Kenneth E. Carpenter (New York: 
R. R. Bowker, 1983), 3-26; see also Liora Salter, "Editor's Introduction," in Communication Studies in Canada/ 
Études Canadiennes en Communication, ed. Liora Salter (Toronto: Butterworth’s, 1981), xi-xxii, xx. 
357 See also Charles T. Meadow, Messages, Meaning, and Symbols: The Communication of Information (Lanham, 
Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2006). 
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consumers of legal information. Simultaneously, however, they were being groomed to be 
customers of legal services, as lawyer-authors sought consciously to profit from publishing self-
help information while (perhaps unconsciously) also promoting the value of an essentially rival 
product, direct professional assistance.358 
 
The Municipal Law Book in Canada-West/Ontario 
The mid-nineteenth century was a time of transition for legal publications, as for all genres.359 
Technology and the market for books of all sorts grew apace, but as several histories of the book 
have noted, there was a great deal of “speculative uncertainty” in the publishing business.”360 At 
mid-century, Upper Canadian authors and publishers experimented with different types of print 
products that might tempt the suddenly numerous group of local politicians and clerks. Though 
municipal corporations were provided with copies of consolidated statutes at government 
expense until 1868, no further information was forthcoming from the province.361 Some councils 
hired lawyers as clerks, but this would not have been an option for many smaller or rural 
communities, especially in the early part of the period.362  
                                                          
358 The eventual ascendancy of the annotated statute format led to a somewhat a pyrrhic victory for lawyer-authors. 
Even as the lay municipal market was wrested from lay authors, it became attenuated and was eventually more or 
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emphasis on the dangers of legally-uninformed local government action and their ambivalence as to the value of 
their published products as compared to their profession’s services. 
359 George L. Parker, "The Evolution of Publishing in Canada," in History of the Book in Canada, vol. 2, ed. Yvan 
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362 Elizabeth Bloomfield, "Lawyers as Members of Urban Business Elite in Southern Ontario, 1860 to 1920," in 
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Municipal law in the United States in the nineteenth century has been depicted as big 
business.363 The same seems to have been true of Upper Canada, if the number and variety of 
publications is any indication. The bibliographies of legal publications from these years show 
that municipal law seems to have run closely behind civil procedure and practice and slightly 
ahead of insolvency as the legal subject most likely to appear profitable to authors and 
publishers.364 The tried-and-true form books, and justice of the peace manuals, which often 
included municipal law and other peripheral areas of general legal interest, overlapped during the 
period with the more specialized works which would eventually supplant them.365  
In this chapter I focus on those products which were explicitly designed to appeal to the 
local government market (although several were aimed at other groups as well). I have arranged 
these first by format and then chronologically within each category. Only one was an alphabetic 
statutory digest: The County Warden and Municipal Officer’s Assistant, by Thomas S. Shenston 
(1851).366 There were a number of statutory compilations, including five editions of Scobie’s 
Municipal Manual for Upper Canada (1850, 1851, 1852, 1853 and1855), as well as Thomas 
Wills’ A Compilation of The Acts respecting the Municipal Institutions of Ontario (1870), and 
Rupert Etheridge Kingsford’s Collection of such of the Revised Statutes of Ontario, And of the 
                                                          
363 See Joan C. Williams, "The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change," The 
American University Law Review 34, no. 2 (1985): 369-438; Joan C. Williams, "The Constitutional Vulnerability of 
American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law," Wisconsin Law Review 1986, no. 1 
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364 The standard references are Reynald Boult, A Bibliography of Canadian Law (Ottawa: Canadian Law 
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365 For form books in Canada, see Halévy, “Publishing the Law in English Canada,” especially 417-18. For the 
United States, see Erwin C. Surrency, “The Beginnings of American Legal Literature,” Journal of American Legal 
History 31 (1987): 207-18. 
366 Thomas S. Shenston, The County Warden and Municipal Officers' Assistant, containing a complete synopsis of 
the Municipal Council and Municipal Council Amendments Act ... to which is added a large number of tables and 
forms for the use of municipal corporations and their officers (Brantford: Herald Office, 1851) [hereafter Shenston, 
The County Warden]. 
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Acts of the Legislature of that Province passed in the Session 41 Victoria, 1878, as relate to 
Municipal Matters, (1878).367 Judicial contributions to the law were the subject matter of the 
aborted Municipal Reports (1863), edited by Robert A. Harrison with Thomas Hodgins.368 Much 
more successful were the monthly periodicals, the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts 
Gazette, later the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts and Municipal Gazette.369 A 
spin-off from the latter, the Local Courts and Municipal Gazette, ran from 1865 until it was re-
absorbed by its parent publication in 1872.370 The final category is the annotated act, a legal 
genre just emerging in this period that would prove the model for much successful legal 
publishing in the future.371 Four editions of variously titled Municipal Manuals by Robert A. 
                                                          
367 Hugh Scobie and J. Balfour, Scobie & Balfour's Municipal Manual for Upper Canada for 1850 (Toronto: Scobie 
& Balfour, 1850); Hugh Scobie, Scobie's Municipal Manual for Upper Canada, 2nd ed., with supplement, 
containing the Municipal Corporations Act (Toronto: H. Scobie, 1851); Hugh Scobie, Scobie's Municipal Manual 
for Upper Canada, 3rd ed. (Toronto: H. Scobie, 1852); Hugh Scobie, Scobie's Municipal Manual for Upper 
Canada: containing, besides the contents of the three previous editions, the acts that have since been passed by the 
Legislature of the province, to the end of the year, 1852, in reference to municipalities and the municipal system 
established in Upper Canada: with a copious index, 4th ed. (Toronto: H. Scobie, 1853) )[hereafter Scobie, 
Municipal Manual]; Hugh Scobie and J. Balfour, The Municipal Manual for Upper Canada. 5th ed. (Toronto: 
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368 Robert A. Harrison and Thomas Hodgins, The Municipal Reports: containing reports of cases arising under the 
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369 The journal published under the first of these titles from 1855 to 1864, when it narrowed its scope to legal 
professionals, becoming the Upper Canada Law Journal, and after confederation in 1867, the Canada Law Journal; 
The Upper Canada Law Journal, [hereafter UCLJ] v.1-10 (Jan. 1855-Dec. 1864); new series v.1-3 (Jan. 1865-Dec. 
1867); Jan. 1855-Dec. 1858; The Upper Canada Law Journal And Local Courts' Gazette  [hereafter UCLJLCG]; 
Jan. 1859-Dec.1864; The Upper Canada Law Journal And Municipal And Local Courts' Gazette [hereafter 
UCLJMLCG] Jan. 1865-Dec. 1867. 
370 The Canada Law Journal [hereafter CLJ] v.4-v.58 (Jan. 1868-Dec. 1922; Local Courts and Municipal Gazette 
[hereafter LCMG] (Toronto: W.C. Chewett, 1865-1872). 
371 See Erwin C. Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing (New York: Oceana Publications, 1990), 77 and 
Joel Fishman, “The History of Statutory Compilations in Pennsylvania,” Law Library Journal 86 (1994): 559-96. 
Harrison’s previous work took this form, apparently on the advice of Judge Gowan, who gave him a volume to use 
as a model; The unpublished diaries of Robert A. Harrison, transcribed by Barbara Goodfellow [hereafter Harrison 
Diaries], AO, MU 8476- 8478, Tuesday, 13 May 1856.  See generally the extensive introduction in Peter Oliver, 
Conventional Man: the Diaries of Ontario Chief Justice Robert A. Harrison, 1856-1878 (Toronto: Published for the 
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 2003). 
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Harrison (1859, 1863, 1874 and 1878) combined the statutory and the judicial by way of 
extensive annotations of the major acts, with commentary on policy and practice by the author.372  
Some of these publications were self-consciously reflective on their aim and purported 
value to the reader, others were not. The quality and quantity of direct evidence on the nature and 
scope of municipal law to be found in prospectuses, editorials, and introductions, as well as 
indirectly in the omissions and inclusions and general presentation varies enormously. 
Unfortunately, there is no direct information on sales or numbers for any of these works, but 
some supplementary information on the success of Harrison’s manuals is to be found in the book 
reviews in the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts and Municipal Gazette, the Toronto 
newspaper The Daily Globe, and publishers’ advertising which appeared in conjunction with 
several of the publications, as well as in the extensive diaries of Harrison himself. The 
configurations and lifespan of the periodicals (and their editors’ explanations) and the 
publication of additional editions of the manuals provide indirect evidence of what appealed to 
the market and may therefore have had the greatest impact on the legal environment. 
 
The Digest-Manual 
Thomas S. Shenston was a non-lawyer, an autodidact who had served as a Justice of the Peace 
and District Councillor.373 Despite the piety of his declaration in the preface of The County 
                                                          
372 Robert A. Harrison, The New Municipal Manual for Upper Canada, (Toronto: MacLear, 1859)[ hereafter 
Harrison, Municipal Manual (1859)]; Robert A. Harrison and Henry O'Brien, The Municipal manual for Upper 
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Warden that his sole concern was to serve, he was probably well aware that self-help legal 
products had been a staple of the North American publishing world from its colonial beginnings, 
and that while following the handbook format might not guarantee success, it had at least this 
potential.374 Most of these digests, arranged alphabetically by topic, were designed primarily for 
justices of the peace, but some were augmented with information for other judicial officers, such 
as coroners, sheriffs, constables and bailiffs. One of the most popular, by Richard Burn, included 
information for parish or township officers, and others in England and the United States had had 
success catering exclusively to the latter group.375   
Many of these prototypes were sophisticated efforts that both paraphrased and integrated 
statute and case law. Shenston, despite his claims to “a good deal of labour, thought and care,” 
was content to regurgitate small and large chunks of the statutes, in very small font to boot.376 
The appendices, which included precedents for oaths of office, assessment rolls, notices, 
petitions, returns, and reports on the selection of judges, standing rules and regulations and “The 
Municipal Clerk’s Ready Reckoner,” a table showing the rate in the pound that would be 
necessary to raise a required amount at various levels of municipality, and calculation of the 
Lunatic Asylum Tax, were also probably not original. Pirating was not uncommon among 
handbooks; as one chronicler has pointed out, the use of tested material tended to add value to 
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the publication.377 Ironically, Shenston did copyright his work, which was unbound, and at 
ninety-three pages more a pamphlet than a book.378  
In his preface, Shenston writes of his decision to assist “the industrious classes” now 
involved in greater numbers in municipal government, who due to their busy lives would not 
have “the leisure or the inclination to study into the long and tiresome details of the Acts.” He 
cites his own experience of inconvenience at “not being able on the instant, to turn to some 
particular section or provision of the Act, to solve a doubt or confirm an opinion,” a situation 
exacerbated by the more “voluminous and complex” statutes on which our Municipal 
Corporations depend.”379 These he identifies as: The Municipal Act, the Municipal Council 
Amended Act [sic], and “such portions of the School, Assessment, Jury, and Tavern Licence 
Acts as impose any duty upon any Municipal Officer.”380 For our purposes it is noteworthy that 
‘municipal law’ was not considered by this author to be confined to one act, and it was the duties 
imposed by all pertinent legislation that he considered particularly germane to his anticipated 
audience.381 
Given that Shenston was “ever busy with his pen,” and lived for another forty-odd years, 
continuing in other governmental offices, political and commercial endeavours, if the work was 
as likely to meet the needs of officials as he claimed, and soon in need of updating given 
constant changes in the law, it might be wondered why he never produced another edition.382 
Although his anonymous biographer claimed the County Warden had a “considerable circulation 
in every county of the Province,” it is doubtful that it was much of a financial success.383 
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Shenston published another small book, The Oxford Gazetteer, the next year, but then abruptly 
ended his career as a municipal author, although he continued to publish on other subjects.384 
Part of the reason for this ostensible lack of success may have been that he was not his 
own publisher—the County Warden was printed at the “Herald Office,” Brantford, and does not 
carry any other imprimatur. Historians have pointed out that a variety of hats were crucial to 
publishing success at this date; Hugh Scobie, who was at once a publisher, printer, journalist, 
stationer and bookseller, is a good example of a successful multi-tasker in the book trade at this 
time.385 Moreover, Toronto was already the publishing capital of the colony; a work from the 
hinterland with no marketing network would have difficulty competing with the other similar 
product on the market at the time, Scobie’s compilation.386 Like the other publications surveyed 
here, the County Warden was sold through subscription, to be paid in advance, as was the usual 
practice in colonial publishing, and Shenston seems to have fallen into trouble by anticipating 
sales. 387 In a letter to the Leeds and Grenville Council he is candid about his precarious position: 
“It would be doing me a great favour if you could let me have the amount for the said 24 
packages immediately. I have yet an amount to pay the printer for printing the work and cash is 
really very scarce with me.” 388  
When the acts were amended, as they were regularly, the value of a volume such as 
Shenston’s would soon depreciate. Its worth probably lay in its relatively low price (1 shilling, 
                                                          
384 The Canadian Biographical Dictionary, 341. 
385  Parrish, “Law Books and Legal Publishing in America,” 355; Parker, “The Evolution of Publishing in Canada,” 
17-32; Parker, “The Beginnings of The Book Trade in Canada,” 77. 
386 See Parker, “The Beginnings of The Book Trade in Canada,” 77-79. 
387 See Yvan Lamonde and Andrea Rotundo, "Marketing Strategies of Booksellers and Publishers," in History of the 
Book in Canada, ed. Y. Lamonde et al., 230-239, 235; McCusker, “The Demise of Distance,” 295-321; Parker, “The 
Beginnings of The Book Trade in Canada,” 37; Parrish, “Law Books and Legal Publishing in America,” 359. 
388 Emphases in original. Not surprisingly this desperation did not impress the council, who promptly repealed a 
resolution to make the purchase: Leeds and Grenville Council Papers, F 1740-3-0-91851 (3). Circulars advertising 
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10 ½ pence) and in the material appended. But in this as well it was obsolescent: in a very few 
years, such material was available directly from stationers, who produced blank forms obviating 
the necessity for the clerk to copy from books such as these, and cheap pamphlets, which could 
be produced quickly to stay current.389 Another disadvantage may have been the alphabetical 
digest format. As J. A. Conley has argued, the “vast nature of the authority” of justices of the 
peace who dealt with petty crimes and disparate other matters set out in often ancient, much 
interpreted statutes, made such a format a rational choice for their manuals.390 The decisions of 
JPs seldom seem to have been judicially reviewed, so the details of the letter of the law may have 
been considered superfluous, as long as the general gist was provided.391 But the wide discretion 
and relative immunity enjoyed by these appointed practitioners of low law were not shared by 
their elected successors in the business of local administration.  As we have seen, the acts of 
municipal governments were subject to review at the initiative of ratepayers and also vulnerable 
to suits by individuals and other corporations in tort or contract. In such cases, a digest would be 
less useful than the verbatim wording of the statute. 
Especially is this so when one considers the omnipresence of clerks in local governments. 
A salaried bureaucrat would be a different customer than an amateur JP. The clerk would need 
more than a general answer to a problem; he would need chapter and verse and ease of reference. 
Of all the manuals canvassed in this study, Shenston’s is the only one which integrated index and 
text. For the others, the extensiveness and detail of the index was evidently a major selling point.  
Simply put, the messages transmitted by the digest format were likely not in accord with the 
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purchasers’ perceived needs. Although W.C. Keele referred to the Municipal Acts in the 1857 
edition of his justice of the peace manual, in the 1864 version the subject was not included even 
peripherally. 392 A form of legal publication that had once been standard for municipal officials 
was not to appear in Canada West/Ontario again. 
 
The Statutory Compilations 
The long pedigree of genre enjoyed by Shenston’s County Warden was not shared by the 
statutory compilations with which it was contemporaneous. While several privately published 
chronological collections of legislation had appeared before the nineteenth century in various 
American jurisdictions, these were few. The topical statutory compilation was very much a 
feature of economic surplus: greater ease of publication, larger, more concentrated markets, and 
the increased legislative output of the nineteenth century.393 In Upper Canada, the statutory 
collections which were produced prior to 1850 all seem to have been official productions of 
current acts by publishers authorized as the King’s or Queen’s Printer.394 The first ‘Municipal 
Manual’ for Upper Canada was thus a significant innovation, evidence of the significance of the 
new lay market for municipal law.  
The first of the manuals was published by the Scottish-born Torontonian, Hugh Scobie, 
proprietor of the British Colonist newspaper, in association with his partner, John Balfour, and 
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entitled Scobie & Balfour’s Municipal Manual for 1850.395 Like Shenston, Scobie and Balfour 
were concerned to forestall any misapprehension that the compilation, as a collection of material 
otherwise publicly available, might not be worth the price, with the assertion that collating this 
information “was attended with considerable labour.”396 To this pre-emptive defence they added 
judicious flattery of the reader: Shenston’s “industrious classes” thus became those “who interest 
themselves in the public affairs of the province.”397 The avowedly high-minded aim “to render 
the community familiar with the Municipal Laws and the mode of carrying them beneficially and 
legally into execution” also mirrored Shenston’s.398 Again we observe the message that purchase 
of the within publication will safeguard the purchaser from possible negative consequences both 
practical and legal. 399  
The subtitle set out the highlights of the manual in the typically longwinded nineteenth 
century style: 
a map of the province…complete lists of the various municipal corporations of 
townships, counties, villages, towns and cities and the ward divisions[,] also the 
boundaries of the several division courts for the recovery of small debts, the times and 
places at which the courts are heard, and the name and address of the judge and clerk of 
each division: to which are added the Municipal Corporations Act, Road and Bridge 
Companies’ Act, and the various other acts of the legislature which confer powers, or 
impose duties on the municipalities.400    
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Scobie’s other publishing ventures, which included the Canadian Almanac, land surveys, and 
lithographs, apparently informed these choices. His background as an apprentice lawyer in 
Scotland also may have been influential, in the selection of jurisdictional geography and local 
courts and their personnel as matters of import.401 Like Shenston, Scobie obviously considered 
that municipal law was not confined to the Municipal Act and that the law relevant to municipal 
actors was as much about duties as powers.  
Scobie’s choices for inclusion of “other acts” differed from and were more numerous 
than Shenston’s. Scobie’s “other acts” included The Division and Counties Act, An Act 
Describing Counties and Ridings, the Municipal Repeal Act (which had immediately preceded 
the Municipal Act), and “acts and parts of acts still in force” such as the Ferries, Highways, 
Houses of Industry, Township Officers, City of Toronto, Niagara Market, Militia Commutation, 
Line Fences and Water Courses, Dog Tax, Road Allowances and Lock up Houses Acts.402 In his 
recognition that continuing acts are an important part of the law, Scobie showed a legal 
sophistication not shared by Shenston; all the additional acts included in The County Warden 
were passed in the year immediately after the Baldwin Act. This is not to say that Shenston’s 
inclusions were not more practical, as befitted an author with local government experience. The 
Niagara Market Act (Scobie’s inclusion) clearly would have had much more limited application 
than the Assessment Act (Shenston’s inclusion). 
Scobie’s greater legal cognizance is also evinced by the express recognition that the law 
would not remain static. The publishers’ notice to the first edition, observing, as had Shenston’s 
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preface, the great changes in the law and the extension of the municipal system, and the 
inconvenience of “Acts…scattered over several volumes of the Statute Book,” set out their plan 
to issue “annually, a Municipal Manual, embodying those changes which may hereafter take 
place with such other information as may be necessary.”403 The next year, the preface to the 
second edition announced that the first publication “having met with favour,” a second edition 
with supplement was being offered, each of which could be purchased separately, if desired.404 
The second edition was more or less identical to the first, so the ability of prior purchasers to buy 
only what we would call ‘updates’ would have been an attractive feature, but the reprinting of 
the main volume would also mean that the market would not be restricted to prior purchasers.405  
The second edition/supplement included an appendix of “Titles of Acts passed in 1849, 
1850, and 1851 not contained in this Manual, but to which it may be sometimes necessary to 
refer,” which cited the pages of the “Official Edition of the Statutes,” with the (unstated) 
assumption that purchasers would own or have access to these.406 Essentially private acts—acts 
with a limited geographic reach, such as that respecting the Niagara Market—were relegated to 
this list, with the exception of “an act to enable the Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto 
to assist in the construction of the Toronto, Simcoe and Lake Huron Union Railroad.”407 The 
supplement reproduced in full those acts included in Shenston’s manual, as well as acts for the 
erection of Lunatic Asylums and other public buildings, and an act respecting land surveyors.       
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405 The decision to publish editions and supplements annually seems a shrewd one, and it is not surprising that 
Scobie died a wealthy and influential businessman. Peter Oliver takes note of the comfortable financial 
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By the time the posthumously published fifth edition appeared, the supplements had 
begun to dwarf the original work. It was decided by Scobie’s successor that it would be desirable 
to revise the primary work, abridging some of the acts, and excluding the flourishing school 
legislation entirely. The preface spoke of a plan to publish a separate manual on school law, but 
that never came to fruition, possibly because such publications under the aegis of and funded by 
the government began to appear about this time.408 Nevertheless, the fifth edition contained 
sixty-four acts and parts of acts, and an appendix which listed fourteen others.       
Shortly thereafter, Scobie’s widow sold his business.409 The profitability of municipal 
manuals had been made clear, however, and the successors to Scobie’s enterprise were to launch 
a product onto the market a few years later that diverged from Scobie’s model, namely the 
annotated manual by Robert A. Harrison. Yet the compilation model was not immediately 
abandoned. Two further attempts were made to jump on the municipal law publishing 
bandwagon using this format: the first, by Hastings county clerk Thomas Wills in 1870 and the 
second by Toronto lawyer Rupert Etheridge Kingsford in 1878. 
Wills’ introduction to his Compilation of the acts respecting the municipal institutions of 
Ontario echoed both Scobie’s and Shenston’s, as he assured potential purchasers that his purpose 
was to save them labour.410 His rationale for the publication was that since the latest statutory 
consolidation there had been a number of amendments, resulting in “a difficulty of knowing 
precisely what the law is.”411 Rather than simply publish the amendments, however, the author 
sought to provide value by integrating these with the statute amended, cutting out “all such parts 
of the Municipal Act of 1866 as have been repealed, and insert[ing] in lieu thereof the 
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amendments, so as to read as the law now stands.”412 The acts included are presumably those that 
have been amended, though this is not entirely clear. In any event, it is worth noting that along 
with the Municipal, Assessment, Line Fences and Water Courses Acts, and the Act Regulating 
Travel on Public Highways which we have seen previously, Wills included acts and amending 
acts: an Act for the Prevention of the Spread of Canada Thistles, an Act to Amend the Act 
Imposing a Tax on Dogs, an Act respecting Weights and Measures and an Act for the Protection 
of Sheep. Although his selection of acts is sparser than that provided latterly by Scobie, Wills’ 
index is perceptibly longer.  
The length and detail of the index of Rupert E. Kingsford’s Collection of such of the 
Revised Statutes of Ontario, And of the Acts of the Legislature of that Province passed in the 
Session 41 Victoria, 1878, as relate to Municipal Matters drew the commendation of the Toronto 
Daily Globe.413 Along with the index, “prepared with much greater care than the index to the 
revised statutes” (which, ironically, Kingsford had helped edit), the Globe reviewer was 
impressed with the organization of this “exceeding useful volume.”414 Part one included 
municipal matters generally, including the Municipal Act as revised, acts pertaining to the 
registration of debentures, exemption of firemen from various duties, support of destitute insane 
persons, property assessment, sale of intoxicating liquors, five acts on the subject of highways, 
two acts on public health, two on protection of the person (exiting public buildings, and from 
threshing machines), six acts under the category ‘Protection of Property,’ three concerning the 
‘Protection of Game ‘and one on the ‘Profanation of the Lords Day’. The second section 
                                                          
412 Wills, Compilation, preface, not paginated. 
413 Kingsford, Collection of such of the Revised Statutes of Ontario and of the acts of the legislature of that province 
passed in the session 41 Victoria, 1878: as relate to municipal matters; Daily Globe, Toronto, 19 April 1878; Tracy 
D. Hynes, “Kingsford, Rupert Etheridge,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=41613&query=kingsford. 
414 Daily Globe, 19 April 1878.  
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comprised two acts on drainage and five on the administration of justice. The third contained 
another eleven acts passed in 1878, all but two of which amended acts appearing in other parts of 
the volume. Of the two exceptions, one repealed the act protecting fur bearing animals; the other 
dealt with bridges in villages. When combined with a volume of education acts expected out 
shortly, the Globe thought that these forty-three acts were sufficiently comprehensive of 
municipal law: “[F]or all practical purposes the ordinary ratepayer will be able to dispense with 
the Revised Statutes altogether.”415 
The anonymous reviewer seemed to take for granted that Kingsford’s compilation was 
meant for a lay audience. He suggested the work might have been “the better for having 
incorporated…. the Agriculture and Arts Act, in view of the great number of agricultural 
associations which have under its operation sprung up all over the province…[because] those 
who take most Interest in these associations take also most interest in municipal government, and 
it would in their eyes very much enhance the value of the work, while it would add 
comparatively little to its cost.”416 However this intention is not clear from the collection itself. 
Kingsford broke with the municipal law publishing practice to date by dispensing with an 
introduction or preface identifying and addressing his audience. One might be led to doubt as 
well by Kingsford’s later oeuvre: the municipal compilation was followed by several on legal 
matters that appear designed for a professional audience.417 Most of these other works were re-
issued several times, yet Kingsford never updated the municipal collection, and one can only 
speculate as to the reason. The handwritten marginalia found in the library and archival holdings 
of many such works show that lawyers were accustomed to note up legislative changes in their 
                                                          
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 These are all on private law matters, mostly in treatise style. 
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own copies of statutes or other works. No doubt clerks and councillors would have done the 
same. While the categorizing of statutes according to general subject was no doubt attractive, 
neither that nor the improved index probably would have made the work into enough of a seller 
to justify the cost of a very substantial volume. 
 Probably the principal reason why neither Kingsford’s nor Wills’ municipal works was 
ever revised and republished, however, was their format as exclusively statutory compilations. 
By 1878, municipal law consumers could not help but have become aware that not only was the 
legislation making up the Municipal Law becoming increasingly complex, extensive, and 
unsettled, as Kingsford’s collection attested, but that statutes alone comprised only part of the 
relevant law. The importance of judge-made law and statutory interpretation was a lesson they 
had been taught by a series of publications in which Robert A. Harrison was a key figure. In his 
successful annotated municipal manuals, and even more directly in the Upper Canada Law 
Journal and Local Courts and Municipal Gazette, as well as the ill-fated Municipal Reports, 
Harrison and his colleagues underscored the importance of case law to prudent municipal 
administrations. 
 
The Case Reports 
Robert A. Harrison and one of his law partners, Thomas Hodgins, were responsible for an early, 
but conspicuously unsuccessful experiment in the embryonic genre of topical case law reports. 
The published volume entitled The Municipal Reports bears the date 1863, and optimistically 
proclaims itself volume I, covering the years 1845-1851. Unfortunately, no prospectus seems to 
have survived (though Harrison’s diaries indicate that there was one). The volume contains no 
introduction or preface to explain either its birth or death, but the reports seem to have had their 
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genesis in a conversation between Harrison and his publishers in January 1859, about the time he 
was about to publish his first Municipal Manual. 418 
 By this time Harrison was already a successful author, with a well-received annotated 
volume on civil procedure and several years of editorship of the Upper Canada Law Journal and 
Local Courts and Municipal Gazette to his credit.419 The idea seems to have been his own. His 
diary records that his publishers “applauded the idea,” but that one suggested that cases on 
school law should be included, to which the diarist had graciously assented.420 Harrison’s former 
mentor, Judge James R. Gowan, was less sanguine.421 In another entry, Harrison reports 
Gowan’s warning that the reports would not be likely to succeed.422 This Harrison decided to 
disregard, attributing it to fears the reports would be competition for the law journal, which was 
Gowan’s brain child and in which he had a financial interest.423  The Journal (under Harrison’s 
self-interested editorship) itself was also sanguine about the reports’ prospects. Possibly in a 
disingenuous attempt to boost sales for the reports, which were described as “likely to succeed,” 
an editorial in January 1861 graciously allowed that “[t]here is room for both [reports and 
journal.] Our spheres are not precisely the same.”424 
 That was something of an overstatement. The case reports can most charitably be 
described as uneven. The reports were not original, having been previously published in one of 
the officially sanctioned court reports. They were reproduced with the headnote and index/digest 
                                                          
418 In the course of its obituary of Harrison, the Canada Law Journal stated that the Reports had been designed as a 
companion to the municipal manual. They excused the demise of the reports as the result of overlap: Canada Law 
Journal [hereafter CLJ], Tuesday, 23 November 1878; Harrison diaries, Saturday, 8 January 1859. 
419 Harrison diaries, Saturday, 8 January 1859. 
420 Ibid. 
421 For Gowan and his relationship with Harrison, see Desmond H. Brown, “Gowan, Sir James Robert,” Dictionary 
of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=40865&query=gowan. 
422 Harrison diaries, Saturday, 15 January 1859. 
423 Brown, “Gowan, Sir James Robert.” 
424 UCLJLCMG, Jan 1861 editorial, UCJLCMG, 1.  
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unchanged, with abbreviated citations to the source. It can be assumed that Harrison and Hodgins 
had permission for these; the reporter’s intellectual property ownership was implied on occasion 
in the Journal, when reporters were given credit and thanks.425 Many of the annotations 
(presented as footnotes) were extensive and technical, but many others were sparse and jejune. If 
this imbalance is due to the dual editorship, it is likely, given the evidence of their later careers, 
that Harrison was responsible for the technicalities and Hodgins the fatuities, as well as the 
silences—many of the cases lack any commentary at all. Although Harrison does not blame 
Hodgins for the demise of the reports directly, by 1863 he was constantly complaining in his 
diary that Hodgins was lazy and a dead weight on the firm, and shortly thereafter he discontinued 
the partnership.426 
 Nevertheless, even had the annotations had been more consistent, it is not clear that the 
reports would have had greater longevity. Not only were some of the cases selected not clearly 
related to either of the ostensible subjects, but the years covered were not current. As one note 
stated, somewhat defensively, “[s]ome of the early cases given in these reports may appear to be 
obsolete and useless, but are still retained with a view not merely to be completeness of the 
series, but for their own intrinsic value, which is not always apparent, but often in practice 
discovered.”427 Only lawyers, and indeed lawyers with Harrison’s command of the field, would 
find much value here. A better strategy might have been to start at the present and work 
backward, the strategy chosen by an early British topical series, the Property Lawyer.428  
                                                          
425 UCLJLCG, May, 1856, editorial. 
426 Harrison Diaries, Saturday 14 February 1863 (the year in which the reports were published in book form), 
Harrison wrote that his patience was “exhausted” by Hodgins. 
427 Harrison and Hodgins, Municipal Reports, 12. 
428 The Property Lawyer (London: H. Butterworth, 1826). This series did not last long either, nor did many of the 
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Periodical: a Study in the Communication of Information”; W. D. Hines, “The Development of Legal Periodical 
Publishing in Great Britain between 1750 and 1939” (M.Lib. thesis, University of Wales, 1985). For the U.S., see 
Bernard J. Hibbitts, ""Our Arctic Brethren;" Canadian Law and Lawyers as Portrayed in American Legal 
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A review of one of Harrison’s non-municipal works in the Canada Law Journal 
attributed the failure of the reports to the fact that the Manual “so covered all the ground.”429 
Would the Municipal and School Reports have succeeded had they been less narrow?  The case 
of an even less successful competitor suggests not. The Municipal Economist, the “sickly 
existence…and premature death” of which The Upper Canada Law Journal marked “in feelings 
of sadness rather than triumph,” had attempted to be the obverse of the Reports.430 Maclear & 
Co.’s Prospectus announced it to be a non-partisan attempt to 
embrace…the "professional" consideration for Road making Bridge building, and other 
works of construction commonly controlled by the Municipalities in which they are 
situated; together with occasional chapters on Street Architecture and Building, with 
especial reference to the beauty of our Towns, the sanitary condition of our dwellings, 
and their safety from incendiary or accidental fires….[and] particulars of…Improvements 
as have been adopted in the older Towns of Europe and America….431 
 
Legal decisions would also be included.  But the rosy prospect of practical knowledge sharing 
did not, as hoped, “secure the support of every one interested in the promotion of sound local 
legislation.” It does not appear that an issue was ever published. 432 Perhaps the price—$3.00 per 
year payable in advance—was too steep, or the material poorly chosen and presented, or not 
considered relevant. Perhaps the target group was insufficiently broad, or considered itself well-
served by the more established monthly, the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts and 
Municipal Gazette, which claimed that the Economist and other rivals had “started in the hope of 
                                                          
Periodicals, 1829-1911," in Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 8: In Honour of R.C.B. Risk, ed. G. Blaine 
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430 UCLJ, Editorial, January 1861.  
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prospectus glued onto an inside cover of the Osgoode Hall Law School Library copy of the first edition of 




diverting some of our municipal and other patronage.”433 Municipal lay readers eventually 
deserted the Journal and its successor, as well, but not for many years. And as long as they 
patronized these journals, the message heard by municipal lay readers was far from the eclectic, 
affirmative vision espoused by the ill-fated Economist. 
 
The Periodicals 
As noted above, the founder of the Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts Gazette, 
Simcoe County Judge James R. Gowan, seems to have had an instinct for what legal publications 
would sell.434 The prospects for a periodical were not auspicious. By 1855, the year the journal 
was launched, many such had been started in Great Britain and the United States, few lasting any 
length of time.435 As its full title promised, and editorials stressed, the Gazette was not aimed 
solely at a professional audience, a strategy which a later editorial frankly admitted probably 
would have doomed it to a speedy demise.436 Rather, the journal pledged to assist officers of the 
local courts (which included bailiffs, clerks, coroners and magistrates) and “Municipal 
Bodies.”437  
 Like its more purely legalistic American and British counterparts, the Gazette included a 
mix of editorials, announcements, case reports, and reviews of books and other periodicals and 
correspondence.438 Most reported decisions were Upper Canadian, emanating from various levels 
                                                          
433 UCLJ, Editorial, January 1861. It is unclear which publications are the other competitors referred to. 
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of courts. Some of these were reported by the lawyers who had appeared in the cause; others by 
the judges who presided.439 Arrangements were made with the officially appointed reporters of 
Chancery, Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas, to provide reports (apparently gratis) in advance 
of the reporter’s own publication.440 Originally, the editors promised notes of explanation and 
context for English reports; although this never transpired, the occasional article discussed the 
application of an English case to the Ontario experience (while being careful to remind the 
reader that English cases should not be taken at face value).441 
 In this, the lay reader would be reminded of his ignorance, a lesson which was 
continually emphasized, both explicitly and implicitly. The number of municipal cases appearing 
in the Gazette and Journal, especially in the early years, might have been a surprise to those 
whose previous exposure to the municipal law had been through the published statutes provided 
by the government or through the early statute-based manuals of Shenston and Scobie. Most of 
these were current and provided in full, others were digested from previously published reports 
in a column dedicated to “Municipal, School, and Magistrate’s Law.” Many of the longer cases 
were published over several months, as were various anonymously authored treatises on the law 
for bailiffs, coroners, and the like.442 The editors were thereby able to maintain balance in the 
sixteen pages published each month, while ensuring that readers would maintain their 
subscriptions.  Though produced monthly, the periodical was not meant to be ephemeral, but to 
be bound and kept for reference.443  
                                                          
439 Judge Gowan’s court was well represented. 
440 Later Practice and Chambers cases were added. 
441 UCLJ, Editorial, January 1855. 
442 None of these treatises seems to have been published in book or pamphlet form. 
443 As is clear from the issue numbers, pagination, indices and title pages. Harrison’s diary contains many reports of 
his trips to the publishers to have his various reports and periodicals bound.  
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 Not all the ‘municipal’ cases dealt with duties or powers of municipalities, although 
many did. Some turned on technical questions regarding elections, assessments and licensing. 
Tort and contract cases involving municipalities were included as well, and it is telling that these 
were classified as ‘municipal’ in most such cases. Still others involved intra-municipal conflicts 
and the position of a municipal corporation or its officers vis à vis its ratepayers. A significant 
number dealt with the quashing of municipal by-laws, a fact the editors were quick to point out 
as a selling point to recalcitrant potential subscribers.  
 The Journal congratulated itself on serving its purpose by “guiding Officers of… 
Municipal Bodies in the discharge of their duties, in some cases preventing errors, in others 
saving from the consequences of persevering in illegal acts,” but occasionally implied that the 
beneficiaries of this service were insufficiently appreciative.444 In 1858, an editorial hectored 
municipal councils about the “endless number of by-laws which are set aside by the Courts and 
the endless complications of everyday affairs which in consequence result,” a state of affairs 
attributed by the editors to the reluctance of Municipal Officers “to patronise us in proportion to 
[their] wants.”445 An earlier editorial left no doubt as to the editors’ opinion of the dependency, 
born of ignorance, of municipal councils on those who were versed in the law: 
Municipalities with the very best intentions are frequently plunged in difficulties by 
reason of defects in the Bye-Laws they pass. Their powers are large, the matters in 
respect to which they are empowered to make bye-laws extensive and varied. 
Corporations are creatures of civil polity; they have only such powers as the Legislature 
has conferred and these powers must be exercised in the method laid down by the laws. 
The members of Corporations, however competent in other matters, are not equal to the 
task of preparing complicated bye-laws, that require not only an acquaintance with the 
provision of the Statutes, but a familiarity with the general principles of Law and the 
decision of the courts…..446 
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 This scare mongering apparently paid off, for by December 1858 the editors were 
reporting that circulation from Municipalities had been “augmented.”447 This was also the year 
the publication moved to Toronto, pursuant to an arrangement with Gowan whereby Robert 
Harrison took over from Barrie lawyer James Patton as one of the two “co-conductors” for the 
journal.448 Because Harrison was known for his digest of Upper Canadian case law, several 
pamphlets on costs and practice, and the annotated Statutes of Practical Utility (a project 
prompted by Gowan) it was his mission to appeal to the law side of the subscription list.449 The 
other editor, another Barrie lawyer by the name of W.D. Ardagh, took over responsibility for the 
grab-bag of other subscribing groups.450 Perhaps for fear municipalities would feel their interests 
were being undervalued in this move to the metropolis, the journal simultaneously changed its 
name to become The Upper Canada Law Journal and Local Courts and Municipal Gazette. 
 The latent conflict of interest between the two target groups, lay and professional, was 
reflected by the editors. Promoters of legal self-help through the periodical and other 
publications, they were still at heart professionals whose inherent belief in the superiority of 
legal services undermined the raison d’être of a legal publication for non-lawyers.451 Thus the 
July 1858 editorial quoted above, after stressing the importance of “reliable information” 
provided by their own organ, could not resist observing that professional advice would be even 
better, albeit somewhat half-heartedly: 
One friend has suggested…that a professional man in each County should be appointed 
to advise the municipal authorities therein, and to prepare bye-laws as required, or one for 
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the whole of Upper Canada…..Another friend has submitted a plan…that from every 
Municipality for which a Bye-Law was prepared by a competent professional man, a 
copy should be sent for publication to the Law Journal, accompanied with a note of the 
circumstance, or at least the name of the lawyer by who it was drawn….452 
 
The additional cost would be “trifling.... [O]ne half of the municipalities in Upper Canada would 
be sufficient to cover the expense.”453 
 Though this idea seemed “feasible enough” to the editors, the municipal authorities 
appealed to apparently had other ideas.454 This is not to say they discounted legal advice: indeed 
the correspondence columns of the journal indicate that many councillors and their clerks sought 
legal advice from the editors, some questioners appearing on a regular basis.455 Although 
cognizant of the fact that correspondents were receiving legal advice worth far more than the 
cost of the subscription, the editors showed remarkable patience with these free-loaders, being 
content to warn readers that it was the journal’s policy not to answer questions of merely 
particular application before proceeding to answer the question which often seemed to meet this 
description, in detail. 
 This tiresome tendency of municipal councillors to be overly thrifty in their dealings with 
the Journal was further denigrated by the editors upon the divergence of the two readerships. The 
Upper Canada Law Journal and the Local Courts and Municipal Gazette divided in 1865, an 
event allegedly precipitated by the dislike of both groups of subscribers for paying for material 
allegedly of sole interest to the other.456 The price of the Gazette was set at $2 per year, while 
Journal subscribers paid $3. Yet despite the reduction in price and “the additional labour and 
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456 LCMG, Editorial, January 1865. 
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expense” claimed by the editors, some members of the lay group seemingly remained 
sceptical.457 Sneered the editors of both journals (who now included Henry O’Brien, a sometime 
court reporter and author of various practical works for lawyers): 
Some few there are amongst the magistracy and municipal bodies that seem to labour 
under the impression that it is quite out of the power of any mortal to add anything to 
their stock of knowledge, and so long as they have the “Consolidated Statutes,” which 
they fondly imagine contain all the law on every subject, they think they cannot go 
wrong. The less such people really know the more they think they know. Fortunately the 
localities blessed with such luminaries are few….458 
 
And fortunately for the prospects of the new journal, there were yea-sayers as well. The Council 
of the County of Simcoe earned editorial approbation for having ordered several copies of both 
publications for the use of the County Council, and two copies of the Local Courts and 
Municipal Gazette for the use of each municipality within the County.459 
 Enough lay subscribers agreed with the County Council of Simcoe that the publication 
survived until 1872. Did it then cease to have value, and if so, was this due to editorial policy, or 
changes in the needs of the readership? Originally the content of the new publication was skewed 
to municipal interests, but these were broadly defined. Material of clear import to local officials 
and politicos, including serialized articles on the duties of Pound-keepers and Arbitrators, the 
effect on municipalities of the Temperance Act and reforms to the municipal and assessment acts 
were commonplace. A campaign to remedy the defects of the Dog Tax and Sheep Protection Act 
was a highlight of 1867.460 Municipal and School cases were duly and regularly reported. 
Relevant statutes were reported—sometimes verbatim—and often considerably in advance of 
public availability. The editors continued their forbearing answers to the legal queries of 
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municipal clerks and councillors. However, other material seemed designed to appeal to the 
readers qua businessmen or private citizens. Lists of insolvents were an early recurring item. A 
regular column, “Simple Contracts and Affairs of Everyday Life,” excerpted cases and copied 
news items on seemingly every subject under the sun, including breach of promise, libel, railway 
negligence toward passengers, and the right to decide the religious education of infants. Cases 
from the Queen’s Bench and Common Pleas included many which would seem to be of marginal 
interest to localities or local courts, including a case (in which Harrison appeared as counsel), on 
fugitive felons. Articles on such doctrinal issues as the law respecting false pretences and the 
continual obituaries for high court judges as well seem to reflect the editors’ preoccupations 
rather than those of their purported readers. 
 That there would be overlap between the two journals was acknowledged from the 
beginning. Yet it is ironic that not until after the departure of Harrison, who had been recruited to 
serve a professional audience, did the legal begin to overwhelm the local in the pages of the 
Local Courts and Municipal Gazette. Irish and American reports began to take the lion’s share of 
column space dedicated to reported cases. Frequent reviews of practitioner-oriented publications 
and American and English legal journals with excerpts from the latter also raise the question of 
what value such items would provide to anyone but the “conductors” (whose own works were 
solicited for reciprocal “notice” by foreign publishers). One issue recommended such foreign 
periodicals as the North British, Westminster and Edinburgh Reviews, the London Quarterly, and 
Blackwood’s magazine with the rather condescending remark that “[n]o educated man, and no 
man who takes an interest in the world of thought should be without these Reviews.”461  
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 Nowhere is the change in policy more clearly demonstrated than in the correspondence 
column. Queries began to be deflected and a quasi-professional threshold set for questioners. 
Hence the admonition in July 1870 that “correspondents should always, when asking questions, 
give full reference to statutes &c.…We take it for granted that questions are asked bona 
fide…and that they are not asked without some thought beforehand on the subject.”462 By the 
time the decision had been made to cease separate publication of the Gazette, this message was 
blatant: “We cannot…give an opinion of the question put by our correspondent. It is a matter 
which should be referred to the legal advisor of the Council.”463 Although lay readers “who were 
at the first our principal supporters” were assured that they would be welcome subscribers to the 
newly enlarged (and more expensive) Canada Law Journal, other than continuing to note dates 
of significance to municipal government in the ‘diary’ which commenced every issue, the editors 
of the CLJ no longer assumed (or even pretended) that legal education for laymen by means of 
subscription to the periodical was desirable or even possible.464 
 
The Annotated Manual 
Of all the legal products sold to municipal actors during this period, Harrison’s municipal 
manuals appear to have been by far the most marketable. Four editions of Harrison’s manual 
were published during the period 1850-1880 (the fourth appearing shortly after Harrison’s 
death). That the Harrison ‘brand’ was considered a selling point is attested to by the production 
of a fifth edition, by his friend and free-lance assistant, Frank Joseph, in 1889, and a sixth, by 
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C.W. Biggar, in 1900.465 Though the flattering reviews of the manuals by the Journal and 
Gazette may be tainted by Harrison’s association as editor and continuing contributor, the Daily 
Globe also testified that “the circulation of the Manual has extended to all parts of Upper 
Canada, and to professional men, as well as members and officers of councils.” 466 On Harrison’s 
appointment to the Bench (as Chief Justice of Ontario) the Canada Law Journal, while opining 
that his annotated Common Law Procedure Act was “the most valuable legal work that has ever 
appeared in this country,” did not claim it was his most popular work.467 The second edition of 
the manual though (naturally) not attracting the international attention of lawyers and judges, as 
had impressed the Journal about the CLPA, was “so popular that it was out of print within six 
weeks.”468 In his diary, Harrison makes note of a comparable achievement—two months—for 
the third edition.469 
 This popularity seems to have translated into significant profit. Harrison’s diary entry for 
20 February 1875 states that 1060 copies of the third edition had been published, with a gross 
return of $5719.00 (527 copies sold at $5 a copy, and another 514 at $6). After deducting a third 
for the publishers (a fact which the author appears to record with dismay), another $2489.75 for 
printing and a few adjustments for his own copies, four copies to papers for review, and one for 
Judge Gowan, his share was $1322.92.470 Harrison clearly thought this was inadequate, but 
considering that his earnings as one of the highest paid lawyers in the province in 1874 were 
                                                          
465 Robert A. Harrison and F. J. Joseph, The Municipal Manual: containing the municipal, assessment, liquor 
license, and other acts relating to municipal corporations, together with the amending acts of 1888 and 1889 with 
notes of cases bearing thereon, 5th ed. (Toronto: Rowsell & Hutchison, 1889); C. R. W. Biggar, The Municipal 
Manual (part I) containing "The Municipal act" (R. S. O. c.223) and the amending acts of 1898, 1899 and 1900. 
viz.-61V. c. 23: 62V. (1st session), cc. 2 and 5: 62V (2nd session) cc. 26 and 30: and 63V. cc. 9, 33, 35, 36 and 37, 
with notes of cases bearing thereon, 11th ed. (Toronto: The Carswell Co., 1900). 
466 Daily Globe, 26 December 1866. However, it should be noted that Harrison wrote for the Globe occasionally and 
his publishers advertised his books, as well as other products, in this paper. 
467 CLJ, 23 November 1875. 
468 Harrison diaries, 23 November 1878. 
469 Ibid, 1 February 1875. 
470 Ibid, 20 February 1875. 
149 
 
$12,002.48 (an amount he observes was double the salary paid to the chief justices), it was a not 
unsubstantial addition to his income.471 
 Such success clearly had not been taken for granted when the prospectus for the first 
edition was issued in 1859. The New Municipal Manual for Upper Canada was priced at $2.00 
per copy, “[a]ll orders to be accompanied with cash.”472 The first edition is dedicated to “The 
Municipal Councils of Upper Canada,” plainly the primary intended audience. Like Shenston 
and Wills, Harrison stressed his own “anxious and protracted” labour, and the inconvenience of 
dealing with legislation “promiscuously scattered through the twenty-two volumes containing the 
Provincial Statutes.” 473 Unlike them he also emphasized the inconsistency and occasional 
unintelligibility of the “multitude of legislative enactments.”474 An additional factor heretofore 
ignored was the plethora of reported judicial pronouncements: “Since 1849 to the present [1859] 
owing in great part to this perplexity [of statutes], the Courts have been called upon in not less 
than one hundred and fifty cases to enunciate principles for the guidance of Municipal 
bodies.”475 While the latter and their mission are glorified (“The Municipal Laws of Upper 
Canada are in importance second to none…Every Municipal Corporation is a small 
parliament…”), councillors’ abilities and training are deprecated. Municipal powers, warned 
Harrison, are “extensive, yet limited”: 
To ascertain in every case the existence or non-existence of a power—the nature of it—
its precise limit, and the mode in which it should be exercised, is the object of all who are 
in any manner concerned in the administration of Municipal affairs. When it is 
considered that in the first instance these matters must be determined by Municipal 
Corporations themselves, seldom composed of men versed in the laws, often acting 
without the aid of professional advice, the importance of a Guide becomes manifest. 476 
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The Prospectus goes on to outline Harrison’s qualifications to provide this guidance, which are 
overtly professional.477 
 Harrison takes care to remind readers of the risks of incorrect action. Dire consequences 
await those who are ignorant or neglectful of the law, especially in the preparation of by-laws 
“on the legality or illegality of which large monied transactions are made to depend.”478 In order 
to assist with this “[g]reat responsibility,” a blank form for money by-laws is included.479 He 
then proceeds to float the idea propounded in the Journal, that a public functionary be appointed 
to provide advance approval for these so that people could invest in municipal debentures with 
confidence, but also notes that the legislature has acted to some extent to provide this security by 
the imposition of a six-month limitation period on actions to quash by-laws as long as they were 
not actually ultra vires. No cure is provided for the latter defect, however; the implicit message 
being that only correct information as provided by the manual will be a sufficient safeguard.480 
 As well as the Municipal Act, annotated with the gist of reported cases (with full 
citations), and Harrison’s speculations as to likely future interpretation, the volume includes acts 
to which “Municipal officers…may in the performance of their duties find it necessary to 
refer.”481 These included such public statutes as the Assessment Act, the Public Health Act, the 
Act Regulating Line Fences and Water Courses, and the Consolidated Municipal Loan Fund, as 
well as acts preventing obstructions in rivers and rivulets, regulating highway driving, elections 
to the Legislative Assembly, weights and measures, requiring the annual returns of information 
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to the Provincial Secretary, and regarding the confinement of lunatics, to name only a handful. 
There were three hundred and fourteen in all.  Many were abridged, particularly private acts, 
such as those which provided for divisions of jurisdictions, annexations, and permission to 
incorporate or move to a higher level of incorporation. Consciously omitted are the Beef, Pork, 
Ashes and Road Corporation acts, many private acts, and education acts, because these were 
already contained in “a small work within the reach of all.”482 
 The claim of the prospectus that “the notes are written in a plain and popular style, such 
as may be understood by all who understand the human language” was not mere puffery.483 A 
barrister experienced in arguing before juries, Harrison was careful not to assume knowledge of 
legal terminology by his readers. Hence, for instance, notes explaining not only what a ‘tender’ is 
but also how to tender and how to respond to a tender, the two distinct meanings of police 
(constabulary and regulation) employed by the act, and that embezzlement is a “statutable [sic] 
stealing and a serious offence.” 484 Harrison is also not shy about hectoring his audience on 
general behaviour, which he insists should be formal and legalistic: 
It is common belief that a municipal body can do by resolution whatever may be done by 
by-law. Nothing can be more erroneous or more tend to the insecurity of municipal 
government…. [B]ut among people generally, and among that class composing 
Municipal Councils particularly, there is a dislike of formality, and in consequence the 
too frequent abandonment of by-laws for mere orders or resolutions….[w]henever a 
Municipal Council is in doubt….it would be much safer and wiser to use a by-law….485 
 
Also emphasized are the many cases where there is a legal duty and consequent personal liability 
for a municipal official—usually the clerk. Harrison is careful to remind councils that their 
jurisdiction is geographically limited (for example, they cannot provide funds for a school 
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situated outside their legal boundaries), and that they are subject to the common as well as statute 
law: “It is necessary for Municipal Councils to be very cautious when interfering with private 
property. An excess of authority may render them liable as trespassers.”486 In short, the 
municipal arena is depicted in detail as full of legal pitfalls for corporations, council members 
and their staff alike. 
  Occasionally Harrison is forced to admit that the act does not specify what he believes is 
the correct course of action: “The right of a Municipal Council to take moneys already 
appropriated and apply them to purposes different from the original appropriation is very 
questionable. Though sometimes done, it should never be encouraged.”487 Harrison confidently 
rebukes the legislature for its choice of wording regarding by-laws for preventing the growth of 
weeds detrimental to good husbandry, noting pedantically that “[a]ll weeds are more or less 
detrimental to good husbandry.”488 Nor is his ex cathedra advice restricted to the purely legal: 
“Drainage, as applied to Cities and Towns, is for sanitary purposes all important.” Though an 
“explanation of the principle of drainage cannot be expected to find a place in this work,” he 
recommends a treatise of the subject by a British civil engineer.489  
 The second, third and fourth editions of the manual follow a similar pattern and similar 
themes. With each version, the number of case citations increases exponentially. In the second 
edition “reference is made to more than six hundred” and in the third “no less than three 
thousand seven hundred.”490 The number, choice and extent of subsidiary acts also changes. The 
first edition provided annotations only for the Municipal Act; although the Assessment Act was 
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given in full, it was without notes. This and the other acts considered relevant Harrison set out 
chronologically, purportedly in order to show the “development” of the law, but probably as 
much for his own convenience in the methodical canvassing of the statute books. In the second 
and third editions the assessment act is also annotated, but all other acts are merely listed and the 
number sharply reduced—only forty in 1867 and twenty-four in 1874, probably the result of a 
decision to exclude private acts.  The fourth edition listed thirty four, but also added substantial 
annotations to the Liquor Licensing Act. 
 A more subtle change followed a similar trajectory to that observed in the Local Courts 
and Municipal Gazette. The second edition was dedicated not to the Municipal Councils, but to 
Chief Justice Hagarty, the third to the Lieutenant Governor, and the fourth to the premier, Oliver 
Mowat. The preface to the second edition promotes lawyers as equal in importance to municipal 
actors as intended readers. Somewhat apologetically, the preface addresses its professional 
audience: 
The first edition of the work received a generous support, as well from the legal 
profession as the great body of the Municipal Councillors and officers of Upper 
Canada…The delays which have occurred were….to some extent rendered necessary by 
reason of the Editor’s great anxiety to make his work simple in its language and reliable 
in this exposition of the law. The work is intended not merely for lawyers, but for men 
unacquainted with the niceties of law. Most of the notes are therefore written in a popular 
style, and as free as possible from legal phraseology.491 
 
The third edition was “submitted to the Profession and the Public,” and the posthumous fourth 
“to the favourable consideration of the Legal Profession, Municipal Corporations, their Officers 
and the Public.”492  
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 This change does not seem to be the result of municipal subscribers deserting the 
publication. Indeed, Harrison notes in his diary in December of 1874 that Mr. Clark (of Copp, 
Clark and Co., successors to the Chewett firm) advised that the retail firm Hart & Rawlinson had 
taken over exclusive supply to the municipalities, and had already sold about three hundred 
copies at $5 (which price was guaranteed to those subscribing before December, those buying 
thereafter to be charged $6) and that this “…will about pay the cost of publication.” 493 Rather, it 
seems that Harrison’s intrinsic lawyer-like outlook was coming to the fore, encouraged by the 
expansion of his market to lawyers and even judges, and also perhaps to the influence of the 
celebrated American legal author, Judge John F. Dillon, whose treatise on Municipal Law was 
published in 1873. 
 Harrison wrote immediately to Dillon, pompously allowing that he had “not been 
disappointed in the purchase.”494 He continued by boasting that  
[M]unicipal Law is my specialty. I published a Municipal Manual for the use of our 
people that has already gone through two editions. By this mail I send you a copy of it. In 
it you will find much to interest you. And I can only say that the notes are at your entire 
disposal…. [I] shall expect you to reciprocate….. …495 
 
Dillon’s reply arrived some ten days later. Slightly condescendingly, he thanked Harrison for the 
manual, complimenting him on the care with which it had been prepared, and granting that “it 
must be indispensable in Upper Canada.”496 In a delicate display of one-upmanship, he 
commented that his own work “is expected to go to a second edition with the present year,” 
adding that “more copies [had] been sold within six months after its issue than of any other law 
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book published in [the U.S.].” He was gracious about Harrison’s “kind permission to refer to 
[his] notes” which he stated he would be happy to do “when they relate to matters of general 
interest,” and gave Harrison a reciprocal right to use his treatise.497 
 Harrison took full advantage of this in the third edition of the manual. “One 
feature…which distinguishes [this edition]” he remarks, “is the copious reference to the 
decisions of the courts of the several States of the United States of America.” The “able Treatise 
on the Law of Municipal Corporations published by Hon. John F. Dillon, LL.D….opened 
up…such a mine of Municipal wealth, that [the author] has not hesitated, with the full 
permission of Judge Dillon, to avail himself of such…as appeared to be of interest in this 
Province.”498 Harrison hastens to assure his readers that the municipal and assessment law of 
Ontario is “one of the most complete and most perfect codes of the kind,” adding the wistful, but 
no doubt forlorn hope that if the legislature “could be induced for a few Sessions to refrain from 
mangling the Acts, so that their provision would become far generally and better understood, it 
would be to the public advantage.”499 
 Whether or not legal readers were impressed with Harrison’s international connections, it 
is difficult to see how lay readers could have been expected to gain anything of value. Again, the 
indirect message would have been be the more powerful. Not only were the acts by which they 
operated considered by the foremost expert to be regularly ‘mangled,’ but their own powers were 
under even greater challenge by the introduction of ‘Dillon’s rule’ to the discourse of municipal 
law. Whereas the first and second editions of Harrison’s manual had matter-of-factly noted the 
subordinate nature of local governments inherent in their status as corporations, which could by 
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common law only act intra vires and through the appropriate use of the corporate seal, 
(“creatures of civil polity,” as we have seen), the introduction of American cases in the third 
edition precipitated a more explicit confirmation of legal subordination. The note to section 7 of 
the Municipal Act, which stated merely that that “The powers of every Body Corporate under 
this Act shall be exercised by the Council thereof” adds the gloss that “[the municipality’s] 
powers are limited…It has no other powers than such as are expressly granted, or such as are 
necessary to carry into effect the powers expressly granted.”500 This rule of strict statutory 
interpretation, unremarkable in itself and routinely followed by English and Canadian courts, is 
expressly attributed by the author to American precedents. More comfortingly from the point of 
view of municipal personnel, Harrison does admit that if the action of municipal corporations is 
“held strictly within the limits prescribed by statute….they are likely to be favoured by the 
courts.”501 In the fourth edition he goes even further toward the adoption of a Dillon-esque 
ideological/constitutional approach. Citing no fewer than two dozen solely American authorities, 
the author gives his opinion that “[M]unicipal bodies are the creatures of the Legislature and 
therefore subject to legislative control….”502 He further speculates that the effect of the BNA Act 
would be to make municipalities even more subordinate.  
 The 1874 edition also imports Dillon’s suspicion of the bona fides of municipal 
councils.503 No comment or context is included to exculpate Upper Canadian counterparts. This 
lay-unfriendly approach became even more pronounced after Harrison’s death: although his 
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successors retained most of the notes included for the edification of non-lawyers, they did not 
add any of their own. Just as the Local Courts and Municipal Gazette became de facto a journal 





Throughout the period 1850-1880, authors re-assembled the law for municipal actors from 
official sources and their own opinions according to their assessment of the needs of their 
customers, or what they could persuade the customers were their needs, emphasizing duties and 
restrictions. Though indefinite in scope—no two authors or editions identified the same 
content—the municipal law they presented comprised not just the foundational statute and 
amendments, but also myriad (and varying) collateral statutes, and a rapidly expanding 
jurisprudence. Legal restriction of local governments was the conceptual starting point for all 
these publications, the necessary condition for their very existence, and it continued to be in the 
material interest of the publishers to stress and even exaggerate this aspect of the law. 
 The legal communications marketed to municipal corporations, their members and their 
staffs, show a marked trend toward ‘juridification.’505 The legal environment for municipal 
actors became a more legalistic one, as the layman as legal author gave way first to the lawyer as 
legal author, and finally to the lawyer as lawyer. The ‘shadow of the law’ produced by this 
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literature may have begun as a mere metaphoric dappling of the sunshine of local independence 
with the inclusion of duties and liabilities with powers in Shenston’s handbook and Scobie’s 
manuals; certainly it had imbued a darker hue with the increased legalism of the later 
publications.     
 We can only speculate on the effect that this had on municipal councillors’ perception of 
their legal environment and on themselves as independent actors. It is important to keep in mind 
that municipal manuals and periodicals were not the only media of legal communication. 
Municipalities had access to the officially published statutes. Some may also have subscribed to 
the various authorized court reports.  The non-legal press also carried lengthy reports of trials 
and editorials on statutory changes and judicial pronouncements. Municipal actors would also 
have their own legal experiences to draw on, and plenty of them, if the volume of reported cases 
and the dicta of the law journals are a reliable gauge. As time progressed, it was more likely that 
they would have more direct communication with lawyers. Harrison’s diaries are authority for 
the fact that many localities seem to have had solicitors on retainer. Those that did not, and even 
some that did, seem to have been more than willing to seek professional advice on an ad hoc 
basis, even to the extent of coming to Toronto for it. Harrison records instances of being retained 
by municipalities; by the 1870s these references are numerous. In addition to work as a barrister 
in municipal litigation, he was in constant demand as a solicitor as well, preparing opinions and 
by-laws for townships and village councils who paid up to $20.00 for the privilege of assistance 
from the self-proclaimed expert. 
 No doubt much of this turn to the professional may have been the result of the greater 
complexity of the source law at the legislative and judicial levels chronicled by municipal law 
authors. It is impossible to tell how much was due to the accompanying doom-saying. But the 
159 
 
effect of this normative backdrop cannot be discounted. Communications scholar Charles T. 
Meadow gives one definition of information as “that which reduces uncertainty in the 
recipient.”506 David R. Hall equates information with power: “If we consider printing (or print 
culture) as synonymous with information, then it seems axiomatic that information is a form of 
power to which some have greater access than others.”507 These definitions do not seem apropos 
in this case. Though information may indeed confer power on the recipient vis à vis the 
uninformed, it may undermine the power of the recipient vis à vis the communicator and thus the 
recipient’s sense of self-sufficiency. Commercial legal publications aimed at the municipal 
government market in the post Baldwin Act period in Canada West/Ontario can be seen as an 
exclusionist discourse designed to augment a sense of uncertainty and concomitant dependency 
in the audience while simultaneously touting the professional expertise and authorial 
omniscience of the communicators as the direct or indirect solution. Whatever the legal ‘reality’ 
may have been, the legal environment produced by these publications was hardly conducive to a 
perception of local government power or autonomy.  
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Chapter 5: The Agency of Local Government: The Municipal Council of the United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville in the Shadow of the Law, 1850-1880 
 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation deal with high law—statutes and reported cases. The 
municipal manuals discussed in Chapter 4 provided a filter for these, in effect turning high law 
output into low governance input. For local governments were—and are—low governments.508 
As I have pointed out, both their lack of constitutional recognition and the corporate rather than 
Westminster structure set them apart from the ‘high’ parliaments and executives at the imperial, 
provincial and later dominion levels. But these terms of high and low should not obscure the fact 
that mid-nineteenth century Canada West/Ontario municipal councils were part of what the 
twentieth and twenty-first century would consider ‘establishment.’ Though lacking in status and 
power vis à vis the imperial, provincial, and later national governments, they should not be 
thought of as part of a group creating ‘law from below,’ to use the term famously coined by 
William Forbath and associates.509 The truly ‘below,’ the ratepayers, residents, claimants, and 
scofflaws we will meet in this and later chapters, are part of the legal, social and political 
environment in which the councils operated. They permeate this study, but are not its focal point.  
The members of the municipal council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville and 
their employees were aware that they were subject to statutory and common law.  Like the low 
law justices of the peace in quarter sessions who preceded them, their practice of low 
governance, both legislative and administrative, was conducted in the ‘shadow’ of this high law. 
I use this term as originally conceived by Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser to describe 
the operation of laymen’s law, as opposed to lawyers’ law; it was their observation that lay 
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persons consciously behave and strategize using ideas of law in good faith which may or may not 
be ‘correct’ to legal professionals.510 In this chapter I consider how the Leeds and Grenville 
council, at once the object of the high law and (low) governors to the further governed, exercised 
agency within this legal shadow.        
As noted in Chapter 1, the records for the county council of the United Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville held at the Archives of Ontario offer an exceptional source of material for the 
student of mid nineteenth century local government—probably the best collection of primary 
documents for any Ontario municipality to have survived for this period.511 A few municipalities 
in Canada West/Ontario printed minutes, by-laws, and reports on a regular or occasional basis, 
and some of these are extant, including a few from Leeds and Grenville. However, supporting 
documentation tended not to be printed as part of the official record and was not retained by 
most municipal governments. Comprised of official and supplementary material in manuscript 
form, the Leeds and Grenville Counties’ Council papers are outstanding in their 
comprehensiveness. These cover the entire period without interruption, with the one exception of 
motion papers (physical vote papers for each councillor on each motion), which were only 
retained until 1875, a few years shy of the end point of this study. The counties’ clerk maintained 
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copies of motions and resolutions, budgets, financial statements, contracts, arbitration awards, 
committee reports, and road commissioner reports, many in both draft and official form, as well 
as miscellaneous received material such as vouchers and receipts, oaths, bonds, circulars, and 
correspondence. Admittedly, there are some gaps and omissions in the Leeds and Grenville 
fonds. There are only a few sessions for which finalized, printed by-laws are extant. However, 
the process of passing or rejecting by-laws is carefully documented in the minutes, and some 
draft by-laws are included in the council papers.  
In this and the following chapters I make use of this collection and related archival 
records to evaluate aspects of local government autonomy from 1850 to 1880. Chapter 6 focuses 
on the corporation as legal (re)actor—on the interaction of the Leeds and Grenville Counties 
Council with two other low law institutions, the locally based grand juries and the centrally 
directed prison inspectors. Chapter 7 leaves the county level to investigate the tax adjustment 
policies of three townships in the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville. The subject of 
Chapter 8 is petitions to the provincial legislature by municipalities, including the United 
Counties, so the frequent petitions addressed to higher levels of government from the counties’ 
council are left to that chapter. The present chapter canvasses other law-related activities, 
considering the county council as a low legislature passing by-laws, as a quasi-administrative 
body weighing the requests of residents and dispensing county largesse, as defendant or potential 
defendant to negligence and nuisance claims, as a corporate organization, party to contracts, 
negotiations and arbitrations, and with the staff and solicitors employed to navigate these diverse 




Legalism and Legality 
The cultural climate in which the Leeds and Grenville counties’ council operated, as revealed by 
these records, was decidedly legalistic. The records abound with references to law writ large and 
small, and to ideals of justice, fairness and equity.512 Any rights consciousness, on the other 
hand, if present at all, was subtle, masked by a blatant obsequiousness. On occasions when a 
disgruntled petitioner to council felt he was being treated unfairly (a not uncommon occurrence), 
his claim was only to “kind consideration.” The members of council and their petitioners seem 
either to have had faith in the existence of an objective standard of fairness, or the statement was 
in itself a form of normative pleading; time and time again the petitions to council refer to “a fair 
remuneration” or a “just and honourable result.” Precise sums are rarely adverted to in these 
cases and, where included, are generally accompanied with the rider that the claimant will accept 
and expect the council to decide what is fair in the circumstance.513  
This is not to say that the counties as a whole were particularly law abiding. The 
Brockville and Johnstown District areas of Upper Canada had a history of lawlessness involving 
pro-establishment agitation by Ogle Gowan of Brockville and the Orange Order he headed.514 
Gowan was the last warden of Johnstown District and the first warden of the United Counties of 
Leeds and Grenville, but the conservative rabble-rousing he espoused disappeared with the 
advent of the new union era and responsible government.515 However, the records do reveal an 
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undercurrent of resistance to low law authority by residents, particularly with regard to the 
enforcement of tolls.516 The circumvention of and agitation against tolls can be seen as evidence 
of extra-legality or legal pluralism, as well as of straightforward illegality.517 Opposition to tolls 
on allegedly impassable roads occurred both within and without the legal system. Incidents of 
arson and toll-evasion by the establishment of parallel routes over private land were not 
uncommon challenges for Leeds and Grenville toll-keepers. But toll resisters also gave formal 
notice of non-compliance and challenged the legality of tolls in local courts.518 Both the 
corporation as defendant and the toll-evaders as plaintiffs seem to have preferred negotiation in 
these cases, but were willing to use the courts as a last resort. 
 In addition to the ubiquity of terms denoting justice and equity found in petitions to 
council, law consciousness is also evinced by the overt legalism with which the Leeds and 
Grenville United Counties conducted their proceedings. David Murray ascribes the tendency to 
legalism of the Quarter Sessions of the Niagara District in the decade prior to the Baldwin Act to 
the lack of differentiation between the judicial and local government functions.519 Clearly this 
reasoning does not explain the similar behaviour of Leeds and Grenville Council post-Baldwin 
Act, unless perhaps as the result of inertia or path dependence. Frequent reference to statutory 
authority (both specifically and in general terms), an elaborate corporate seal, signatures and 
counter-signatures, recitals in excessively formal language, and dedication to rules of procedure 
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for meetings combined to imbue the operation of local government in Leeds and Grenville with 
the formal appearance of authority and legitimacy. One example of this was that in most years 
one or more of the newly elected candidates was refused admittance to council for lack of, or the 
technical inadequacy of, sworn oaths and certificates of lawful election.520 All written oaths and 
certificates were maintained by the clerk as part of the municipal records, presumably intended 
to be in perpetuity: a measure of the importance of formal legitimacy. 
Of course, self-conscious legalism can be a cloak for conscious illegality, but this does 
not seem to have been the case for this municipality. That does not mean that the council did in 
fact adhere to the law or proper procedure in all cases. Despite the apparent sophistication of the 
council and its long-serving clerk, James Jessup, serious defects were found in several of the by-
laws that were referred to solicitors. At least one rule of procedure set out by the Municipal Act, 
requiring that the three required readings of a by-law not take place on the same day, was 
breached on a number of occasions. Frequently references to legislation, lawful on their face, left 
out (or mistook) chapter, section and/or regnal year, or vaguely referred to ‘the laws in force in 
the province,’ or ‘the act as amended.’    
Yet the council (or its clerk) seems to have been sensitive to the substance of legislation, 
and particularly any changes thereto, if not to formal or procedural complexities. The course of 
motions shows little lag between the passage of a mandatory statutory provision and its 
enactment as a by-law, although some permissive sections were not acted on immediately. For 
instance, several years passed after counties were permitted by the legislature to enact by-laws 
for weights and measures inspection before Leeds and Grenville decided to do so. That the 
                                                          
520 They were admitted later in the session or at subsequent sessions. 
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successive councils were aware of the new power is attested to by annual unsuccessful motions 
in favour of the appointment of such an inspector.521 
 
Low Legislation  
Of all the functions of municipal government revealed by the minutes, the legislative may have 
been the most ubiquitous, but perhaps least significant.522 Aside from the occasional by-law to 
preserve public morals or regulate taverns or hawkers and peddlers, which can be considered acts 
of policy, almost all Leeds and Grenville counties by-laws during these years were pro forma 
acts of administration.523 Because the common law of corporations did not allow for much in the 
way of executive action per se, and this was unaltered by the statute, all routine matters such as 
appointments of county officers, setting of their salaries, replacing them, relieving them (and 
their sureties) from future responsibility, opening and closing and changing of roads (a habitual 
                                                          
521 The Act respecting Weights and Measures was passed in 1859: 22 Vic. c.58. A by-law pursuant to section 6 of 
the act was eventually passed by the Council of the United Counties four years later: Leeds and Grenville council 
minutes, June session, 1863. One reason for the unpopularity of this initiative seems to have been the cost of the 
necessary equipment, which the province refused to subsidize. The finance committee still balked at the $160 price 
in 1863, but was over-ruled by the committee of the whole: Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January session, 
1863. 
522 Very little is known about nineteenth century by-laws in Ontario or elsewhere, although Raphaël Fischler’s study 
of zoning by-laws notes an unsurprising evolution toward differentiation and specifics, including diagrams:  Raphaël 
Fischler, “Development Controls in Toronto in the Nineteenth Century,” Urban History Review / Revue d’Histoire 
Urbaine 36, no. 1 (2007): 16–31. 
523 Unfortunately, there is no extant text or draft of the Leeds and Grenville by-law to preserve public morals, or any 
of its several amendments. A by-law of the County of Middlesex, no. 218 (amending no. 168) of 1868 may be 
analogous; this by-law prohibited gambling, vagrancy, giving alcohol to minors or apprentices, indecent exposure, 
blasphemy, profanity, obscene graffiti and the destruction of shade trees:  
https://archive.org/stream/cihm_56553#page/n5/mode/1up. The records of the various constituent municipalities of 
Leeds and Grenville at the Archives of Ontario are also spotty with regards to by-laws, but a complete run of by-
laws for this period is available for the Township of McGillivray in Middlesex County: AO, Township of 
McGillivray Diffusion Material D240, microfilm GS 53 (Minutes and By-Laws 1843-1886). Like the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville, most of the McGillivray by-laws were of the routine administrative variety: tax 
levies, appointments, salaries and duties of township officers, roads, fences, boundaries etc. with only a few ‘policy 
by-laws’ for matters allowed to the township, including prohibitions against unsafe driving (no. 32,1869), animals 
running at large (no. 8, 1850) regulating auctioneers (no. 6, 1855) taverns and gambling (no. 13, 1852), and 
preventing obstruction of streams (no. 33, 1869). Unlike those of Leeds and Grenville, the McGillivray by-laws are 
inconsistently numbered. They exhibit similar, if less detailed, legalism as the Leeds and Grenville by-laws, but less 
legality; the council was continually having to pass by-laws correcting previous by-laws and many are missing a 
signature, counter-signature or seal. 
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activity), setting the county levy, granting aid in the early years to townships and later years to 
agricultural societies and schools, paying all invoices, and changing meeting schedules were 
effected by by-laws. Most of these were discrete enactments, although authorizations of payment 
of invoices, grants, salaries and honoraria began to be grouped in omnibus by-laws to be 
approved at the end of each session early in the period.524 Routine by-laws or clauses in omnibus 
by-laws also provided endorsement for negotiated settlements with towns for their share of 
shared facilities, discounts on the assessments of some sub-municipalities, and regulation of the 
manner of printing council business and the public or private use of county facilities.  
At the beginning of the period all executive acts were carried out in this legislative 
manner, complete with movers, seconders, and recorded votes for the main motion and any 
amendments (some of which were numerous), three readings, and the seals, signatures and 
countersignatures stipulated by the statute. Later in the 1870s, a few by-laws delegated authority 
to act in limited circumstances to the Warden.  Most matters that were to be the subject of a by-
law were referred to the clerk, to one of the standing committees or to a special committee for 
one or more reports. The council as committee of the whole—numbering twenty-five members 
in 1850, rising to thirty-three in 1879—would then debate, after which one of the councillors 
would move a motion to accept or reject the report, with or without amendment.  
By-laws of the United Counties were numbered beginning with number one in 1850; 
however, by-laws of the previous regime, the Johnstown District, continued in force, and unless 
there was a reason to change these there was no move to re-enact or reprint them. Adding to or 
changing this corpus of district council low legislation, which numbered in the hundreds after 
                                                          
524 There were typically three sessions a year, each taking three to five days (not always consecutively). Special 
sessions called by the Warden for some pressing purpose were few. 
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less than a decade, was not a council priority.525 By-laws were sent to a printer from the 
beginning of the period; in the latter part together with the minutes of the session which had 
generated them.526       
Formal resolutions passed by a majority of council were also common. Staff and 
solicitors were directed by this means. As well, resolutions were often, though not necessarily, 
the precursor of a motion leading to a by-law. One (atypical) printed set of resolutions has 
survived; unanimous (an uncommon feature), it was printed for distribution to other 
municipalities, who were importuned for a joint petitioning effort. Dated October 16, 1851, the 
numbered resolutions begin with thanksgiving for an abundant harvest, proceed to self-praise for 
councillors’ efforts in road construction and improvement, and segue into council’s preferences 
in provincial railway policy.527 
Next to the routine administrative by-laws, by far the greatest percentage of legislative 
output of the united counties, especially in the earlier half of the period, related to the major road 
improvement project to which the resolutions of October, 1851 adverted. One of the first actions 
                                                          
525 By-law no. 26 was a by-law to repeal by-law no. 186 of the late District Council was passed in June 1852 
(relating to the salary of the clerk).   
526 A few printed sets of printed minutes and by-laws are extant; The Edith and Lorne Pierce Collection of 
Canadiana, Queen’s University: By-Laws of the Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, 
passed at their session October, 1850 (pamphlet) (Brockville: The Recorder and Advertiser Office),  
https://archive.org/details/by-lawsofmunicip00leed By-Laws of the Municipal Council of Leeds and Grenville, 
passed at their session June, 1851 (pamphlet), (Brockville: D. W. Wylie, Recorder Office),  
https://archive.org/details/by-lawsofmunicip00leed, Minutes, reports, by-laws, &c. of the Council of the of the 
Corporation of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville [microform]: second meeting for 1872 (June, 1872) 
(pamphlet), (Brockville: Office of the Recorder, Buell Street, 1872), https://archive.org/details/cihm_68116, 
Minutes, reports, by-laws, &c. of the Council of the of the Corporation of the United Counties of Leeds and 
Grenville: third meeting for 1872 (November, 1872) (pamphlet) (Brockville: D. Wylie, printer, “Recorder” Office, 
Buell Street, 1873),  https://archive.org/details/cihm_68117; Minutes, reports, by-laws, &c. of the Council of the 
Corporation of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville [microform]: second meeting, Brockville, 16 June, 1873, 
and a special meeting, 8 July 1873 (1873) (Brockville: D. Wylie, printed at the “Recorder” office, Buell Street)  
https://archive.org/details/cihm_68119: Minutes, reports, by-laws, &c. of the Council of the of the Corporation of 
the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville: third meeting for 1874 (Brockville: D.Wylie, printed, Recorder Office, 
Brockville), https://archive.org/details/cihm_68120. 
527 In favour of a St. Lawrence to Lake Huron route and in opposition to the proposed Toronto to Halifax Grand 
Trunk: “Resolutions adopted unanimously by the Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, 
on the 16th day of October, 1851,” https://archive.org/details/cihm_67577.  
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of the post-Baldwin Act council was to commence the macadamization of four main cross-
county roads. By-law number 4, an exceptionally long and detailed enactment, set out the 
specifications of each road and the means of raising money for the improvements by tolls and 
provided superintendents for each in the persons of commissioners. More on the doomed history 
of the counties’ macadamization efforts will be found below in the discussion of the contracting 
process; suffice it to say that the fact that by-law no. 4 had no sooner been passed than it was 
significantly amended by by-law no. 5 was not an auspicious beginning. Indeed, the year did not 
go by that did not see the county toll road by-laws either amended or repealed and replaced 
(occasionally in the same session), until the councillors finally gave in to defeat and transferred 
the roads to the townships in the mid-sixties.528  
No other such major initiative was attempted during the period, although several by-
laws—such as for the raising of money by debentures (for gaol and registry office construction 
or to re-pay bank loans), for the granting of bonuses to Railway or Joint Stock Road companies 
or for the joining or dissolution of subservient municipalities or school sections—were 
considered important enough to warrant the taking of legal advice or legal assistance in drafting. 
It is fair to say that the Leeds and Grenville council’s agency was as a rule not expressed by its 
legislation, but through its spending power.  
 
The Municipal Council as Administrator 
The road macadamization project and other major building projects (such as the gaol and 
courthouse) were initiated by council through by-laws and executed by contracts under the 
oversight of commissioners reporting to council, but where the municipal corporation of the 
                                                          
528 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 8 November 1864. 
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United Counties of Leeds and Grenville incurred expenditures for more minor infrastructure, it 
generally did so indirectly by means of grants, initially through a reactive process that bore some 
resemblance to that of an administrative tribunal. For most of the period grants-in-aid to 
townships, agricultural societies, charitable institutions, schools and occasionally individuals 
were initiated by a petitioner or petitioners.  
Although the occasional letter of request to council without this format survives, these 
were almost always formalized afterwards with a petition. A letter might set out a claim or 
argument, but did not provide a medium for the inclusion of supporting evidence as did petitions, 
which were generally an amalgam of plea and evidence. The petitioning ratepayer or resident, or 
someone on his behalf, would make a request of council, and various neighbours would add their 
signatures, not simply to add their support by weight of numbers, but also in many cases to 
testify to the truth of the grounds for a claim to ‘justice’ from council. On occasion, supporting 
petitions would add additional grounds for the granting of relief to the original appeal. Thus, for 
instance, Elizabeth Bird, the lessee of a toll gate (a numerous class of petitioner), petitioned to 
have her rent reduced, listing the equitable reasons why the contract should not be enforced 
against her. Her neighbours’ petition testified to the truth of these grounds, and added that as a 
widow with small children to support she was worthy of charity as well as justice.529 
 Sometimes the petitioning process was adversarial, though it appears that in only one 
case did a party make use of a lawyer.530 Petitions would be presented for and against certain 
requests and the council would have to side with one or the other. The council of Leeds and 
Grenville, composed of reeves of the constituent units together with deputy reeves where 
                                                          
529 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1854 (5); Petition of Mrs. Elizabeth Bird; Leeds and Grenville council 
minutes, 9 October 1854. In a later session Mrs. Bird was remitted £10 of rent due in consequence of persons 
crossing the ice and thereby evading tolls: Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (1). 
530 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1865 (5). 
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populations justified a second representative, do not seem to have followed the nose-counting 
approach to decision making, for the number of signatures on one side or the other was not a 
reliable indicator of eventual success. More probably, availability of funds, the councillors’ own 
knowledge of the petitioners, and partisan political or regional considerations would have been 
the governing criteria. This is borne out by the unpredictable fate of unopposed petitions.  
Few of the toll lessees’ remittance petitions were accepted. In their treatment of the toll-
keepers the council was inconsistent, but the fact that requests were made so frequently is 
illuminating. Presumably the toll lessees and their supporters felt that a waiver of contractual 
terms was worth the attempt, and that mercy in enforcement, if not the duty of council, was at 
least not an improper factor in the exercise of official discretion.  This perception is reinforced 
by the number of purely charitable petitions entertained, raising several questions. If Victorian 
individualistic morality made for tight-fistedness in municipal public assistance, as the literature 
informs us was the case, why were these claims made so regularly?531 Why were such appeals 
often successful at the town, township and village level (as the records of the Town of 
Brockville, townships of Augusta, Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, Rear of Leeds and 
Landsdowne, and the village of Gananoque attest) but rarely at the counties level?  
 The council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, when faced with a petition 
for charity, invariably responded that they had no power to make such a gift. Because the council 
tended to be careful with money, this may have been merely an excuse. David Murray takes this 
position concerning the many petitions for charity to the Quarter Sessions of the Peace in the 
Niagara District in the period 1841-9.532 However, from a legal point of view, this response had a 
                                                          
531 See, for example, Speisman, "Munificent Parsons and Municipal Parsimony." David Murray also finds that the 
repeated refusals of Quarter Sessions in Niagara to grant aid to the distressed and their sponsors did not stop these 
requests; Murray, Colonial Justice, 107-30.                   
532 Ibid.  
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certain validity. There was nothing in the act that said that a county could not grant aid, but 
nothing that said it could, and as a corporation in the shadow of a law as restrictively interpreted 
by the courts and/or by doubt-fostering manual writers, the council may have been reasonable in 
preferring to err on the side of caution.  It may also be that the ‘cultural baggage’ of the English 
settlers regarding parish rather than county poor relief was long lasting.533 According to the 
Finance Committee to which one such case was referred, subsidiarity (to use an admittedly 
anachronistic term) was the governing principle for welfare: “under the existing laws it is the 
duty of every [first level] Municipality to provide for their own destitute."534 This did not mean 
the request would ultimately be denied. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the Leeds and 
Grenville townships of Augusta, Front of Leeds and Landsdowne and Rear of Leeds and 
Landsdowne were accustomed to granting money to or for township residents in “embarrassed 
circumstances.”  
In situations in which the Leeds and Grenville Council did have express or implied 
jurisdiction to act, as for instance in granting reductions to its contractual partners, the 
councillors seem to have been guided to a considerable degree by fiduciary principles and 
perhaps as well by political reality; careful guardianship of public money was clearly a valued 
goal. Indeed, an annual balanced budget was a legal as well as a political imperative. Yet it is 
noteworthy that the councillors were least concerned with the toll-keeper lessees’ hardships 
when the corporation itself was in financial difficulties and most lenient when the toll roads had 
                                                          
533 See generally George Emery and J. C. H. Emery, "The Premier versus the Aristocrat," Ontario History 100, no. 2 
(2008): 178-204. 
534 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1866 (2a) 24 January 1866, First report of the Finance Committee. 
Technically this was incorrect: by this time first level municipalities had the power to provide poor relief, but not a 
duty in the legal sense. 
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been transferred to the townships. Even then, however, they were selective in their mercy and did 
not hesitate to sue those defaulters whose reasons for breach of contract seemed shakiest.  
Council occasionally granted money to charitable appeals that did not come directly 
under the category of poor relief. Unsurprisingly, some direct assistance went to local residents, 
such as victims of fire in the township of North Crosby, counties residents who had volunteered 
to fight the Fenians, and the families of these volunteers. Some assistance of potential indirect 
benefit to the counties was also granted to recipients outside the jurisdiction; for instance, aid to 
sufferers of major fires in Carleton County and St. John, New Brunswick, may have been made 
on the assumption that there would be help back from these jurisdictions or others if ever 
needed.535 The counties also provided aid seemingly as a rough quid pro quo to institutions 
outside their jurisdiction which accepted counties’ residents, such as the school for the Deaf and 
Dumb in Hamilton, the Marchmont Home in Ottawa (of which a local luminary was a founder 
and sponsor), and the Protestant General Hospital in Carleton County.536 However, some 
charitable grants seem to have been wholly philanthropic, such as aid to the “distressed 
operatives” of Lancashire, England.537 
In the latter part of the period, the council, while still retaining the reactive petition-
initiated process for awarding many of its grants, began to move toward a more proactive model, 
especially with regard to infrastructure and education. During the 1860s the practice first began 
to change with regard to bridge and road repairs; requests for grants for these purposes were no 
                                                          
535 Apparently a not uncommon practice, then as now: see Peter De Lottinville and John C. Weaver, “The 
Conflagration and the City: Disaster and Progress in British North America during the Nineteenth Century,” Social 
History/Histoire Sociale 11 (1980): 417-49.  
536 The Marchmont Home was founded by local worthy Billa Flint: see Larry Turner, “Flint, Billa” Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/flint_billa_12E.html. 
537 The Lancashire Cotton Famine (1861-1865) prompted an empire-wide relief effort. See Report of the American 
International Relief Committee for the Suffering Operatives of Great Britain, 1862-63 (New York: C. A. Alvord, 
1864): Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 16 October 1862. 
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longer entertained, and a pre-determined amount was divided equally among the townships. 
Exceptions were considered, but usually only if there was matching assistance from either the 
lower municipality where the road or bridge was located, or an individual.  This tack was also 
taken when the council was approached by neighbouring counties for funds for an inter-county 
road or bridge.  
On one occasion this approach was stymied by the law, at least initially. Informed by its 
solicitor that the counties were legally responsible for the repair or replacement of a major bridge 
at Gananoque, the council used the threat of placing tolls on the new bridge until it had been 
fully paid for to force the village council to agree to certain concessions: firstly that the village 
would pay the counties ten instalments of $1,500.00 toward the cost, secondly that the village 
would undertake to maintain the bridge henceforth, and finally that the village council would 
obtain a private act from the legislature to ensure that they would not be able to renege on the 
settlement.538   
The line taken in this latter period with respect to grants to local school boards was more 
carrot than stick, but equally effective. Beginning in 1870, the council made it a policy to pay 
half the cost of each of the counties’ high schools every year (the province paid the other half), 
but only on condition that the schools would be free to students.539 That councillors preferred 
value for their philanthropy is also apparent in the debates over whether or not to build a House 
of Refuge or House of Industry near the end of the period. A special committee was dispatched 
                                                          
538 The negotiations dragged on through 1875 and 1876, as the Gananoque council was slow to hold up its end of the 
bargain. Leeds and Grenville went to the lengths of tendering a contract for the erection of a toll-gate before the 
village council finally conceded to the counties’ terms. The cost to the counties of the victory was not negligible: as 
well as paying for the new bridge it was necessary to buy out a prior contract to maintain the old structure. 
539 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 27 January 1850. Originally the counties paid $150 to each high school, an 
amount that rose gradually throughout the rest of the period. See Gordon Darroch “'Scanty Fortunes and Rural 
Middle-Class Formation in Nineteenth Century Rural Ontario” in Canadian Historical Review 79, no.4 (1998): 621-
56. Darroch argues that the middle class near-homogeneity of the Victorian Ontario rural communities explains their 
high degree of support for education (655). 
175 
 
to research the issues of how many were destitute in the counties, what it would cost for a site 
and to build a “poor house,” how such institutions operated “in Canada and the United States” 
and what the annual cost of maintenance would be.540 On the committee’s report that there would 
be no savings guaranteed by moving to an institutional model, the council determined to 
continue with outdoor relief provided by the townships.541 There was no suggestion that poor 




Leeds and Grenville councillors, conscious of the issues of road ‘passability’ that concerned their 
constituents, also showed an increasing attention to safety throughout the period, possibly due to 
awareness of the negligence and nuisance cases reviewed in Chapter 3. Settlement of tort claims 
against a municipal corporation could be a drain on municipal resources, and one for which it 
was impossible to budget.  In an article, “Municipal Compensation Cases: Toronto in the 1860s,” 
urban historian Eric Jarvis puzzled over the phenomenon of apparent municipal generosity to 
injured claimants, but failed to distinguish between the compromise of a potential civil suit 
against the municipality and acceptance of run-of-the-mill appeals from the destitute.542 
Admittedly, the Toronto claimant/petitioners themselves may have been nonchalant about the 
distinction, but the city council, its clerk and its solicitors seem to have been wary about creating 
a precedent: Jarvis notes a practice of awarding money in some instances while expressly 
                                                          
540 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 12 November 1878. At the same session a resolution was passed to request 
the Legislature to compel every county to have a poor house: see Chapter 8. 
541 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 6 February 1879. 
542 Eric James Jarvis, "Municipal Compensation Cases: Toronto in the 1860s," Urban History Review 3 (1977): 14-
23.           
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disclaiming responsibility. Probably these were ‘without prejudice’ type settlement offers made 
on the advice of counsel.  
Only two negligence claims were presented to Leeds and Grenville council during this 
period. In the first case the petitioner simply dropped the claim after he was turned down by 
council.543 In the second, the plaintiff bypassed the petition stage and brought his claim to court 
directly.544 Perhaps he felt it was likely to be considered undeserving by council on the merits, 
for political reasons, or due to the large amount claimed, $2000.00 plus costs.545 The claim was 
to be a source of some anxiety for the council and its solicitors over several sessions. William 
Henry Wilkinson, acting under a power of attorney granted by Agmond D. Roe, alleged that a 
pile of earth and stones on the Victoria macadamized road had upset a horse, a carriage, and Mr. 
Roe one night, damaging horse, carriage, Mr. Roe personally and Mr. Roe’s livelihood. As the 
facts were investigated it appeared that Mr. Roe’s claim for damages was not as strong as it 
might have been; it was discovered that he had been injured and lost his job before the date of 
the incident. Despite (or because of) interlocutory efforts by the counties’ solicitor and his 
agents, and a judge whose sympathies lay with the defendants, a jury awarded $350.00 to the 
plaintiff. The council may have been wise to proceed to trial; the plaintiff’s offer to settle had 
been $800.00. Still, the relative modesty of the award was no doubt of little consolation to 
                                                          
543 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1850 (2). 
544 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1864 (2a). 
545 It is difficult to say what percentage of the county levy this represented, as the Treasurer continued to use pounds, 
shillings and pence for years after other sums were presented as dollar figures. This was apparently decided on 
because the account books were set up for the old figures. Canada West moved to dollars in 1855, but former 
currency continued to be legal: see James Powell, A History of the Canadian Dollar (The Bank of Canada, 
December 2005), https://www.bankofcanada,ca/we-content/uploads/2010/07/dollar_book.pdf, 23. It was clearly a 
significant sum: a few sessions later the gaoler complained to council that $200 per annum was an insufficient 
annual salary to offer to attract a good turnkey, a full-time position: Minutes, October session, 1866.  See also Adam 
Shortt, “History of Canadian Metallic Currency” in Money and Banking in Canada, ed. E.P. Neufeld (Toronto: 
McClelland and Steward 1964), 116-31. 
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council: with the plaintiff’s costs and their own legal expenses and disbursements the total bill 
came to $1, 435.00.546 
If the prospect of civil litigation was not a sufficient encouragement to safety, Leeds and 
Grenville counties also faced ratepayer initiated court supervision, presumably by the indictment 
procedure referred to in Chapters 2 and 3. Twice the council received notices from the county 
engineer that he had been instructed to inspect a certain length of road or bridge by the county 
judge.547 The judge had found the road wanting in various respects and ordered that it be put in 
repair immediately or the counties would face the statutory penalty. That these incidents had an 
impact on the corporate consciousness is indicated by the wording of the Roads and Bridges 
Committee reports; the words ‘parapet’ and ‘approach’ never appear before they were used in 
these notices, but crop up with reasonable frequency thereafter.  Somewhat spitefully, the council 
refused to pay the engineer’s accounts for the inspection in both these cases; these were paid by 
the provincial government or not at all. In like fashion, unhappy with the outcome of the Roe 
lawsuit, the council vented its ire on the special committee appointed to conduct the defense and 
the lawyers retained. They expressed the (vain) hope that some way could be found to pay the 
county solicitors a fixed annual fee whether their services were required or not, in order to avoid 
such uncontrollable blips in future budgets.548 
 
Contracts 
The frustration of council with the results in the Roe case is understandable. When one reads the 
years of documents generated by a constant struggle with road repair it is easy to appreciate the 
                                                          
546 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1863 (5), 1864 (2a), 1864 (3). 
547 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1858 (4). I have not been able to find this order 
548 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1864 (2b). 
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councillors’ feeling that they were doing all that was reasonably possible. Given the technology 
of the time, resources, state of development of the counties, geography and climate, no 
government could have achieved perfection.549 Yet it would not be accurate to say they did all 
they could. Rather, they did what they could, given their stubborn preference for a system of 
contracting by tender, a process which may have encouraged both parties to be impractical. Early 
in the period, county surveyor Thomas Hume advised that a salaried overseer be employed with 
hands hired by the day. Accepting Hume’s proposal might not have saved the corporation from 
the threat of negligence claims and indictments, but it might well have reduced headaches and 
administrative and legal costs.550 In effect, the counties exercised their agency by declining to 
experiment. 
Since the days of the Johnstown District Council, the tender and contract system had 
been the preferred practice. The counties contracted out almost all road work (statute labour 
under overseers was usually confined to roads of the subsidiary municipalities). Some money 
might be advanced for materials, but payment for the project was held back until the result was 
approved by council or its representatives. Previously the district warden had performed this 
function. In 1850 road commissioners were appointed, one set for each of the four county roads 
the counties had determined to macadamize. Commissioners, usually members or former 
members of council, would have the roads surveyed, and then would “let out” the road building 
to independent contractors. The commissioners were remunerated for the letting out process and 
                                                          
549 On the difficulties experienced by nineteenth century road builders in Upper Canada see Derek Murray, 
""Equitable Claims and Future Considerations: Road Building and Colonization in Early Ontario, 1850-1890," 
Journal of the Canadian Historical Association / Revue de la Société Historique du Canada 24, no. 2 (2013): 156-
88; Andrew F. Burghardt, "Some Economic Constraints on Land Transportation in Upper Canada/Canada West," 
Urban History Review 18, no. 3 (1990): 232-36, Michael S. Cross, "The Stormy History of the York Roads, 1833-
1865," Ontario History 54, no. 1 (1962): 1-24; Christopher Andreae, "Narrow Gauge Through the Bush," Ontario 
History 100, no. 2 (2008): 242-44.     
550 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1851 (3). 
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approval. Municipal contracts were all in writing, and the road contracts involved a considerable 
degree of formality and customization. The practice for other contracts varied; toll contracts after 
1856 used printed standard forms drafted by the county solicitor.551 Other small contracts, for 
printing for example, were handled by the clerk in his free-lance capacity, probably with the help 
of a precedent book. 
Legal sociologist Stewart Macaulay has suggested that the greater the bargaining power 
differential between contracting parties, the more likely the relationship will be reduced to 
written contractual form, and the less likely the contract will ever be tested by litigation.552 
Certainly this seems to have been true of the Leeds and Grenville contracts during this period. 
The road contracts were drafted to give the contractor very little power in the relationship; if he 
failed to meet his schedule for completion, the contract provided that the counties could hire 
another contractor in his place at his expense or the expense of his sureties. He might be paid 
either wholly or partly in municipal debentures at the council’s discretion, rather than cash. The 
road contracts also provided for liquidated damages so that the quantification of defects or non-
completion would not be open to consideration by a judge or jury. In the early fifties the 
contracting process was especially one-sided in favour of the council: if the lowest tenderer 
objected to the corporation’s terms, there was no negotiation. The commissioner merely moved 
on to the next lowest bid. Perhaps due to painful experience, later contracts showed more 
concern for terms that were likely to be achievable. Nonetheless, it was perhaps fortunate for the 
council that none of the road contracts was litigated. The commissioners often contracted in their 
                                                          
551 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (5), 1860 (3). 
552 Stewart Macaulay, "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," American Sociological 
Review 28, no. 1 (1963): 55-67.        
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own names and without the use of the corporate seal, which might have rendered the contract 
void or voidable.553 
Despite the efforts of the commissioners, or perhaps because their priorities were saving 
money and forestalling litigation and not building good roads, the counties’ roads remained a 
mess, as did their management. The mandamus application brought by Augusta Township 
against the United Counties noted in Chapter 3 rose out of the poor state of one of the county 
roads.554 Contractors petitioned for more money, having lost out on the exchange of debentures 
or through inexperience in anticipating costs. In 1855 the council tried another dubious tack, 
contracting with one of its own members. This was against the law, but most likely an innocent 
mistake. The agreement provided that the councillor, one Robert Peden, would take over all four 
county toll roads for a period of thirteen years, putting each into a state of “perfect repair.” In 
exchange, Peden would receive all the tolls for that period.555  
As Thomas Hume might have predicted, this arrangement was extremely short-lived. 
First, Peden’s conflict of interest resulted in “agitation” to be “fomented” against him.556 He left 
council in 1857, to return after his series of contracts had been terminated and a by-law had been 
passed on the advice of the county solicitor to ratify the illegal act. Secondly, the lack of clarity 
of terms and various omissions caused problems of interpretation, particularly relating to tolls, 
such as: could council change the location of or rate of tolls? Who would bear the loss if a toll 
                                                          
553 But see Risk, "The Nineteenth Century Foundations of the Business Corporation in Ontario."  Risk states that 
there was some movement in the courts during the union period to provide exceptions to this rule. The first was for 
routine contracts in the course of business for which the corporation was created where value had been received. A 
second exception for contracts for authorized purposes was rejected by the Court of Error and Appeal in 1860 (284). 
554 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January 1855. Council first sought (and was granted) a stay, then on 
payment of costs and the approval of Augusta Township to plans for remediation (through the contract with Robert 
Peden) the township dropped the application. 
555 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1855 (5), 12 October 1855. Peden was mayor of Brockville at the time. He 
was elected warden of Leeds and Grenville (by council) in 1852 and 1853. 
556 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 2 February 1856: a motion of approbation for Peden won by a margin of 
one vote; Papers, 1857 (3), letter from Robert Peden, 17 November 1857. 
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house burned down? Who was to clear the roads of snow? All of these questions were referred 
for legal advice. Finally, and most importantly, Peden ran into the usual problem of running 
behind schedule and out of money. 
In consequence of these problems, a new contract, apparently the first municipal contract 
to be professionally drafted in Leeds and Grenville, was entered into between the corporation 
and the former councillor, at the latter’s expense.557 The term was extended to fifteen years and 
Peden was bound to remove the snow. Still, the longer period did not solve the difficulties of the 
initial capital outlay required and Peden’s inability to raise the money. In 1858 council passed a 
by-law to loan Peden £2000, only to be met with a order from the Court of Common Pleas to 
show cause why the by-law should not be quashed for illegality on the ground that a public loan 
was being made to a private individual.558 The loan was eventually allowed to stand, but on 
January 28, 1859 a letter from the beleaguered contractor was received by the clerk stating that 
he was impelled to repudiate and would leave the matter of reimbursement for work done to date 
in the hands of council, “knowing that you will do what is just and right.”559 According to 
previously sought advice from solicitor A. N. Richards, the council was compelled to settle or 
face a quantum meruit claim. Peden asked for £9089, being £15, 389 expenditures, less £4000 
tolls received, less the £2000 loan, and charging £500 for his services. Council counter-offered 
£8200 payable in instalments, which offer Peden accepted.560 
                                                          
557 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (5), letter from Richard Steele to Roads and Bridges Committee, 1 
March 1856, contract between the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville and Robert Peden, 7 March 1856. 
558 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1858 (4). In the Court of Common Pleas, Hilary Term 21st Victoria, in the 
matter of Richard Coleman the Younger and the Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, 
(A.N. Richards acting for Coleman) 4 February 1858 (apparently unreported.) 
559 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1858 (2), 3 October 1858. 
560 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January session, 1859. The debate regarding the buy-out of Peden’s 
contract was acrimonious, but the settlement eventually passed by seven votes. 
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The lesson that road building was a losing proposition was long in the learning for local 
entrepreneurs. Even before the second contract with Peden was formally terminated, a tender by 
Thomas Wood had been accepted in principle. Wood’s contract lasted only until June, 1861, 
when he also petitioned to be released. Later he accused the council of forcing him to give up the 
road business by their insistence on adhering to the letter of the contract and their decision to 
release no funds in advance of results, thereby causing him to lose his credit with suppliers and 
subcontractors. Wood further complained to the councillors that their lawyer had drawn the 
contract. He had objected to some of the wording and had been assured by the warden that no 
advantage would be taken of him; further, he had not known what was meant by ‘repair.’ His 
plea to the council “as it was then constituted” was unsuccessful, as was his claim to be 
reimbursed for material left on the road. Apparently, he had forgotten that his request for release 
had offered supplies on hand to the corporation, but the council had not, and held him to his own 
terms.561 Undaunted, Wood and a partner applied for a new contract but were refused. A 
compromise suggestion similar to that put forward by Hume was advanced by one of the road 
commissioners (the office had been revived on Wood’s release) to the effect that council enter 
into a series of “small contracts” under the supervision of a salaried overseer, but the councillors 
chose instead to download all responsibilities for building the four roads to the townships.562 
As noted above, contracts to regulate tolls and toll-keepers also posed problems. Councils 
were continually bombarded with petitions to relieve toll-keepers of the consequences of their 
bad bargains. Collusion by toll-keepers with toll-breakers was suspected in some instances. A 
low tender might be accepted, but when the toll-keeper could not arrange a surety, the tender 
                                                          
561 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1861 (2), 1861 (3) 1861 (4), 1862 (1), 1862 (2a). 
562 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1862 (2a). On October 16, 1862 the Roads and Bridges Committee report 
recommended that the county solicitor be requested to draft a by-law to transfer the roads back to the townships 
from which they had been assumed. 
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would fall through and the process would have to be repeated. Moreover, toll-keepers became 
wary with experience. Roads and Bridges committees reported difficulty getting tenders for 
some of the tolls, and were eventually “forced” to hire a salaried keeper. It is unclear why this 
was considered so unfortunate, but it does show the strength of their dedication to the contract 
system.  
Nor were the contracts for printing devoid of problems. Due to the statutory requirements 
for notices for various types of municipal action, printing was a constant item in the budget. At 
the beginning of the period council printing work was parcelled out to a favoured few who 
shared the amount appropriated among them, but, perhaps as a part of a drive to public probity or 
parsimony, printing contracts also became part of the tender system. The results of this change 
were as might be expected; the lowest bidder would win the contract, then petition for more 
money. Opined David Wylie, proprietor of the Brockville Recorder: “[i]t is impossible to tender 
for the whole work justly. Either council would be cheated or the printer. If the printer is the 
victim, council would be petitioned for more as has frequently been the case.”563 The only just 
and honest way to purchase typeset, he explained, would be to pay a unit price. That way the 
council would pay only for work done, but the printer would have the advantage of knowing for 
what he was contracting. Council was unwilling to give up the budgetary certainty that a fixed 
price for all annual printing needs allowed, but did permit Wylie to inspect the written material 
in the clerk’s office to be printed before submitting his tender.  
                                                          
563 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1866 (5), Letter from David Wylie, 19 January 1866. Wylie had some 
experience in municipal matters. He was a long-time member of the Board of Education in Brockville. The next 
year, he began a stint as a Brockville Town Councillor, which position he held for the next five years. It seems likely 
that he felt a certain confidence dealing with the county council that his competitors may have lacked. See Thaddeus 
Leavitt, History of Leeds and Grenville, Ontario, from 1749 to 1879 (Brockville: The Recorder Press, 1879), 149-
50; http://brockvillehistoryalbum.wordpress.com/tag/brockville-recorder/. One of Wylie’s chief competitors was 
John McMullen of the Monitor, who often underbid him but whose contracts were rarely accomplished without 
problems.   
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Even when written contracts with attached specifications clarified areas of 
misunderstanding (such as who would supply the paper), the contractual relationship with 
printers could be frustrated by unanticipated events, such as the Fenian threat of the mid-1860s. 
When the Fenian scare hit, council felt obliged to pay an additional amount to a contractor to 
take the printing to be done out of Brockville. This additional payment had the incidental effect 
of raising the price over that of the next lowest bidder, and also resulted in the very financial 
uncertainty that the council was seemingly trying so hard to avoid. 
Contracts for the lease of counties property, which occasionally required both legal 
advice and legal action, were another repeating item on the agenda of council sessions. One lease 
in particular was the cause of much deliberation almost throughout the entire period. A former 
Johnstown District property (the old court house) had been let at what had been or had become a 
nominal rent to the highly connected Hon. James Morris, years before the Municipal Act gave 
the right to manage county property to the county council.564 This arrangement was particularly 
irksome to the council, possibly for partisan political reasons, but clearly also for financial ones, 
when their efforts to cancel the lease or at least charge fair market value were stymied by the 
Crown Lands Office, the nominal landlord. After years of protest and an unsuccessful trip to 
court, negotiations finally resulted in an agreement by the province that council could let the 
property to the Township of Edwardsburg at a more favourable rate.565 When the Edwardsburgh 
Township Council agreed to buy the property a few years later, legal advice was sought, and 
                                                          
564 Leeds v. Morris was heard in the Division Court. The counties lost. As it was found the lis was due to the fault of 
the crown, no costs awarded were awarded: Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1861(5). See also P.G. Cornell, 
“Morris, James,” http://www. Biographi.ca/en/morris_james_9E.html 
565 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January 1867: the rent was $10 a year. 
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several years later instructions were given to the lawyer to seek a private act to allow the 
transaction, which finally put an end to the issue.566 
 
Arbitration 
Some Leeds and Grenville contracts called for arbitration in case of dispute, but this does not 
seem to have been resorted to in the case of many contracts that went awry. As we have seen in 
the cases of Messrs. Peden and Wood, the council preferred to renegotiate or just cancel the 
contract. Since payment was withheld until the work was complete, there was no incentive to 
arbitrate on the part of the council. Other arbitrations were mandated by statute. The Municipal 
Acts stated that arbitrations were to be held in cases of expropriation by a municipality where the 
value of the land was in issue, and in division of public debt (as on secession). Each party was to 
notify the other of his or its claim and choice of arbitrator, and the two arbitrators together 
appointed a third. Although framed in imperative language, the Leeds and Grenville council do 
not seem to have interpreted these provisions as forbidding prior negotiation.567 Thus, when the 
Town of Brockville withdrew jurisdictionally from the United Counties, the legal expenses for 
Leeds and Grenville were $110.00, which sum included representation and negotiations well as 
“drafting the award.”568 The fact that the arbitration agreement with Brockville broke down, 
resulting in an (unsuccessful) suit brought by Brockville against Leeds and Grenville in the Court 
of Chancery, with concomitant legal expenses, may also have soured the council on this process. 
Some years later, when the Town of Prescott sought to follow suit, the United Counties’ council 
                                                          
566 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January, 1877: the price was $200. The decision to sell to Edwardsburgh 
had been made five years earlier: Leeds and Grenville council minutes, November 1872. 
567 The imperative language suggests that these arbitrations were not seen as an alternative to litigation, but rather as 
a routine quasi-bureaucratic process. 
568 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1859 (1), 11 October 1859. 
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was so determined to avoid arbitration that they decided that the Prescott offer was “close 
enough” to their own idea of what was acceptable.569  
For a while after the passage of the Baldwin Act, Leeds and Grenville appeared to prefer 
arbitration over negotiation when expropriating land, but by the end of the period the council had 
returned to the Johnstown District practice of allowing road commissioners to negotiate private 
settlements. Since it was the commissioners who seem to have acted as the council arbitrator on 
a regular basis in any event, this may not have made much difference to the sums paid, though it 
saved on the fee to the third arbitrator. Costs of arbitration, although not high in absolute terms, 
may have been prohibitive in relative terms; some awards show the costs as greater than the 
actual award. In some cases, no money changed hands except to pay the arbitrators. This could 
be the case, for instance, if an old road allowance was exchanged for a new one. In these cases 
Leeds and Grenville paid the entire cost of the arbitration. 
 The Leeds and Grenville council papers contain a number of such arbitration awards, 
many with seals, oaths of the arbitrators and affidavits of execution. Unfortunately for the 
historian, such formality was observed in most of these that the boiler-plate reveals little more 
than the participants’ penchant for legalism. A few of the awards, however, are more casual and 
therefore more instructive. One such shows the method used by at least that set of arbitrators.570 
Thomas Robertson, a township clerk acting for the counties, Allan Hunter, a road commissioner 
acting for Andrew Smail, ratepayer, and J. MacMillian, the independent arbitrator chosen by 
                                                          
569 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1868 (3). 
570 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1854 (1), award to Andrew Smail, 15 April 1854. Mr. Smail wrote to the 
council that he had been “informed by Allan Hunter” that this was the only way he could get damages, and that he 




Robertson and Hunter, met at the site and decided the value of various facets of the loss to Smail 
as follows:  
 
TABLE 3: ARBITRATION AWARD CONCERNING EXPROPRIATION LOSS OF ANDREW SMAIL 
 T.Robertson A.Hunter J.MacMillian 
Allowed for fencing a lane (18 rods) 13.10 13.10 13.10 
Loss of land for lane 9 6.10 5 
Allowed for disconvenience [sic] of distance from 
road 
20 30 15.10 
Deducted for advantages by drainage of new road 17.10 0 0 
Totals 20.50 50.00 34.00 
 
Faced with the (extreme) discrepancies among the values, the arbitrators accepted MacMillian’s 
figures and awarded Smail £34 plus costs. As for the loss of land for the road itself, it was agreed 
by all that this would be compensated by the granting of a deed for the old road. As observed 
previously, it is difficult to tell whether other awards followed the Smail pattern. Few seemed to 
have recognized “disconvenience,” or if they did, they did not note it.  
In the Leeds and Grenville council papers for 1857, a document apparently in the hand of 
county clerk James Jessup marked “Instructions” sets out rules for arbitrators, based on statutory 
provisions.571 Among these is a prohibition against awards for anything other than real property, 
such as fencing, an admonition that if the advantage was to the counties the award should be in 
the counties’ favour, and a further warning to make sure the land holder provided proof of 
ownership.572 For some time fencing did disappear as an item in the awards, but no arbitration 
gave the award to the county, in spite of the fact that proximity to the road was likely to have 
                                                          
571 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (1): 12 Vic. c.81 s.197. A reference to 16 Vic. c.181 s.33 is crossed out. 
572 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (1). 
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been worth more than the land taken in at least a few instances. As well, as arbitrators grew more 
seasoned, or as land values became more settled, fewer cases included a third arbitrator. Again, 
as the clerk remained vigilant about other statutory requirements regarding notices back and 
forth, it must have been felt that this common sense approach was within the spirit of the law, 
albeit outside the letter.573 
 
Bureaucratic and Legal Assistance 
The importance of municipal bureaucrats James Jessup, the county clerk throughout most of this 
period, and his financial counterpart, Treasurer James Lancaster Schofield, who also held office 
during most of this time, is evident throughout the records. They were paid by salary, whereas 
other officers were paid on a fee-for-service basis. The report of a survey drawn up by the 
Frontenac County Council in 1869, to which twenty-six counties responded, shows that Leeds 
and Grenville paid the most per dollar of assessed value of any of the responding jurisdictions to 
its treasurer, $300 over the next highest spending county.574 For the office of clerk, Leeds and 
Grenville was second in expenditure, paying $200 less than did the much more populous and 
wealthier County of York. The treasurer was also required to post ‘bail’ or sureties for faithful 
performance, the financial responsibility for which the council chose to assume.575 Nevertheless, 
it would appear that Leeds and Grenville councillors felt they received value for their money: 
neither officer had his remuneration reduced after the lower salaries paid by the other counties 
were discovered. The minutes of the Townships of Leeds and Landsdowne Front and Rear show 
                                                          
573 Notations indicate Jessup often returned defective notices with instructions on how to correct them. 
574 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1869 (5) 8 November 1869, replies to circular of September 26, 1869. 
Twenty-six counties reported. York County paid its Treasurer $1400 per year, and its clerk $900. Lambton County 
paid $500 and $350 respectively. 
575 In 1864, for example, the Finance and Assessment Committee reported on a policy with the European Assurance 
Company for coverage of $8000.00: Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1864 (2b). 
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a good deal of turnover in their respective staffs; that this was not the case at the counties level is 
probably because the value of a good bureaucrat was felt to be greater than any advantages 
arising from new opportunities to dispense patronage.  
A layman who had been clerk to the Johnstown district Quarter Sessions, then to the 
Johnstown District Council, Jessup was the eminence grise of the county council until his death 
in 1876.576 He drew up the agenda and stage-managed proceedings of council by drafting 
motions with blanks for the names of mover and seconder to be filled in at the time of the 
meeting.577 Jessup also handled all correspondence and performed duties imposed by the 
legislature on the county generally, as well as on the clerk personally. He assisted with 
assessment rolls and supervised printing. In addition, he acted as Clerk of the Peace, for which 
service he was paid by the Attorney General’s department, until lay persons were no longer 
permitted to fill this position.578 He also freelanced, preparing forms, returns and contracts for 
township and village clerks and others.  His death in 1876 necessitated a special meeting of 
council; six applications were considered and Samuel Reynolds (a lawyer who was currently the 
clerk of assize) was appointed.579 
James Lancaster Schofield directed council on financial matters. On his death in 1873 
(which also necessitated a special meeting) he was replaced by his son, Frederick Schofield, who 
had acted as assistant treasurer on occasion.580 In his regular correspondence with the Finance 
                                                          
576 Scion of a local loyalist military family, Jessup became clerk of the peace for the Johnstown District Quarter 
Sessions in 1830: Frederick H. Armstrong, Handbook of Upper Canadian Chronology (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 
1985), 278.  
577 Usually the movers and seconders were the same people in each of the sessions. 
578 Pursuant to An Act for the Appointment of County Attorneys, and for other purposes related to the local 
administration of justice in Upper Canada (1857), 29 Vic. c.59.  
579 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, 8 December 1876; Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1875 (3b): letter 
from Reynolds to Jessup dated 31 March 1875 identified him as clerk of assize. 
580 There was only one other candidate. Mr. Chapman, the Treasurer for Augusta, was nominated by the Reeve of 
Augusta but lost by seven votes: Leeds and Grenville council minutes, Special Meeting 9 July 1873. 
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and Assessment Committee Schofield advised as to the current and projected liquidity of the 
corporation, reminded council when their debentures were coming due and when finance and 
debt related by-laws were about to expire. He set out alternative courses of actions to be 
followed regarding the budget for the year, listing the advantages of each and urging belt 
tightening where possible. He also collected tolls from the toll-keepers, conferred with solicitors, 
directed legal action when necessary to enforce contracts and leases, and instructed the Sheriff in 
regard to the sale of lands for collection of back taxes.  The latter task was a complicated one, 
fraught with legal pitfalls, especially in regard to non-residents, and Schofield feared the 
responsibility. Writing to the warden, he advised that they “employ some legal gentlemen of the 
town” to ensure that the taxes collected on wild lands would be unassailable.581  
An independent accountant hired to check the books in 1853 found Schofield’s system of 
accounts superior to his predecessor’s in all respects; indeed, he discovered the county was being 
undercharged by their treasurer.582 However, the accountant also found that Schofield was 
intermingling private and public funds, contrary to legislation and common law. In consequence 
of this report the counties initiated the keeping of dedicated accounts. Ironically, Schofield later 
kept the counties afloat during the hiatus between payment of accounts and return of assessments 
by dint of his personal credit with the bank, a technical violation of the principle of private-
public separation.583 Sporadically, special audits were called for to augment the required annual 
auditor’s reports. No serious defects were unearthed, but councillors excused themselves for the 
                                                          
581 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1854 (3), 26 January 1854. 
582 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1853 (6), 5 December 1853, report of Walter Finlay. Finlay advised that the 
system of the former Treasurer, H. Buell, had been “irregular.”  
583 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1858 (2). Council expressed its thanks to Schofield for having used his 
personal credit in dealings with the Bank for the last three or four years. 
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cost of this extra vigilance as a deterrent against money being spent “in a loose and careless 
manner.”584 
Every request by the treasurer or clerk for funds or clerical assistance seems to have been 
cheerfully granted.585 Other professionals, part-time assistants and temporary help were treated 
more shabbily, in keeping with the penny-pinching approach to contractual partners noted 
earlier. Similarly, other low law officials who were outside the purview of their patronage, but 
for whose workplace needs they were responsible, such as the county registrar, were also 
provisioned grudgingly. Often the invoices of these provincial appointees and officials were 
reduced by up to a third. Naturally, there were many complaints from the recipients at this 
cavalier treatment, but only one, who cited additional reasons, quit civic service.586 None seems 
to have considered legal action. 
One group whose accounts were questioned by the council in the first few years were 
solicitors. For the first part of the period there was no official county solicitor. The first lawyer to 
appear in the council records is John Hillyard Cameron, by this time a leading member of the 
Toronto bar, who was consulted for an opinion on the Wild Lands Tax.587 Council also looked to 
the metropolis on a few occasions for legal opinions from another leading lawyer, Philip 
VanKoughnet.588 Once, after a disappointing answer from the latter on a question of how to tax 
                                                          
584 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, June 1879. 
585 For instance, in 1854 the Finance Committee recommended Jessup’s salary be increased to £100 “due to the 
increase in statutes:” Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1854 (2), report of the Finance Committee, 21 June, 1854. 
On 9 November1868 he wrote to the Warden, noting several years of service respecting assessments—preparing 
forms, superintending printing and distributing which was “not [his] duty by law” but which he undertook “to assure 
a correct and uniform system.” A raise was voted without discussion: Leeds and Grenville Council papers, 1868 (5). 
Schofield was originally paid according to the percentages set by statute. 
586 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1852 (7), 12 June: Thomas Hume resigned when his account was not paid, 
citing the “unprofitable situation” together with other reasons with which “it was unnecessary to trouble [the 
council.]” 
587 Donald Swainson, “Cameron, John Hillyard,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/cameron_john_hillyard_10E.html.  




property in towns, they decided to get a local second opinion; Sherwood and Steele of Brockville 
provided an opinion identical to VanKoughnet’s but “more clear” and less expensive.589 Two 
years later Sherwood and Steele were formally appointed county solicitors.590    
Even when officially appointed, lawyers for the corporation were employed on an ad hoc 
basis, usually as crisis control, to advise or act on behalf of the municipality in proceedings 
threatened or taken against the council or one of its agents. Occasionally legal work was referred 
to A. N. Richards, but Sherwood and Steele of Brockville remained official county solicitors 
until R. F. Steele was appointed to the bench in 1868.591  Steele was replaced by Herbert Stone 
Macdonald, who fulfilled the role until he too was given a judicial appointment in 1873. 592 The 
next county solicitor, W.S. Senkler, lasted only a year until he too became a judge.593 Senkler’s 
successor, T. M. Brooke, seems to have been less distinguished and/or connected than his 
predecessors; he was a young man when appointed in 1874 and remained county solicitor at least 
                                                          
589 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1854 (6), 1854 (7). VanKoughnet charged £7.10, Sherwood and Steele, £6.  
590 Leeds and Grenville council minutes, January, 1856. 
591 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1868 (5). A. N. Richards, himself later a distinguished politician, serving as 
member of the provincial legislature for Leeds and later as Attorney General of the Northwest Territories and 
Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, was the younger brother of Sir William Buell Richards, first Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. See “Richards, The Hon. Albert Norton,” PARLINFO (Parliament of Canada 
Website), http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Files/Parliamentarian.aspx?Item=74306bed-8848-4eaa-bfbe-
52f41b63d3cb&Language=E&Section=ALL; Steele’s senior partner, George Sherwood, followed Ogle Gowan as 
warden of the counties in 1851. He then left municipal for provincial politics, and was eventually appointed County 
Judge of Hastings County in 1860. See Biography of Hon. George Sherwood, Q.C, The Canadian Biographical 
Dictionary and Portrait Gallery of Eminent and Self-Made Men (Ontario Volume) (Toronto: American Biographical 
Publishing Company, 1880) http://www.accessgenealogy.com/canada/biography-of-hon-george-sherwood-q-c.htm. 
The appointment was not accompanied by a monetary retainer. 
592 “Herbert Stone Macdonald,” in A Cyclopæedia of Canadian Biography: Being Chiefly Men of the Time: A 
Collection of Persons Distinguished in Professional and Political Life: Leaders in The Commerce and Industry of 
Canada, and Successful Pioneers (Toronto: Rose Publishing Co., 1888), 652. 
593 W. S. Senkler had practised in partnership with J. D. Buell: Upper Canada Law List (Toronto: Rordans and 
Finch, publishers,1862) http://books.google.ca/books?id=nEoWAAAAYAAJ&lpg=PA130&ots=-
DqVri5JTk&dq=W.%20S.%20Senkler&pg=PA130#v=onepage&q=W.%20S.%20Senkler&f=false. Like the 
Sherwoods, the Buells were a prominent local family, related to the Richards: see Ian MacPherson, Matters of 
Loyalty: The Buells of Brockville, 1830–1850 (Belleville, 1981) and Ian MacPherson, “Buell, William” Dictionary 
of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/buell_william_1792_1862_9E.html.  
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until the end of the period. 594 Perhaps council was content with the trade-off of a less prominent 
or experienced practitioner for greater stability in the role.  
After 1858 all major Leeds and Grenville contracts were either drafted or reviewed by the 
county solicitor. Unsurprisingly, at about this time the counties began to pay their legal bills in 
full and without question and to scale back purchases of the municipal manuals discussed in 
Chapter 4. The council papers are full of publishers’ pleas for subscribers to various guides and 
forms, and at the beginning of the period Leeds and Grenville councils were good customers of 
reference material. In 1851 they purchased 149 copies of Thomas Shenston’s The County 
Warden, for their own use and to distribute to the town, townships and villages within the 
counties. In 1852, one copy of Hugh Scobie’s Municipal Manual was purchased for each 
municipality, and the council also subscribed to Scobie’s proposed Municipal Almanac. Eight 
new manuals were bought by council in 1859: two from Maclear publishing (probably 
Harrison’s manual) and six from Thomson and company. That was their last major purchase of 
legal reference material for this period, although in 1864 they did buy one hundred and fifty 
copies of a guide that provided names and addresses of functionaries across the province.595 By 
the second half of the period Leeds and Grenville councillors seem to have found it safer and 
more cost effective to rely on their solicitors when in doubt. 
A further significant source of information (and direction) was the provincial 
government. Every year council received copies of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly with 
appendices, one for each constituent municipality. Until confederation these were provided free 
                                                          
594 Brooke (or Brook or Brooks) was apparently never appointed to the bench in Ontario. He was twenty-seven years 
old in 1875. At that time had the approval of the Manager of Molson’s Bank in Brockville, who recommended him 
to American firms in need of an agent in Leeds County: Martindale's United State Law Directory for1875-6 (New 
York: J. B. Martindale), 709. 
595 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1864 (5). George Gregg’s Municipal Guide was an undated pamphlet 
published by the “Leader office” that provided pertinent and not-so-pertinent information. Among the latter: the 
ages of the officers and politicians listed.  
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of charge; thereafter the council paid. A steady stream of correspondence from various provincial 
departments arrived for the attention of the clerk and council; as we will see in the next chapter, 
much of that was considered a nuisance at best, and interference at worst, but no doubt at least 
some was useful, at least in managing or complying with the accompanying demands. 
 
Conclusion  
The law-related activities of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville were myriad and 
diverse, and this chapter has just hinted at many of them. The municipal records show that the 
shadow of law was omnipresent. Although the council’s actions were not always lawful in a 
strict sense, they were always legalistic. All corporate acts were ostensibly legitimized by by-
laws, and only in the latter few years of the period did they begin to move away from the model 
of having each and every action and expenditure moved, seconded and debated by the 
“committee of the whole,” even when part of an omnibus by-law.  
Throughout the period the members of Leeds and Grenville Council relied on their clerk 
and treasurer to get things done, and done properly, and they were willing to pay relatively 
generously for this service. But while the council and its staff during this period referred 
continually to law and showed an appropriate awareness of and deference to legal form and 
substance, there is no doubt that they occasionally showed a certain nonchalance about both 
determining and complying with the letter of the law. Legal reference material was valued at the 
start of the period, but less so latterly. Solicitors were relied on more and more as time went on, 
albeit grudgingly at first, and always on an ad hoc basis. Legal conformity was an objective, but 
not the sole or over-riding one. When it appeared that the Treasurer was less than meticulous 
about legal rules, councillors were unfazed. They were comfortable with his scruples and 
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competence, and the wisdom of this tolerance was confirmed when his relaxed standards allowed 
them to piggyback on his personal credit. In a similar vein, statutorily mandated arbitrations were 
not flouted, but rather transformed into formalized negotiations, as the third arbitrator was 
dispensed with.  
 Though the council showed a readiness to use law and legal practices to facilitate their 
agenda, this did not always lead to success. The quasi-judicial petitioning system made for 
unbalanced and unplanned expenditure, and gradually began to be replaced, or at least 
supplemented, by pre-considered grants. Corporate law required contracts as well as by-laws for 
the corporation to act, and these were duly entered into, seemingly in good faith, though not 
always properly executed. But as standard forms gave way to professionally drafted contracts, it 
became clear that no amount of advice and documentation could make up for weaknesses in the 
underlying economic reality and the impracticality of the tendering process, as toll, printing and 
road contracts alike could not be sustained. That the council’s legal position was strong in these 
contract disputes was cold comfort when their ultimate objectives could not be met. Nonetheless, 
the contractual mindset was resilient in the face of failure; rather than move to a bureaucratic 
model, they simply re-negotiated many of the smaller contracts and abandoned their lofty plans 
for major improvement of the county roads by downloading responsibility to the lower level 
municipalities. 
 The council did make use of the judicial system to press the counties’ own claims, and 
were unable to avoid the claims of others, but deplored the concomitant costs even when they 
were successful. They preferred negotiation to judicial or arbitral process, a preference that 
strengthened over time. In their legal dealings, the council (or their staff and lawyers) showed a 
knack for extra-legal problem solving, as is evident in their ability to maneuver past their 
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statutory responsibility in the Gananoque bridge dispute by using another part of the law—their 
right to erect tolls—to force the village council to capitulate. Law was also employed as a reason 
for inaction, as in the decision not to fund welfare requests. In addition, the council made use of 
its spending power to achieve goals outside its legislative mandate, such the requirement that 
school boards make education free to pupils in exchange for grants from the municipality.  
 The problem of the Johnstown property is particularly illustrative of the ambivalent 
nature of the agency of the Municipal Corporation of the United Counties of Leeds and 
Grenville. High law and political circumstances were obstacles to the achievement of a discrete 
municipal objective—the effective exploitation of a resource. An additional complicating factor 
was the competing authority of the Crown Lands office, another governmental sub-unit with its 
own locus of power. Various modes of action were contemplated and attempted, and eventually, 
after a number of legal setbacks and considerable time, the goal was accomplished with the help 
of legal professionals.  
The municipal corporation of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville was 
undoubtedly ‘a creature of the province.’ The shadow of high law affected all matters of low 
governance. However, the council’s freedom to raise revenue beyond what was necessary to 
fulfil their statutory and common law obligations provided a modest space for local government 
initiative. With the help of staff and lawyers, using by-laws, contracts, and grants, the municipal 
councils of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville were able to exercise agency, if not 
autonomy, in the pursuit of their agendas.  
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Chapter 6:  Soft Law, Hard Law, and Supervision: Grand Juries, Prison Inspectors, and Local 
Government Autonomy in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-1880 
 
 
Many years ago Willard Hurst and Harry Arthurs drew the attention of legal historians to the 
importance of legislative/executive and administrative/regulatory institutions in the socio-legal 
study of law. Their insistence on the centrality of non-judicial aspects of law in the nineteenth 
century common law world, though honoured more in acknowledgement than practice, is equally 
applicable to the sphere of low law.596 In this dissertation I argue that the high/low dichotomy 
should not be confined to the judicial facets of the legal system, and that municipal councils can 
be seen as ‘low legislatures.’ However, while the conceit of portraying law as ‘high’ or ‘low’ has 
incontrovertible value in drawing attention to the submerged nine-tenths of the legal iceberg, it 
should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, whether low or high, law is never reducible to a 
simple model.  
When looking at the relationship of law and institutions of governance, another analytic 
duality, namely that of ‘hard’ and ‘soft,’ complicates the ‘law’ part of the low/high law concept. 
Simply put, ‘hard law’ is the law that is instantly recognizable to Western eyes as legal: 
positivist, monist, hierarchical, and coercive. ‘Soft law’ is non-coercive, communicative and 
cultural.597 As Anna di Robilant has put it, “Soft law...labels those regulatory instruments and 
mechanisms of governance, that while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do not 
                                                          
596 See for example, James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United 
States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), Hurst, The Growth of American Law; H. W. Arthurs, 
"Without the Law": Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century England (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1985). 
597 See generally Anna Di Robilant, "Genealogies of Soft Law," American Journal of Comparative Law 54 (2006): 
499-544, T. Gruchalla-Wesierski, "A Framework for Understanding Soft Law," McGill Law Journal 30 (1984): 37-




rely on binding rules or on a regime of formal sanctions.”598 For some time much in vogue in the 
field of international law, these terms have had little impact on the thinking of legal historians 
outside the history of the lex mercatoria, the European international private law of trade, from 
which it has been claimed the soft law of the European Union and other non-state ‘transnational’ 
regulation descends.599 Yet the phenomenon is also discernible infra-nationally, in such 
otherwise legally difficult to classify institutions as the mid-Victorian Ontario grand jury in its 
non-judicial, supervisory mode.  
The Upper Canadian grand jury was one of the received conventions of the common law, 
a fixture of criminal justice at the inferior courts of general (or quarter) sessions and in superior 
circuit courts of Oyer, Terminer and General Gaol Delivery (commonly known as the Assize, or 
Assizes).600 In the criminal law sphere, while guilt was determined by a petit jury, grand juries 
reviewed proposed prosecutions to determine which should proceed to trial. In addition, grand 
jurors commented on political issues and lobbied for reforms by means of a general report called 
a ‘presentment.’601 They also regularly presented on matters of local governance, such as the 
condition and administration of facilities such as the court house, local roads and bridges, and 
particularly the district gaols.602 Peter Oliver has written on the proclivity of Upper Canadian 
                                                          
598 Di Robilant, "Genealogies of Soft Law," 500.  
599 Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in the World Society,” in Gunther Teubner ed., Global 
Law without a State, ed. Gunther Teubner (Aldershot; Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1997), 3-28. 
600 For a chronology of changes in the Ontario courts see Banks, "The Evolution of Ontario Courts, 492-572. 
601 For the political use of the grand jury in pre-revolution America see Marvin E. Frankel and Gary P. Naftalis, The 
Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 10. 
602 The Hon. R. I. Ferguson attributed the gaol investigation function to the grand jury’s role in general gaol 
delivery: R. I. Ferguson, "The Grand Jury," Criminal Law Quarterly 5 (1862-3): 210-219. See also George John 
Edwards, The Grand Jury: considered from an historical, political and legal standpoint, and the law and practice 
relating thereto (Philadelphia: G.T. Bisel, 1906); J. Van Voorhis, Note on the History in New York State of the 
Powers of Grand Juries (Albany, N.Y.: Albany Law School, 1962), 13, on the conduct of local supervision of 
accounts and infrastructure in the United States. See also W. A. Clarke, ed., The Grand Jury Recommend: a 
Selection of Entries in the Restigouche Grand Jury Book 1858-1877 (Dalhousie, N.B.: Restigouche Regional 
Museum, 1995) for a collection of presentments by grand juries in nineteenth century New Brunswick. Other works 
on grand juries include Richard D. Younger, “A History of the Grand Jury in the United States” (Ph.D. dissertation, 
The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1954), Sidney N. Lederman, Study of the Civil Jury and Grand Jury in 
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grand jurors in the early part of the nineteenth century to chastise the justices of the Courts of 
Quarter Sessions by presentments on the state of district gaols that fell below what the jurors felt 
was an acceptable standard.603 But except for their duties in the approval of indictments—at both 
the sessions and assizes—and their responsibility to determine the eligibility of ‘lunatics’ for 
poor relief at sessions, grand juries in the pre-Municipal Act period operated as a purely ‘soft’ 
institution, for whose strictures there was no enforcement. 
 While the courts of quarter sessions survived, professionally trained county judges took 
over their leadership from the amateur justices of the peace, and even their criminal jurisdiction 
narrowed and diminished.604 As for the venerable institution of the grand jury, it came under 
attack by those who considered its role in the criminal justice system to be an offence to 
principles of modernization, professionalization, and Benthamite rationality.605 Blake Brown has 
argued that the importance of the jury in British legal ideology seems to have helped shield the 
Canada West/Ontario grand jury from reform.606 It might be expected that the grand juries’ ‘soft’ 
supervision of local government operation of correctional facilities would have been unprotected 
                                                          
Ontario: Prepared for Ontario Law Reform Commission (Ontario Law Reform Commission Toronto, 1971); 
Frankel and Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial; Donald Fyson, “Grand Juries, Political Power and 
Citizenship in Quebec and Lower Canada, 1764-1830,” a paper for the 77th annual meeting of the Canadian 
Historical Association vol. Ottawa, 1998, http://www.hst.ulaval.ca/profs/dfyson/GJ.htm., expanded as Donald 
Fyson, “Jurys, Participation Civique et Representation au Quebec et au Bas-Canada: Les Grands Jurys du District de 
Montreal (1764-1832),” Revue d'Histoire de L'Amerique Francaise 55, no.1 (2001): 85-120. For the grand jury 
reform movement in nineteenth century Canada, see Nancy Kay Parker, “Reaching a Verdict: The Changing 
Structure of Decision-Making in the Canadian Criminal Courts, 1867-1905” (Ph.D. dissertation, York University, 
1999), 236-90. 
603 See Peter Oliver, 'Terror to Evil-Doers': Prisons and Punishment in Nineteenth-Century Ontario (Toronto: The 
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History and the University of Toronto Press, 1998), 60-62. 
604 See generally Banks, “The Evolution of Ontario Courts, 1788-1981”; Parker, “Reaching a Verdict.” 
605 See R. Blake Brown, “The Jury, Politics, and the State in British North America: Reforms to Jury Systems in 
Nova Scotia and Upper Canada, 1825-1867” (Ph.D. dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2005), and R. Blake Brown, 
A Trying Question: The Jury in Nineteenth Century Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode 
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2009). See also John Alexander Kains, How Say You?: A Review of the 
Movement for Abolishing the Grand Jury System in Canada (St. Thomas, Ont.: The Journal, 1893) Lederman, Study 
of the Civil Jury and Grand Jury in Ontario: Prepared for Ontario Law Reform Commission; Romney, Mr. 
Attorney, 298-310. 
606 See Brown, “The Jury, Politics, and the State in British North America,”282, also Brown, A Trying Question. 
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by this powerful ideological aura, and have been repealed, or atrophied, once hard-law, new-
regime prison inspectorates seemingly occupied the field, as they did, first with the passage of an 
act of the province of Canada for the inspection of prisons and other institutions in 1859, with a 
province of Ontario version following in 1868.607 However, that transformation did not occur; 
the old and new instruments of supervision existed in tandem.  
 The history of the Ontario prison inspectorate has been the subject of considerable 
historical inquiry, most particularly in the work of Peter Oliver.608 The post 1859 survival of the 
general presentment function of the Upper Canadian grand jury, on the other hand, has remained 
unexplored. In this chapter I consider the continuation of this old regime aspect of low law in the 
new regime. Using surviving presentments in the records of the Office of the Provincial 
Secretary, evidence from newspapers, and the records of local governments, in the first part of 
the chapter I look at the class composition and attitudes of mid-Victorian Ontario grand juries as 
revealed in the presentments, and discuss the practice of recommendations directed at ‘proper 
authorities’ at all levels of government, with a view to shedding light on the persistence of this 
facet of the institution.609 In the second part of the chapter, I consider the relative influence of old 
                                                          
607 An Act respecting Inspectors of Public Asylums, Hospitals, the Provincial Penitentiary of Canada and of all 
common Gaols and other Prisons, 22 Vic. c.110 (1859); Act to Provide for the Inspection of  
Asylums, Hospitals, Common Gaols and Reformatories in the Province, 32 Vic. c.21 (1868).  
608 See Oliver, 'Terror to Evil-Doers’, Part 3; see also Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service and Hodgetts, From Arm’s 
Length to Hands-on) for the development of the public service as a whole and Splane, Social Welfare in Ontario, 
1791-1893. 
609 ‘Proper’ as used in matters of nineteenth century governance means appropriate. Cities and counties had 
responsibility for local gaols and other public facilities, the primary subjects of grand jury presentments. Primary 
sources used in this part of the chapter include the Toronto Daily Globe, 
http://heritage.theglobeandmail.com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/default.asp?sessionID=1951973317; The Brockville 
Recorder, AO, MS N 144, (1851-4); The Prescott Telegraph, N131 R 10, (1861, 1864,1871); Peterborough County 
Court of General Sessions of the Peace Grand Jury Presentments, AO RG 22-81 Box 1 [hereafter Peterborough 
Presentments]; Index registers to general correspondence of the Provincial Secretary, Ontario, AO, RG 8 Series I-1-
F 1867-1909, MS 581 reel 1 [hereafter Provincial Secretary’s register, Ontario]; General Correspondence of the 
Provincial Secretary (Ontario), AO, RG 8 series I -1-D, [hereafter Provincial Secretary’s correspondence, Ontario]; 
Provincial Secretary (Canada) numbered correspondence file, Library and Archives Canada, RG 5 C1, indices and 
registers volumes 896 to 930 reel C-10804 to 10809 [hereafter Provincial Secretary’s register, Canada].  
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regime grand juries and new regime inspectorates on the actions of one low government, namely 
the Municipal Council of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, during the period 1850-
1880, as reflected in the counties’ municipal records. 610 I speculate whether the grand jury a soft 
law institution with ad hoc, temporary membership may have had an impact on the ‘proper 
authorities’ of Leeds and Grenville equal to or greater than that of contemporaneous hard law 
inspectorates.  
  
Grand Juries in Canada West/Ontario 
In their obituary for Robert Baldwin, the editors of the Upper Canada Law Journal waxed 
eloquently on the “glory of the country,” the Municipal Act, for which legislation he was most 
famous, but insisted that the Jury Act of 1850 was a close rival as his greatest achievement.611 
Baldwin’s Jury Act is surprisingly succinct (especially when compared to the sixty-plus pages of 
the Municipal Act), and dealt only with the composition and selection of juries. Nonetheless, as 
Blake Brown has pointed out, it was both creative and innovative, providing for selection of 
jurors by ballot rather than by the sheriff, and substituting a sliding scale for the absolute 
property qualifications employed previously, used in other jurisdictions, and maintained in 
Canada West for voting and office holding eligibility at every level of government.612 To provide 
a sufficient pool of jurors, the act required that the top three quarters of (male) ratepayers by 
                                                          
610 These include Leeds and Grenville United Counties Court of General Sessions of the Peace Minute Books, AO, 
RG 22-12-0-9, 1845-1869 MS 699 Reels 2 and 3 [hereafter Leeds and Grenville sessions minutes], and the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville council papers, AO, F-1740-8, 1850-1880, Boxes 12 to 28 [hereafter Leeds and 
Grenville papers]. The Leeds and Grenville Criminal Assize (Oyer, Terminer and Gaol Delivery) Minute Book (AO, 
RG 22 2906-0-2) [hereafter Leeds and Grenville assize minutes] was also consulted, though it unfortunately does 
not cover the entire period, beginning only in 1861, and is frequently illegible. 
611 “The Late Robert Baldwin,” The Upper Canada Law Journal vol.5, Jan. 1859; An act for the consolidation and 
amendment of the Laws relative to Jurors, Juries and Inquests in that part of this Province called Upper Canada, 13 
&14 Vic. 1850, c.55 [hereafter Jury Act, 1850]. The editors gave fewer kudos to the project for which later 
generations would venerate Baldwin, the realization of the reform movement for responsible government. 
612 See generally Brown, A Trying Question, chapter 6. 
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assessed value in any county would be eligible for jury duty (with some exemptions). Later the 
pool became even more rarefied by the reduction of the eligible to the top half of ratepayers.613 
The municipal electoral constituency was designed to be more democratic than this, especially in 
rural areas. While there were absolute property qualifications for elected officials at every level, 
(male) voters in townships and villages merely had to be on the assessment rolls, that is, own 
some amount of rateable property.614 As a result, jurors were from the outset a (comparatively) 
elite group within the community. 
 The jury act created an unwieldy, time-consuming system with copious amounts of 
paper-work (the cost of which was expected to be borne by the localities), but had the virtue of 
eliminating much of the potential for corruption for which the system was, justly or not, 
notorious, and spreading the burden of jury service more evenly throughout the jurisdictions.615 
Although the act set out the proportions of the pool to be allocated to each of the four juries—
grand and petit juries for the two levels of courts—and specified who should be exempt from 
service on each, it was silent as to which ratepayers should serve on what jury, provided they 
were appropriately discreet, competent, and sound of judgment and character in the opinion of 
the elected officials who formed the board of selectors.616 
 The minute books of the Leeds and Grenville quarter sessions show that in that 
jurisdiction at least, the grand jurors for superior courts were chosen first, followed by grand 
jurors for inferior courts, then petit jurors in the same order. It seems likely that other 
jurisdictions followed this pattern; one speech in the legislative assembly in favour of abolishing 
the grand jury argued that “the allocation of grand jurors greatly limit[s] the panel of petit 
                                                          
613 See Brown, A Trying Question, 143 
614 See Municipal Act, 1849, 12 Vic. c.81 s.23, s.53. This rose to $100 in 1866. 
615 See Brown, A Trying Question, chapter 6. See also Romney, Mr. Attorney, 294-6. 
616 See Jury Act, 1850, ss. 5 and 6. The selectors were also paid for their trouble. 
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jurors.”617 The minutes do not indicate the specific assessed value for the names given, but it 
seems that ratepayers with property of the greatest assessed value were directed to the grand 
juries, with the Assize grand jury receiving the most propertied. This impression is supported by 
the accompanying occupational descriptors. For example, the Leeds and Grenville grand jury list 
for 1869 for the superior courts includes fourteen ‘esquires’ (a term used to signify justices of the 
peace, who were eligible for grand, but not petit jury service), eleven ‘yeomen,’ six merchants, 
and one member of each of the following occupations: blacksmith, cabinet maker, tanner, joiner, 
tinsmith, manufacturer, hotelkeeper, gas manager, innkeeper and miller. The grand jury list for 
the inferior courts included twenty farmers, seven merchants, three ‘gentlemen,’ three butchers, 
two joiners, a baker, a civil engineer, a bank clerk, a waggon [sic] maker, an insurance agent, a 
hotel keeper, a mechanic, a marble cutter and a tinsmith. The petit jury list for the superior courts 
was heavier with ‘yeomen’ (thirty-two) and farmers (twenty-nine) though it also included six 
each of ‘gentlemen’ and merchants, and a variety of business- and tradesmen. The petit jury for 
the inferior courts consisted mostly of farmers and included fewer merchants and no 
‘gentlemen.’618    
Grand juries were likely to include at least a few experienced members. Once having 
served, jurors were exempt for the next three years, but could then be pressed into service again. 
Several charges to the grand jury indicate that it was usual to see repeat members. One charge to 
the Wentworth grand jury acknowledged this, presumably in apology for a lengthy and detailed 
explanatory address: “[p]erhaps some of you were never on a grand jury before and may not be 
                                                          
617 Daily Globe, 27 January 1876, 4. For a much more detailed breakdown of class and occupation in juries during 
an earlier period, and a different system of selection in Halifax, see Jim Phillips, “Halifax Juries in the Eighteenth 
Century,” in Criminal Justice in the Old World and the New: Essays in Honour of J.M. Beattie ed. Greg T. Smith et 
al. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998). 
618 Leeds and Grenville sessions minutes, 18 December 1868.  
204 
 
again for years to come.”619 Many grand juries seem to have been aware of the presentments of 
their predecessors and referred to these explicitly in their own presentments. The court clerk of 
the general sessions of the county of Peterborough kept a collection of presentments to which 
subsequent juries may have had access, but this may not have been a general practice; it does not 
seem to have been done in Leeds and Grenville, where the fact of the presentment was recorded 
but the content was not, unless it was forwarded to and kept by the relevant ‘proper 
authorities.’620 However, it can be assumed that grand jurors would at least have had second-
hand knowledge of previous presentments through press reports, or because they had been read 
in aloud in court and had become part of general community knowledge in that way.621 Some 
grand jurors were probably also well-versed in municipal affairs. While municipal councillors 
and officers were exempt from grand jury duty, this was only during their tenure of elected 
service. I have not systematically investigated the identities of grand jurors, but one foreman 
mentioned in the Daily Globe in 1875 was “W. H. Howland,” presumably the same of that name 
to become a notable Toronto mayor.622 In an address to the Simcoe County municipal council, 
Judge James R. Gowan remarked that “there are many gentlemen in [the council] who have 
frequently served as grand jurors.”623  
 Whatever their level of formal experience, there is little doubt that grand jurors were, as 
one newspaper noted, “very respectable gentlemen.”624 This respectability—code for the 
                                                          
619 Daily Globe, 1 April 1859, 3. 
620 Peterborough is the only jurisdiction for which the Archives of Ontario has a collection of presentments for this 
period. 
621 The Globe, a daily, had more space for court reporting than did the Brockville Recorder or Prescott Telegraph, 
both weeklies which had to fit international, national, provincial, and local affairs, not to mention advertising and 
notices, in a scant four pages a week. 
622 Daily Globe, 1 February 1875, 2.  Ron Sawatsky, “W.H. Howland,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/howland_william_holmes_12E.html. 
623 Kains, How Say You?, 12. 
624 Daily Globe, 1 April 1859. For a discussion of the interrelationship of the political and cultural aspects of the 
mid-Victorian Ontario middle class see Holman, A Sense of Their Duty.  
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propertied middle class—is evident in the attitudes of grand jurors to the varied matters on which 
they made presentments. Observations on the state of gaols and other institutions of social 
control and public welfare, such as hospitals, asylums, and Houses of Refuge (where the 
jurisdiction boasted such facilities), with which I deal in the latter part of this chapter, were the 
mainstay of presentments during this period. However, the presentments also indicate 
considerable interest in non-institutional facets of criminal justice, as might be expected, given 
the grand juries’ primary task, the finding of indictments. The plight of young offenders exposed 
to hardened criminals prompted many expressions of concern, although the suggestion that they 
be flogged in preference to ‘unclassified’ imprisonment might not have been considered a 
kindness by the juveniles in question. Adult male vagrants, on the other hand, attracted juror 
distaste and gave rise to several proposals for deterrence with hard labour. Still, grand jurors 
were not shy about advocating for even the prima facie ‘undeserving,’ if they felt these were 
inappropriately incarcerated, either because, in their opinion, the prisoner had been confined too 
long for a ‘trifling’ offence or an inability to produce sureties, and, most frequently, for the 
mentally ill, especially females, for whom they seem to have had a sincere, if paternalistic, 
concern.625  
 The mentally ill had a special significance for the grand juries of the quarter sessions. As 
noted above, the only ‘hard’ grand jury power (other than the right to accept or refuse 
indictments) was the right and duty to determine entitlement and quantum of support for the 
‘Insane Destitute’ of the counties.626 This jurisdiction to infringe on the fiscal autonomy of the 
counties had its origin in a statutory power to dictate to the court of quarter sessions given to the 
                                                          
625 There may have been a degree of prurience in this interest. See generally Janet Miron, ""Open to the Public": 
Touring Ontario Asylums in the Nineteenth Century," in Mental Health and Canadian Society: Historical 
Perspectives, ed. David Wright and James E. Moran (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 19-48. 
626 The grand juries of the superior courts had no jurisdiction to order support for the mentally ill. 
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grand jury of the Home District in 1830. This was extended to quarter sessions juries in all 
districts in 1832, and was then held to apply to the quarter sessions juries of the counties, an 
extension made explicit by legislation in 1858.627 About half of the presentments of the sessions’ 
grand juries that were recorded by the clerk of the peace of the United Counties of Leeds and 
Grenville dealt exclusively with ‘lunatics.’ Often overlooked by historians, the law regarding the 
destitute insane was an early exception to the well-known lack of mandatory poor relief in Upper 
Canada.628 A finding by the grand jury that a person was both destitute and insane resulted in a 
peremptory order by the chairman of sessions to the treasurer of the county council to provide for 
the resident ‘lunatic’ by means of payments to a third party for his or her benefit.629  
In the so-called final presentments, the issues canvassed by grand juries at both levels 
went beyond the specific problems of insanity and criminality to issues of more general interest. 
                                                          
627 See An Act respecting the support of destitute insane persons, 11 Geo IV c. 20 (1830); 3 Will. IV c. 45 (1832), 22 
Vic. c.122 (1858). Whether these powers really qualify as hard law is arguable. In theory these decisions would have 
been reviewable by certiorari or mandamus, but there is no record of any such proceeding in the reported cases. See 
infra regarding the doubts of the county judge regarding the legal appropriateness of a grand jury finding concerning 
a ‘lunatic’ to the Leeds and Grenville Counties’ Council. In “A Janus-Like Asylum: The City and the Institutional 
Confinement of the Mentally Ill in Victorian Ontario,” (2008) Urban History Review/ Revue d’Histoire Urbaine 36 
no.2: 43-52, authors David Wright, Shawn Day, Jessica Smith and Nathan Flis express their surprise at the high 
numbers of rural patients who were treated at the Toronto asylum. See also Joseph Dunlop, “Politics, Patronage and 
Scandal at the Provincial Lunatic Asylum, 1848-1857,” (2006) Ontario History, 98 (2), 183-208. 
628 Charlotte Neff, “Pauper Apprenticeship in Early Nineteenth Century Ontario,” Journal of Family History 21, no. 
2 (1996): 144-71; Russell Charles Smandych, Upper Canadian Considerations about Rejecting the English Poor 
Law, 1817-1837: A Comparative Study of the Reception of Law (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, Faculty of Law, 
Working Paper Series vol.9, Canadian Legal History Project, 1991); Russell C. Smandych, “William Osgoode, John 
Graves Simcoe and the Exclusion of the English Poor Law from Upper Canada,” in Law, Society and the State: Law 
and Legal Pluralism in the Making of Modern Societies, ed. Louis A. Knafla and Susan W. S. Binnie (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995), 99-128; J. C. Levy, “The Poor Laws in Early Upper Canada,” in Law and 
Society in Canada in Historical Perspective, ed. D. J. Bercuson and L. A. Knafla (Calgary: University of Calgary 
Studies in History No. 2, 1979), 23–44. David Murray made note of the legislation in passing: Murray, Colonial 
Justice, 119. 
629 The genesis of this act is beyond the scope of this study, but the rationale may have been that the mentally ill 
were seen as more of a challenge to their families and neighbours who might be expected to assist. Paupers could 
usually help out in some way; the mentally ill could only be a burden by definition, and their presence in a family 
could be devastating to those that were otherwise barely subsisting, especially where the afflicted person had been a 
supporting member. See Thierry Nootens, ""For years we have never had a happy home”: Madness and Families in 
Nineteenth-Century Montreal," in Mental Health and Canadian Society: Historical Perspectives, ed. James E. 
Moran and David Wright (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), 49-68 Wright and Moran point out in 
their introduction that “just as not all institutionalized were mad, not all mad were institutionalized.” (9).  
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These included such disparate—and multi-jurisdictional—matters as extradition treaties, snow 
removal, gun control, furious driving, free public education, the bravery of the volunteer militia 
defenders against the Fenian threat (for whose dependents a Leeds and Grenville grand jury 
urged support from public funds), and the reprehensible conduct of young people. One popular 
topic was court facilities for participants, including spectators and witnesses as well as jurors. On 
this issue one can see the consequences of a rising standard of living and concomitant 
expectations; the provision of cushions for juries and waiting rooms for witnesses interested 
juries in the 1870s, but not in the 1850s, although the facilities can hardly have been more 
comfortable or commodious in the earlier decade.       
 Grand jury service was evidently not a particularly attractive duty, especially for those 
who did not live in or near the county seat.630 One presentment of the Leeds and Grenville grand 
jury made suggestions concerning the time for calling them to jury service, noting that travel 
time made morning sittings a hardship for many.631 A Perth grand jury went still further, stating 
that as reforms of the criminal law resulted in the grand jury being called a considerable distance 
for a “mere form,” the institution should be done away with at sessions.632 A partial boycott of 
jury duty by Leeds and Grenville quarter sessions grand jurors occurred in January 1854, when 
only eight of the summonsed individuals appeared, forcing the sheriff to make up the numbers on 
the spot and moving the chairman to order fines for the absentees, which seems to have deterred 
further recalcitrance. Still, the Upper Canadian resistance to travelling for jury service seems to 
have been much less than Blake Brown finds was the case in Nova Scotia at the same time, 
perhaps due to better infrastructure in Upper Canada, and/or the greater accountability afforded 
                                                          
630 See Brown, A Trying Question. See also R. Blake Brown, "Research Note: Storms, Roads and Harvest Time: 
Criticisms of Jury Service in Pre-Confederation Nova Scotia," Acadiensis 36, no. 1 (2007): 93-111. 
631 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1876 (3d). 
632 Correspondence of Provincial Secretary (Ontario), 1878, #1553. 
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by more democratic local government. In any event, having made the trip out of either legal or 
moral obligation, grand jurors made the most of the opportunity they did not seek. Few grand 
juries seem to have left their assignment without having made some recommendations. 
 Strangely, given the grand jurors’ stated dislike of having to travel to the courts, the 
condition of roads and highways does not appear as a subject of concern in any of the 
presentments canvassed. The state of the roads had been a traditional concern of grand juries in 
England and Nova Scotia as well as in Upper Canada, and as I have shown, remained a 
preoccupation for the county councils, especially in the earlier part of the period.633 Perhaps the 
fact that failure to keep local roads in repair, as well as giving rise to nuisance claims against the 
municipalities, was a statutory misdemeanour and thus potentially the subject of an indictment, 
excluded this as a fit subject for presentment. More likely, grand jurors were well aware of the 
fact that the new municipal councils were already devoting a considerable part of their time and 
resources to transportation infrastructure and declined to press a matter that was already clearly 
an accepted priority.634  
The “crying evil” of intemperance also made fewer appearances in the general 
presentments than might have been expected.635 Possibly that absence was due to intra-jury 
conflict on this issue, as is indicated in one presentment from the county of Peterborough, 
wherein the foreman indicated that the grand jury forbore from presenting on the issue “owing to 
the various and confused opinions which have arisen” on the point.636  
                                                          
633 See Chapter 5. Compare Eastwood, Governing Rural England, 33; Brown, “Research Note: Storms, Roads and 
Harvest Time.” 
634 On 21 October 1870 W. H. Boulton applied to a grand jury in Toronto to indict the city for misdemeanour in 
leaving certain streets in a bad condition: Daily Globe, 21 Oct. 1870, 2. 
635 See generally Craig Heron, Booze: A Distilled History (Toronto: Between the Lines Press, 2003); Brian Paul 
Trainor, “Towards a Genealogy of Temperance: Identity, Belief and Drink in Victorian Ontario” (M.A. thesis, 
Queen’s University, Kingston, Ont., 1993). The phrase ‘crying evil’ is from Peterborough presentments, 5 June 
1878.  
636 Peterborough presentments, 5 June 1878. 
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 Although majority agreement rather than unanimity on these issues was the technical 
requirement, consensus seems to have been de rigueur for grand as for petit juries.637 Minority 
reports seem to have been rare or non-existent. That was also true of nonfeasance of the duty to 
make a presentment; although the Leeds and Grenville sessions minutes do not always record 
that a presentment was made, it seems likely that in those cases either the clerk neglected to 
record it, or the judge or chairman decided it to be unnecessary, as grand jurors could not leave 
their post until formally discharged, and the presentments were customarily the last thing the 
grand jury undertook before being excused.638 Any conflict between judge and jurors on this 
issue would likely have attracted a notation to that effect. 
 It might be wondered why, if the Peterborough grand jury “concluded not to dictate on 
the question” of drink, the foreman chose to mention it at all. The answer seems to be that a 
preliminary agenda for presentment deliberations was set by the presiding judge. The charge to 
the jury was a standard element of criminal court proceedings, and it was assumed that the judge 
or magistrate need not confine himself to the cases on the docket. According to the 1816 edition 
of Joseph Chitty’s Treatise on the Criminal Law, 
the chairman of the sessions usually delivers his charge to [the grand jury], relative to the 
bills about to be submitted to their consideration, the state of the county, and the duties he 
has to fulfil.....[T]he judicious magistrate will take care not only that his remarks are, in 
general, suited to the offices which a grand jury have to discharge, but have a plain 
reference to local objects, events, discussions, and concerns as far as they properly fall 
within the limits of his jurisdiction, and seem entitled to his notice. He will strive to allay 
animosities, to destroy the spirit of party, to discountenance every receptacle of idleness 
and vice as well as every vestige of popular barbarity and grossness.639 
 
                                                          
637 Petit juries were made up of twelve jurors. Grand jurors were to number at least twelve and fewer than twenty-
four, and a vote of twelve was considered binding: for the rules and procedures for nineteenth century grand juries in 
Ontario see Kains, How Say You? The Leeds and Grenville sessions grand jurors tended to number at least 
seventeen. 
638 With the exception of presentments concerning the destitute insane, which in Leeds and Grenville were usually—
though not always—the first item on the grand jury’s agenda. 
639 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, vol.1 (London: A.J. Valpy, 1816), 211. 
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 “Animosities… [and] the spirit of party” seem not to have much interested mid-Victorian 
judges and magistrates in Canada West/Ontario, but many other political issues did attract their 
attention. Writing on the predilection of superior court judges, especially the reform-minded, to 
use the opportunity of addressing the grand jury as a sort of bully pulpit for the expression of 
views for which any other outlet might be considered inappropriate at best and unconstitutional 
at worst, Patrick Brode has noted that judges “were not shy about rendering their opinions,” 
especially regarding the condition of prisons.640 Nor were they reticent in eliciting opinions from 
the grand juries to supplement their own. The presentments are full of evidence of judicial 
direction as to what to do (for example, to visit the hospital “in accordance with your Lordship’s 
wish,”) to consider (“our attention drawn by your Lordship,”) and, more insidiously, to think 
(“your Lordship’s suggestive charge”).641    
Simcoe County Judge James Gowan seems to have been defensive about an actual or 
feared allegation that he had overly influenced grand juries. Ironically, given that he was a strong 
advocate of grand jury abolition, Gowan protested that he was “only anxious to avail myself of 
these occasions to reach the thinking public.”642 He and his colleagues were likely well aware 
that if the newspapers did not report their charges they might still report the presentments that 
followed.643 The press found presentments to be good copy and printed a variety from 
jurisdictions across the colony, the country, and even the continent. Despite their non-binding 
status, grand jury presentments may have had a greater perceived legitimacy than a judge’s 
charge, especially on issues that were not directly law-related.  
                                                          
640 Patrick Brode, "Grand Jury Addresses of the Early Canadian Judges in an Age of Reform," The Law Society of 
Upper Canada Gazette 23 (June 1989): 130-47, 139. 
641 Daily Globe, 18 November, 1865; Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1866 (5); Provincial Secretary’s register 
(Ontario), 1867, #91. 
642 Charge to the Grand Jury of Simcoe County, 1881, quoted in Kains, How Say You?, 13.  
643 See Brown, A Trying Question, 189. 
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 Still, a grand jury was a transient, ephemeral group with no institutional identity once 
released from service, and no recognized right to initiate direct communication with 
governments. The Leeds and Grenville assize and quarter sessions minute books indicate that it 
was in the judge’s discretion whether a presentment was forwarded to the provincial secretary or 
county council or both or merely ‘filed.’ Cover letters by the clerks who copied the presentments 
attest to the fact that the presentments were being sent pursuant to the judge’s direction. Often 
the judge took a personal interest; Peter Oliver noted that after mid-century the judges of 
common pleas, and Justice James Buchanan Macaulay in particular, maintained an ongoing 
reform campaign with a series of letters accompanying presentments on gaols.644 In a letter to 
Toronto City Council, Justice Adam Wilson highlighted the points of the presentment he wished 
to draw to the councillors’ attention, as did Justice Richards on several occasions to the Leeds 
and Grenville council.645 One entry in the Leeds and Grenville assize minute books relates that 
the judge took the presentment with him back to Toronto, presumably to hand deliver.646 While 
grand juries could and sometimes did ask that the presentment be forwarded to one or other of 
the ‘proper authorities,’ once they were functus officio they had no means of ensuring or even 
knowing whether this had been done. In the United States, grand juries may have been more 
disposed to communicate with the government on their own, but in Canada West/Ontario the 
presentment process was a joint effort.647 
                                                          
644 See Oliver, 'Terror to Evil-doers’, 330. 
645 Daily Globe, 21 November 1865.  It is possible that Justice Richards took a particular interest in Leeds and 
Grenville since he had once been the local member of the legislative assembly: Ian MacPherson “Richards, William 
Buell,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/richards_william_buell_11E.html. 
646 Leeds and Grenville assize minutes, 26 Sept 1871. 
647 On 10 December 1875, the Globe reported that a Missouri Grand Jury had sent a letter to President Ulysses S. 
Grant in words that suggested the lack of a judicial intermediary (1). 
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 Patrick Brode has suggested a certain condescension by the judges “as they looked down 
on the yeoman of the county.”648 There is no question that the grand jurors tended to be 
deferential, often to the point of obsequiousness, as they congratulated the judges on their 
elevation to the bench, wisdom, and/or health. However, grand jurors also displayed signs of 
independence and a pronounced sense of their own importance. Occasionally grand juries chose 
not to follow the script set out for them by the judges. The refusal of the Peterborough grand jury 
to “dictate” on temperance was mentioned earlier. One jury remarked that because they heartily 
concurred with the judge there was no need for a written presentment.649 Several Toronto grand 
juries observed in their presentments that they declined to visit certain institutions as judicially 
directed because these places had just been inspected or because they did not think it 
necessary.650  
There are also hints that some grand jurors saw their duty as arising from “time honoured 
tradition” or “accustomed usage” rather than mere judicial fiat. On occasion, a grand jury might 
itself seem somewhat patronizing, as when one “express[ed] sympathy with [the judge’s] 
humane tone.”651 The Globe reports also reveal apparent judicial respect for grand jurors, both in 
the charge and in the reply. Often judges were quoted thanking jurors in fulsome terms and 
assuring them that the presentments would be forwarded to the proper authorities who would “no 
doubt” give them due consideration. While some charges tended to heavy-handedness in 
assigning inspectoral duties to the grand jurors, others show more ambivalence; one such charge 
                                                          
648 Brode, “Grand Jury Addresses of the Early Canadian Judges in an Age of Reform,” 139. 
649 Daily Globe, 3 February 1876. 
650 It should be noted that institutions in Toronto could be visited by grand juries of the Recorders’ courts and assizes 
of the city, and of the quarter sessions and assizes of the County of York several times a year. 
651 Daily Globe, 31 January 1857, 2. 
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declared a duty to visit the gaol and asylum, and thereafter such municipal or provincial 
institutions as the grand jury themselves might choose.652  
 
Grand Juries and Proper Authorities 
Grand jurors’ consciousness of their own worth is also revealed by their frequent expressions of 
frustration and resentment at the fact that previous recommendations had not been followed. 
While many grand jurors may have felt that their efforts were in vain, the records of the 
Provincial Secretaries before and after confederation show that presentments were not 
completely ignored at the higher government level. When received, the secretary or his clerk 
furnished the presentment with a standard printed wrapper, on which he filled in information 
about the source, and acknowledged receipt in a letter to the court clerk. Then he would forward 
the presentment to the appropriate government department or departments. Presentments tended 
to be undifferentiated, and ‘the proper authorities’ to whom they might be relevant could be 
multiple, especially after confederation. The first person to review a presentment after the 
provincial secretary or his clerk was usually the Attorney General, who would acknowledge it, 
often with a recommendation or comments, and return it to the provincial secretary’s office. 
Others who might see the same copy of the presentment included the premier, the prison 
inspector, and the director of the asylum. Each would minute the wrapper with his initials and the 
date of review. Turn-around time was usually no more than a few days. In the case of ‘lunatics’ 
whom the grand jury felt were wrongly incarcerated, if the asylum agreed to accept them the 
provincial secretary would be deputed to inform the clerk and advise the sheriff to make the 
necessary arrangements.  
                                                          
652 Daily Globe, 15 December 1874, 4. 
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 Whether the more amorphous items such as presentments on the death of the Prince 
Consort or free public education made much impact on the executive is hard to say, but like the 
petitions that were regularly sent on such matters, it is possible that they were used as an opinion 
poll might be today, to gauge the mood of the electorate.653 How much value the recipients 
would attribute to the opinions would doubtless depend on how representative of the electorate 
the presentments were considered to be. Even allowing for the exclusion of voters who were not 
among the top half of the assessment roll, it is not at all clear that the presentments were 
necessarily even geographically comprehensive, as the government would have been aware.       
At the beginning of the period under review, it appears that only a handful of 
presentments were ordered to be sent to the provincial government. This began to increase in the 
latter half of the 1850s. In 1880 some twenty-five presentments were recorded by the provincial 
secretary.654 Yet that is still probably only a fraction of all the presentments generated by grand 
juries during the year, as these juries met three (later two) times a year in each jurisdiction at 
sessions and at assizes. Some counties were more frequently represented in the registers, while 
some rarely appear; that variation can be attributed to the idiosyncrasies of the judge and jury 
and perhaps the relative condition of county gaols as the sine qua non of the general presentment 
agenda.       
 Though the excerpt from Joseph Chitty quoted earlier refers to charges by magistrates, 
and while county judges of Canada West/Ontario, sitting as chairmen of quarter sessions, often 
did as he stipulated, the practice of using the charge for purposes not strictly connected to the 
                                                          
653 See generally Chapter 8, also Jeffrey L. McNairn, The Capacity to Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative 
Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). 
654 The zenith was 1878, when twenty-seven presentments were recorded in the register. 
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trial of offences seems to have been more popular with judges at the assize level.655 About three-
quarters of the presentments sent to the provincial government were from superior courts, a 
pattern that seems to hold true of publication in the press as well. The preponderance of charges 
and presentments from the assizes reported in the Globe could be attributed to elitism on the part 
of the editors and their readers, or on the part of the judges and grand juries themselves. In Leeds 
and Grenville, court minute books indicate that the sessions grand juries generated between 
twenty-one and twenty-four presentments over thirty years (excluding those dealing solely with 
the destitute insane), whereas the assize minutes show sixteen over nineteen years, a comparable 
ratio. However, the respective minutes of the sessions and assizes show that more of the 
presentments from the latter were noted as having been sent to the council or government, and 
more of the assize presentments made their way to the counties papers currently in the Ontario 
archives.656 Quarter sessions charges and presentments may have tended more to the perfunctory; 
the clerk of this court in Leeds and Grenville often records that the chairman made “his usual 
remarks” to the grand jury and that they made theirs in return.  
 It may have been the case that the judges of quarter sessions were less convinced of their 
own mission in this respect, or that there was too much social, professional, and geographical 
distance between the county bench and the government and, paradoxically, too little distance 
from the other ‘proper authorities,’ the county councils. The provincial government paid the 
county judge’s salary, but the Leeds and Grenville Council papers show a close relationship 
between the two branches of low law and governance. Indeed, the clerk of the peace and the 
                                                          
655 The county judge was ex officio chairman of quarter sessions. The Leeds and Grenville council minutes refer to 
him as chairman and esquire, until a reform which allowed him to sit alone, that is, without at least one justice of the 
peace, after which time he is referred to as the Honourable Judge of the County Court. 
656 Three of the presentments mentioned in the session’s minutes are not identifiable as being about the destitute 
insane or not. Of course, it is possible that the clerk of the peace did not record all the presentments. That is also true 
of the assize, as the Leeds and Grenville council papers show presentments from the assizes for which there is no 
notation in the assize court minute book. 
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clerk of the counties were the same person until 1857. The counties’ council was in effect the 
landlord for the courts and their personnel, and once sent a message to the county judge that the 
Division court would have to be held in the grand jury room because the council would be using 
the court room for municipal business.657 Property committee reports include numerous instances 
of requests by the judge and other court officials for space, matting, furniture, stoves, and even 
curtains.658 Hence it is possible that the county court judge was less than assertive with the 
council, or that familiarity bred, if not contempt, at least lack of deference by the latter. On one 
occasion, the apparently legally dubious generosity of a Leeds and Grenville grand jury finding 
regarding the eligibility for support of a woman as destitute and insane was raised after the fact 
(and presumably without notice to the jurors) by the chairman of the sessions in a letter to the 
county council, to no avail—it does not appear that the letter was even referred to a 
committee.659  
 Or it may be that on this issue the council simply considered the grand jury to be the 
legitimate decision maker. Though the Leeds and Grenville quarter sessions’ records are scanty, 
and it is impossible to tell what proportion of, or to what extent, applications were successful, it 
does not appear that claims for support for the destitute insane were ever challenged in court by a 
representative of council. Nor is there any indication of viva voce evidence from an alleged 
lunatic or his or her sponsors. Probably the grand jury found on the basis of a petition with 
                                                          
657 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (3). 
658 A letter to the Warden from William Chewett and Sons, publishers, claimed that several councils subscribed to 
court reports for their county judges. (Leeds and Grenville do not appear to have followed suit.) Leeds and Grenville 
council papers, 1865 (5). 
659 Letter of James Jessup, clerk of the peace, to the Warden of the County Council of Leeds and Grenville: “Sir, I 
am directed by the Chairman of the Quarter sessions to call the attention of the Council to a Presentment made by 
the Grand Jury J in the month of March last granting the sum of thirty dollars for the support of Mary Ann 
Goff,…The Grand Jury in authorized by the consolidated statue of Upper Canada chapter 122 to make presentments 
for the support of Insane Destitute persons but his Worship is not satisfied that Mrs. Goff is a person coming within 
the meaning of the statute, and submits the matter to the Council for their directions as to whether or not the amount 
shall be paid.” Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1868 (5), 16 June 1968. 
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supporting signatures or affidavits, similar to those presented to township councils for ordinary 
(discretionary) poor relief, or to the county council for relief for (similarly discretionary) relief 
for other disabilities, such as blindness, deafness, or ‘idiocy.’660 Perhaps there was no perceived 
need to challenge the amounts claimed for the maintenance of the insane, as these appear to have 
been commensurate with the discretionary amounts granted by the councils of these townships 
for poor relief.661   
While the county judge might not have been able to trump the grand jury in such a case, 
on other issues he may have been more influential, an influence that may have been more social 
than legal and exercised informally. One letter to the chair of the Leeds and Grenville property 
committee in 1878 from the county judge requested a personal meeting on the matter of 
procuring a table for the judge’s chambers.662 That county judges were considered to be 
appropriate authorities on the matter of gaols is attested to by a letter by Leeds and Grenville 
Warden William Garvey to E.A. Meredith, the Prison Inspector. Angry at what he saw as the 
Inspector’s meddling in county business, Garvey argued that gaol matters could safely be left to 
the superintendence of the county judge, the sheriff and the warden.663 Whether Garvey 
understood that judges would be assisted by grand juries in his preferred state of affairs is 
                                                          
660 See Chapter 5. Though careful not to trench on the jurisdiction of the townships (and presumably not wanting to 
be accused of playing favourites among its constituent units), the Leeds and Grenville council regularly granted 
money to worthy causes such as hospitals for the deaf and dumb, and provided matching funds where a township 
wished to send a disabled resident out of the jurisdiction to a residential facility. 
661 On 11 March 1863, the Grand Jury of Leeds and Grenville “presented to the Court… [that] Sally Hubble of 
Augusta in the County of Grenville be allowed the sum of fifty cents per week for each of her two lunatic sons for 
the present year.” In 1872, the Prescott Telegraph reported that Mrs. Hubble had been granted $25.00 for the year 
on her own account out of the ‘poor funds’ of the Township of Augusta. Leeds and Grenville sessions minutes, 
March 11, 1863; The Prescott Telegraph, 3 August 1871, 3. What mid-Victorian Ontario lacked in privacy, it seems 
to have made up for in civic transparency. 
662 Letter of Judge H.S. Macdonald to Mr. Stafford, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1878 (3a). Most requests 
seem to have been made in writing. (The judge was granted the table.) 
663 Letter of William Garvey to E.A. Meredith, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1862 (5). 
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unclear, but there is no other evidence in the Leeds and Grenville papers of a county judge 
exercising influence over gaols other than indirectly by forwarding the grand jury report. 
 Despite Garvey’s assertion that the gaols were well supervised, the inspectorial assault on 
local autonomy continued apace. After the issue of gaol conditions had been raised for many 
years by grand juries, judges and rudimentary government inspection, the province took steps to 
provide administrative infrastructure—a new form of ‘hard’ low law for the province, in the 
form of prison inspectorates. The first of these was introduced in 1859, the second reconfigured 
for the new province of Ontario in 1868.664 Peter Oliver has written extensively of the extreme 
frustration of the few itinerant inspectors—five led by E. A. Meredith pre-confederation, and 
J.W. Langmuir, the sole post-confederation Ontario inspector—with what they saw as the 
obstruction of their mandate by county councils.665 Although Oliver did show some sympathy 
with the budgetary concerns of the justices of quarter sessions when gaols were their bug-bear 
prior to local government reform, he accepted that the municipally administered county gaols 
post reform were badly in need of amelioration and that councils were bent on resistance. 
Perhaps because he relied on the Inspectors’ own professionally biased reports and the 
presentments filed with the government, which were skewed to the critical by the very fact that 
they were forwarded, Oliver inferred that the grand juries, which he credited “in the absence of 
appointed inspectors [as having] served to prevent some of the worst abuses” in the early years, 
were rendered irrelevant by the advent of correct and crusading bureaucrats.666 The Leeds and 
                                                          
664 An Act respecting Inspectors of Public Asylums, Hospitals, the Provincial Penitentiary of Canada and of all 
Common Gaols and other Prisons, Canada, Statutes, c.110 (1859); An Act to Provide for the Inspection of  
Asylums, Hospitals, Common Gaols and Reformatories in the Province, Ontario Statutes, c. 21 (1868); Oliver, 
‘Terror to Evil-Doers’, chapters 9 and 10. 
665 Peter Oliver, “Meredith, Edmund Allen” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 
http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/meredith_edmund_allen_12E.html; Peter Oliver, “Langmuir, John Woodburn” 
Dictionary of Canadian Biography, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/langmuir_john_woodburn_14E.html. 
666 Oliver, ‘Terror to Evil-Doers’, 60. 
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Grenville council papers provide ample evidence for these arguments, but also show that the 
situation was more complicated than Oliver describes. 
 There is nothing in the presentments to suggest that there was any crisis in the condition 
of the Leeds and Grenville counties facilities as the 1850s began. The first presentment from that 
decade to be filed with the Council papers, in 1852, includes a complaint—which later 
presentments would repeat—that the court and public are disturbed by excessive noise during 
proceedings, and “suggests…having the court Room and pasages [sic] connected there with 
covered with strong matting or Carpeting which would greatly lessen if not wholley [sic] prevent 
the annoyances….”667 The gaol, however, was “clean and secure,” with no complaints from the 
prisoners, who are said to be “satisfied and greatful [sic] for the humane attention of the 
Jailor.”668 That wording is similar to many presentments in Leeds and Grenville and other 
jurisdictions of the time that seemed to follow a similar format in regards to the gaol report, 
focussing especially on the performance of the gaoler. The gaoler was generally commended, but 
the approval was not supposed to be formulaic. Chief Justice Draper, in a charge reported in the 
Brockville Recorder, reminded one grand jury of the importance of this part of their duty, citing 
an incident in England “where two or three youth committed suicide to escape the torture of the 
keeper of the prison and his myrmidons."669  
 Doubtless it is unsafe to draw too much from the alleged satisfaction of the prisoners with 
their treatment. Oliver cited instances in which prisoners were vehement about terrible 
conditions in the colonial period, so they were presumably not without voice, but they were 
naturally in a somewhat vulnerable position when it came to the gaoler. The grand jurors’ 
                                                          
667 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1852 (8) (no date). 
668 Ibid. The courtroom was carpeted. Later presentments and judges’ letters requested (and received) carpeting in 
the halls and galleries, on account of noise and distraction. 
669 Brockville Recorder, 27 October 1853, 2. 
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tendency to approbation of gaolers may also have been partially due to a structural bias, albeit a 
less direct one. Grand jurors exhibited a similar appreciation of officials on whose assistance 
they relied in the performance of their duties, including the directors of the other institutions 
visited, the county crown attorney, and the judge himself. Yet just as in the case of the judges, it 
is clear that this was often a two-way street; the officials in question also sought to make use of 
the grand jury to add authority to their own concerns and complaints.670 Nor is there any reason 
to suspect that the gaol staff was less than exemplary, as even the Prison Inspectors, although 
they tended to be sparing in their praise, had only one negative comment concerning the Leeds 
and Grenville gaol employees, and that for a turnkey who was dismissed for negligence 
following an escape, rather than for ill-treatment of prisoners.671 Indeed, during this entire period 
the prison inspectors had no qualms about the cleanliness or upkeep of the prison, and it is clear 
from the property committee records that the council had the gaol painted and repaired on an 
ongoing basis. Neglect and negligence were not problems, it would seem. Rather, the core of the 
conflict between the council and the inspectorate seems to have derived from differing missions 
and administrative structures and from a related divergence in expectations and assumptions. 
 It is instructive that the first criticism of the gaol during the period under review came 
neither from the grand jury nor the inspectorate, but from the gaol surgeon, and that his 
complaints were related to his own professional priorities. In October of 1856, Dr. Thomas 
Reynolds wrote to the assize judge, emphasizing that “though it was not strictly his duty” to 
report, he had concerns that the gaol walls were insufficient, resulting in a restriction on outside 
                                                          
670 James Moran has written that in 1844 a conflict between the Asylum superintendent and the Board of 
Commissioners was initiated by the publication of a grand jury report that took the position espoused by the 
superintendent who had guided the grand jury in their inspection: James E. Moran, Committed to the State Asylum: 
Insanity and Society in Nineteenth Century Quebec and Ontario (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 
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exercise, and that there were no facilities for sick inmates.672 The next month he repeated his 
concerns in a letter to the court of quarter sessions, adding a request for further remuneration for 
himself.673 In response, the assize grand jury agreed on the question of security, but was silent as 
to the erection of a small building to serve as a hospital, whereas the quarter sessions’ jury 
agreed with all the suggestions, and recommended the salary increase.674 Success was similarly 
mixed when both presentments with the accompanying letters were forwarded to the council, 
which in turn referred them to the newly established standing committee on counties property.675 
The committee recommended repairs to the wall, and the increase in salary, but balked at the 
hospital “in the present state of finances.”676 A letter from the sheriff sounding alarms as to a 
water supply problem, a broken stone floor and consequent rat problem, and severe leaks in the 
roof was referred to a special committee to make the necessary repairs.677 The rats were never 
mentioned again, so presumably they were either exaggerated or eradicated, the roof received a 
temporary repair, and the sheriff was authorized to have the prisoners dig a new well and to call 
on the Treasurer for payment for water deliveries in the meantime.678    
 In 1858 a grand jury of the quarter sessions, reconsidering Dr. Reynolds’ request, 
advised once again in favour of improvements to the walls, but decided “it was prudent to 
forbear” on the question of the hospital.679 It is difficult to tell whether the implied reason for the 
                                                          
672 Letter of Dr. Thomas Reynolds to Justice Hagarty, 20 October 1856, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 
(1). 
673 Letter of Dr. Thomas Reynolds to Chairman George Malloch, 18 November 1856, Leeds and Grenville council 
papers, 1856 (1). At this time the court was responsible for appointing and paying the gaol surgeon, a part-time 
contract position. Later the council took over these responsibilities. 
674 Presentment to Assize, 24 October 1856, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (6); Presentment to Quarter 
Sessions, 18 November 1856, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (6). 
675 In the early 1850s gaol matters were referred to the omnibus Finance and Assessment committee. 
676 First report of the standing committee on property, 28 May 1857, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (3). 
677 Letter of Adiel Sherwood, 7 April 1857, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (2). 
678 First report of standing committee on property, 14 October 1857, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (2). 
679 Presentment of 20 April 1858, Leeds and Grenville Council papers 1856 (6). (Some of the presentments have 
been filed together in an earlier year, suggesting that someone culled them from several years and subsequently filed 
them all according to the earliest date.) 
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decision not to proceed with the gaol hospital for lack of funds was disingenuous. The late 1850s 
were a time of province-wide depression.680 Municipal councils were elected annually, and 
budgets and rates set only for that year. There is no reason to think that the counties were not as 
hard-up for funds, especially as to capital, as they alleged, or that the grand juries were not aware 
of this. 
 That the council was not expecting an extreme condemnation of their gaol by the 
provincial bureaucracy is revealed by the Warden’s 1857 address to council in which he 
announced the proclamation of the new prisons inspection act, commenting that he expected the 
council “cheerfully [to] cooperate with the Government in placing the Gaol of these counties 
upon such a footing as will make it such an institution as the Legislature contemplated.”681 The 
next year he recommended that Dr. Reynolds be appointed to the inspectorate.682 Change was 
clearly in the offing, though, and council set up a special committee to meet with the Inspectors 
as required by the statute. The inspectors, however, were dilatory about meeting, which 
ironically may have resulted in deterioration of the gaol in the meantime. Perhaps under the 
influence of interest from the press and the concern of a reformist judge, the gaoler and two 
grand juries found the gaol to be in need of repair and renovation. One of these reports was 
particularly pointed, recommending: 
 1st That the different cells for the Prisoners need to be enlarged and further   
 ventilated  
 2nd That the Building should be enlarged in order to accomplish the object above   
 referred to as well as those alluded to hereafter 
 3rd That great necessity exists for separate apartments for Male & for Female   
 Juvenile offenders to avoid the serious evil of contamination by those   
 more hardened in crime 
                                                          
680 See McCalla, Planting the Province, Chapter 12, Michael Piva, “Government Finance and the Development of 
the Canadian State,” 264. 
681 Warden's address, 12 October 1857, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1857 (2). 
682 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1858 (2). 
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 4th That all the cells of the Jail should be prepared with a view to the comfort and  
 cheerfulness of the Prisoners so far as may be consistent with perfect   
 safety 
 5th That separate apartments for the sick should be prepared say for the Males &   
 for Females 
 6th That Baths for the general cleansing & health of the prisoners are desirable 
 7th That either a good well or cistern should be provided to ensure a sufficient [sic] of  
 good water 
 8th That the Walls enclosing the Yards of the Jail are insufficient as a watch is   
 found necessary to prevent escape.683 
 
The council’s property committee, while urging renewed temporary protection for the 
roof, declined to recommend the “significant outlay” implicitly requisite in the presentments. 
Though they did vote money for a gaol library at the behest of the gaol surgeon and sheriff, and 
expressly concurred with the criticisms set out in the presentments, committee members cited 
their fear that whatever improvements were undertaken might not be in accord with the 
Inspector’s requirements. While that determination may well have been an insincere 
procrastination, given later developments it also showed a degree of perspicacity.  
 Once the Inspectors finally did arrange to meet, they sent a four-page illustrated pamphlet 
in advance, setting out plans for a model gaol. The ideal building would be of specific 
proportions, close to the court, with at least an acre of yard space, waxed hardwood floors and 
wide corridors.684 To comply with this plan would require an even more significant capital 
expenditure than the grand juries’ suggested improvements. Unlike the grand juries, the 
inspectors made no acknowledgement that there was an operating gaol in existence that had 
already been erected with local taxes. As might be expected, the council and committee took 
                                                          
683 Presentment dated November, 1858, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1856 (6). As noted, the dates of the 
council papers files do not always match the dates of the folders. The grand jury also included an item commending 
the gaoler, and another expressing indignation that the gaoler was using his own money to buy food for an indigent 
debtor, which it argued should have been the responsibility of the quarter sessions or the province. 
684 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1860 (5). 
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umbrage at their criticism, denying that the gaol was as “wretched as represented” and railing 
against the necessity of the significant alterations requisitioned.685 
 But resistance was not a monolithic response. The question of the appropriate degree of 
cooperation seems to have been a contested one, as is demonstrated by deletions and 
amendments to the committee reports, and conflicting reports by successive committees. The 
special committee eventually recommended that the inspector’s instructions be followed, only to 
be overruled by the Finance and Assessment committee. The negotiations took several years, and 
were hindered by the council’s voting an insufficient amount to begin the alterations, to the 
consternation of the commissioners, who were naturally hesitant to begin work without secure 
funding. They warned that the inspectors had threatened government action, in the form of 
suspension of the counties’ corporate status, in the face of municipal “contumacy.” 686 Despite 
their ‘hard law’ status, this was the only sanction at the inspector’s disposal, a somewhat blunt 
instrument with which to secure compliance. Eventually the truculent warden, William Garvey, 
was replaced by the more tractable James Keeler, and the committee proffered an appropriate 
plan that was approved by the inspectors and provincial executive. Work was finally completed 
in 1863, at a cost of $3921.20, half of which was to be borne by the province.687  
The inspectors’ perspective excluded extraneous considerations, including the fact that 
counties did not have immediate access to unlimited or uncontested resources. In 1871 the Leeds 
and Grenville statement of assets and liabilities declared the number of ratepayers to be 9862, 
many of whom seem to have been regularly clamouring for economic infrastructure in the form 
of roads and bridges, which latter seemed to have the unfortunate habit of being destroyed by 
                                                          
685 Report of standing committee on property, 7 November 1860, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1860 (3). 
686 Report of commissioners, 13 October 1862, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1862 (5).  
687 Report of commissioners, 29 December 1863, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1863 (5). 
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floods almost as fast as the council could build them.688 Although they were not entirely adverse 
to discretionary spending—they voted for improvements to the town square, at a cost of $400, 
and, as noted in Chapter 5, paid their staff relatively generous salaries—for large outlays the 
councillors were forced to borrow; to finance the new gaol and registry office they incurred bank 
debt of $4000 to provide for the anticipated expenditure of $7500.00 over two years.689 
 Notwithstanding the council’s capitulation, there was to be little peace on the gaol front. 
No sooner had the council agreed to the renovations than Inspector Meredith began to press them 
on the subject of proper diet for prisoners, and the addition of a small multi-purpose building to 
serve as a kitchen, both of which proposals gained the approval of a grand jury. Once again, 
William Garvey, who was property committee chairman as well as warden, initially refused 
point-blank. His successors, perhaps persuaded by Meredith’s assertion that his proposal for 
feeding the prisoners a regulated diet provided by someone other than the gaoler would save 
money, took a more conciliatory stance, although they still balked at the additional building. 
Meredith had less success with a requirement for inmate clothing, which continued to be a point 
of disagreement. The property committees ignored his and those of his successor, J.W. 
Langmuir, not acquiescing on this issue until the mid-1870s, after several grand juries added 
their exhortations to that of the inspectors.  However, no sooner did they do so than the 
                                                          
688 Statement of Assets and Liabilities for 1871, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1871 (1). 
This does not include the towns of Brockville and Prescott, which had separated from the counties, but which paid a 
proportionate amount for shared services according to contracts they entered into on separation. The council papers 
are full of requests for roads and bridges; and in the early part of the period the council’s time and money was 
almost entirely committed to providing these facilities and schools. In 1862, the year the first addition to the gaol 
was paid for, at least eight bridges were destroyed or badly damaged by spring freshets. 
689 A schedule based on returns to a circular of 8 September 1869 to all county wardens shows that Leeds and 
Grenville’s assessed property of $5,386,413 was close to the median. Lowest was Renfrew, with $1,700,000, and the 
highest was York with $14, 125,027; letter of Treasurer regarding plan to borrow funds, Leeds and Grenville council 




inspectors once again upped the standard in a circular of 1878, which advised that prison 
clothing would henceforth be purchased through the central prison at county expense.690  
 Nor did the money spent on the gaol building result in concord on that issue. After 
confederation, a new provincial inspectorate replaced the old Board. The newly renovated gaol, 
which had received the imprimatur of the provincial executive only a few years before, incurred 
the contempt of Meredith’s successor, who announced in 1869 that, among other deficiencies, 
the “internal arrangements” of the gaol were “seriously defective.”691 Langmuir was particularly 
appalled by the dayrooms, which had not even been mentioned in previous discussions, but 
which he felt were much too crowded. One might assume from this that that the prison 
population had increased, but in fact it was fairly stable, with eleven confined in 1869, one fewer 
than in 1856.692 Langmuir’s opinion seems to have been rooted in new professional ideals that 
privileged the ‘classification’ of prisoners by such categories as age, gender, mental competency, 
and the severity of the offense.693 Again, the property committee and council remained 
unconvinced. 
The council did follow Langmuir’s suggestions as to baths and padlocks, but did so only 
after those improvements had been endorsed by grand juries. Similarly, once the grand juries 
took up the mantra of classification and stressed the necessity for more commodious dayrooms, 
the committee and council finally accepted the new standard and agreed to invest in a significant 
                                                          
690 (To aid in prison discipline and deter escapes.) Circular from the Prison Inspector to sheriffs, 7 January 1878, 
Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1878 (3a). 
691 Report of Inspector J.W. Langmuir, 19 June 1869, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1869 (5). 
692 Report of Prison Inspector J. W. Langmuir, 19 June 1869, Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1869 (5); Letter of 
Gaol Physician, 20 October 1856, Leeds and Grenville Papers, 1856(6). The numbers increased toward the end of 
the period, after the gaol had been rebuilt, with the committee on property reporting 29 in 1875 and 21 in 1878; 
Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1875(2), 1878 (8). 
693 One of the core tenets of the nineteenth century prison reform movement, classification, ostensibly part of the 
trend toward rehabilitation, was also “born of a desire to limit the spread of moral contagion:” Norval Morris and 
David J. Rothman eds., The Oxford History of Prisons: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 97. See also Oliver, ‘Terror to Evil-Doers’, 198, 357. 
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revamping and extension of the building, along with a new registry office (pursuant to the 
demands of another provincial inspector). Thereafter, the grand juries moved on to related 
causes, inveighing on the problem of ‘incurables’ and the desirability of a House of Refuge for 
the counties.694  
 During all this time the property committees continued to recommend payment for minor 
repairs, as well as stoves and furnishings for the courthouse, registry office, and municipal and 
judicial offices. Most of those requests seem to have been accepted without much difficulty by 
the finance committee and the committee of the whole. As with the grand jury recommendations, 
it often took several reports before a property committee’s more expensive recommendations 
would be accepted. It is arguable, then, that it was an aversion to capital expenditure and a 
structure of decision making that required a proposal to pass several levels of scrutiny, in each 
case vulnerable to competing factions and priorities, coupled with a lay rather than professional 
perspective, and not a lack of interest or innate miserliness that was the cause of the divergence 
between councils and inspectors. The grand jury seemed to occupy a middle ground, 
representing the standards of the ‘respectable’ parts of the community, which, though they rose 
continually during this period, were mitigated by local knowledge, and would by definition never 
match the inflationary ideals espoused by the professionals.       
  
Conclusion 
The grand jury in mid-Victorian Canada West/Ontario was a legal institution that defies easy 
categorization or hierarchic placement, intersecting in various ways with judicial, administrative, 
and executive branches of government at both high and low levels. At the higher end of the 
                                                          
694 No such project was begun until after the period under review. 
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governance spectrum, grand jury presentments may have had indirect ramifications for the 
policies, or at least the politicking, of the provincial and federal governments. There is no 
question that the grand jury of the quarter sessions had an important ongoing quasi-judicial role 
in the determination of eligibility and quantum of support for the ‘destitute insane,’ a group that 
at least in Leeds and Grenville they appear to have defined generously, and probably had 
influence on the institutional fates of particular individuals they identified as insane. 
  As far as matters of local governance are concerned, the imprint of those instruments of 
the old regime and new—the grand jury and the inspectors—cannot be easily disentangled. 
County councils were assailed by both bodies, not in concert, but often simultaneously and often 
also in counterpoint with gaolers, sheriffs, doctors, the press, and even their own members sitting 
in property committees. Indeed the most direct repercussions of the grand jury presentments may 
have been on the agendas and reports of those committees, which mimicked grand jury 
presentments on issues relating to the gaol, including the physical visit of the committee 
members to the premises, the commendation of the gaoler, the enumeration of the prisoners 
(which made sense for the grand jury in the context of general gaol delivery but which was of 
doubtful relevance to municipal administration), and the eliciting of prisoners’ opinions as to 
their treatment.  
 The effects of even the ‘hardest’ of laws and legal institutions are notoriously resistant to 
measurement. With the possible exception of maintenance orders for the destitute insane, the 
non-criminal presentments of the grand juries in mid-Victorian Canada West/Ontario lacked an 
enforcement mechanism. This does not mean that they were necessarily ineffective, or at least 
any more ineffective than the new professional, centralizing and bureaucratic organs of 
administration. The experience of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville may not have been 
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typical, but there is no reason to think that it was exceptional. In these counties, as we have seen, 
the record is unclear, but suggests that the municipal council was just as, or more, likely to be 
influenced by the opinions of grand jurors on gaol-related issues. In this case grand jury 
presentments can be seen as a nineteenth-century variety of soft law, where the norms expressed 
were imprecise yet consequential, those of the most prosperous, male members of the local 
community on whatever subject was raised by the judge, institutional convention, or 
circumstances. While other forms of low law underwent drastic transformation and innovation, 
the presentment function of the grand jury was merely adapted to the context of the new regime 
as the press, judges, and grand jurors themselves continued to find purpose in a ‘soft’ old regime 
institution.  
 Between the old and new systems of supervision, the municipal county councils of 
Canada West/Ontario during the thirty years after the Baldwin Act were never left alone to 
exercise the power the statute gave them over local correctional facilities. Still, though not 
unmolested, they were able to exert considerable agency. The oversight of the grand juries, 
though legitimated by tradition and the social standing of its members, was indeed ‘soft;’ in the 
case of Leeds and Grenville, as we have seen, grand jury recommendations could not be ignored 
indefinitely, but action and expenditure could be deferred. As for the inspectors, their 
surveillance was sporadic, and their victories long fought and hard won. The municipal council 
of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville was sometimes active, sometimes passive, in the 
defence of its independence. But in this area at least, its autonomy, and to a certain extent its 
agency as well, was clearly compromised by the will of the legislature through its bureaucrats, 








The power to tax has often been recognized as fundamental to state power and state formation.695 
While the colony of Upper Canada also raised funds through customs (shared with, and collected 
at, Lower Canada), fees and licences, and imperial subsidies, locally administered property taxes 
formed the greater part of government revenues from the first settlement of the province.696 
Local ‘rates’ financed the roads, bridges and markets crucial to the development of an 
agricultural economy, as well as public buildings and the salaries of local officials.697 In keeping 
with the colonial policy of top-down, non-democratic governance, setting and administering 
                                                          
695 See generally Glenn W. Fisher, The Worst Tax?: A History of the Property Tax in America (Lawrence, Kan.: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996), 245; Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 
1700-2000 (New York: Basic Books, 2001); Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988); Dennis Hale, "The Evolution of the Property Tax: a Study of the Relation between Public 
Finance and Political Theory," Journal of Politics 47 no. 2 (1985): 382-404; Andrew Smith, "Toryism, Classical 
Liberalism, and Capitalism: The Politics of Taxation and the Struggle for Canadian Confederation," Canadian 
Historical Review 89, no.1 (2008): 1-25; John B. Legler, Richard Sylla, and John J. Wallis, "U.S. City Finances and 
the Growth of Government, 1859-1902," Journal of Economic History 48, no. 2 (1988): 347-56; Stuart Landon and 
David L. Ryan, "The Political Costs of Taxes and Government Spending," Canadian Journal of Economics 30, no.1 
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World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986). 
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and Good Government: A New Political History of Canada, 1867-1917 (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017). 
Heaman provides a useful glossary of tax terms and concepts: 465-70. For the twentieth-century see Shirley 
Tillotson, Give and Take: The Citizen-Taxpayer and the Rise of Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2017). See also J. Harvey Perry, Taxes, Tariffs, & Subsidies: A History of Canadian Fiscal 
Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955). The law (but not much history) of municipal taxation is 
the subject of Assessment and Rating: Being the Law of Municipal Taxation in Canada, 4th ed. by Harold Ernest 
Manning (Toronto: Canada Law Book Co., 1962). An act-by-act account is to be found in Ontario, Commission on 
Municipal Institutions, Reports of the Commission on Municipal Institutions (Toronto: Warwick & Sons, 1888), 
Municipal Commission and Ontario Legislative Assembly, Sessional Paper no. 13 (Second Report of the Municipal 
Commission,1889). For the legal transformation of the physical environment see J. David Wood, Making Ontario: 
Agricultural Colonization and Landscape Recreation before the Railway (Montreal; Kington; London: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 2000).  
 697 On the pre-eminence of agriculture in Upper Canadian economic development during this period, see McCalla, 
Planting the Province, Douglas McCalla and Peter George, "Measurement, Myth and Reality: Reflections on the 
Economic History of Nineteenth Century Ontario," Journal of Canadian Studies 21, no. 3 (1986): 71-86; Ian M. 
Drummond, Progress without Planning: the Economic History of Ontario from Confederation to the Second World 
War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987). 
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property taxes had been the métier of appointed justices of the peace meeting in district courts of 
general quarter sessions.  
Townships had been the basic geographic unit in Upper Canada since the colony was 
opened up for settlement in the late eighteenth century, but their utility for local government 
purposes had been had been forsworn by Upper Canadian governors, their local Tory supporters 
and superiors in the colonial office and above, who feared they could be a lightning rod for 
revolutionary republicanism.698 Eventually annual township meetings had been allowed for the 
limited purpose of selecting local officials—clerks, road overseers, pound-keepers, assessors, 
collectors and fence-viewers—and later to vote on the appropriate configuration of fences and 
animal control. The transformation of townships from this negligible position to one of the key 
components of the system of low governance was one of the most significant of mid-nineteenth 
century reforms. By the Baldwin Act, townships were automatically incorporated. Led for the 
first time by elected councils, they were given many of the powers over local administration and 
development that had been most recently exercised at the district or provincial levels.699 Most 
significantly, the ability to raise taxes from the rural majority was taken from the justices of the 
peace by the act and its companion statute, the Assessment Act of 1850, and transferred to the 
township, rather than the county.700 
As we have seen, historians are divided as to whether the Baldwin Act gave meaningful 
autonomy to local governments, and the argument that the reforms were in fact a thinly disguised 
                                                          
698 See Glazebrook, "The Origins of Local Government," Isin, "The Origins of Canadian Municipal Government," 
David Siegal, "Local Government in Ontario," in The Government and Politics of Ontario, ed. Donald C. 
MacDonald (Toronto: MacMillan Canada, 1990); Aitchison, ""The Development of Local Government in Upper 
Canada," Virgil Martin, Changing Landscapes of Southern Ontario (Erin, Ont.: Boston Mills Press, 1988). 
699 See Chapter 2. 
700 As the (roughly) equivalent jurisdiction to the district. An Act to establish a more equal and just system of 
Assessment in the Several Townships, Villages, Towns and Cities in Upper Canada, 13 & 14 Vic. c.67 [hereafter 
Assessment Act, 1850]. 
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instrumentalist project, designed primarily to increase economic growth rather than to bring self-
rule to the local community for its own sake, is a persuasive one. Following this line of 
interpretation, it can be surmised that the township was chosen as the most effective jurisdiction 
to extract revenue from the rural majority, on the expectation that township councils would apply 
the proceeds to the purposes of local infrastructure and thereby enhance market development. 
Township councillors were empowered to decide on the amount of tax to levy to meet the county 
requisition and their own estimates of need for local purposes, and to appoint, pay and regulate 
the part-time employees who would do the evaluations and collections. Furthermore, township 
councils were given the jurisdiction, previously exercised by the courts of quarter sessions, to 
hear appeals by taxpayers from these tax assessments when sitting as ‘courts of revision.’ These 
infant tribunals can be seen as an early Upper Canadian manifestation of the transformation in 
adjudication from judicial to administrative institutions which marked the evolution of law in 
English-based jurisdictions in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.701 As discussed in 
Chapter 5, even in their regular business, in deciding what projects to fund and, in the case of 
taxation, what ratepayers to relieve, the councils can be seen as quasi-judicial in function if, as 
elected bodies, not in form. 
The economics of the assessment and resource-allocation processes and the mechanics of 
enforcement are beyond my present focus. Rather, it is the politico-juridical aspect of the early 
Ontario township council as tax tribunal that is the subject of this chapter. I investigate the 
management of tax appeals by councils acting both in their regular capacity and as courts of 
revision in three townships in the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville, namely the Front of 
Leeds and Landsdowne, the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne, and Augusta Townships during the 
                                                          
701 H. W. Arthurs, Without the Law.   
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period 1850-1880.702 The first two of these were chosen for the comprehensiveness of their 
council minutes, which extend almost unbroken through the entirety of the period. While its 
minutes are extant mainly for the latter part of the period, Augusta has a fairly comprehensive set 
of surviving by-laws for the entirety of the period.703 
 I do not claim that these three municipalities were necessarily representative of Upper 
Canadian townships of the time. But even though a small sample cannot provide definitive 
answers, it can suggest some preliminary ones to several inter-related questions. If the premise of 
mandatory municipal incorporation as a strategy for economic development is correct—and if 
the alleged strategists were at all prescient—it could be expected that the three councils would 
demonstrate a tendency to pragmatic resource-maximization. Did these councils act as 
“predatory rulers,” as Margaret Levi has argued is characteristic of taxing authorities throughout 
history?704 What of the political concerns of councillors who depended on election for their 
position, which Levi concedes can be a tempering factor in the drive to extract revenue?705 
Townships under the Baldwin Act were ‘ratepayer democracies.’706 With the exception of 
                                                          
702 AO, Augusta Township Fonds 1523, Council Minutes 1523-1, MS 337 Reels 1-2 [hereafter Augusta minutes]; 
AO, Township of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne Fonds, F 1668, Council Minutes F 1668-1 MS 614 [hereafter 
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major limitation on rule is revenue, the income of the government. The greater the revenue...the more possible it is 
to extend rule....I hypothesize that rules maximize the revenue accruing to the state subject to the constraints of their 
relative bargaining power, transaction costs, and discount rates....[I] assume[s] all actions are rational and self-
interested…[and] that actors who compose the state have interests of their own, derived from and supported by 
institutional power. Rulers may sometimes, even often, act on behalf of others. Nonetheless, they are not simply 
handmaidens of the dominant economic class...Rulers are predatory in that they try to extract as much revenue as 
they can from the population…:Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, 2-3. 
705 See also Landon and Ryan, "The Political Costs of Taxes and Government Spending," 85-111. 
706 See Webb and Webb, The Development of English Local Government, 1689-1835, especially vol. 1 part 1, The 
Parish. On the relevance of the fiduciary principle in this context, see J. Adler, "Incommensurable Values- Local 
Government and Judicial Review," Public Law (2001): 717-31. 
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propertied women, who paid taxes but did not vote, constituents and taxpayers were identical 
sets.707 Elections were held annually, and the ballot was an open one until 1875; do township 
councillors seem to have been sensitive to the rights (and interests) of their constituents, and if 
so, was this sensitivity selective?708 David Murray has argued that the quarter sessions of the 
peace of the Niagara district in the pre-reform period were markedly legalistic in their 
administrative processes and bureaucratic in their attitudes; recurring conflicts arose between 
local supplicants and cold hearted and tight-fisted magistrates.709 Were elected politicians in 
these townships moved by non-fiscal or extra-legal considerations?  
  
The Law of Municipal Taxation in Canada West/Ontario 
Called the ‘worst tax’ by Glenn W. Fisher, the Anglo-American property tax has a long and 
contentious lineage. In the land-based gradations of feudal obligation, Dennis Hale has found the 
origins of such principles of assessment as reference to ability to pay and decentralized 
administration, and the chronic tension between pragmatism and policy.710 The ‘rate’ on property 
was literally a fraction of the value of one’s property determined either by investigation  
                                                          
707 Eligibility was derived from ownership of a property interest, not residency. 
708 Canada. Elections Canada. and Canada. Public Works and Government Services, A History of the Vote in 
Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada for the Chief Electoral Officer of 
Canada, 1997), 43. For the extreme consciousness of politicians of the wishes of various factions of the voting 
public, see generally John Garner, The Franchise and Politics in British North America, 1755-1867 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1969). 
709 Murray, Colonial Justice, especially chapter 6, “The Cold Hand of Charity,” 107-130. 
710 Fisher, The Worst Tax? As revealed by the question mark in the title, Fisher is ambivalent about the property tax. 
He accedes to the correctness of the charge that “it sins against the cardinal rules of uniformity, or equality, and of 
universality of taxation [and i]t puts a premium on dishonesty” but also is of the opinion that it is the basis for local 
autonomy (which he considers a self-evident good), 4-5; Hale, The Evolution of the Property Tax. For local 
governance by the “rulers of the county” see Webb and Webb, The Development of English Local Government, 1689-
183, vol.1 part 2, The County, and David Eastwood, Government and Community in The English Provinces, 1700-
1870 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); see also Eastwood, Governing Rural England, 34. 
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(inevitably unpopular), or voluntary disclosure (inevitably inefficient), and either way vulnerable 
to corruption, as well as expensive to administer and enforce.711  
 Americans entrenched property taxes in their state constitutions and uploaded revenue 
from localities to pay for centralized services, but with minor exceptions Upper Canadian 
governments chose to download both responsibilities and the means to fulfil these to the local 
level. The governing bodies of the thirteen colonies had relied heavily on property taxes, but also 
experimented with various other types of tax instruments, including income, ‘faculty’ and poll 
taxes.712 The latter two were eschewed by Upper Canadian governors in favour of taxation on 
real and personal property.713 Although income taxes were included as an incident of personal 
property from time to time, including the period under review, they were notoriously hard to 
ferret out.714  
Another staple of the Anglo-American taxation system, mandatory road work, or ‘statute 
labour,’ was also relied on from the earliest assessment statutes in Upper Canada. Man and 
animal power were far more plentiful than currency, and roads were crucial to progress, and 
indeed to survival for European settlers. By 1850 monetary commutation was allowed, and 
indeed required for non-resident owners. This taxation in kind was an incident of property tax, 
                                                          
711 Hale, The Evolution of the Property Tax, 382-404; J. V. Beckett, "Local Taxation in England from the Sixteenth 
Century to the Nineteenth," Local Historian 12, no. 1 (1976): 7-12; George Charles Sumner Benson, The American 
Property Tax: Its History, Administration, and Economic Impact (Claremont Calif.: 1965); Martin Donahue, "The 
History of Administrative Law in Massachusetts, 1629-1932," Journal of Legal History 8, no. 3 (1987): 330-66. 
712 Edward T. Howe and Donald J. Reeb, "The Historical Evolution of State and Local Tax Systems," Social Science 
Quarterly 78, no. 1 (1997): 109-21. A faculty tax is a tax based on one’s profession or occupation. A poll tax, also 
known as a head tax, is a tax per person (variously defined as citizen, adult, or individual). See also Benson, The 
American Property Tax; Fisher, The Worst Tax? 
713 As Niall Fergusson points out, a property tax is the “natural tax for a primarily agricultural society:” Ferguson, 
The Cash Nexus, 65. 
714 For example, the Village of Gananoque assessment rolls for 1864 indicate that only one inhabitant disclosed 
income over £100 to be included in his personal property as the statute required. William Robinson, collector of 
customs, was assessed on income of £150. This income would have been public as part of the civil list. Town of 
Gananoque Assessment and Collector’s Rolls, AO, F 1672, MS 613 [hereafter Gananoque Rolls], 1864. See John 
Joseph Wallis, "Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842-
1852," The Journal of Economic History 65, no.1 (2005): 211-56; Fisher, The Worst Tax?. 
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since real property owners (including women) were assessed for statute labour according to a 
graduated scale. However, it was also partly an indirect poll tax, since all male residents between 
the years of twenty-one and sixty were liable for road service whether they owned real property 
or not.715 
 Valuation or ‘assessment’ of property for the purposes of determining the amount each 
taxpayer would pay (when the ‘rate’ was applied to the assessed value) took place every year. 
Until the act of 1850, Upper Canadian assessors had to rely on the property owner’s self-
assessment. Thereafter, assessors were still dependent on ratepayers’ valuation of non-visible 
personal property, but for real property and visible chattels were empowered to make their own 
evaluation.716 This development naturally put a greater premium on the recruitment of competent 
personnel.717 The legislature and local councils experimented with methods of payment for 
assessors and collectors, which were distinct offices. For most of the years canvassed, all three of 
the townships reviewed here paid their assessors a flat fee, but paid their collectors a percentage 
of the amount collected. The system was designed to be arbitrary, with no discretion at the level 
of bureaucracy; leeway was for the courts of revision. 
As noted above, a major change to the assessment framework with the 1850 Assessment 
act was the inclusion of this ‘court,’ a five-man committee of the township, town, village or city 
                                                          
715 See for example An Act to consolidate the Assessment Laws (Upper Canada) 16 Vic. c.182 (1853) [hereafter 
Assessment Act, 1853], s.36, in which the lowest possible requirement was two days, rising to twelve days for 
someone with an assessed value of £1000, with an additional day for each £100 above this amount. There was no 
maximum. Little has been written on this important aspect of pioneer life. For a geographer’s view, see Robert 
Summerby-Murray, "Statute Labour on Ontario Township Roads, 1849-1948: Responding to a Changing Space 
Economy," The Canadian Geographer 43, no. 1 (1999), 36-52. 
716  Quarter Sessions records indicate that issues of ownership and value of livestock and machinery were contested 
in the years prior to 1850. See Leeds and Grenville United Counties Court of General Sessions of the Peace Minute 
Books, AO RG 22-12-0-9 minutes 1845-1869 MS 699 Reel 2. 
717 John Niblock, the appointed assessor for 1850 for the Township of the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne, resigned 
one month after his appointment, citing his lack of confidence in his ability. He was replaced by one of the recently 
appointed auditors, Samuel Green, who agreed to the change “[i]t being your [council’s] wish.” RoLL minutes, 23 
March 1850. Niblock (or Neblock) became collector, presumably a less exacting post. 
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council, to hear appeals from the assessor’s decisions.718 For most townships during this time 
period, the composition of the council and court were probably identical, as the minimum 
number of councillors was also five. The consolidation of 1853 went into greater detail on the 
court, as on other aspects of the assessment process. Subject to a few minor amendments, this 
version was the statutory framework throughout the period under review. The scope and purpose 
of the court, now referred to as the court of revision, was set out in Section 26, which stated that 
if a ratepayer was 
 wrongfully inserted on or omitted...or undercharged or overcharged....he or his Agent 
may....give notice in writing to the Clerk....and the Court after hearing the complainant 
and the Assessor…and any witness…upon oath, shall determine the matter and confirm 
or amend the Roll accordingly, and if either party shall fail to appear either in person or 
by agent, such Court may proceed ex parte...and if any Municipal elector shall think that 
any party has been assessed too low or too high, or has been wrongfully inserted on or 
omitted from the Roll, the Clerk shall… give notice to such party and to the Assessor... 
and the Roll as finally… certified...shall bind all parties..., and the Clerk of the 
Municipality shall post up in some convenient and public place…a list of all 
complainants on their own behalf against the Assessor’s return, and of all complainants 
on account of the assessment of other parties….719 
 
Other noteworthy provisions included a right of further appeal on questions of fact to the 
judge of the county court, a stipulation that false declarations to the court were to be punished as 
perjury, and power for the court to adjourn, provided the roll be “finally revised by the first day 
of June in every year.”720 Enforcement was to be by distraint, and if no goods were available, or 
the party was a non-resident and arrears (with 10% interest) had accumulated for five years, the 
county treasurer could direct the sheriff to hold a sale by public auction.721 Penalties were also 
provided for officers failing their duties under the act.722 Every property owner was permitted a 
                                                          
718 Assessment Act, 1850 s.28.  
719 Assessment Act, 1853, s.26. 
720 Assessment Act, 1853, ss. 28, 27, 30. 
721 Assessment Act, 1853, ss. 42, 50, 53, 55-57. 
722 Assessment Act, 1853, s.77. 
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basic exemption, and various officials and clergymen were granted further exemptions.723 As in 
prior acts, some provision was made for discretion. The court of revision could extend time for 
payment until March and could 
            receive and decide upon any Petition from any party assessed [and]…from any party who 
from sickness or extreme poverty shall declare himself unable to pay the taxes, or who by 
reason of any gross and manifest error in the Roll as finally passed by the Court, shall 
have been overcharged more than 25% on the sum he ought to have been charged, and to 
remit or reduce the taxes due by any such party, or to reject such Petition, as to them shall 
seem meet and right….724 
 
Although schedules set out the format for the assessment roll and notice, no direction was given 
to the court as to the form of record to be kept.   
Nor was there any explicit provision made for appeals from the county court, the decision 
of which was declared by the act to be final, but it was not long before cases began to make their 
way into the Court of Queen’s Bench.725 In 1852, refusing to contemplate even the possibility of 
a mandamus in the circumstances, Chief Justice Robinson held that by virtue of giving 
jurisdiction to find assessment values as a matter of fact to the court of revision, and allowing 
alteration only by the county court, the legislature had intended that the opinions of the superior 
judges on this point were not permitted.726 Later cases would carve out exceptions to this hands-
off approach, however. Territorial jurisdiction was to be respected and terms were not to be 
given interpretations that would most prejudice the taxpayer, who was also held to be entitled to 
notice and the right to be heard. Core elements of present day administrative law—the critical, 
albeit often problematic, distinction between matters of ‘law’ and ‘fact,’ and audi alterem 
                                                          
723 Presumably for reasons of public policy: Assessment Act, 1853, s.6. 
724 Assessment Act, 1853, ss.37, 46, 29. 
725 Presumably according to the regular process of appeals from county courts. The cases do not show much 
consciousness of the act’s mention of finality as a bar to the hearing of the case. Rather, the issue seems to have 
been treated partly substantively, that is in determining the intent of the legislature, and partly through the doctrine 
of ultra vires. 
726 In re William Dickson and the Municipal Council of the Village of Galt [1852] O.J. no. 85, 10 U.C.R. 395. 
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partem, the right to respond—were affirmed.727 Still, with few exceptions, the reported cases 
from this period continued to assert the right of democratically elected councils to act 
capriciously, partially, politically and arbitrarily, to favour residents over non-residents, and 
voters over business corporations, especially railway companies.728 Not surprisingly, given the 
natural skew of high court proceedings to the monied, most of these cases involved the larger 
urban municipalities and commercial interests. While part of the legal environment in which 
councils and courts of revision deliberated, these cases, exceptional by definition, cannot be 
relied on as reflective of circumstances in the townships.        
 
Courts of Revision in Three Townships 
The variations in legal culture to be seen in the records of the three townships can be attributed to 
the idiosyncrasies of their personnel (particularly their clerks, each of whom had his preferred 
style for the recording of minutes), as well as to precedents established by their founding 
members and kept alive through institutional inertia, and/or to differences in their socio-
economic makeup. The Front of Leeds and Landsdowne and Augusta Townships had a head start 
with respect to European settlement, fronting as they did on the St. Lawrence River, and better 
quality—that is, more arable—land, although each had areas which were better than others, and 
inhabitants who were more established and prosperous than others.729 Leeds and Landsdowne 
                                                          
727 These principles, of course, did not originate with Robinson. 
728 The bias of municipalities against non-residents and railway corporations was apparently a Pan-American 
phenomenon. See Robert Swierenga, "Land Speculation and Frontier Tax Assessments" Agricultural History 44, no. 
3 (1970): 253-66: “Legal regulations to the contrary, it apparently was the practice in new counties for officials to 
assess nonresident lands 'a little higher' than those of settlers. Absentee land speculators may not have been innocent 
victims, but they were victimized."(266). See also Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America, 152. 
729 Donald Akenson has estimated that the total population of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne in 1848 was 2,639 
and that in 1851 the joint population of the Front and Rear of the townships was 4722. In 1871 the breakdown was 
Front, 5780, and Rear 2363, total 8,143: Akenson, The Irish in Ontario, 204; Glenn Lockwood also makes the point 
that there was a range of economic strata in the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne, citing a photograph of children in 
front of their school, some well-dressed and shod and some decidedly not: Glenn J. Lockwood, The Rear of Leeds & 
Lansdowne, 189. The enumeration of Augusta for 1851 indicates a population of about 5,154. It was the second 
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had been laid out to be two regular, rectangular townships stretching back from the St. Lawrence, 
but as Glenn Lockwood has observed, history and geography interfered with this plan, and in the 
early days of the colony the townships were first united and then re-divided for local 
administration purposes by a horizontal zigzag following the Gananoque river system and a 
rocky barrier that impeded communication.730 The Township of the Rear of Leeds and 
Landsdowne had been settled somewhat later, and was generally rockier and less attractive, both 
materially and politically, having been the site of considerable political violence and conflict 
between American settlers and more recently arrived Orangemen.731 Judging by the amounts 
each paid its officers, the township council of Augusta was the most financially well-off, 
followed by the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne and then the Rear of the same townships.732 
Augusta also had the greatest number of people presented to council as ‘poor’ or ‘indigent;’ not 
necessarily a contradiction since these are, of course, relative (and subjective) terms.733 
 Of the three, the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne seems to have been the most casual 
about the holding of courts of revision. The council minutes confirm that these were in fact held, 
in entries of payment for advertising, printing, and serving notices and attendances by the 
assessor, legal advice procured in one case, and several terse motions that the roll be accepted 
“as revised.” But in only one of the thirty years under review did the clerk include more than the 
most cursory record of court proceedings. In most cases any accepted changes were noted 
                                                          
most populous township of the two counties: Ontario Genealogical Society Provincial Index, 
https://www.ogs.on.ca/ogspi/5/5.htm.  
730 Lockwood, The Rear of Leeds & Lansdowne, 45. The division was maintained by the Baldwin Act for municipal 
purposes and remained in effect until 2001, when the two townships were merged (along with the Front of Escott) to 
become the Township of Leeds and the Thousand Islands. 
731 Akenson, The Irish in Ontario. Akenson writes that the two townships “became a sizeable bank of over 104,000 
acres of what contemporaries viewed as second quality land” (50). See also Carol Wilton, "'Lawless Law'".  
732 In 1876, a fairly typical year, the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne paid its assessors $45 and $50. The Rear of 
Leeds and Landsdowne had one assessor, who was paid $80. Augusta had two assessors that year, each of whom 
was paid $80.00. 
733 Also one of the highest numbers of “Lunatic [sic], and Idiots” in the Canadas: Census of the Canadas, 1851-2 
(Quebec: Lovell and Lamoureux, 1855), 20. 
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directly on the assessor’s roll. The time frames for sittings noted indicate that the proceedings did 
not tend to be lengthy. In many cases the minutes show the councillors adjourning to hold the 
court after lunch and reconvening as a council the same afternoon, with enough time left for the 
conduct of regular business (although some gaps in dates of meetings around the time required 
for meeting would have allowed for a lengthier session or sessions).  
 The one exception to the custom of proceeding without taking minutes in the court of 
revision in the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne is an illuminating one. On April 17, 1852, it was 
moved that “council do now resolve and form itself into a revision court for the purpose of 
Revising the assessment Roll, and of hearing and determining on any Complaint that may be 
made relating to over and under assessment.”734 After the councillors were sworn, the court 
proceeded to hear one case, that of Alonzo Washburn, who alleged that his real property had 
been assessed too low at £75. Seven witnesses were sworn, including one Henry Washburn. 
Henry was presumably a relative, but he was also superintendent for schools, and the other 
witnesses, who testified to valuations ranging from £100 to £185, were also members of the 
political elite of the township, either current, past or future councillors or officials. The inclusion 
of a witness list and court record, such as it is, in the township minutes are understandable when 
it is noted that Alonzo had just been elected a councillor of the township and the property 
threshold to hold this office was £100.735  
 To say that the records for the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne are more detailed would 
be an understatement, though these are still frustrating in that they leave out far more than they 
include. While the outcome is noted (i.e. case dismissed, appeal granted) it is impossible to tell 
                                                          
734 RoLL minutes, 17 April 1852. 
735 It is not certain that the low assessment was politically motivated, but, perhaps significantly, the assessor was 
soon replaced: RoLL minutes, 17 January 1853. Alonzo was re-elected to council in 1853, 1854, and 1855. Another 
Washburn, Seneca, was also a long serving member of council. 
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exactly what the ramifications of each case were without the benefit of the notice of complaint 
on which it was based. Often it is unclear as to whether the appellant is asking that the 
assessment be decreased or increased, and whether the appellant is the property owner or another 
ratepayer. Nonetheless, the entries, while succinct, do give some intriguing glimpses into the 
process. 
There seems to have been little regularity in the type of proof offered by the appellant 
and/or required by the court in the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne. Though the statute directed 
that testimony was to be sworn, and indeed it is likely that this is the reason the tribunal was 
called a court, sometimes ‘revisors’ (as the councillors in this capacity were sometimes referred 
to) seem to have taken the unsworn and unsupported word of an appellant or defendant, 
especially where the other party failed to appear. In other cases, witnesses or parties merely 
produced documentation, such as a lease or a deed, or were asked to provide a ‘certificate.’ 
Many appeals or complaints were dismissed for lack of evidence; on some occasions the lack of 
evidence was due to the absence of the complainant, on others to the complainant’s refusal to be 
sworn (presumably due to the fear of penalties for perjury), and on still others to a finding that 
the evidence offered did not in fact contradict the assessor’s opinion. When these did conflict and 
the assessor testified, his evidence seems usually, but not invariably, to have been preferred to 
that of the ratepayer. On several occasions the assessor himself acted as appellant, asking for 
corrections of his own mistakes, perhaps with an eye to forestalling the potential imposition of 
the penalties set out in the statute for negligence or fraud, or with an eye to maintaining his 
appointment. 
 Despite their lack of consistency on the necessity of oath-taking by witnesses, that the 
council members of the Township of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne took the distinction 
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between the court and council seriously to some degree is indicated by a slight but significant 
divergence between court and council proceedings. When the council convened as a court, court-
specific oaths were recorded as having been taken by each councillor as stipulated by the act, and 
the assessors were usually in attendance.736 Nor did the reeve automatically, or even usually, act 
as chair; the chairmanship of the court was decided on motion at the beginning of the session. 
These, like most of the decisions of the court, rarely required a vote. When an issue was put to a 
division, the clerk noted the fact and identified which councillors voted yeas or nays.  
Because of the truncated character of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne court of 
revision records, it is difficult to tell with what degree of rigor the revisors adhered to the letter 
of the law. Like their neighbours to the rear, they consulted lawyers periodically, and the minutes 
show that they purchased various municipal manuals (as did the other townships), so it cannot be 
assumed they were ignorant of, or hostile to, the relevant legislation. However, there are hints 
that they may have regarded the law as a starting point, rather than the be-all and end-all of their 
deliberations. In 1854, for instance, a resolution was made to exempt two clergymen from all or 
an additional part of their taxes. Limited statutory exemptions were available for church property 
and clergy income, but it appears that the court of revision chose to be more generous than was 
legally required, setting out for the record their belief that “according to the spirit and intention 
of the Law… all ministers of the Gospel should be exempt from taxation in as far as the Property 
in their possession is used and devoted to the purposes of their professions.”737 
                                                          
736 The minutes indicate that assessors were generally paid extra for court appearances. Usually there were two 
assessors for each township. They would not work in concert, however: each would be given a part of the township 
(i.e. Leeds or Landsdowne) to assess. It is easy to see that such a system could lead to disputes of valuation, 
especially near boundaries. 
737 FoLL minutes, 1 May 1854. 
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Since it not clear exactly what relief was being requested and by whom, with the 
exception of requests to be exempted from all taxation for reasons of indigence, it is not possible 
to gauge the success rate of complaints to the court of revision of the Front of Leeds and 
Landsdowne. However, the numbers indicate that at least a few ratepayers in most years felt that 
bringing a complaint was worth the effort of filing the notice and time away from the farm. As 
the following table indicates, the incidence of complaints fluctuated considerably, from none in 
1856, to over a hundred in 1874. 738 
 









Other Total comments 
1851       N/A 
1852 6 2    8  
1853 7 4    11  
1854  2   2* 4 *Two clergy 
1855  3    3  
1856  3    3  
1857      N/A No record in 
minutes 
1858  4    4 Record indicates a 
number of 
complaints were 
laid but that no 
one appeared. 
1859      0 No complaints laid 
1860 2 4   2* 7 *Customs house 
and unoccupied 
                                                          
738 Occasionally a case would be initiated on motion of one of the revisors, and it is unclear as to whether there was 





1861 2 7   ?* 9 *Unspecified 
number of tenant 
complaints for 
wrong method of 
assessment; 
adjourned to allow 
re-assessment, no 
decisions made by 
court on re-
assessments 
1862 1 9   1* 11 *appeal by 
executors of estate 
to be exempted—
appeal accepted 
1863      0  
1864 40*     4? *3 of which may 
be double-
counted; 3 by 
William Beatty re 
omissions from 
the roll including 
councillors; 22 by 
Asahel Keyes; at 
least 4 additional 
by Beatty 




1866 7*  1   7  *At least one of 




1867 5     5  
1868 11     11  
1869 9  5   14  
1870      5 Possibly one 
additional claim 
heard June 13  
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1871 2     2  
1872 1     1  Plus one unclear 
as to whether a 
complaint made, 
or initiated by 
revisors 
1873 1     1  
1874 103     103 Assessment act 
amended 
1875 8     8 Plus one unclear 
as to whether a 
complaint made, 
or initiated by 
revisors 
1876 2     2  
1877 5     5  
1878 5     5  




Total all years 257  
 
 Except in the cases of requests for exemption due to indigence, the determining variables 
in these numbers seem to have been more political than economic. This is not surprising, for the 
assessment process was critical to politics at every level. The local assessment roll determined 
eligibility for elections and office holding at the provincial/national as well as the municipal 
level, and the reported cases offer copious evidence that elections often involved court scrutiny 
of the property qualifications of the candidates and their supporters.739 At the beginning of this 
                                                          
739 See for example The Queen ex rel. Metcalfe v. Smart [1852] O.J. no. 12, 10 U.C.Q.B.R. 89. Before 1853, voters’ 
lists were independent of the assessment roll: Canada. Elections Canada and Canada. Public Works and Government 
Services, A History of the Vote in Canada, 31. Election law was an important head of legal contestation, and earned 
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period, a (male 21 year old) freeholder or householder merely had to be listed on the collector’s 
roll to vote in municipal elections, although he would have to be assessed for £25 to vote 
provincially. Later these thresholds were converted to $100 and $200 respectively.740 Whenever 
changes were made to the amount and type of property required to vote, there were new grounds 
to argue the assessment. In 1874, a banner year for the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne court of 
revision, the assessment act had been amended in several respects, most notably to include 
income from trade or profession as a qualifying category.741 At the beginning of the period the 
superior courts had taken a hard line in matters of voting eligibility; in 1852 the Court of 
Queen’s Bench decided that a voter who was qualified, but did not appear on the roll, could not 
be given a ballot.742 This attitude was relaxed as time progressed, ending with general acceptance 
of the principle that the franchise was to be given a liberal construction and the voter given the 
benefit of the doubt, but problems continued to arise nonetheless.743 
In the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne ratepayers took advantage of the statutory 
permission to challenge each other’s assessment, presumably for reasons of personal animosity 
or partisan politics. The blip in numbers for the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne in 1864 may be 
due to the latter dynamic. Of the approximately thirty-three complaints, twenty-two were brought 
                                                          
its own considerable space in the case reports, as well as a variety of publications marketed to municipal officials as 
well as lawyers and judges.  
740 Canada. Elections Canada and Canada. Public Works and Government Services, A History of the Vote in 
Canada, 31-33. 
741 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Law respecting the Assessment of Property in the Province of Ontario, 22 
Vic. c.26 (1874), ss. 4, 8, 9. Farmers’ incomes had been specifically exempted from income tax since 1868-9. An 
amendment to this act (33 Vic. c.27) also extended the exemption to income from other forms of property which was 
not exempt. Harrison attributed this to the legislature’s concern for fairness, in other words, no ‘double dipping’: 
Robert A. Harrison, The Municipal Manual, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Copp, Clarke, 1874), 526, note (r). 
742 The Queen ex rel. Metcalfe v. Smart [1852] O.J. no. 12, 10 U.C.R. 89: if the ratepayer was not on the roll, he was 
not qualified, despite having the requisite property. 
743 In an 1874 reported case from Yonge township in the Counties of Leeds and Grenville, a Mr. McCulloch, who 
had taken possession of a farm after the assessment had taken place, appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench when 
the assessor and court of revision refused to change the roll and the county judge dismissed his appeal for a defect in 
form. R. v. McCulloch (sub. Nom. Re McCulloch and the Judge of the County Court of the United Counties of Leeds 
and Grenville [1874] O.J. no. 82, 35 U.C.R. 449, 5 C.B.R. 86 (Ont.QB).  
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by Asahel Keyes concerning the property assessments of others both as to inclusion and value. 
At least seven others were launched by William Beatty. The objects of Beatty’s appeals included 
several parties by the name of Keyes, as well as several sitting councillors. It is impossible to tell 
what was behind this vendetta, but the politics of patronage may be part of the story.744 Beatty 
was a sometime township surveyor and a township overseer, both of which were part-time paid 
positions. More sought after were the posts of clerk, assessor and collector; indeed most of the 
(very few) contested motions of all three councils dealt with such appointments. The year before 
Asahel Keyes brought his appeals, the application of Ephraim Keyes had been turned down for 
the position of collector.745 
Keyes began by challenging the entire roll, which challenge was (unsurprisingly) 
unsuccessful. His score was fourteen losses, six wins, two withdrawals, and one unclear. Beatty 
won five (four of which added councillor/revisors who had been omitted from the roll), lost one, 
and withdrew two. The hypothesis that some at least of these appeals were motivated by political 
rivalry is supported by the success of appeals of the four revisors (who did not recuse 
themselves). An earlier appeal by William Beatty against the assessment of Albert Keyes may 
also indicate a history of personal antagonism. Though the back story is murky, the denouement 
is fairly clear. Most of Keyes’ complaints were dismissed; Beatty’s were almost all accepted.746 
                                                          
744 For the ubiquity of patronage at every level, see Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers. For Lower Canada/Canada East 
see J. I. Little, State and Society in Transition: the Politics of Institutional Reform in the Eastern Townships, 1838-
1852 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997).  
745 FoLL minutes, 15 February 1859. 
746 FoLL minutes, 5 August 1878. In 1864 it was established by testimony of George Taylor that Albert Keyes had 
been for some time living in Mallorytown, where he was a bailiff: FoLL minutes, 16 May 1864. Asahel Keyes next 
appears in the minutes in 1879, when he was elected to council, possibly as a “new broom”; his first motion was to 
reduce the compensation of councillors from $2.00 to $1.50 a day: FoLL minutes, 21 January 1879. Later that year, 
Thomas Kavanagh appealed against Keyes’ assessment, asserting that “he had heard” that Keyes had “had notes due 




 Intriguingly, the appellants (or the clerk) in the Front of Leeds and Lansdowne often used 
the language of rights. Ratepayers were continually recorded as having demanded the ‘right’ to 
be assessed at a higher level. Contrary to the modern expectation that a taxpayer will only seek to 
avoid tax are many requests that an assessment be raised. Not all of these related to the various 
franchises. As the roll was open to the public, higher assessments may have conferred social 
status on the ratepayer. Numerous non-residents also specifically requested to be placed by name 
on the assessment roll. Not being named did not relieve one from tax. In addition to conferring 
the right to vote in the jurisdiction, voluntary enrolment could allow the taxpayer to perform 
statute labour, rather than pay the commuted amount required of non-residents, and perhaps to 
reduce discriminatory assessments; one American study has argued that the widespread 
perception that non-residents were “unfairly” assessed was not unfounded.747  
This is not to say that there were not tax evaders. The minutes of all three townships as 
well as the court reports indicate that action was taken to collect taxes from recalcitrant 
ratepayers, and the collector’s rolls of Gananoque village show notations by the collector of 
property available for distraint.748 Many Front of Leeds and Landsdowne appellants asked that 
their assessment be reduced, or their names struck off the roll entirely. During the years that the 
township had a dog tax by-law, dog owners asked the court of revision to relieve them of this tax 
for various reasons, including the death of the dog (often apparently by the hand of its owner), 
that the dog had run away, or the ratepayer had never owned a dog. These were matters that must 
have been simpler to prove than the value of land; no such appeal was turned down by the court 
of revision. The court was also receptive to appeals by those ratepayers, often widows who 
                                                          
747 See Swierenga, "Land Speculation and Frontier Tax Assessments," 253.  
748 See for example, Gananoque Rolls, 1864. Compare Township of Reach Collector’s Rolls, AO, F 1888, MS 61 
(14), Township of Otonabee assessment and collector’s rolls, AO, F 1847, MS 619 (1). 
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would not have been allowed to vote in any event, who appealed for exemptions for reasons of 
poverty and/or ill health as explicitly permitted by the legislation. It may be that these matters 
were accepted by revisors who were also neighbours as a matter of judicial notice; not one of 
these cases was refused during the years canvassed.  
 Proving land value was more problematic. The legislature vacillated as to whether an 
actual or imputed rental income should be the measure of assessable value in urban areas, but in 
the countryside the standard remained capital (market) value.749 Some ratepayers made a 
complaint but withdrew it on receiving an explanation of the assessor’s reasoning. When 
property had not recently changed hands, the assessor and revisors seem to have made their 
decisions based on the value of property “in the vicinity,” adjusted for the quality of the land, 
and the ratepayer could challenge the assessment on the same bases. It was the assumption of all 
that a rocky, swampy or otherwise non-arable tract should not attract the same taxes as a more 
productive or potentially more productive one, and that like cases should be treated alike.  
Many complainants did not appear and their complaints were usually dismissed, but 
allowances were made in some cases, with no reason given for the indulgence. Witnesses could 
be penalized for failure to appear, but these particular courts of revision never seemed to exact 
these penalties, or to refer absentee witnesses for prosecution.750 The grounds for complaint were 
not always substantive. Often the matter was a question of a name spelled incorrectly. Perhaps 
such a minimal error might deprive someone of a vote, if the name was spelled differently on the 
voters’ list. On two occasions the township/court of revision clerk himself complained, first 
respecting abbreviations used instead of full names, and secondly of headings left blank.751 The 
                                                          
749 Manning, Assessment and Rating: Being the Law of Municipal Taxation in Canada, 6-7. 
750 Assessment Act, 1853, s.30.  
751 FoLL minutes, 4 June 1877 (“on account of certain names being abbreviated in their spelling”); 9 June 1879, 
(headings of roll not filled out). 
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upshot of these complaints was that the clerk himself was retained—and paid—to fix the 
omissions.  
 On only one occasion was it clear that the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne revisors were 
dismissing a complaint on a technicality, a practice that had been roundly condemned by the 
Court of Queen’s Bench in R. v. Cornwall.752 In that case, some seventy-seven potential voters 
had been disenfranchised, in what seems to have been a clear instance of political bias.753 It is 
not clear on the face of the record that the refusal of the court of revision for the Front of Leeds 
and Landsdowne to allow appeals brought in an incorrect format was similarly motivated. But as 
we shall see, the council regularly heard appeals in general council sessions and routinely struck 
or reduced taxes even after the assessment roll had been confirmed, so it is hard to avoid the 
inference that the councillors were being less than impartial. Also suspect is their treatment of 
the Grand Trunk Railway, which had little more success in the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne 
than it seems to have in other municipalities it traversed.754  
As noted, councillors did not recuse themselves from the hearing of complaints regarding 
their own property, although usually they refrained from moving or seconding the judgment on 
these issues.755 Councillors were not always successful, or not fully successful in their own 
cases. In one such instance, Thomas Darling, long-standing member of council and former reeve, 
was refused an amendment, the court noting (in a rare explanation) that the assessor had already 
                                                          
752 FoLL minutes, 28 May 1875; sub nom. The Queen v. The Court of Revision of the Town of Cornwall, [1866] O.J. 
no. 74 25 U.C.R. 286 (UCQB). 
753 Among them was a James P. Whitney, likely the same of this name to later become premier of Ontario. See 
Charles W. Humphries “Whitney, Sir James Pliny,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, at http: 
www.biographi.ca/en/bio/whitney_james_pliny_14E.html. 
754 A search on Quicklaw of “railway” and “assessment” limited by year and jurisdiction finds a number of these, for 
the Grand Trunk and other railway companies. The three townships here reviewed did not partake in inter-municipal 
competition for railways. In fact, when railways appear in the minutes they are usually in an adversarial mode, 
having blocked or damaged roadways or fences. 
755 If they had, the court would have presumably lost its statutorily stipulated five members.  
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reduced the assessment by $100.756 Revisors also regularly adjudicated the appeals of their 
apparent relations, who seem to have been successful more often than not. Interestingly, there is 
little evidence of automatic capitulation to local big-wigs who were not municipally connected. 
Although an appeal by his father, the Honourable John, had been successful to the extent of an 
£1800 reduction, a claim by Herbert Stone McDonald, at that time deputy county judge and later 
(and with the approval of council) county judge, that his property had been valued higher than 
others in the vicinity was rejected.757  
 Some families seemed singularly unlucky (to put the most positive spin on it) in their 
dealings with the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne court of revision. Among these were the 
Galways, one of whom led a petition to fire the assessor.758 There are other hints of opposition 
toward the process and personnel. The Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne council posted a 
reward—a unique event for this township during this period—for the arrest of those responsible 
for torching the collector’s barn, and there is also evidence that some of the aggrieved took their 
cases to the county court for further argument.759 Still, in the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, 
even more markedly than in the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne and Augusta, assessors and 
collectors were often former or future councillors, and the stability of the membership of the 
                                                          
756 FoLL minutes, 18 May 1871. 
757 The Honorable John McDonald is referred to as the “patriarch of the village [of Gananoque]” by Donald 
Akenson: Akenson, The Irish in Ontario, 287; Appeal by Hon. John McDonald, FoLL minutes, 18 and 19 April 
1853, appeals by H. S. McDonald, FoLL minutes, 29 May 1876; Council support for appointment of H.S. 
McDonald as county judge, FoLL minutes, 31 July 1869. 
758 The Galway name first appears in 1863, when a payment of $5 to William Galway for acting as a returning 
officer was rescinded on a contested motion. He was paid $3 as was the other returning officer. FoLL minutes, 2 
February 1863. In 1871, a William Galway complained he had been assessed too high, without success. FoLL 
minutes, 18 May 1871. In 1873 James Galway petitioned council to change the Assessor for Leeds, which petition 
was not adopted (on motion): FoLL minutes, 1 March 1873. In 1874, Robert and William Galway each failed to 
appear, resulting in the dismissal of one case for which Robert was witness, and William’s own complaint: FoLL 
minutes, 1 June 1874. At the same court sitting, “the assessor for Leeds front state[d] to the court that he had omitted 
to assess…50 acres and that the property [was] occupied by James Galway….” (Although he was then assessed at 
$200, which as has been noted, may have been a mixed blessing, or mixed curse, depending on one’s point of view.) 
759 See, for example, the payment of assessors to attend at “Judge’s Revision Court” in Brockville and constables to 
serve notices for attendance at this court; RoLL minutes, 20 December 1866. 
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township council over the years suggests that here at least the personnel and process were 
accepted by the ratepaying electorate as legitimate, or at least unexceptional.  
 Though the Augusta court of revision minutes are only available for 1872 to 1880, during 
these years they exhibit similarities to those of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, including the 
variation in numbers, which oscillated even more severely in Augusta, as the following table 
demonstrates.  
 









Other Total  Comments 
1850       Minutes of council 
exist, but no court of 
revision appeals 
recorded 
1872 157     157 Assessment Act 
amended to change 
property thresholds 
for determining 
amounts of statute 
labour, 1870-71 
1873 3     3  
1874 95     95 Assessment Act 
amended, 1874 to 
change leasehold 
amounts 
1875 14     14  
1876 8     8  
1877 154     154 Farmer’s sons 
allowed to vote if 
parent’s property 
greater or equal to 
twice the required 
property, provision 
passed in 1876 
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1878      ? missing 
1879 3     3  
Total all years 434  
  
In the Augusta minutes the franchise factor is even easier to discern, as in many of the cases the 
clerk noted that the issue to be determined as whether or not the property in question was worth 
more or less than the $200 threshold. The Augusta minutes may also show the effects of party 
organizing at the federal level; federal elections were held in 1872, 1874 and 1878.760 There were 
no fees set for bringing cases before the court of revision (although appeals to the county court 
did attract the usual court costs), so there was little financial disincentive to complain.  
The payment of fees to agents may have been an additional optional cost. In Augusta, as 
in the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, landlords routinely appeared for their tenants and sons 
for their fathers and vice versa. The non-related agents who appear in the Augusta minutes seem 
to have made a general practice of appearing for others to whom they do not appear to be related. 
An intriguing case in Augusta appears to point to party organization and possible professional 
rivalry. In 1877, John B. Checkley, a frequent appellant on behalf of others of no apparent 
relationship, was able to oust ninety-four appeals filed by Sidney Row, another even more 
frequent and apparently equally disinterested participant, on the ground that Row was not at the 
time “a legally qualified elector of this municipality.”761 Although lawyers did appear at courts 
                                                          
760 Parliament of Canada, History of Federal Ridings, General Elections, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/about/process/house/. Provincial electioneering was possibly a factor in 1875. 
Provincial elections were held during this decade in 1871, 1875, and 1879: Elections Ontario, Composition of 
Legislature following General Elections, 
http://results.elections.on.ca/results/history/composition/default.jsp?flag=E&layout=G&rec=0&rec-page=10 I thank 
Doug Hay for suggesting a correlation between number fluctuations and the timing of elections. 
761 Augusta minutes, 1 June 1877. Another participant, William O’Brien, objected to the objection, to no effect. Row 




of revision on larger cases in urban centres, it is likely that these advocates in Augusta were 
multi-tasking businessmen or clerks.762 
 As was the case in the other two jurisdictions, Augusta court of revision sessions seem 
often to have been held outside the statute-mandated dates. However, a measure of clerical 
professionalism can be discerned, beginning with the first meeting of the new corporation in 
1850, and lasting into the eighteen-seventies. The Augusta court of revision minutes, although 
not much more detailed than those of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, are presented with 
greater neatness and uniformity, in quasi-chart form, with column headings for appellant, sworn 
witnesses, matter complained of, and outcome. A sense that the business was serious and 
consequential is also manifest in the refusal of one Augusta councillor to take the chair at the 
first day of court of revision proceedings in May of 1872: Mr. Chapman, nominated by Mr. 
Wilson, “objected on account of his not having had experience in a Court of Revision.”763  
There are other interesting differences in the court of revision records of the two 
townships. Applications to exempt the old, ill, or poor from tax, which were a mainstay of 
proceedings for the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne court of revision, especially in the eighteen-
fifties, when in some years they were the only matter considered by the court, do not appear at all 
in the Augusta minutes (and indeed are comparatively rare in Front of Leeds and Landsdowne 
court of revision minutes in the sixties and seventies), a disparity which requires explanation, or 
at least speculation. Hypotheses that Augusta, being better-off, did not include the marginalized 
among its residents, that the Augusta councillors had less sympathy for the poor, or that Front of 
Leeds and Landsdowne either abandoned the indigent or that indigence ceased to exist in Front 
                                                          
762 Neither of them appears as a lawyer in any of the Leeds and Grenville records or elsewhere. Checkley does not 
seem to have had a position with the Township. Row was briefly a township auditor.   
763 Augusta minutes, 20 May 1870. 
256 
 
of Leeds and Landsdowne would perhaps be reasonable if the court of revision records are taken 
in isolation, but would be erroneous. For the court of revision was but one iteration of council, 
and the distinction seems often to have been more one of form than of substance.      
Contemplating the three township councils as administrative tribunals, the attitudes of 
councillors regarding their role as tax arbiters, especially regarding statute labour and 
exemptions for indigence, become both clearer and more nuanced.  
   
Township Councils as Administrative Tribunals  
Any thought that the municipal reforms brought about by the Baldwin Act resulted in a clean 
Montesquieu-esque division of government functions, with the Quarter Sessions retaining the 
judicial, and the municipal corporations the legislative and executive components, is dispelled by 
the post-reform records of both sets of institutions. Criminal trials took up proportionally more of 
the time of the Quarter Sessions after the partition, but quasi-administrative matters remained 
part of the proceedings.764 As I have shown was the case for the county councils of the United 
Counties, in the three townships here examined legislation was but a minute part of their work. 
In all three jurisdictions, by-laws were largely a pro forma step in administration, the ‘legalizing’ 
of routine acts, many of which concerned the annual appointments of township officers and the 
amount of their pay. There was some variation, but in all three townships, councillors seemed to 
regard their primary function as administrative. Although the Augusta minutes indicate that the 
township was moving to a more rationalized procedure, for the most part the proceedings of all 
three councils tended to the haphazard. This seems much in keeping with another, indeed a 
                                                          
764 For instance, naturalization applications. 
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defining characteristic of the councils, and one which brings them closer to present-day tribunals 
than present-day councils. That is, all three were essentially reactive as opposed to proactive.       
With rare exceptions, council decision-making originated in one of two ways: either in 
institutional routine, or by ratepayer initiative. In the former category are to be found annual 
appointments, the levying of rates, and the implementation of mandated provincial or county 
programmes.765 Ratepayer requests for municipal expenditures, on the other hand, were regular 
in the sense that they were customary, but were rarely routine. The minutes of almost every 
meeting show ratepayers asking for municipal largesse of some sort, occasionally by letter, legal 
claim, or personal appearance, but most commonly by petition. In default of petitions from 
ratepayers, the Front and Rear of Leeds and Lansdowne, and to a lesser extent Augusta, merely 
divided their funds among the various school and road sections into which the township was 
divided. A ratepayer or group could “pray” for a departure from this spending model. These 
requests might be for extra funds to be spent on a particular road or school section, for the 
granting of a tavern licence to a particular applicant, for the adoption or rejection of a statutory or 
county level law, such as the Temperance Act or the Sheep Protection and Dog Tax Act, or for 
poor relief for an indigent neighbour. 
Scattered within this mélange are to be found requests for exemption and variation of tax 
assessment. While the extreme numbers presented in some years to the courts of revision of the 
Front of Leeds and Landsdowne and Augusta are not present, a fairly steady stream of tax-
related requests made their way to the three councils, as the following tables demonstrate.  
  
                                                          
765 By institutional routine, I mean annual business of approving appointments, paying bills etc. All these were done 
annually by by-law. Cooperative endeavours with the county council were rare. For example, a major road through 
the counties was macadamized by a joint effort. As members of the county council, the reeves and deputy reeves 
would have had direct input.  
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TABLE 6: TAX PETITIONS TO TOWNSHIP COUNCIL, FRONT OF LEEDS AND LANDSDOWNE 
Year Error, over 
/under 
charge 




other Total comments 
1850    1*  1 *exemption for 
three years on 
completion of 
bridge 
1851        
1852  2    2  




unoccupied for 3 
months or more) 
1854  2    2  
1855  3    3  
1856  3  2*  5 *exemption 
offered in lieu of 
aid for sidewalk 
1857        
1858 2 4  1  7  
1859        
1860  1    1  
1861  5  1  6  
1862        
1863  5  1  6  
1864 2 3    5  
1865 3 3 1 3    27 * 37 *arrears cancelled 
dog tax begins 
1866  2 6 3 1*  11 *arrears 
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1867 3  6 1  7  
1868 3 1 9   13  
1869 2 1 4 2 4* 13 *from collector’s 
roll, (3 as 
uncollectable) 
1870 3 3 1* 10** 1 *** 18 *for prior year, 
dog tax ends 
**2 for indigence 
*** changes made 
on collector’s roll 
1871 5 2 
(reduced) 
 4  11  
1872 5   2  7  
1873 1 1   9+  11+  
1874    11  11  
1875 7* 4  7 2 ** 20 *includes 
remission of tax on 
steam mill and one 
refused because 
not brought to 
court of revision 
**Steam mill for 5 
years and property 
burned) 
1876 1   1*  1 *rescinded 
1877 1       
1878 1   2  2  
1879 5 1  5  5  
Total all years 188  
 









other Total comments 
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1850 1     1  
1851 1   4*  5 *all indigence 
1852 1   1  2  
1853        
1854    2 *  2 *1 indigence  
1855    1*  1 * indigence 
1856        
1857    7*  7 * all indigence 
1858 2   2  4  
1859 1   7*  8 *6 indigence 
and/or small 
children and large 
families 
1860    2  2  
1861 1   6*  7 *4 for indigence 
1862    1  1  
1863 1   1  2  
1864        
1865    2  2  
1866 10  1  1* 12 *refund to clergy 
for parsonage 
1867 6*  4 1  11 *3 for interest on 
back taxes 
1868   6* 3  9 *1 claim rejected 
on legal advice 
1869 3   1 1* 5 *refund to clergy 
1870    1 1* 2 *by-law to remit 
part of lot 
1871        
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1872    1  1  
1873 6*   1  7 *3 re back taxes 
1874 2   1  3  
1875 1     1  
1876    4  4  
1877 4* 1  1+ 2 ** 8 *1 back taxes 
** lack of benefit 
from school taxes 
1878 1*   1  2 *settlement for 
back taxes 
1879    4  4  
Total all years 113  
  








other Total comments 
1850        
1872     1 * 1 *mill destroyed by 
fire 
1873 2     2  
1874    1+ 
unknown 
 1+  
1875  7  4  9  
1876        
1877 1 5   4* 10 *“lately burnt out” 
1878 3 6  7  16  
1879  9*  2  11 *one for previous 
year 





In skirting the courts of revision, were these requests illegal, or extra-legal? As I have 
noted, the statute did allow changes after the assessment roll had been confirmed and passed, in 
cases where there was a “gross and obvious error” of at least 25% over or under actual value. In 
no case do the minutes of any of the three townships show a finding of such error as a 
precondition of council making tax petition decisions, but they do not provide much detail on 
which to base any very firm conclusions in this regard. Most of the petitions for relief based on 
error seem to be similar to those brought to the courts of revision. One difference is that all 
apparently are matters of over- rather than undercharge, whereas in the court of revision minutes, 
as we have seen, undercharge appeared as a significant category of appeal. This is as might be 
expected. Council could (or would) vary tax liability, but the records show that often the changes 
seem only to have been effected by a resolution or passed motion sent by the clerk to the 
collector, in which case the assessment and collector’s rolls would not reflect the change. Since 
the rolls were authoritative for voting purposes, a claim for undercharge to raise the assessment 
to voting or candidacy level would have to be taken to the court of revision to achieve the desired 
end.  
Though problems arising from transcription or errors of fact seem less prevalent in the 
petitions brought to council than the appeals to the courts of revision, these did occur. A 
ratepayer assessed twice (once by each assessor), or one who was assessed instead of another 
with a similar name could expect a sympathetic hearing even after the assessment roll had been 
passed. In only one case did the council instruct the clerk to inform a ratepayer that his appeal 
could not be entertained because the request should have been made to the court of revision.766 
                                                          
766 FoLL minutes, 13 December 1875. 
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Unfortunately the minutes do not reveal the reason for this refusal, that is, whether it was based 
on a finding that the alleged error was not “gross and obvious” or less than 25%, or whether the 
council was just asserting it was generally functus. If the latter, this was at best disingenuous, at 
worst, mendacious.  
The assessment act did not make any mention of appeals of dog taxes brought after 
confirmation of the roll. In some cases, the inappropriateness of a dog tax was fairly clear-cut, 
where the ratepayer denied he had ever owned a dog. In more cases, however, the reasons for the 
petition were based on grounds of justice or mercy similar to those cited in the court of revision 
appeals. Thus councillors waived the dog tax in cases where it was alleged that the dog had died, 
been killed or somehow lost during the year following the making of the assessment. Stephen 
Wheeler of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, identified as an indigent blind man elsewhere in 
the minutes, was also exempted from this tax.767 Applications by ratepayers for relief for refunds 
or exemptions from the dog tax were almost uniformly successful in all three townships during 
this period. The one exception is telling: the request of Andrew McCardle to have his dog taken 
off the roll was apparently based on legal, rather than equitable grounds. His petition was held 
over to the next meeting to allow the Reeve to seek legal advice; on this being in favour of the 
assessment, the petition was denied.768  
No exceptions to liability for dog tax were included in the governing legislation, nor in 
the one by-law on the subject which is extant for these townships.769 Similarly, councillors 
remitted property taxes for ratepayers whose property had been burned, another extenuating 
circumstance on which the legislation was silent. It could be argued that the council was merely 
                                                          
767 FoLL minutes, 18 January 1869.  
768 RoLL minutes, 6 May and 15 September 1868. 
769 FoLL By-laws, #189 (no date). 
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proceeding by analogy, as the legislation did allow an exemption for property which was under 
water. However, it seems more likely that the councillors were using an extra-legal discretion to 
relieve from injustices arising from arbitrary rules. Clemency in these cases can be seen as a 
competing public policy. 
Exemption from statute labour might be seen as even more legally dubious, as the 
legislation specifically forbade municipalities from reducing the statutory minimums for 
statutory labour.770  Ratepayers brought statute labour issues to council in all three jurisdictions. 
Some of these related to errors of fact, especially as to whether or not the work had been done. 
Road overseers were supposed to provide records, but this requirement was often flouted.771 
Again, almost all these petitions were successful. One was specifically granted “in part;” one 
which had been granted was rescinded (possibly because of an ongoing claim against the 
municipality by a family member of the petitioner). Only one was contested, as the council 
debated whether Samuel McCammon’s claim to have fulfilled his obligations should be 
accepted.772 (The fact that McCammon was a lawyer may have been a factor in this unusual 
manifestation of doubt.)  
The township councils of the Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne regularly exempted 
ratepayers from statute labour for reasons of indigence, especially in the early part of the period. 
An Augusta by-law, setting out the procedure for statute labour and the supervision by overseers 
specifically allowed an exemption for inability to perform to those who “due to old age, sickness 
or numerous family or misfortune may be in poor and indigent circumstances….”773 The 
                                                          
770 Or at least not directly: as I have noted, the question of whether a property owner was resident or non-resident 
had implications for statute labour and its commutation. 
771 Augusta By-laws, #5 (1850); FoLL By-laws, #313 (no date). 
772 FoLL minutes, 11 December 1865. 
773 Augusta By-laws, By-law #5, s.12 (1850). The by-law provided that this exemption was only available to those 
whose property was assessed at less than £25, the exemption level for general taxes.  
It also provided for an informer’s award of half the fine if one was imposed. 
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ratepayer was to apply first to a councillor, who was to make due enquiry, which may partly 
explain the high degree of success at the council level. The Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne’s 
practice of exempting statute labour for such reasons seems to have died out after 1861, possibly 
because poor relief was specifically included as part of the township’s jurisdiction in 1858, and 
councillors were then able to assist the poor both legally and directly.774    
Failure to perform statute labour (without an excuse ratified by a councillor and then full 
council) does seem to have been regularly prosecuted by all three jurisdictions, but all three also 
seem to have allowed plenty of latitude. Each allowed variation of statute labour requirements 
practically on request, permitting the ratepayer to work on roads on or near his or her own 
property as a matter of course. While in some cases the privilege was granted subject to the 
supervision of the local overseer, in only one case was an application to vary statute labour 
requirements denied. Even in this case, the request was originally granted, but rescinded, perhaps 
in retaliation for a claim for restitution by a kinsman of the applicant that was considered 
extortionate.775 In many of these cases the indigence or ill-health of the applicant was cited as 
ground for the adjustment; perhaps the Assessment Act’s provision for discretion in such cases in 
property tax matters was seen as an implicit sanction. In several, the existence of a large brood of 
young children (who presumably could not be expected to spell off their fathers on the road, or 
on the farm while the road work was being conducted), which was established as a ground for 
relief by the by-laws mentioned above, or the death of the ratepayer (which is nowhere given as a 
                                                          
774 An Act respecting the Municipal Institutions of Upper Canada, 22 Vic. c.90 (assented to 16 August 1858, 
effective date December 1, 1858), s.269. But see also 16 Vic. c.181 (1852), s.9 (2). 
775 In 1876, Lawrence Boyle made a claim for $150 against the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne for damages to his 
horse due to “a bridge or culvert.” The council settled for $100. The same day this was agreed to, a resolution 
allowing John Boyle and John Featherston (who may have been collateral damage in this dispute) to do their statute 
labour on a road of their choice was then rescinded. A month later the council had to pay a third party $20 for 
having boarded the horse; that day a claim by Patrick Boyle for expropriation of land for a road, it was resolved 




statutory reason for non-performance) were accepted as extenuating circumstances. Again, these 
were not ‘legal’ but were accepted as legitimate by the council, and their inclusion in the minutes 
suggests that it was presumed that they would be by their constituency.776  
The Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne was creative with statute labour exemptions in the 
early part of the period in a different way, choosing to exempt ratepayers from statute labour on 
the grounds of indigence. Again, it is not clear that such exemptions were allowable by statute, 
except insofar as the requirement is considered a tax for the purposes of the section allowing 
remittances for ill-health, poverty and gross and obvious error previously referred to. In any 
event, a few years after direct poor relief was explicitly included as a head of jurisdiction, this 
method, which was not employed by either of the other townships examined, fell into disuse. At 
least as far as can be determined: in many cases the councils merely noted that a remittance was 
granted or reduction made, without recording the reason. 
An initial willingness by the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne to experiment with statute 
labour as a budgetary tool—excusing a contractor and petitioners from completion of their 
statute labour as part of the contract price for a bridge in the first instance and in lieu of support 
for a sidewalk in the second—is not to be found in the other jurisdictions, and did not persist in 
the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne past the second instance, when it may or may not have been 
accepted.777 Possibly trading credit for future statute labour was frowned on as legally dubious, 
perhaps such arrangements were too difficult to keep track of, given that assessment rolls were 
filled in from scratch every year, or politically assailable if they purported to last (as was the case 
with the bridge contract) past the one-year mandate of council. In the latter part of the period, 
                                                          
776 Township minutes were occasionally printed in local newspapers. Though I have not found any published 
minutes for the Front or Rear of Leeds and Landsdowne, I have found Augusta township minutes printed (though 
not consistently) by the Brockville Recorder (also known as Brockville Weekly Recorder), AO, N 144. 
777 FoLL minutes, 20 September and 29 December 1851, 8 October 1856. 
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exemptions from all taxes for commercial establishments were specifically allowed by statute; 
the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne was the only one of the jurisdictions to take advantage of 
this during this period, when its council exempted a steam-mill from all tax for five years. 
If a tax was ‘uncollectable,’ it might be struck from the collectors’ roll, usually without 
setting out the reason for the uncollectability. The minutes of all three councils show many 
instances of attempts to collect taxes. When considering one request for a remittance, the 
councillors of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne were careful to add the caveat that their 
largesse was dependent on the collector relieving the township of liability for any legal damages 
which might have been incurred by attempts at distraint.778 
 Since the county requisition was based on the assessment total, not the amount collected, 
the cost of the remittance to the township could be greater than the stated amount. Even when an 
uncollected tax bill had been reported to the County Treasurer, to be tracked for eventual sale of 
the property by the sheriff, the three township councils often retroactively forgave the debt. They 
also routinely extended the time for payment. Often no reason is given for the forgiveness for 
these debts, or the interest on the debt.779 It is possible that the councillors did not wish to 
embarrass the objects of their generosity in these cases, but the many occasions on which they 
did cite a reason for forgiveness for indigence, fire-loss, and ill-health are evidence that being an 
object of compassion in tax matters was perhaps not considered a matter for shame.  
Requests for exemption or reduction for reasons of indigence made to council were as 
successful as those made to the courts of revision. As far as can be ascertained, none was 
                                                          
778 RoLL minutes, 17 January 1876: resolved that “James Kelsey be remitted his taxes for the year 1875, provided 
the Collector relieves this Township of any liability for cost incurred in distraining and keeping Kelsey's property 
while striving to collect said Kelsey’s taxes.” 
779 RoLL minutes, 9 February 1869. Forgiveness on interest on back taxes of former councillor (and former 
assessor) Thomas Sheffield and two others (the amount forgiven was less in the case of Sheffield’s debt). 
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refused, nor were any held over for investigation. Many were made by petition, but some by 
motion of a councillor. That “it was represented” that a ratepayer was unable to pay was deemed 
a sufficient ground for relief. Augusta Township granted tax exemptions for inability to pay in 
batches, in keeping with its practice of group grants of poor relief. The motions in these cases 
referred matter-of-factly to the “poverty and sickness [the listed ratepayers] have had to pass 
through in the last year.”780 There did not seem to be any sense that the poor or those in difficult 
circumstances should have to divest themselves of their capital to the threshold of the personal 
exemption in order to request tax relief, or indeed to request poor relief. Some overlap can be 
seen, but many—especially widows—received tax relief who were not also receiving poor relief. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the opacity of and lack of detail provided by the record, it is safe to say that the 
townships of Augusta and the Rear and Front of Leeds and Landsdowne during the thirty years 
following the implementation of the Baldwin Act in Canada West/Ontario were not particularly 
“legalistic” in their implementation of the tax laws, whether acting as courts of revision or in 
their capacity as quasi-administrative tribunals. Though cognizant of and ready to follow the 
spirit of the laws, they also seemed disposed to consider these as non-binding as far as council 
action was concerned. Even when following the law exactly, for instance, in the matter of clergy 
exemptions, they chose to appeal to ‘custom’ to legitimate their actions. The records of their 
decisions never cited the by-law or law involved; where they bothered to give any reason at all 
they chose to stress the grounds of their decisions in policy or natural justice.  
                                                          
780 Augusta minutes, 11 March 1879. 
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On tax matters, as on most other subjects, the councillors showed a remarkable 
consensus.781 That this was not a distortion, a function of the record keeping process, is 
demonstrated by the recording of occasional disagreements on other matters, especially 
involving patronage, and evidence of amendment of the record where the clerk expected a 
motion to be passed and had to insert amendments and record ayes and nays. Moreover, their 
attitudes did not seem to change with turnover in personnel. Albeit to different degrees, all three 
townships demonstrated a somewhat nonchalant attitude to the statutory minutiae of dates and 
deadlines, and the distinction between court of revision business and that of council.  
One can understand the reasoning: if municipal revenue was theirs to spend as they 
wished, or at least as not specifically prohibited, the right to forego its collection would seem to 
follow logically, whatever the legislative drafters might have directed otherwise. The identical 
membership, meeting place and clerk for townships councils and courts of revision may have 
accentuated a natural tendency to deal with tax appeals in the same way, and according to the 
same standards as other claims and issues. It is thus hardly surprising that there are instances of 
political or personal bias in abundance, and it is of course possible that these may have been even 
more pronounced than the record indicates. Social filters may have operated to obscure relations 
of political power and cultural tyranny, so that only those claims which were understood to be 
acceptable even made it to the court of revision or to council.  
                                                          
781 In the seventies especially, there were disagreements not only as to whom the council hired, but how much was 
paid. Applicants tendered for the position much as they would a contract. For example, in 1875, J.A. Bradley, long-
time clerk of the Front of Leeds and Landsdowne, refused to accept less than the $225.00 per annum that he was to 
that point being paid, and resigned. Council then decided to accept the application of John Redmond (formerly an 
assessor) at $150.00, but then had second thoughts that “the appointment of a new clerk would not be for the interest 
of this municipality considering the amount of work to be done and the important documents and contracts to be 
entered….and as the present Clerk has performed a large portion of the work of the present year it would be no 
saving to this municipality to appoint a new clerk.” FoLL minutes, 22 February 1875. However, the next year 
Bradley retreated from this position and accepted $175.00. By 1878 this had been reduced to $150.00: FoLL 
minutes, 7 February 1876, 18 February 1878. 
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Certainly, it seems likely that councillor-revisors shared, or reflected, the expectations of 
their constituents, propertied by definition, whose petitions dictated the greater part of the 
agendas of their meetings. It is clear that in following or departing from the law, the lesser elites 
who made up the township council did not feel compelled by their voting public to place a 
premium on the maximization of revenue. Not that they neglected their duty to raise funds.782 
Nevertheless, the mid-Victorian councillors of Augusta and Leeds and Landsdowne, Front and 
Rear, did not act as predatory administrators. The assessment laws, and the public priorities they 
are alleged to have embodied—the encouragement of improvements in infrastructure, and 
indirectly the economic progress which local taxes made possible, were not inconsequential. 
Since the preponderance of their time and money was spent on roads and schools, it cannot be 
said that the councils, and indirectly the ratepaying constituents, failed to share these particular 
provincial priorities. However, when law and provincial policy came into conflict with local 
community norms such as mercy and justice, the former were consistently trumped by the latter.  
It is impossible to tell how far these findings pertain generally to municipal governments 
in Canada West/Ontario. But since the introduction of the township as the default for local 
government with right to tax and manage money was such a major departure from the pre-
Baldwin Act system of local governance, since the majority of the Canada West/Ontario settler 
society were residents of townships, and since local taxation was the only direct tax to which 
they were subject, these observations should be taken seriously in any evaluation of local 
autonomy at this time. For these three townships, municipal law facilitated, or at least permitted, 
a sphere of autonomy in a key aspect of local governance. 
  
                                                          
782 Indeed, the ability of Canada West to do so, in comparison with Canada East, was a notorious challenge to the 
union, and the later dominion. See Smith, Toryism, Classical Liberalism, and Capitalism, 1-25. J. L. Little writes of 
the reluctance of Quebeckers to pay municipal taxes: Little, State and Society in Transition, 320.  
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Chapter 8:  The Legislative Agency of Local Governments: Petitions from Municipal 
Corporations to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1867-1877  
 
Now used almost exclusively as a tool of collective advocacy, petitions in the common law 
world were once merely the common format for individual supplication to the crown or 
government. The transition from private to public was already clear in the nineteenth century, 
when petitions, circulated and delivered by increasingly reliable and inexpensive postal services, 
became such a popular vehicle for reform-minded agitators that ‘gag-rules’ were enacted by 
some legislatures to curb their use.783 In mid-Victorian Ontario, some twenty-five years after the 
advent of “responsible” government whereby elected representatives might have been expected 
to absorb the role of petitions, and also in spite of a gag-rule, petitions were a commonly 
employed element of the legislative process.784 Individuals and corporations still used them for 
private benefit. Others hoped to influence policy, particularly on “wild card” issues, and local 
governments routinely used them for both purposes.  
                                                          
783 For gag rules in the United States, see David C. Frederick, “John Quincy Adams, Slavery, and the Disappearance 
of the Right of Petition,” Law & History Review 9, no. 1 (1991): 113-55. Frederick’s discussion focuses on the 
political and constitutional aspects of petitioning, and it is unclear whether the disappearance also refers to other 
forms of petitioning.  In the case of Britain, however, Colin Leys discovered that neither similar restrictions, 
imposed for comparable reasons, nor, as he expected, the passage of the Reform Bill, served to stop petitions; he 
attributed the lag between constitutional developments and eventual attenuation of petitioning in large part to social 
inertia: Colin Leys, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries” Political Studies 3, no. 1 (1955): 45-64. 
784 Historians’ interest in petitions, formerly confined to the petition of right and related constitutional subjects, has 
extended to a wide variety of social and political topics. See Kristin A. Collins, "“Petitions Without Number”: 
Widows' Petitions and the Early Nineteenth-Century Origins of Public Marriage-Based Entitlements," Law & 
History Review 31, no. 1 (2013): 1-60, J. K. Johnson, In Duty Bound: Men, Women, and the State in Upper Canada, 
1783-1841 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014), Henry Miller, "Popular Petitioning and the Corn 
Laws, 1833–46," English Historical Review 127, no. 527 (2012): 882-919; Steven Watt, ""Duty Bound and Ever 
Praying": Collective Petitioning to Governors and Legislatures Selected Regions of Lower Canada and Maine, 
1820-1838" (Ph.D. diss., Université du Quebec à Montreal, 2006); James G. Hanley, "The Public's Reaction to 
Public Health: Petitions Submitted to Parliament, 1847-1848," Social History of Medicine 15, no. 3 (2002): 393-411; 
Kathy Strunk and Karon LeCompte, "Tennessee's First Public School Finance Issues: the Peoples' Petitions, 1812-
1861," American Educational History Journal 31, no. 1 (2004): 29-36; Maggie McKinley, “Petitioning and the 
Making of the Administrative State,”  University of Pennsylvania Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 18-9 
(2018), SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150671; and the collection of essays in  Petitions in Social History, ed. 
Lex Heerma Van Voss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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In an early article on the subject, political scientist Colin Leys focussed on the “mass” 
public petitions made possible by printing technology in nineteenth century Britain.785 Surprised 
by the preponderance of public over private petitions, Leys suggested that it took the public time 
after the reform of Parliament to realize that their petitions were being ignored. Because this 
insufficiently explains why the phenomenon continued well into the twentieth century, he 
ventured as a corollary that “the successful organization of petitions was an important end in 
itself.”786 Whether or not the latter point was true of petitioning citizens in Ontario, it is 
unhelpful with regard to what can be termed “institutional” petitioners.787 To the school boards, 
Boards of Trade, and municipal corporations who regularly petitioned the provincial (and also 
the federal and imperial) legislatures, organization was a fait accompli, so presumably not a 
concern. Although municipal councillors occasionally circulated draft petitions to other local 
governments to enlist support, it is more likely that in most instances these groups intended to do 
what they were purporting to do, that is, change their legal environment in specific ways.788  
The use of petitions to redress grievances by requesting alterations in law dates in Upper 
Canada to the appearance of an organized government.789 Unfortunately, petitions and 
governmental records in general for the pre-confederation part of the period under investigation, 
held at the National Archives in Ottawa, are sporadic at best. The Archives of Ontario, on the 
                                                          
785 Leys, "Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries." For considerations of the role of petitioning in 
nineteenth century reform politics see Seymour Drescher, "History's Engines: British Mobilization in the Age of 
Revolution," William & Mary Quarterly 66, no. 4 (2009): 737-56; Miller, "Popular Petitioning and the Corn Laws." 
786 Leys, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” 58. 
787 The practice of institutional or corporate petitioning seems not to have been addressed directly by academics. 
788 See a similar phenomenon discussed by Daniel Carpenter, “On the Emergence of the Administrative Petition: 
Innovations in Nineteenth-Century Indigenous North America,” in Administrative Law from the Inside Out: Essays 
on Themes in the Work of Jerry L. Mashaw, ed. Nicholas R. Parrillo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017), 349-72 
789 For petitions and the legislative process at the federal level, see John George Bourinot, Parliamentary Procedure 
and Practice, with an Introductory Account of the Origin and Growth of Parliamentary Institutions in the Dominion 
of Canada (Montreal, 1884). Sheila Lambert in Bills and Acts: Legislative Procedure in Eighteenth-Century 




other hand, has a dedicated collection dating from confederation, from which it appears that few 
are missing.790 I have based this chapter on the records from the ten year period 1867-77; nothing 
in the provincial or federal records, or indeed those of the municipalities held by the provincial 
archives, suggests that this period is unrepresentative. Petitions, drafts, and related 
correspondence can also be found in the records of various municipalities held by the Archives 
of Ontario. The municipal records, published acts, the Journals of the Legislative Assembly, the 
rules of the legislature and sessional papers, the petition wrappers and included affidavits and 
notices, and indices and registers, although less complete than the petitions themselves, provide 
much useful information.  
Although Sidney and Beatrice Webb’s multi-volume history of English local 
government, which seems to leave no stone unturned at least twice, does not refer to municipal 
petitioning in England, a volume is devoted to the local acts by which nineteenth-century urban 
reform was often accomplished.791 As I discuss in Chapter 1, American urban historian Jon C. 
Teaford has argued that such private or “special” legislation was one fount of municipal 
autonomy in the United States from 1865 to 1900, but in arguing that Ontario municipalities 
were autonomous in the post-Baldwin Act period, Canadian urban historian John H. Taylor does 
not contemplate this possibility.792 If Ontario local governments could command private 
legislation as their urban American counterparts did, or indeed public legislation on municipal 
issues, Taylor’s general thesis concerning municipal autonomy vis à vis the province would be 
strengthened. As the formal and common method of communication and request to government, 
                                                          
790 Petitions to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, 1867-1933, 1987-2011, AO, RG 49-38-2. I have cited these by 
sessional year and number. 
791 Webb and Webb, History of English Local Government, vol. 5, Statutory Authorities for Public Purposes. 
792 Taylor, “Urban Autonomy in Canada,” 478-500; Teaford, “Special Legislation and the Cities.” Except where the 
text makes clear, I do not distinguish between urban and rural governments. As far as I can tell they were not treated 
differently within the petitioning process. 
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petitions offer the best evidence of what municipal councils considered to be necessary and 
desirable, or inadequate and harmful, in the law that gave them existence and within which they 
operated.793 
In their survey of literature on legislative history, Margaret Susan Thompson and Joel 
Sibley imply that research into bills and acts “before and off the floor,” should be supplemental 
and secondary to the preliminary and primary work of “counting.”794 I have followed their 
recommendation, but only to the most rudimentary level of classification and analysis. A 
quantitative model designed to track the relative success rate of petitions from municipal 
corporations would be superficially attractive but ultimately unproductive, due to the fluidity of 
the texts (many of which combine or alternate requests), the indeterminacy and complexity of the 
petitioning and legislative processes, lacunae in the legislative records, lack of useful Hansard 
and committee records, and conflict among the petitioning municipalities themselves. The 
examination that follows is subject to the inherent weaknesses of qualitative inquiry, but 
ultimately power and independence are subjective subjects. 
 
Petitions from Municipal Corporations 
In the first ten years after confederation, 6927 petitions were filed with the clerk of the Ontario 
Legislative Assembly, of which 1536 (22 percent) were from municipalities.  Much can be 
learned about these even without opening them. The petitions were folded in thirds so that 
information could be inscribed on the backs. Each petition was given a number, under which it 
                                                          
793 Of course, there may well have been ‘back channel’ informal communications. But these would have been 
formalized by petition before a bill was moved, unless they were to be truly secret. It is hard to imagine many 
instances when the municipality would want its request to be presented as though it was an initiative of government, 
and the government would have been agreeable to such a manoeuvre. 
794 Margaret Susan Thompson and Joel H. Silbey, “Historical Research on Nineteenth-Century Legislatures,” in 
Handbook of Legislative Research, ed. Gerhard Lowenberg et al. (Cambridge, Mass. and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 1985), 701-32, 710. 
275 
 
was filed and also registered in the petition register and distribution books. The number was 
inscribed at the bottom by the clerk, along with the date of filing and the name of the member 
who filed it. At the top the clerk inscribed the petitioner’s name(s) or description (e.g. “certain 
inhabitants of the township of York,” “The Municipal Corporation of the Township of York”) 
along with the relief sought.795 In some cases the registrar made amendments to suit his indexing 
preferences. Printed blank-form petitions from the end of the period studied also had a printed 
back for greater clerical convenience. The few petitions in every year that are missing can be 
identified by subject and petitioner in the petition registers.796 Petition “wrappers,” envelopes 
that seem to have been provided by the legislature, are filed in a separate series.797 In some cases 
they can be matched against the corresponding petition by means of the number, but many more 
of the wrappers are missing. The wrappers are also less uniform in the information they present. 
While spaces were provided to note various matters about the petition and resulting bill, if any, 
on most some or all of these are left blank. Some wrappers contain affidavits swearing to the 
conditions precedent or press clippings of required notices (occasionally these find their way into 
petitions as well).798  
 Municipal councils were responsible for more petitions than any other identifiable group. 
This is the more remarkable when it is noted that the greater number of the filed petitions are 
printed standard forms, of which hundreds might be filed on a single issue. Municipal 
governments participated in some of these mass petitioning efforts, and indeed were responsible 
for the bulk of petitions on two issues, namely the establishment of an ophthalmic hospital and 
                                                          
795 The wrapper summary is not always a reliable guide to the relief sought in the petition. 
796 Petition Register books, AO, RG 49-38-3.  
797 Petition wrappers, AO, RG 49-38-1. 
798 There seem to be no extant records of the Private Bills Committee for this time period, and references to petitions 
and their outcome in the Journals of the Legislative Assembly although plentiful are inadequate and inconsistent:  
Canada. Legislature. Legislative Assembly, Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Canada. 
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repeal of tax exemptions. In general, however, they confined themselves to traditional, non-
standardized, hand-written “prayers for relief.”799 As might be expected, much of the petitioning 
of municipal councils is concerned with amendments to the municipal and related acts, but many 
other areas of law and policy, such as conservation policy, franchise acts and medical acts, were 
considered by municipal councillors to be fit subjects for petitioning.  
 The petitions, like the ensuing bills and acts, if any, were classified by the clerk as 
“public” or “private” according to parliamentary law and convention.  However, this 
classification was not always cut and dried. Some petitions are ambiguous and others combine 
requests on several issues, occasionally mixing public with private.  Of the 1536 from 
municipalities, 576 were filed as private and 960 as public.800 Each type was (and is) subject to a 
separate procedure and status before and after enactment. The terms are somewhat confusing, 
owing to the fact they refer to the legal character of the law to be altered, not to the scope or 
impact of the change. Thus, for example, while a petition to regulate railways or a particular 
class of railways would be classified as “public,” a petition to incorporate a major railway with 
far-reaching economic, social, and political repercussions would still be “private.”801 Nor should 
one mistake the private petition/bill/act for the private member’s bill, which can be either public 
or private in legislative status, as can government-sponsored legislation.  
                                                          
799 Some of these were concerned with monetary relief or aid-in-kind, and are marked (presumably by the clerk) 
“not read” or “praying for aid,” as any petition requiring the outlay of public money required prior approval of 
cabinet, with a duplicate petition sent to the Lieutenant Governor. Because these petitions for aid cannot be 
classified as attempts at legislative change, they therefore will be considered only incidentally, to illustrate various 
attitudes of municipal politicians: Ontario Legislative Assembly, Rules, Orders and Forms of Proceeding of the 
Legislative Assembly of Ontario, adapted by the House in the First Session of the First Parliament (Toronto, 1868), 
23 (2nd edition, 1876), 26 [hereafter cited as Rules.] In the first edition, the rule only required that a petition for 
public aid be adjourned to a later day. An archivist’s or clerk’s note in RG 49-38-2 (1871-72) on the back of a 
printed notice to provincial members states that such petitions required a duplicate to the Lieutenant Governor; this 
was confirmed by the second edition.  
800 The hybrid “local” act, used extensively in England, was never transplanted to Ontario: Lambert, Bills and Acts, 
53, 85.  




I have broken down the public petitions from local governments during this ten year 
period by general subject, from the most to least numerous, as follows: ophthalmic hospital 
(228), assessment act (189), municipal institutions and municipal drainage acts (115), liquor 
licensing/prohibition (115), education (48), registry act (30), local improvement fund (29), 
distribution of supplies (17), distribution of statutes (13), conservation/timber policy (11), 
elections/franchise/voters list act (10), medical act (9), Canada thistle act (4), vagrancy act (2), 
miscellaneous (10).  Private petitions from local governments categorized by subject, from the 
most to the least numerous, are as follows: railways (134), restructuring jurisdictions (118), aid 
for civic projects or general purposes (44), “legalize” by-law or agreement (28), confirm or deny, 
survey etc. roads (24), authorize/amend water or gas works (18), location of registry office (14), 
charitable institutions/aid to fire victims (12), bonus to manufacturers (12), change of municipal 
classification (10), Huron and Ontario canal (9), open/close/widen/change name of streets (9), 
companies other than railways (9), limit or extend limits of municipality (9), additional 
provincial member of legislature for Essex (8), normal schools (8), authorization of extra debt 
(8), amendment of debt (8), distribution of Middlesex debt (7), investigation of various matters 
(5), crown lands in municipality (6), accounting between municipalities (4), legalize past 
mistakes (3), miscellaneous (19).802 
 
The Petitioning Process 
During the last several decades of the eighteenth and early decades of the nineteenth century, 
British radicals made use of petitions to stonewall Parliament, resulting in the adoption of the so-
                                                          
802 Some of these would not have been meant to result in private acts, but to changes in schedules to public acts, but 
are included here because they would have been routed through the private bills committee. Since they were not 




called “gag rule,” replicated in Ontario, whereby a member could not speak on presentation of a 
petition, but was confined to reading it. Unless it concerned an urgent, pressing, personal matter, 
there was to be no debate.803 Members were under a duty to present all petitions from 
constituents, but were not responsible for advancing their contents. It was thus customary for 
politicians to present, though not necessarily to promote, petitions on opposing sides of an issue. 
 By definition, private acts confer a privilege. Hence the prerequisite petitions for such 
acts were subject to a quasi-judicial process intended to prove they were also in the public 
interest and to allow anyone who might be adversely affected to object. Private petitions were to 
be referred first to the committee on standing orders; if correct in form, they then proceeded to 
the Private Bills Committee.804 There were restrictions on the time during the session in which a 
private petition could be brought and the ensuing bill enacted; these grew more stringent over 
time, although the time a private petition spent in committee was halved. Strict notice 
requirements had to be met and demonstrated. The grounds for the prayed-for relief, set out in 
the preamble, had also to be proved, although occasionally the House would send back a bill 
rejected by the committee with the curt instruction to consider the preamble proven.805 Aside 
from this latter phenomenon, it is hard to tell how far partisan politics intruded into the private 
bill procedure. The Journals of the Legislative Assembly indicate that few private bills were 
subject of a division in the House as it sat as a committee of the whole or even of discussion.806  
 Private legislation was not cheap. As well as the costs of drafting the bill, usually by the 
petitioner’s own lawyer or parliamentary agent, and printing the bill in the number required by 
                                                          
803 Leys, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” 48-52. 
804 Rules (1868), (1876). 
805 See Arthur Sydere, General Index to the Journals and Sessional Papers of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Province of Ontario, 1867-1882 (Toronto: Warwick & Sons 1883). Occasionally other requirements, such as time 
for filing, were waived by the committee. 
806 Unfortunately, the Journals are less than uniform in their reporting regarding petitions. 
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the rules (one per member unless otherwise specified), done by the government’s contractor, 
there were fees payable to the Legislature (sixty dollars in 1867, one hundred dollars by 1877).807 
Under some circumstances these fees would be remitted, for instance if the petition/bill were 
withdrawn at an early stage. Very rarely, it seems, were fees remitted if the bill passed. In 
addition, a private petitioner might incur the expense of counsel and any witnesses. Notices in 
the local papers and the Ontario Gazette would have to be paid for and, if documentation were 
required, there would be other costs. For example, a municipality that wished to separate from 
another or change its category of incorporation (for example, from village to town) would incur 
costs of notices, procuring copies of assessments, polls and an accounting.808 “Lobbying” 
connotes personal contact—in the lobby—between the lobbyist and member, and private 
petitions were probably often accompanied by a petitioner or representative; but attendance, 
though likely helpful, was not a condition prescribed by the rules.809 “Public” petitions faced 
fewer technical obstacles. They could be brought at any time and cost nothing, unless there was a 
cost for drafting; in the case of municipal corporations, this usually seems to have been done in-
house by the clerk.810 If a petition attempted to alter policy, it could also be vulnerable to partisan 
political challenges, but the petitioner would have little if anything to lose by the effort. 
                                                          
807 Rules (1868), 15, and Rules (1876), 17, 30. 
808 That the petitioning municipality would bear these costs was set out in the statute itself. See, for examples, 39 
Vic. c.39, c. 40, c. 41, and c. 42. 
809 For the origins of lobbying, see Hurst, The Growth of American Law, 62. Elwood Jones and Douglas McCalla 
mention the advantage of physical proximity to the private bills committee: “Toronto Waterworks 1840-77: 
Continuity and Change in Nineteenth Century Toronto Politics,” Canadian Historical Review 60 (1979): 300-23, 
309. 
810 This was the practice in Leeds and Grenville counties, and an examination of the handwriting against the 
signature of the clerk (who was a signing officer of the municipal corporation, and that of the Warden/Mayor/Reeve 
indicates that this was also the case in other municipalities. Since clerks were generally salaried employees any cost 
would be indirect and negligible. A few (non-municipal) petitions include the name of the lawyer or law firm on the 
back. Others can be recognized as “professional” by the quality of the paper, calligraphy, and language. The rules 
provided for parliamentary agents; there was a professional “parliamentary bar” in England; Private Bill Legislation 
2:267-70; Lambert, Bills and Acts; Rules (1868), 19.  
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Consequently, it is not surprising that municipal corporations’ public petitions outnumbered their 
private petitions during these years. 
 Perhaps the most telling difference between the mass petitions and those generated by 
municipal corporations and other institutions is their style. The printed, standard-form, mass 
petitions are typically long and rhetorical, waxing eloquent on the liberty of the British subject or 
the evils of drink. This is in keeping with Leys’ observation that they are designed more for their 
effect on the petitioners than on the petitioned; that is, the main aim is to induce the reader to 
sign, thereby committing him- or herself to the cause.811 Municipal petitions that were not part of 
a mass petitioning movement were rarely printed during this period, except when they were 
circulated to other local governments for consideration and support. Sometimes municipal 
petitions on the same issue used the same wording, but in most cases municipal councils were 
stubbornly independent. There are numerous examples in the Essex and the Leeds and Grenville 
council papers of amendments, emendations, complete revisions, and refusals to join in the 
petitioning efforts of other local governments.812 
 This is not to intimate that municipal petitions were carelessly drafted or that no thought 
was given to their reception. Some municipal corporations petitioned more frequently than 
others, and some were not heard from at all, but for few it seems was petitioning a thoughtless, 
rote exercise. Many gave grounds for the reform promoted. Many ask for a measure of relief in 
the alternative or that some objectionable clause be made permissive rather than replaced 
outright. References to municipalities’ experience in carrying out the law—evidently their 
strongest claim to legitimacy—are common. Drafts of petitions in the Essex and the Leeds and 
                                                          
811 Leys, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” 58. 
812 AO, Essex County Council Fonds, F 1654, documents cited by county name, year, and folder number; United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville Fonds. 
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Grenville council papers show alterations in wording, presumably to make the petition more 
effective. For example, one petition requesting the adoption of an American-style debtor-
protection law shows the word “Canada” crossed out and replaced by “Her Majesty’s 
Dominions,” perhaps to counter an anticipated inference of disloyalty.813 Others tried 
sycophancy, suggesting that better provisions must have been inadvertently overlooked.814 Of 
course, some councils were in fact more ingenuous than disingenuous. One local government 
petitioned for monetary assistance, giving as its sole explanation the argument that progress and 
improvements are expensive.815 Some petitions cite statutes quite professionally, only to refer to 
the wrong section; one is seriously misspelled (in spite of having been transcribed by a 
professional clerk); others ask for action that could not be more clearly ultra vires the 
province.816 
 However, the unsophisticated petitions are decidedly the minority. Most demonstrate the 
sober second thought that the province may have given up in dispensing with a legislative 
council. They point out contradictions and drafting errors and anticipate problems of 
implementation. One such petition refers to a discussion of a proposed provincial bill by a 
committee of the municipal council. The committee report is appended; it goes on for three and a 
half pages and contains thirty-two suggestions, mostly to correct errors of drafting.817 Although 
not all technical and practical ideas of local governments were acted on by the province, in many 
cases the legislature was probably more than pleased to buttress their free-lance drafting talent 
                                                          
813 Essex county council papers, 1869 (3).  
814 This phenomenon was especially prevalent in the petitions on the issue of “equalization.” See, for example, 1869 
(78) and 1870-71 (27). 
815 1869 (755). 
816 See, for example, 1871-72 (388), 1876-77 (1367), 1871-72 (102). Of course, confederation was still a recent 
event and it might well be that the new division of powers was apt to slip the mind. 
817 1871-72 (105). 
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with the eagle eyes of municipal politicians.818 Not to mention those of the local governments’ 
civil servants—the correspondence of the united counties of Leeds and Grenville indicates that 
many of the practical problems that the council eventually brought to the legislature’s attention 
had been originally pointed out by their clerk or treasurer.  As has been remarked of the much-
maligned lobbyists of the American Gilded Age, the councillors and their staff simply knew 
more about their interests and could not but be influential as a result.819 For their part, municipal 
governments and their employees seem to have been very aware of the legislative agenda. 
Petitions refer to proposed bills, bills presently before the House, the “usual Notices,” and even 
bills presented in a “hurried manner” before the municipality could act.820 Most petitions seem to 
have been forwarded by mail, and a short time might lapse between the resolution of a council on 
an issue and the presenting of the petition to the legislature.821 
 Generally business-like and to the point, municipal petitions still resonate with the code-
words of their framers’ time and place. It was not necessary to indulge in the purple prose found 
in the printed mass petitions to convey a sense of the values shared by the petitioners and their 
audience. As one might expect, municipal petitions advert to a shared belief in liberty, progress, 
development, and Christianity, as well as lesser virtues of convenience, efficiency, economy, and 
necessity. Interestingly, the value appealed to most often is justice; “arbitrary” was the dirtiest 
word in the municipal politician’s lexicon. To state that a particular state of affairs or legal 
process was unjust was often all that municipal politicians seem to have felt obliged to say in 
asking for legislative action, whether the matter was “public” or “private.” 
                                                          
818 1876-77 (1029), 40 Vic. c.17 s.40. 
819 A phenomenon now known as ‘capture,’ but not a new one: Thompson and Sibley, “Historical Research,” 713.  
820 See, for example, 1868-69 (785). 
821 For example, 1869 (883), 1868-69 (783, 797), 1868-69 (896), 1875 (59). 
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 Aside from formal protestations of humility, the tone of municipal petitions is rarely 
deferential and often blunt. Some local governments “recommend” various changes in the law, 
giving no reasons; presumably they felt the weight of their stated opinions was sufficient. One 
local government saw fit to lecture the assembly in an almost condescending manner: “The 
abolition of the said [local improvement] fund [is] at variance with the well understood principle 
of British Legislation [of] which we look on you as the guardians, and to which we believe it to 
be your desire ever to define; namely the respect for the vested rights of the subject.”822 
 We can surmise that other segments of the community considered that municipal councils 
had influence with the legislature from their use of the councils as launching pads for their own 
lobbying efforts. The council papers of the County of Essex, for instance, contain submissions 
from residents to be forwarded to the legislature under the aegis of the county council. Most 
municipal petitions filed with the legislature on the subject of railways are of this type. Some 
petitions explicitly state that the council is acting as the agent for others. The series of petitions 
concerning the de-legalization of midwifery by the Ontario Medical Act, for instance, almost all 
state that “application has been made to the council” on the question.823 
 No doubt the imprimatur of an elected group was considered to add legitimacy, especially 
in the case of commercial ventures. Clearly, the local member of the provincial parliament was 
not the only avenue of representation to the legislature recognized by contemporaries. However, 
the petitions in themselves provide insufficient evidence to determine whether councils were 
lobbied in lieu of or in addition to the member or regional power broker.824 This is not to suggest 
                                                          
822 1869 (724). 
823 1876-77 (89), for example. The Ontario Medical Act petitions, though hand written, all use the same or similar 
wording; see C. David Naylor, “Rural Protest and Medical Professionalism in Turn of the Century Ontario,” Journal 
of Canadian Studies 21 (1986): 511-37. 
824 Lillian F. Gates, After the Rebellion: The Later Years of William Lyon Mackenzie (Toronto, 1988), 180 ff., 
demonstrates that Mackenzie, while provincial member for Haldimand County, worked in conjunction with the 
county council; this is only one instance and for a slightly earlier period. It seems likely that tandem efforts would 
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that municipal councils were in any way disinterested parties in acting as clearing houses for the 
supplications of others, especially in the case of railways, an interest that has been well 
documented.825 As far as other matters are concerned, it would seem that municipal councillors 
were moved to petition by a perceived benefit or loss to their constituency. There is no evidence 
that one could require the council to submit a petition to the legislature as of right, as one could 
the local provincial member. 
 
Petitions for Private Acts 
It is easier to establish that municipal politicians thought they had influence in obtaining private 
acts, and that they had support for this belief among other sectors of the population, than that the 
belief was well founded. Correlation of private petitions with the statute books reveals 
considerable success, which a perusal of the Journals of the Legislative Assembly indicates was 
also true of other private bill petitions, especially those involving commercial corporations such 
as railways. We cannot, however, conclude that this success was automatic or easy to come by, 
or that it is indicative of power or influence.  
 Many private petitions to “legalize” by-laws not allowed by statute—say, for the raising 
of debentures in order to loan the proceeds to a railway, or to grant a tax exemption “bonus” to a 
manufacturer—were routine applications but not mere corrections ex post facto. The by-law in 
question was scrutinized by the private bill committee to ensure that there had been adequate 
notice and no interests were injuriously affected. If these criteria were met, the bill passed 
                                                          
depend on considerations of party or other power relationships. See also Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers, especially 
chapters 12 and 13. Noel contends that party structure at this time was still essentially a coalition of factions and 
interests. 
825 See inter alia, Ken Cruikshank, Close Ties: Railways, Government and the Board of Railway Commissioners, 
1851-1933 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991). 
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without problems. Other types of private petition as well seem to have been commonly granted 
as long as they were not opposed. Where a municipal project did meet opposition, the request 
was occasionally denied. The committee does not seem to have counted noses, whether corporate 
or individual, in these matters, but no doubt the onus “to prove the preamble” was greater where 
contradictory allegations were raised.826 This function of the private bills committee, though 
perhaps more administrative than either legislative or adjudicative, was still far from automatic. 
In addition to the costs and delay involved in the committee process, success could be prejudiced 
by the legislative context. For example, a petition might pass all preliminary stages, only to have 
to be resubmitted if the assembly prorogued before the bill’s third reading. Such delay could be 
crucial; in their study of the attempts of the City of Toronto to establish waterworks, Douglas 
McCalla and Elwood Jones report that an extra year made the difference between success and 
failure of the proposal when the economy suffered a downturn.827 
 Yet none of these obstacles seems to have aroused any explicit ire from local 
governments, who seem, on the contrary, to have been glad of any attention they could muster 
from the legislature. There is no hint of agitation for general enabling legislation or a simplified 
procedure, repeal of the watch-dog provisions, or attempts to circumvent the process. Ontario did 
not experience the scandals and ensuing procedural and substantive restrictions on the private 
bill process which occurred in many of the United States at this time.828 Rather, local 
governments seem to have preferred to have an unquestionable legislative stamp of approval for 
their various schemes, however onerous the process. Any doubt as to jurisdiction could reduce 
the value of municipal debentures, as several petitions candidly admit. Moreover, if a scheme 
                                                          
826 For example, the petition of the City of Toronto to establish gasworks: 1874 (244). 
827 Jones and McCalla, “Toronto Waterworks 1849-77,” 300-23. 
828 See Hurst, The Growth of American Law, 229, 242. 
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failed, advance approval might forestall legislative retribution in the form of the stringent debt 
consolidation acts that were the legacy for some local governments of the crash of 1857.829 
 It was perhaps considered better to make a trip—or several—to the private bills 
committee than to deal with courts at any level. There appears at least one instance wherein a 
local government, a party to a matter already before the courts, sought a guaranteed outcome by 
legislative fiat (possibly facilitated by the fact that the warden was also a provincial member).830 
Usually, however, the two legal avenues were not mutually exclusive and often intertwined. The 
County of York, for example, for years tried to separate from judicial union with Toronto to 
avoid subsidizing Toronto’s busy justice administration. Only days after one such petition, they 
withdrew from the battle, explaining in a supplementary petition that it was preferable to put up 
with the situation than invite litigation, presumably on the question of a judicial accounting, by 
pressing for new legislation.831 
 About seven out of ten of the private petitions from municipal corporations seem to have 
been successful. In pondering this level of success, it is important to keep in mind that a high rate 
of success for the instigators of legal proceedings is axiomatic.832 Few will push a losing case, 
especially if there are significant costs involved. Private bills faced both fixed and variable 
expenses; in addition, there is evidence that lawyers or parliamentary agents were involved in at 
                                                          
829 The bankruptcies of numerous communities, and the legislative responsibility therefore, have been chronicled by 
several historians. For a detailed account see Shortt, "Municipal History, 1791-1914," 442-52. It was perhaps due to 
former laxity in matters of municipal indebtedness that the legislature was careful in the amendment of these acts. 
830 The council of the City of Kingston accused the provincial member, also warden of the County of Frontenac, of 
introducing a colorable, retroactive bill to prejudice the rights of the city in pending litigation with the county in the 
Court of Common Pleas: 1867-68 (893). In his study Close Ties, Ken Cruikshank notes that the County of Simcoe, 
though armed with favourable legal opinions, preferred to lobby the federal government (albeit fruitlessly) rather 
than proceed to the Court of Appeal (35). 
831 1870-71 (290, 294). 
832 This is not always recognized by legal historians. See for example Tony A. Freyer, “Law and the Antebellum 
Southern Economy: An Interpretation,” in Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the South, ed. David K. 
Bodenhamer and James W. Ely (Jackson, Miss., 1984). Aside from the petitions requesting aid, which I have not 
investigated, about seven out of ten private petitions seem to have been successful. 
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least some, and probably many, of these private petitions.833 It being their function to anticipate 
and avoid obstacles and defeat, professional advice in advance may have been a factor in the 
composition of submissions. The care in drafting, characteristic of the municipal petitions 
generally, is especially marked in the private petitions.  Reasons and circumstances also tend to 
be more plentiful in private than in public petitions. Some local governments seem to have 
assumed that conditions to the relief sought would be imposed and anticipate these in the 
petition.  When asking that power be granted to build a drain or other improvement or detach or 
attach territory, the petitions would usually stipulate that the power would be exercisable only if 
it were the desire of the majority of rate-payers or settlers, expressed either by further petition or 
special poll.       
The occasional private petition gives a glimpse of the line of an argument to be taken at 
the hearing. The village of Clifton (now Niagara Falls) petitioned on several occasions for 
different types of legal privileges to enhance its ability to attract tourists.834 Perhaps as the best 
defense to an expected objection of unwarranted favouritism, one of the Clifton petitions entered 
a spirited offense: “Your petitioners cannot doubt that your Honourable Body would 
unhesitatingly refuse to permit the erection of a tollgate on King Street in Toronto and yet during 
the season of pleasure travel, free and uninterrupted passage up and down Niagara River…is as 
essential to the numerous persons and vehicles using it as is the free and uninterrupted use of 
King Street to the citizen of Toronto and the strangers who visit it.”835 The fact that private 
petitions/bills/acts tend to be reasoned, explicit, specific, and limited suggests that it may have 
                                                          
833 See 1871 (82), 1875-76 (194). Jones and McCalla state that Toronto council sought “expert legal advice at every 
stage” of a private petition, “Toronto Waterworks, 1847-77,” 304. There is also the indirect evidence of ‘legal’ 
paper, legal wording, and elegant calligraphy not found in the public petitions. 
834 Such as license to hack cabs, etc. 1873 (441), against suspension bridge 1867-68 (464), against tollgate 1869 
(385). 
835 1867 (385). 
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been well known that the legislature and courts would not suffer any general or expansive 
delegation of authority by which a local government would be able to modify its legal 
environment without continual supplication for the variation of every detail. 
 Given the trouble taken to achieve success for a private petition, the failures take on 
greater significance. It may be that some were not intended to succeed. A historian of the 
political manoeuvrings of the leather industry in Elizabethan England has observed that some 
attempts to obtain private legislation were clearly tactical exercises undertaken to publicise an 
issue, test the waters, or drum up support.836 Absent intensive research into the proceedings of 
individual councils, one can only speculate as to internal political considerations that may have 
directed the issuing of a petition for which there was little likelihood of success. It seems likely 
that in such cases the private petitions would, if possible, be framed so as to be classified as 
public (as was the case with the Elizabethan leather lobby), to minimize expenses. 
 The Journals show that private petitions were often withdrawn. Sometimes a withdrawn 
petition would be resubmitted, sometimes not. Many petitions seem to have been filed, never to 
be referred to again. In other cases, a petition resulting in an un-enacted bill might be resubmitted 
year after year. Perhaps this was a result of inexpert drafting, or perhaps of calculation by the 
corporate solicitor or insistence by the private bills committee that the latter would require 
frequent opportunities to review the situation before allowing extensions. Such resubmissions 
were customary where additional credit was requested. For example, the Town of Peterborough 
had its debt consolidation act amended eight times from 1867 to 1877. Four of these amendments 
were to enable the petitioners to raise money. As a municipality with a poor financial record, 
Peterborough required government approval to do anything more than pay current expenses and 
                                                          




into the sinking fund. In each case, the legislature allowed funds to be raised, on condition that 
they be used only for the stipulated purpose. Several of the other occasions must have been more 
annoying as undeserved. In 1868, for instance, the Peterborough trustees, who managed the 
money, were not unanimous; an amendment had to be obtained to allow the majority to act. The 
next year the amendment had to be submitted again. Because of an oversight, a clause had been 
included that had actually been voted down by council. In neither case were fees remitted.837 
 At least Peterborough eventually got what it asked for. Other urban centres were less 
fortunate. Like Peterborough, the Ottawa council was forced to keep returning, five times on the 
subject of waterworks and twice on an application to widen Broad Street. The waterworks acts 
were amended each time (again without remission of fees), but the Broad Street submissions 
were rejected on both occasions.838 Toronto City Council was defeated on three occasions. A bid 
to authorize gas works was lost after a petition was filed in opposition.839 A petition to separate 
Toronto from York county judicially because union was “so much trouble”—Toronto had 
apparently been converted to York’s point of view—was withdrawn at the bill stage, and in the 
1876-77 session the city’s petition to change the names of several streets was withdrawn and fees 
refunded.840 A request to sell certain land unsuitable for a park was permitted, but only on the 
condition that the proceeds be used for a park fund.841 Of all the major urban centres, only 
Hamilton seems to have been granted every piece of legislation it sought during these years, at 
least respecting the city proper. But an impassioned plea by Hamilton council to deny the Erie 
and Niagara Railway Extension, which they argued would seriously impair Hamilton’s 
                                                          
837 1867-68 (83), 1868-69 (68), 1969 (3, 19, 58), 1871-72 (8), 1974 (35, 91). 
838 1873 (144), 1874 (6), petition of Canada Central Railway, 1874 (93), 1876-77 (166). It would appear that the 
Ottawa council had run counter to a railway company with more clout. 
839 1874 (244). 
840 1871-72 (189), 1875-76 (163), 39 Vic. c.62; Sydere, General Index to the Journals, 173, 149; 1867-68 (443). 
841 1873 (494); Kingston’s first attempt to be allowed to mortgage its market property was “reported adversely” by 
the private bills committee, though the next year saw the act pass; 1867-68 (397), 1867-68 (42), 32 Vic. c.15.  
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investments in the Grand Trunk, and from their perspective no doubt the most crucial of all their 
petitions, was an exercise in futility.842 
 Nor did rural municipalities have everything their own way. Unlike their urban 
counterparts, rural municipalities tended to petition more for public legislation that would apply 
to all municipalities of a certain class. As well as the costs, there are other factors that may have 
been involved in this phenomenon. Undoubtedly it was more difficult to prove special 
circumstances that could justify a private act for many of the rural municipalities’ desires, if only 
because they were more numerous than the urban centres. Perhaps as well rural councils felt the 
legislature would not allocate time to reforms that would affect a limited group number of people 
or give an advantage for which there was no rational basis. It is hardly remarkable that an appeal 
by the County of York, framed as a private petition—that is, to apply only to York—to allow it 
to regulate weights and measures was denied.843 
 “Restructuring,” for want of a better term, made up an important segment of the local 
governments’ private petitions.844 Included in this category are petitions for and against 
annexation, changes in riding division, new provisional counties, “dismemberment” of old 
counties, separation of unions of townships, electoral and registration division, and judicial 
unions. These were topics that also seriously concerned individual ratepayers and gave rise to 
petitions from a number of informal groups as well as municipal councils. The legislature 
became the forum for conflict in almost every such instance, as any redistribution would affect 
tax bases and expenses, not to mention (as many petitions do) the inconvenience of a longer ride 
to the registry office or county town. Often a petition would not even be filed for a restructuring 
                                                          
842 1867-68 (433). 
843 1868-69 (8). 
844 Exceeded only by railways.  
291 
 
before petitions were flooding in against it. Quick off the mark once the obligatory notices were 
published, local governments did not hesitate to advance their position with more than one 
petition to the same effect.  
Municipalities were simply unable to ignore each other, though they may have wished 
they could. Boundaries had to be adjusted, boundary roads, bridges, and canals erected and 
maintained, and accounts settled respecting separation, shared jails, registry offices, houses of 
refuge, high schools, and other shared institutions and services. These gave rise to disputes 
ending up in court, in the private bills committee, or both. Indeed, one public issue on which 
several municipalities petitioned with success was a provision for arbitration of disputes about 
ditches to obviate the need for continual resort to the courts.845 That municipalities competed for 
the attention and favours of the government is not surprising. As the secondary literature reveals, 
urban centres in particular were in competition for everything.846 The private petitions also 
exhibit the “booster” tendency existing among the rural municipalities, although not always 
directly in their own behalf. It should not be forgotten that the immediate hinterland could have 
as much to gain by the process of metropolitanizing as the metropolis. Thus, Middlesex County 
petitioned vigorously for London to be awarded a normal school, while the London Council 
remained silent on the issue.847 
 It may be that the London Council felt petitioning for a normal school unnecessary due to 
their political connections, or useless for the same reason. It is impossible to do more than 
speculate on the influence of party and partisanship in the private bill process without going 
further behind the face of the record. But it is hard to suppose that party politics did not dictate 
                                                          
845 For example, 1874 (265), An Act Respecting Ditching Water-courses, 38 Vic. c.26 (1874). 
846 Artibise and Linteau offer a useful compilation and critique of these works in The Evolution of Urban Canada. 
847 1874 (213). 
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victory or defeat for many of these private petitions, especially those that sought a “boon;” his 
biographer recounts the enraged reaction of Conservative premier John Sandfield Macdonald 
when the municipal council of Strathroy, which had returned a Liberal provincial member, 
importuned him to choose their town as the site of a new provincial prison.848 Teaford’s study of 
special (private) legislation states that local legislation was left in the hands of the “local 
delegation” in most states, but it is likely that under the Canadian system, the cabinet would have 
had much more of a say in decisions regarding private as well as public bills.849  
 
Public Petitions 
American legal historian Morton Horwitz, writing of the public/private distinction, states that 
“[o]ne of the central goals of nineteenth-century legal thought was to create a clean separation” 
between the two.850 The rules of the legislature made the distinction; the separation, however, is 
less clear when we look at the petitions themselves. Often the petition seems to be requesting a 
change in the general law but is actually seeking a specific exemption. It is not uncommon to 
find a statement such as the following: “Please amend the Municipal law to allow your 
petitioners to grant a bonus and to make legal debentures issued notwithstanding acts to the 
contrary,” the subject of one petition by the Town of St. Catharines.851 Since the town was a 
regular petitioner, the councillors of St. Catharines would probably have known this request 
would go through the private bills committee; either “the Municipal Law” and the law pertaining 
                                                          
848 Bruce W. Hodgins, John Sandfield Macdonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 89 ff. 
849 Teaford, “Special Legislation and the Cities,” 193.  
850 Morton Horwitz, “The History of the Public/Private Distinction,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130 
(1982): 1423-8. 
851 1871-72 (24). 
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to St. Catharines were regarded as one and the same, or the council was trying to avoid the 
private bills costs and procedure by fudging the distinction—possibly both. 
 Similarly, a number of “public” petitions contain a claim for exclusive relief in the 
alternative, such as the appeal by one township: “your petitioners view with alarm any attempt 
by legislation to deprive parties of rights which they have acquired under the existing 
laws….[We] pray the bill not pass or if it does please except the township of Smith.”852 This plea 
may not be as naïve as it first appears. Many of the public statutes touching areas of municipal 
jurisdiction or responsibility contain schedules setting out different categories of status or 
selection. Any change in electoral boundaries, or in the location of a registry office would 
therefore be to the general law, although it stretches the imagination to think of these as 
particularly public (in the legal sense), in that they obviously affected only a small, discrete part 
of the population. Indeed, a request for an exemption simpliciter, or any change to the schedule 
of a public act would be an amalgam, beginning as a private petition, but not resulting in a 
private act. According to Hurst, this was a common ploy in the United States after abuses and 
scandals resulted in the passage of procedural and substantive restrictions on private and local 
acts in Congress and many states.853 Aside from the increase in fees over the ten-year period 
reviewed, no comparable developments occurred in Ontario, perhaps partly because the British 
rules of parliament already contained many of the reforms Hurst notes, such as publication, 
publicity, and readings of bills before enactment. 
 It is telling that the various petitions asking for aid for the victims of the fire that 
devastated the County of Carleton in 1870 were classified as private, although their real thrust is 
an implicit demand that a “private” matter be considered “public.” Interestingly, Carleton did not 
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853 Hurst, Growth of American Law, 232. 
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appeal to the province itself, or at least not by means of a petition to the legislative assembly. 
Rather, the council approached other communities for help. Whether those communities that did 
petition the legislature themselves contributed is not clear from the petitions, but research in the 
area indicates that inter-community aid in cases of fire loss was a standard practice.854 Passing 
the charitable buck to the province may have been a factor in the fire aid campaign, as local 
governments were always looking for means to economize. This does not detract from the 
sincerity or cogency of the argument that private disasters are a public problem, and that it is 
“just” to spread the burden imposed by acts of God as widely as possible.  
 Such correspondence and cooperation between municipalities seems to have been fairly 
common. Occasionally, as in the case of the London normal school noted above, one 
municipality might have a stake in another’s private project. More often, solidarity was solicited 
by means of printed invitations to join in petitioning on a “public” issue. Interestingly, if the 
members of the recipient council were in agreement, they were asked not to subscribe to a single 
document but rather to send a separate request. At the beginning of this period, although printed 
form letters of supplication were sent, the recipient municipality was left to do its own drafting 
of the petition, even if it decided to copy the originator’s words, as many did, sometimes making 
slight amendments or deletions. By 1877, more fill-in-the-blank printed forms were being 
circulated. Some local governments still preferred to amend the form to make their own 
contributions. This was probably a futile gesture, as the petition was generally marked “to the 
same effect” by the clerk and filed with the group without note being taken of any changes.  
 It is difficult to tell whether participation in a concentrated group effort added to the 
ultimate success of a measure or whether chances were enhanced or diminished by standard form 
                                                          
854 See Weaver and de Lottinville, “The Conflagration and the City.’ 
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or more contemplative hand-drafted efforts.855 Many municipal corporations in Ontario during 
this period filed at least one petition on the question of tax exemptions in one form or the other, 
to little effect. Eventually a select committee was set up to study the issue, but a thorough 
revision did not take place until the early 1880s. Perhaps, as has been suggested, such petitions 
created a climate for later reform.856 One specific exemption for civil servants that particularly 
raised the ire of the local governments of Ottawa and Toronto was repealed after only a few 
petitions over a few years.857 Nor does persistence seem to have been a determining factor. The 
County of Huron petitioned again and again for statutory permission to use statute labour to clear 
snow from the roads, and the County of Middlesex continued to harangue against the need for a 
grand jury (with some help from other counties and the bench as well), both only to be totally 
ignored; neither question even meriting a discussion in house or committee as far as I can 
ascertain.858  
 Needless to say, many solo attempts by local governments to change public acts also fell 
on deaf ears. It is probably not surprising that some of the more daring efforts—to pay county 
wardens a salary, to prohibit traction engines on highways, to prevent the obstruction of streams 
by mills and factories, or to set up public fire insurance—did not prosper, but neither did many 
milder requests.859 Petitions for the power to permit the owner of an impounded animal to 
redeem it before sale, to allow a separate ballot for every office to be filled at municipal 
                                                          
855 Most of the earlier exemption petitions are handwritten; the later ones are printed specifically for use by the 
municipalities. The earlier form petitions were designed for individuals and had to be adapted for completion by a 
corporation. 
856 Eleanor Barnes and Danguole Jaczapavicius, Select Committees of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario: A 
Checklist of Reports (Toronto, 1983), 13-14. The authors report that Oliver Mowat, then premier and attorney 
general, suggested that the petitions did not accurately reflect public opinion. A select committee was set up in 1878. 
The next year, a second select committee analyzed the answer to a questionnaire sent by the first committee. This 
process the authors claim created a “climate for reform.” 
857 32 Vic. c.27 s.9.  
858 1875-76 (8); 1876-77 (1069); 1867-68 (425), 1868-69 (200), 1870-71 (50), 1871-72 (26, 28).  
859 1869 (843); 1871-72 (303); 1868-69 (798); 1871-72 (107). 
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elections, and to use statute labour for sidewalks, among others, were also ignored despite their 
apparent innocuousness.860 
 One might ask why local governments bothered to ask for such powers, rather than just 
carrying them out on their own, as it seems unlikely that the provincial government would mind 
any of this latter group of activities, or even discover them. One likely answer is that local 
governments were wary of potential court challenges by ratepayers or defeated candidates as to 
misuse of funds or electoral impropriety. The court reports are full of such cases; litigation seems 
to have been used often in local government power struggles. Local governments were also 
sensitive to the legal “doubts” that might threaten their credit. Perhaps municipal politicians were 
legally, as well as economically, conscious and conscientious. Their unsuccessful crusade by 
petition to reinstate the free distribution of statutes seems to point to such a mixture of 
motives.861 
 Whether or not they were ultimately successful, these called-for amendments to the 
public law attest to the fact that, outwardly comprehensive and permissive as it seems, the 
Baldwin Act had hardly given municipalities the comprehensive latitude for self-government 
claimed by Taylor. If the above examples seem somewhat trivial, consider some weightier 
requests. St. Catharines petitioned to be able to acquire cemeteries by compelling the owner to 
sell at a price to be fixed by arbitration.862 A singularly image-conscious and aggressive town, St. 
Catharines also asked twice that councils be allowed the power to plant shade trees and compel 
property owners to contribute to and maintain them.863 Several municipalities, led by Toronto, 
                                                          
860 1875-76 (171); 1876-77 (1105); 1873 (691). 
861 1870-71 (24, 32, 42, 144, 260, 315); 1871-71 (39); 1876-77 (1085, 1086). A provincial clerk seems to have felt 
these petitions were for aid rather than to change policy; the two latter petitions are marked to this affect. 
862 1873 (691). 
863 1871-71 (79); 1873 (691). 
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wanted municipal corporations to be able to initiate drainage projects without waiting for a 
ratepayers’ petition.864 Kingston twice petitioned to change the municipal act to allow councils to 
regulate (and charge license fees of) butchers operating outside the market.865 None of these 
petitions achieved its object during the years surveyed. 
 Because a private petition was prerequisite to a private act, there is a clear, if not 
necessarily consequential, relation between them. A public petition, on the other hand, could 
easily have been of little or no effect, even if an analogous measure was eventually passed, and it 
is tempting to sneer at the idea of a hamlet seriously petitioning on affairs of state. Indeed, 
Donald Akenson, in his study of nineteenth-century rural life, The Irish in Ontario, denigrates 
the petition of one council to the imperial parliament on the advisability of confederation.866 The 
particular petition, of course, is in hindsight insignificant, but had potential for impact in 
conjunction with others. The fact that the council thought it worth the bother speaks as much to 
their perception of their role as of their self-importance. Indeed, the number of public petitions to 
the Ontario legislature indicates that many councillors considered the exercise worthwhile, if 
only to add an additional democratically legitimated voice to one side or another of an on-going 
debate. 
 Not all public petitions concerned lofty matters, and it is easier to see the more 
commonplace efforts as sincere attempts at legal change. Several local governments petitioned 
for power to invest funds from the municipal loan and land improvement funds for educational 
purposes; they were successful, although not until there had been several years’ agitation on the 
                                                          
864 1875-76 (124); 1876-77 (421, 679, 1108). 
865 1874-75 (108); 1875-76 (72). 
866 Akenson, The Irish in Ontario, 210. 
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point.867 Other petitions led to municipal powers to trespass on property to combat the spread of 
the Canada thistle.868 An amendment to the Joint Stock Roads Companies Act met petitioners’ 
pleas for the power to confiscate roads and tolls if the company breached its covenant to 
maintain a certain standard of repair.869 On most questions of municipal structure and technical 
problems, such as changing the time for assessment, collection, and tax appeal to the courts, the 
legislature seems to have been extremely responsive to the much-vaunted experience of local 
councils. Indeed, most of the yearly amendments to the municipal and assessment acts appear to 
have originated with municipal petitions. The few exceptions, such as the refusal of the 
legislature to reinstate the election of mayors by council, or allow the division of townships into 
wards, seems as likely to have been the result of disagreement among municipalities as to reflect 
government policy.870 
 In some cases of widespread disagreement among municipalities, the legislature chose 
the local option alternative. One such case was the amendment of the Dog Tax and Sheep 
Protection Act in 1865-1866, the subject of considerable petitioning during the first few years 
after confederation.871 Under the original scheme, all dog owners were to be taxed by the 
municipality to provide a fund out of which the owners of injured sheep would be reimbursed, 
                                                          
867 For example, 1868-69 (36); 1870-71 (25); 1874 (291, 427). The act was amended in 1875-76 (39 Vic. c.4) to 
allow investment in education, sectional bonuses or fire engines.  
868 For example, 1874 (33); 32 Vic. c.42. 
869 1871 (12), 1873 (2); 1867-68 (569); 35 Vic. c.33; 36 Vic. c.41. 
870 K. W. McKay, “Municipal History, 1867-1913” in Canada and Its Provinces vol. 17 Ontario, ed. A. Shortt and 
A.G. Doughty (Toronto: (Toronto: Brook and Co., 1914), 457-61, also 1867-68 (415) and 1868-69 (456), but 1873 
(81) and 1874-75 (96) inter alia, contra. For a discussion of the “regress” and progress of municipal democracy, see 
Jarvis, “Mid-Victorian Toronto: Panic, Policy and Public Response.” 
871 The Municipal Acts had allowed a tax on dogs at a township’s discretion. By An Act to Impose a Tax on Dogs 
and for the Better Protection of Sheep, 29 & 30 Vic. c.55, the legislature set up a compulsory default insurance 
scheme, whereby the tax on dogs would be held to provide a fund to provide damages for sheep killed by dogs 
whose ownership could not be determined. This was amended in 1868 (32 Vic. 31) to allow municipalities to opt 
out. The scheme was a matter of considerable dispute among municipalities, partly because the funds were collected 
and maintained by the township, but dogs were no respecters of boundaries, and dogs from one township could 
depredate (or be accused of depredation of) a neighbouring jurisdiction; 1867-68 (5) inter alia, but see (162) contra. 
See also Chapter 4. 
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without having to resort to a civil suit against the dog owner (if the owner could be identified) to 
determine the latter’s negligence. Established locales strongly supported the scheme, but the 
local governments and inhabitants of newly settled areas complained that the tax was onerous, 
that settlers needed dogs for protection against wild animals, that careless sheep owners were 
being unfairly subsidized, and that the fund was insufficient to pay damages. A select committee 
report challenged the truth of the last of these charges, but the decision was made to let each 
municipality opt in or out.872 The compromise seems to have satisfied most of the municipalities 
on both sides of the question, but not all: the County of Victoria protested (by petition) that even 
the option was detrimental to sheep farming areas, since dogs from neighboring districts might 
be undeterred.873 
 Another example of resort to local option that did not meet everyone’s expectations was 
the amendment of section 71(2) of the Assessment Act, an issue that also attracted numerous 
petitions throughout this period. By the Assessment Act of 1869, the province had determined 
that in “equalizing” (adjusting) the assessments of its subordinate units, a county was to discount 
the assessments of towns and villages by forty percent.874 The reason for this is unclear, but it 
may have been meant to reflect such shared burdens as streets used by rural ratepayers coming to 
market. Naturally, towns and villages supported this scheme and counties and townships did not. 
The rural element was victorious to an extent, when counties were finally given the discretion to 
discount or not in the 1874 session.875 The next year, however, three counties renewed their plea 
for complete repeal of this section, arguing that the amendment “causes unjust contention, and 
                                                          
872 32 Vic. c.31, 39 Vic. c.30. 
873 1870-71 (92). 
874 33 Vic. c.27. 
875 37 Vic. c.36. 
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occupies time,” with which appeal the legislature did not comply. 876 On this, as on many issues, 
it was simply impossible to satisfy everyone. Feeling as they apparently did that the law was and 
should be in a state of flux, some local governments seem to have taken each reform as a 
challenge to point out new objections. Given this mindset, together with their own institutional 
and political imperatives, it is no wonder that members of the legislature failed to attend to every 
complaint. 
 The amendment of equalization provisions of the Assessment Act can be seen as an 
example of ascendancy of the rural majority over the urban minority, but this was not a universal 
occurrence. Another group of petitioners protested vehemently against the requirement that 
counties maintain bridges over a certain size in incorporated villages, only to have the provision 
changed to favour the villages even further.877 Such an “arbitrary” preference was stigmatized as 
“unjust,” and agitation to revoke the clause continued fitfully throughout the period. 
 The idea that justice consists in equality of treatment in and before the law is a recurrent 
theme in many of the local governments’ attempts at reform of public acts.878 The most coherent 
case of this was the extended fight to repeal tax exemptions. The Assessment Act of 1869 
stipulated twenty-five categories of exemption from tax, including the ill-fated endeavour by the 
government to protect its employees from tax (presumably to save on salaries). Other exemptions 
seem less objectionable to the modern eye: incomes under one hundred dollars, pensions under 
two hundred dollars, incomes of military personnel and the Lieutenant-Governor, clergymen’s 
stipends, manses, churches, and churchyards were all excluded from assessment.879  
                                                          
876 1875-76 (10, 11, 170). 
877 34 and 35 Vic. c.30, 30 Vic. c.48, 37 Vic. c.16. 
878 See Marquis, “Doing Justice to British Justice,” 43-78, 51-53. 
879 32 Vic. c.36. For a discussion of wider consequences of Ontario’s concept of justice at a slightly later date, see 
A.I. Silver, “Ontario’s Alleged Fanaticism in the Riel Affair,” Canadian Historical Review 69 (1988): 21-50. 
301 
 
 At first glance it would seem that the municipalities were simply trying to preserve their 
tax base, and no doubt economic self-interest was a potent consideration, as Ottawa reported one 
million and Toronto four million dollars’ worth of property exempted.880 An impression of 
hypocrisy is introduced when it is observed that several local governments protested the move to 
include a tax on bank stock as personal property, and that several municipalities were also 
petitioning to exempt factories from tax as a “bonus.” Yet to conclude that municipal politicians 
were men of property concerned to protect it (which they were) and pro-business (which they 
were), is to miss a crucial component. For one of the attacked exemptions, which must have 
benefited many of the rural council members as well as their constituents, embraced all income 
and produce derived from and personal property used in farming.881 It would therefore seem that 
when rural municipal politicians argued that those who benefitted from “improvements” and 
services should help pay for them, they were reasonably in earnest. After all, bank stock 
dividends were already taxed as income, and the manufacturers who received bonuses gave value 
for the privilege in the form of conditions, reached through negotiation. Tax exemptions, it 
would seem, were to be available to those who could actually show cause in the public interest: a 
priori class exemptions in perpetuity without regard to circumstance were arbitrary and hence 
anathema in a “free and democratic” society.882 
 In a similar vein, several counties asked unsuccessfully for the discretion to reduce 
mandatory statute labour by those who were not assessable for property tax from two days to 
one, so that laborers could be encouraged to settle in the province. Again, this relief would have 
been adjustable, and the municipality would still be responsible for the shortfall and its 
                                                          
880 1869 (367); 1876-77 (12). 
881 32 Vic. c.36 s.9. 
882 For example, 1875-76 (45). 
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consequences. Justice as equality, then, did not preclude policy distinctions; these were to be 
made not theoretically, but empirically. It is noteworthy that several of the local governments in 
favour of the compulsory dog tax were uncomfortable with the strict liability aspect of the 
system, opining that it would be “more just” if sheep owners were not automatically rewarded 
for losses to which their own negligence might have contributed. Furthermore, they argued, 
sheep owners should have to prove their damages rather than receiving a “premium for 
carelessness.”883 
 The inference that “justice” had substantive as well as rhetorical meaning is borne out by 
an analysis of other public petitions. To take one example, in 1866 the legislature had made it 
mandatory that each county erect a House of Industry and Refuge within two years.884 Several 
counties began to build expeditiously, only to have the government, under pressure from those 
with fewer resources or less good will, make the provision permissive.885 Rather than merely ask 
to be reimbursed or dismantle the facility, the compliant counties asked that the others be again 
compelled to provide for their poor, or at least that the English law of settlement be applied so 
that the costs of providing for the province’s unfortunate would be borne more equitably. The 
County of Brant, which intended to but had not yet started to build a facility, asked that it be 
made mandatory for all counties, so their money would not be expended on those from outside 
their jurisdiction.886 Similarly, when some counties built prisons under a law granting a partial 
subsidy, which was later repealed, counties building later sought, and received, equal grants—no 
more, no less.887 Considering the fragmented tax base, it is little wonder that municipal councils 
                                                          
883 1867-68 (528); 1871-72 (310); 1868-69 (826, 827); 1867-68 (504); 1875-76 (170). 
884 29 Vic. c.12 s.413. 
885 31 Vic. c.12 s.413. 
886 1870-71 (276); 1873 (77). 
887 31 Vic. c.7, 37 Vic. c.31. 
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as trustees of the propertied were wary of freeloaders yet supportive of centralized welfare, such 
as the aforementioned fire aid grant and the ophthalmic hospital. Indeed, the largest number of 
municipal petitions filed on any subject were those praying for provincial support of the latter 
institution.888 
 That saving the ratepayers’ money was not their sole concern is also illustrated by the 
local governments’ attitude toward the reform of the Registry Act. Throughout the decade, 
several counties implored the government to allow payment of registrars by salary rather than by 
fees. The government responded with a sliding scale to limit the registrar’s percentages, which 
left the counties unsatisfied.889 It may be that they contemplated that the provincial government 
would pick up the tab, but the petitions do not even hint at this, and it seems unlikely. When 
gaolers began to be paid by salary during this period, their salaries were provided by the 
county.890 Another possibility, that the counties detected a profit to be made, is also negated by 
the fact that they were simultaneously petitioning to lower the fees charged for the registration 
and searching. Fees for registration, which were fixed by the transaction, not the value of the 
property, would have been hardest on the poorest and especially on those who were frequent 
mortgagors, although speculators would also be affected. 891 
 A campaign for the reform of the laws regarding the Administration of Justice Act and the 
Jury Act, and particularly for the repeal of the grand jury, may have been similarly prompted.892 
                                                          
888 The hospital for the blind (ophthalmic hospital), located in Brantford, was given a measure of provincial support, 
to be in the discretion of the inspector, in 1873: 36 Vic. c.32 s.3. 
889 35 Vic. c.28. 
890 36 Vic. c.48 s.58. Although the counties had to foot the bill, the amount fixed was subject to revision by the 
provincial prison inspectors. 
891 See Gagan, Hopeful Travellers, and more particularly David Gagan, “The Security of Land: Mortgaging in 
Toronto Gore Township, 1835-95,” in Aspects of Nineteenth Century Ontario, ed. F.H. Armstrong et al., 135-53. 
Gagan argues that mortgaging was common as between father and son where no money changed hands, to ensure 
security for the parents and other children. In such a case registration fees would be particularly burdensome as there 
would be no proceeds out of which disbursements could be made. 
892 32 Vic. c.6.  
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The petitions cite the inconvenience to farmers of travel without pay and unnecessary 
attendances at harvesting time. Again, this campaign was only marginally successful, resulting 
only in concessions that travel expenses would be compensated and special jurors would be 
paid.893 There may have been another ulterior motive involved respecting the grand jury, 
however, which may explain the provinces’ reluctance to comply on this point. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the grand jury could be a considerable irritant to the council by reporting adversely on 
the condition of the county prison and requiring the maintenance of lunatics and the “indigent 
sick.”894 On a parallel issue, the government agreed that crown witnesses could be compensated. 
The payments would be shared by province and county, with the county assuming the lion’s 
share.895  
As these concerns remind us, municipal councils had by no means complete control over 
their revenues. Challenges to fiscal autonomy such as the requirement for a Board of Police in 
the larger towns and cities, which transferred power from municipal councils without relieving 
financial obligation, were strenuously, though unsuccessfully opposed.896 One partial exception 
to this succession of losses was the crusade of some local governments against the “grouping 
clause,” by which railway companies were for a while practically able to guarantee themselves a 
bonus by selecting only townships favourable to their cause to hold a vote on the question.897 A 
wave of resentment against this gerrymandering scheme, expressed in concentrated petitioning, 
seems to have resulted in the rescission of the section. The City Council of Toronto, however, 
                                                          
893 32 Vic. c.13, 38 Vic. c.14. 
894 See Chapter 6. 
895 36 Vic. c.13. The county was reimbursed for a third of the extra expense. 
896 36 Vic. c.48, 37 Vic. c.16. 
897 39 Vic. c.26. The “grouping” clause originated in a private act inspecting the Fenelon Falls Railway Company 
(34 Vic. c.43); it entered the Municipal Act in 1873 (36 Vic. c.48) and was repealed the next year (37 Vic. c.16). 
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continued to complain that municipalities were still forced to pay for a poll at a railway’s 
initiative.898  
As S.J.R. Noel has recounted, municipal fiscal issues were extremely delicate and 
momentous in early post-confederation Ontario. His discussion of the Municipal Loan Fund 
portrays a conflict between considerations of public justice and private advantage. Solvent 
municipalities were concerned lest the government grant “unfair” subsidies, whereas from the 
perspective of the insolvent, these was nothing unfair in the province assuming deficits that it 
had implicitly or explicitly countenanced.899 Noel considers the “brokering” of a solution to these 
apparently irreconcilable interests through the Municipal Loan Fund Indebtedness Act of 1873, 
by means of a formula whereby the latter’s debts were underwritten on easy terms and the former 
allowed matching grants, to be one of Premier Oliver Mowat’s greatest triumphs.900 However, 
Noel’s assessment that there were few restrictions attached to the grants is not borne out by a 
series of petitions that followed the act. These petitions asked either that the decision as to 
acceptable expenditures be left entirely to council or set out further desired heads of 
appropriation, most notably schools.901 In the 1875-76 session, the act was duly amended to add 
schools, fire engines, and sectional bonuses to railways to the list, these being only a few of the 
changes requested, and far from the total discretion hoped for by some.902 
 
 
                                                          
898 1874 (154). The council claimed that the city had granted seven hundred dollars in bonuses, complaining that on 
the petition of a few ratepayers they were required to hold a minor election costing sixteen hundred dollars. They 
also wished to require that the by-law not pass by a majority of votes cast but by a majority of all entitled to vote and 
that promoters defray the expenses of the vote. 
899 Noel, Patron, Clients, Brokers, 243-46. Noel is unusual in his recognition of the importance of municipalities at 
this stage of provincial history. 
900 36 Vic. c.47; Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers, 246. 
901 1874 (212, 221, 291, 302, 314, 315, 348, 360, 391, 429, 430). 




For the legal historian, petitions present an opportunity to examine aspects of the legislative 
process that have tended to escape notice. In this chapter I have demonstrated that elected 
members of many Ontario local governments during the decade 1867-77 had no doubts as to 
their prerogative to advocate for legal change as institutions (rather than as individuals), believed 
that it was worth the effort involved, and had decided ideas about what norms that they believed 
the law should embody and the form their legal environment(s) should take. Although extensive 
research would be required to show that any one of these petitions was the cause of ensuing 
legislative changes, it can be said that they enjoyed a problematic degree of success; sufficient to 
fuel the continuing phenomenon, yet uneven, uncertain, possibly expensive, and probably 
frustrating. Because the range of local governments’ activity was great and their interests 
diverse, there are myriad instances and varying degrees of successful and failed petitioning. I 
have concentrated on issues that seem to have had the most significance for those concerned, 
with the exception of education. While often concerned with schools and schooling, on these 
matters the municipal councils took a back seat to the Boards of School Trustees, who generally 
seem to have been the instigators of municipal petitions on school issues. 
 Much remains to be unearthed about post-confederation Ontario local governments and 
their place in legislation and politics. The sheer number of petitions for legal change from 
municipal corporations demonstrates that these entities were far from autonomous. Yet they were 
not without considerable agency. While conscious of frustration, municipal councils had 
confidence in their duty, competence and ability to revise the law through petitioning, which 
does not appear to have been entirely misplaced. Clearly, mid-Victorian Ontario municipalities 
lacked the power to control their legislative environment Teaford finds exhibited by some 
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contemporaneous urban American centres. No doubt this was at least partly due to the more 
highly centralized, executive-dominated governmental structure in Canada West/Ontario. Still, 
internal contradictions likely did much to undermine the effectiveness of municipal councils, as 
their conflicting roles as booster institutions engaged in “private” progress, and as local 
fiduciaries concerned about “public” justice, could not but complicate their authority in the 
legislative process.  Furthermore, municipal agency was undermined by municipal multiplicity: 
the gain of one municipality, or group of municipalities, could be the loss of another, whether the 
issue was public or private. The success of one petition could, and often did, entail the failure of 
others. 
 As for petitions, it is evident that a mode of legislative participation that began as a 
precursor continued during this period as either adjunct or alternative to representative 
democracy. The volume of petitions alone is an indication that the Member of Parliament had not 
replaced the petition as the principal conduit of communication from a governed to governor. 
The evidence that petitions from council were considered to have greater clout than those from 
individuals also indicates that MPPs had competition from municipal councils as the recognized 
representatives of the electorate. Ultimately, though, their lack of (constitutional) legal standing 
meant that their influence would be both indirect and variable.  
The dissonance between municipal councils’ desire for political influence through 
participation in legislative change and the weakness inherent in their non-existent constitutional 
status is perhaps best expressed by the actors involved. Shortly after the end of the period under 
consideration, Leeds and Grenville counties received a circular from the County of Simcoe. The 
relevant text begins with an excerpt from the warden’s opening address of the year: 
As this is the age of progress not only in arts and industries, but also in 
legislation tending to the advancement of the material prosperity of the country, I 
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trust I may be pardoned for introducing the subject…calculated to attract the 
attention of the Province. There are many subjects affecting municipal 
government which the people find some difficulty in forcing upon the attention 
of the Local Legislature, such as assessment, drainage, reclaiming wasted lands, 
agriculture, schools, limitation of municipal indebtedness, protection to 
municipalities having given bounties, extension or contraction of county 
boundaries, discrimination in freight tariff on railways, &c., &c. These subjects 
demand the careful attention of our law makers, and I would suggest that this 
Council propose a general conference of Wardens, to be held annually in 
Toronto, for the purpose of discussing matters of such general public interest, 
and bringing their conclusions before the Government in a practical way. Local 
municipalities would then instruct their Reeves, who at a regular session would 
introduce the subject to the County Council, and their representative, the 
Warden, would thus be able to propose amendments to the Municipal law at the 
general conference. It should be the means of placing the views of the people, 
through their representatives, before the Government, and it would also give the 
Government an opportunity of consulting men of municipal experience on 
proposed amendments.  
 
The Leeds and Grenville council referred the remarks to a select committee, which agreed 
[i]t has been the custom of the Various County councils to the Province to 
petition the Legislature from time to time respecting needed changes in 
Municipal Law, but these petitions representing in most cases the opinion of a 
comparatively small section of the country have often passed unnoticed. But 
your Committee believe that suggestions, emanating from a thoroughly 
representative body composed in a great measure of gentlemen of large 
experience in Municipal matters, would receive from the Government and 
Legislature the most careful consideration.903 
 
 
Whether because other counties were unreceptive, members of the legislative assembly 
jealous of the implied challenge to their position, or the cabinet unwilling to set up an 
organization that could act as a forum for dissent, nothing came of this idea. Local governments 
continued with their petitioning, neither impotent nor omnipotent, not partners in the political 
apparatus, but partakers in the process of legislative change. 
  
                                                          
903 Leeds and Grenville council papers, 1879 (d). Note that cities and separated towns are conspicuous by their 
exclusion from this proposal. 
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion: Law, Autonomy, and Local Government in Canada West/Ontario, 1850-
1880 
 
The local governments of Canada West/Ontario, constituted as municipal corporations under the 
Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, were not ‘autonomous’ during the years 1850-1880.  
Although freed of the provincial government control and constraints on revenue raising that 
marked the predecessor legislation and not yet subject to administrative boards and controls, 
municipal corporations in the thirty years following the proclamation of the Municipal Act were 
bound by law and the legal system. Still, it appears that these institutions of mid-nineteenth 
century Canada West/Ontario low governance had considerable agency, an overall common 
purpose with higher levels of government, an understanding of their importance within the 
system, and some ability to express community norms and affect their legal environment. 
Delegated though it was, there is no doubt that local governments had a great deal of power, at 
least as far as the scope of government is concerned.  Many functions performed by ‘high’ 
governments in the present day, including taxation, health and welfare, the building and 
maintenance of infrastructure, and much social, moral, and environmental regulation, were either 
exclusively or mainly matters for local government in the mid-nineteenth century.   
The historiographic question raised by the literature canvassed in chapter one as to 
whether the Baldwin Act was designed more to bring (a limited) democracy to the community 
level, or to facilitate economic growth as part of a provincial or imperial agenda promotes a 
false, perhaps an irrelevant, dichotomy.  There is certainly evidence in the ‘must’ and ‘may’ 
clauses in the Municipal Act, 1849 to support both points of view. However, the two goals were 
never at odds. Since the settler population was likely to support market expansion and economic 
growth in its own interests, the empowerment of elected local governments could be expected to 
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serve that goal, as well as to be an end in itself from the viewpoint of liberal political philosophy.  
But the immediate hopes and intentions intention(s) of the designers aside, the act clearly had a 
deeper legal-structural purpose. As the commission set up in the late 1880s to report on 
municipal government put it, the act was a “Municipal Magna Charta.”904 Much like the BNA 
act, it was not to be a compendium of all relevant structural law for all time, or even its own 
time, but was a ‘who does what’ practical constitution for low governance.  
As I observe in Chapter 1, the act and its successors provided a jurisdictional framework 
for low governance and administration, with some prompting as to appropriate agenda, 
augmented by collateral legislation and tweaked by frequent amendments.  It is tempting but 
impossible to discern a linear pattern showing that these expanded or contracted local 
government autonomy. Changes followed the template of particularity, and therefore often just 
expanded the subjects of possible government action, rather than the degree of freedom with 
which these could be pursued. The residual POGG-type provision included in the 1849 act could 
have provided a statutory basis for expanding local government power at a municipality’s 
initiative, but the clause was short lived. On the other hand, the change in control of police 
boards a statutory change appeared to start a decline in one aspect of municipal autonomy, but 
was reversed after a few years.905 The concept of autonomy presumes a primary binary 
relationship between the community and the province but the acts make it clear that the most 
immediate inter-governmental relationships, and those that were expected to cause conflict for 
local governments, were between municipalities of the same or different tiers, and between 
municipalities and other low law/low government entities.  Thus more power to the local 
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community—whether of immunity or initiative—would necessarily affect and perhaps diminish 
the autonomy of other units.   
The drafters of the Municipal Acts attempted to mediate these conflicts by arbitrary rules, 
but also anticipated that further mediation would be necessary by means of the judicial system 
and arbitration. To say that the Municipal Act was a low constitution is not to suggest it was 
without direction. It is true that the act gave a new fiscal freedom to municipal councils, and for 
the most part suggested, rather than insisted on, matters on which property taxes could be spent.  
In this sense there was room for local government agency. But there was clearly little autonomy. 
Even in the facilitative sections, it is evident that the options of municipal councils were legally 
constrained, both as to subject, and by means of internal and external conditions. A number of 
‘powers’ were limited by the wording of the clauses that set them out, by adjectives and adverbs 
that could invite judicial second-guessing of council decisions. Others, especially those with a 
monetary aspect, included pre-requisite and co-requisite conditions such as recitals, notice, 
initiating process by specified ratepayer petitions, together with process for objection. Because 
the corporation was a ‘person,’ an entity separate from the ratepayers it represented, one or a 
group of ratepayers had many avenues to stymie corporate plans.  
As for the mandatory clauses, the provincial priorities associated with economic 
development, such as the maintenance of such infrastructure entrusted by the acts to the 
municipality, are discernible throughout the act. Just as central to development were the 
requirements for compulsory participation in the province’s information gathering process, given 
extra impetus by personal penalties on clerks for non-compliance, and less directly the more 
general duties relating to honest and efficient administration. As well, some specific duties were 
set out by the education, registry and other acts that centred on other agencies of low law.  The 
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expenses of these, over which the municipal councils were given no control or input, were 
charged to the locality. As well as the quasi-criminal liability by means of fines and 
imprisonment placed on the municipal officers and politicians, all mandatory tasks were 
supported by civil forfeiture against the corporations. Sheriffs were specifically empowered by 
the statute to execute judgments against the ‘private’ property of the corporation. Also key in this 
regard was the ability of the province to withhold funds due a municipality from its share of the 
clergy reserves fund. In addition, references to mechanisms of judicial review punctuate the 
statutes; municipal corporations were answerable to the province both directly and indirectly. 
 The reported cases as a whole and the three subsets examined in Chapter 3 support the 
conclusion that judicial oversight, while random and rare, at least at the high court levels reflected 
by the case reports, was a threat to municipal autonomy that was always to be anticipated. Of 
course, municipalities could and did invite judicial intervention themselves, although at least at 
the high court level they were far more likely to be defendants. Municipalities persisted with their 
own claims most often against other corporations, either powerful commercial corporations such 
as railways, or other municipal corporations or Boards of School Trustees with their own 
legitimacy and public standing. Judges might sympathize with councils over the threats to 
community funds and the problems attendant on climate, geography, poor legislative drafting and 
conflicts with other low institutions, but they remained vigilant against error, whether ingenuous 
or disingenuous, and conflicts of interest.  
By the prerogative writ of mandamus, ratepayers or other parties could employ the power 
of the state to force municipalities to fulfil their obligations. The remedy had originally been an 
individual one, and the institutional character of the municipalities, and also the democratic 
legitimacy of elected councils, did give rise at first to some trepidation on the part of judges who 
313 
 
would have preferred the use of criminal procedure in road maintenance cases and the protection 
provided by viva voce evidence and juries in civil cases. However, they adjusted, going so far as 
to ease standards to make the remedy easier to obtain as time went by, and often gave unsuccessful 
complainants advice on how to better their chances, on the likely assumption that the applications 
were but one salvo in a lengthier political struggle. 
The right of ratepayers and others to bring actions to ‘quash’ by-laws for illegality was a 
second mechanism whereby municipal action could be thwarted, or at least, scrutinized. From the 
outset the courts made it clear that no amount of democratic clout would be allowed to prevail over 
the rights of an individual to rely on the rule of law, at least in theory. In most cases courts preferred 
certainty, but they could not escape the fiscal disaster that quashing a money by-law could have, 
so were less stringent in such cases, while still taking care to warn municipalities that even if they 
did not quash the by-law, ratepayers could still raise civil challenges. The quashing cases 
demonstrate that efforts by municipal councils to extend their jurisdiction and autonomy were rare. 
A few attempts were made to counteract the rules against conflict of interest and self-dealing, but 
otherwise municipal councils seem to have been uninterested in pushing their statutory limits, 
although the town of Clifton did try to use the short-lived ‘general power’ to deal with unlicensed 
tourism entrepreneurs. This kind of specific increase in power, along with the ability to provide 
tax exemptions for manufacture, would be left to the legislature to accommodate. Also in 
opposition to municipal autonomy was the increasing willingness of the courts to use their 
discretion to look beyond the lack of errors on its face to void a by-law by reason of deficiencies 
in the ‘extraneous factors’ of the by-legislative process. Also marked—more so by the end of the 
period—was a judicial preference for the protection of the public purse over the rights of council 
to make financial choices on behalf of their constituency. However, while they were distrustful of 
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municipal councils, the high courts, especially when under the leadership of Chief Justice Robert 
Harrison, also showed little deference to the legislature, for example choosing to protect their own 
power to scrutinize and disallow municipal action, allowing common law values such as the 
‘liberty of the subject’ to trump the provincial priorities of temperance, and publicly criticizing the 
legislature for errors in drafting that caused problems for municipalities and other parties.  
The cases in which a municipality was sued for liability for damages to persons or property 
arising from negligence or nuisance were complicated by the involvement of a jury, and the reports 
make clear that juries were more apt to be generous to plaintiffs than were judges. Still, even in 
cases where juries decided in favour of plaintiffs, awards were often reduced on appeal. The fact 
that the liability cases, although relatively few, were considered legally significant is attested to by 
the length of the decisions, and the inclusion of similarly lengthy dissents and the volume of case 
law cited and considered especially foreign law, all of which was unusual for municipal cases. 
Courts allowed the common law to augment municipal responsibility, but not to excuse it (with 
the exception of the concept of notice). Whatever the legal standard of causation, proximate cause 
or contributory negligence the courts decided on, they still made it clear that only the most 
‘eligible’ plaintiffs could expect benevolence from the bench. Also relevant were local conditions: 
longer established, richer municipalities were expected to meet a higher standard of road repair, a 
standard that rose over time with the development of the province. The fact that roads had 
economic importance seems to have been an unspoken factor; no situational excuses or 
requirements were allowed for sidewalks, which were viewed as an amenity, not a necessity.   
The mandamus, quashing and liability cases are all evidence that the ballot box and press 
were not the only real checks on municipal councils. Clearly, any consideration of power between 
the province and the locality must include the judicial system as a third party. The reported cases 
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are evidence that while municipal councils did generally accept the law and legal system they were 
prepared to work within it to achieve their objectives. Cases in which one municipality was a 
plaintiff and another was a defendant complicate any easy conclusions that the courts would favour 
a municipal party or not and problematize the binary premise of the locality versus the centre. 
 The sense that the law was a danger to municipalities, their councils and their officials 
was reinforced during the period by the for-profit publications that municipalities almost 
certainly used as their primary source of legal information. In Chapter 4 I have discussed the 
ways that authors and publishers reproduced and framed the official sources of law according to 
their assessment of the needs of their customers, or what they could persuade the customers were 
their needs, attempting to add to their marketability by emphasizing the risks accompanying 
statutory duties and restrictions. No two authors or editions identified the same selection of acts 
or cases that official sources presented, but it is apparent that these were numerous, belying the 
common equation by scholars of municipal law with the Baldwin Act alone. The law for 
municipalities revealed by these publications comprised not just the original act and its 
amendments, but also collateral statutes, and a constantly growing jurisprudence. The lack of 
autonomy of local governments was the premise for all these publications, and it continued to be 
in the material interest of the publishers to stress and even exaggerate this aspect of the law. The 
legal environment for municipal actors became progressively more legalistic, as the layman as 
legal author gave way first to the lawyer as legal author. The final step in this progression was to 
the lawyer as lawyer: as the law detailed by the publications became more complex, the legal 
position of councils and staff appeared more uncertain, and the shadow of the law darker through 
the repeated warnings of the authors, the municipalities became more likely to turn to 
professional help rather than to self-help reference materials. Whether or not the law filtered by 
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either of these resources matched the actual experience of municipal actors dealing with the law 
is impossible for us to say, as it was impossible for them. Prisoners of an information system and 
information providers who were biased in favour of erring on the side of caution, the legal 
environment produced by these publications was antithetical to the concept of local government 
autonomy. 
In Chapter 5 I considered the law-related experience of one municipality, the United 
Counties of Leeds and Grenville. The councils and their staff acted in the shadow of a law that 
the municipal records show was omnipresent, either directly or as subtext. The actions of council 
and its staff may not always have been true to the letter of the law, but were always expressed as 
such—they were overtly ‘legalistic.’ County councils relied on their clerk and treasurer to get 
things done within the law, for which service they were prepared to pay relatively well.  But 
while both councillors and staff referred and deferred to the letter and spirit of the law, they 
varied in the degree of care with which they acted. Legal reference material was valued, although 
less at the end than at the start of the period. Solicitors were relied on more and more as time 
went on, although always on an ad hoc basis. Legal conformity was not the only priority. The 
council did not terminate their Treasurer when the latter transgressed technical rules, and indeed 
took advantage of his legal nonchalance by making use of his personal credit. Similarly, they 
were flexible about statutory requirements for arbitrations, transforming these into mere 
formalized negotiations. 
 Though the council showed a readiness to follow legal process in the pursuit of municipal 
goals, this too was adapted to circumstances. The quasi-judicial petitioning system to determine 
expenditures led to uncertainty and a lack of objectivity, and during the period began to be 
replaced, or at least supplemented, by pre-determined grants. Contracts as well as by-laws were 
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legally required for the corporation to act, so were duly entered, seemingly in good faith, 
although not always properly executed. But even as standard forms gave way to professionally 
drafted contracts, the impracticality of the tendering system and acting through contractors 
became manifest.  Still, despite continual failures arising from the disconnect between economic 
reality and expectations, the Leeds and Grenville councils resisted the move from a contract-
based model to a permanent work force, re-negotiating smaller contracts and downloading 
responsibility for road improvements to subsidiary municipalities. 
 By necessity the councils used the judicial system to press the counties’ own claims, and 
were unable to avoid the legal claims of others, but lamented the costs even when they were 
successful.  A clear preference for negotiation over judicial or arbitral process grew stronger over 
time. The councils, their staff and lawyers were occasionally creative in finding solutions to legal 
problems, as for example when they took advantage of their right to establish tolls to evade their 
statutory responsibility in their dispute with the Village of Gananoque. Similarly, they made use 
of their spending power to exact what might be considered extra-legal policy concessions—free 
education—from school boards who were not legally required to provide them. However, when 
the matter was not a council priority (and there were legal alternatives) they also relied on law as 
a reason for inaction, as in the decision not to fund welfare requests. When facing a legal 
quandary involving the Johnstown property, when high law, a competing agency of low law, and 
political circumstances converged against them, they made use of legal professionals and tried 
various options until they were successful. While undoubtedly ‘a creature of the province,’ 
operating in the shadow of provincial law, the freedom of the municipal corporation of the 
United Counties of Leeds and Grenville to raise revenue beyond what the common law and the 
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province commandeered, together with the help of legal and extra-legal tools allowed for a 
degree for local government initiative and agency.  
As I noted in the introduction, the lack of administrative supervision over municipal 
corporations in mid-nineteenth century Canada West/Ontario has led some scholars to conclude 
that councils were basically free to act as they saw fit.  In Chapter 6 I argued that this assumption 
is incorrect in one important area of municipal jurisdiction. Two types of overseers provided a 
check on municipal action in matters of incarceration; one through the old regime ex tempore 
institution of the grand jury, the other permanent ‘new regime’ inspectorates, precursors to the 
default mode of scrutiny of the administrative state. There is no question that the grand jury of 
the quarter sessions had a ‘hard law’ quasi-judicial role in the determination of eligibility and 
quantum of support for the ‘destitute insane.’ However, with this exception, the non-criminal 
presentments of the grand juries in mid-Victorian Canada West/Ontario lacked an enforcement 
mechanism; they were what is now categorized as ‘soft law.’ In spite of this, grand juries may 
have been the more effective of the two.  
Grand jury ‘presentments,’ a traditional form of input by the local gentry, or in Canada 
West/Ontario the local elite, probably had an indirect influence on the policies and the politics of 
the provincial and federal governments. As far as matters of local governance are concerned, the 
effect of the grand juries and the inspectors resist easy, or indeed any evaluation, but the 
evidence is suggestive. County councils were critiqued by both in regard to their administration 
of the gaols, often simultaneously and in conjunction or syncopation with gaolers, sheriffs, 
doctors, and the press. Even their own members sitting in property committees manifest the 
influence of the grand juries, as their agendas and gaol reports came to mimic grand jury 
presentments.  The experience of the United Counties of Leeds and Grenville may not have been 
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typical, but there is no reason to think that it was not. The record is unclear, but it suggests that 
the municipal council was just as, or more, likely to be influenced by the opinions of grand jurors 
as by those of provincial inspectors on gaol-related issues.  
 Between the old and new systems of supervision, the municipal county councils of 
Canada West/Ontario during the thirty years after the Baldwin Act were never left alone to 
exercise the power the statute gave them over local correctional facilities. Still, the grand juries 
though persuasive, were impermanent. As for the inspectorates, these were under-staffed, their 
surveillance intermittent, and their successes far from automatic, or even easy. Despite the 
onslaught of scrutiny both hard and soft, the municipal council of the United Counties Leeds and 
Grenville was able to exert some independence, if only to the extent of delaying inevitable 
compliance. But in this area at least, it is clear that the ‘power’ over gaols ostensibly given the 
county councils by the Municipal Act was easily compromised by the will of the legislature 
enforced through its new regime bureaucrats, and perhaps even more by the lay participants of 
the old regime judicial system.  
 Historians and political scientists hailing the Baldwin Act for bringing about local 
government independence point to the freedom to raise and spend revenue at the lowest 
community level introduced by the act. In Chapter 7 I examined the records of three township 
councils and their courts of revision in Leeds and Grenville counties for evidence of autonomy in 
their implementation of the tax laws. The townships of Augusta and the Rear and Front of Leeds 
and Landsdowne during the thirty years following the implementation of the Baldwin Act in 
Canada West/Ontario were not particularly ‘legalistic’ whether acting in committee as courts of 
revision or as quasi-administrative tribunals in their capacity as municipal councils. For instance, 
even when following the law to the letter, in the matter of clergy exemptions, they chose to 
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appeal to custom to legitimate their actions. The records of their decisions never cited the by-law 
or law involved; where they gave a reason for the decision, they referred to policy or natural 
justice. All three townships demonstrated a somewhat relaxed attitude toward the statutory 
minutiae of dates and deadlines, and the distinction between court of revision business and that 
of council. 
On tax matters, as on most other subjects, the councillors of the three townships showed a 
remarkable consensus over the thirty years canvassed. Tax forgiveness was not controversial. 
Municipal revenue was theirs to spend as they wished, or at least as not specifically prohibited, 
the right to forego its collection would seem to follow logically, whatever the legislation might 
say to the contrary. The identical membership, meeting place and clerk for townships councils 
and courts of revision probably encouraged them in a tendency to deal with tax appeals in the 
same way, and according to the same standards, as other claims and issues. There are instances 
of political or personal bias, probably more than is indicated on the face of the record. No doubt 
councillor-revisors shared and reflected the expectations of their constituents, propertied by 
definition, whose petitions set the agendas of council meetings.  
It is clear that in following or departing from the law, the mid-Victorian councillors of 
Augusta and Leeds and Landsdowne, Front and Rear, did not act as predatory administrators. 
Not that they neglected their duty to raise funds. The assessment laws, and the public priorities 
they are alleged to have embodied—the encouragement of improvements in infrastructure, and 
indirectly the economic progress which local taxes made possible—provided the expectations, 
while the specific circumstances brought to council or the court of revision compelled the 
exceptions.  When law and economic policy—shared by all levels of government—came into 
321 
 
conflict with concerns of mercy and justice, the councillors could be swayed by facts and ‘local 
knowledge’.  
For these three townships, municipal law facilitated, or at least permitted, a small sphere 
of autonomy in a key aspect of local governance. It is impossible to tell how far these findings 
pertain generally to municipal governments in Canada West/Ontario. But since the majority of 
the voting population of the settler society of Canada West/Ontario were residents of townships, 
and since local taxation was the only direct tax to which they were subject, these observations 
should be taken seriously in any evaluation of local autonomy at this time. 
 In most of this dissertation I have looked at local autonomy from the perspective of the 
‘legal scale,’ the immunity municipal corporations enjoyed and the initiative permitted by the 
legal apparatus of the provincial state. In Chapter 8 I considered the political scale—the ability 
municipal corporations may have had to affect the law that established the parameters of action. 
Looking at the petitions sent to the province during the decade 1867-77, it seems that members 
of municipal corporations seem to have had no doubts as to their prerogative as low law 
institutions to advocate for legal change; that they believed that it was worth the effort involved, 
and that they had decided, if sometimes divergent, ideas about the form their legal 
environment(s) should take. It is clear, however, that municipal corporations were advocating, 
not dictating, to higher levels of government. Petitions from municipal corporations can be said 
to have enjoyed some degree of success; uneven, uncertain, possibly expensive, and probably 
frustrating, yet enough that the effort seemed worthwhile. 
The sheer number of petitions for legal change from municipal corporations demonstrates 
that the latter were far from autonomous. Yet they reveal a strong sense of agency. Municipal 
councils had confidence in their duty, competence and ability to revise the law through 
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petitioning, which does not appear to have been entirely misplaced. No doubt at least partly due 
to the more highly centralized, executive-dominated governmental structure in Canada 
West/Ontario, mid-Victorian Ontario municipalities lacked the power to control their legislative 
environment attributed to some urban American centres under policies of home rule. However, 
the undifferentiated legal character of municipal corporations, without making distinctions of 
type except for gradations within a single category likely did much to undermine the 
effectiveness of municipal councils as lobbyists and law reformers. Their conflicting roles as 
boosters engaged in the promotion of private progress, and as low governance fiduciaries 
concerned about public justice also diminished their authority in the legislative process. 
Furthermore, their voice was diluted by sibling rivalry: the gain of one municipality, or group of 
municipalities, could be the loss of another. The success of one petition could, and often did, 
entail the failure of others. The volume of petitions from municipalities is an indication that the 
Member of Parliament had not entirely replaced the petition as the principal method of 
communication from governed to governor, and that members of the low governments could 
challenge members of high governments to be the recognized representatives of their 
communities. Nevertheless, their lack of constitutional standing meant that low government 
influence would be both indirect and sporadic, as political will may always challenge, but rarely 
triumph over the embedded authority of legal superstructure.  
William Novak writes that “law was the modality of governance” in the nineteenth 
century United States; this is also true of British North America.906 Certainly, law is key to the 
understanding of municipal corporations and their place in the operation of governance in 
Canada West/Ontario. In this dissertation I have attempted to show various aspects of the ways 
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in which, in the period from the coming into effect of the Baldwin Act to the advent of the urban 
reform era, municipal corporations were in effect the focal point of a ‘micro-culture’ of low 
law.907  Low law, of course, is still with us, albeit much transformed, and municipal corporations 
are no longer the keystone of the system. Just as the nineteenth century municipalities superseded 
the justices of the peace, municipal corporations and other institutions of low law of the mid-
Victorian period have been superseded in importance by the administrative boards and 
government agencies of the twentieth and twenty first centuries. Law still provides the 
framework for governance, but it no longer constitutes the ‘modality.’ Conurbations, rather than 
counties, are now the drivers of the economy, and loom so large in the academic and popular 
imagination that other units are not even considered when question of municipal power are 
debated.  To a certain extent, to raise the question of mid-Victorian local government autonomy 
is an anachronistic exercise. In absolute terms local governments in the period were not 
autonomous, but while specific facets of the laws were irksome to municipal councils, their legal 
subservience in itself does not seem to have been an issue.  
During the first thirty years after the Baldwin Act the municipal law system was more or 
less synchronized with economic and social reality. That there is now a mismatch seems 
incontrovertible. We can speculate that divergence in interest may have been the product of or at 
least co-relative to the social and economic transformation of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.908 When industrialization became the goal for Ontario towns and cities, the 
commonality of interest in the previously more homogenous market economy was disrupted. 
Similarly, the accompanying population surge in urban areas resulted in a growing asymmetry in 
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908 See, for example, Robert Craig Brown and G. Ramsay Cook, Canada, 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974). 
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‘local’ problems of health and welfare. Eventually, a powerful metropolis that wanted to be more 
powerful, and its political allies, were able to force significant changes to the low constitution, 
culminating in the current state of affairs, wherein the City of Toronto is entirely removed from 
the Municipal Act, although not from its subordinate legal status as a municipal corporation.909 
The agitation to remove the metropolis, with or without other cities, even further from the 
confines of the low constitution continues, albeit sporadically, and without much likelihood of 
success. Lack of local government autonomy is embedded in a constitutional model that 
crystallized in a vastly different political context.910   
In this study I have attempted to show that the law relating to mid-Victorian municipal 
corporations in Canada West/Ontario was multiplistic; the letter of the law contained in the text 
of the foundational statute is only a small part of a rhizomatic network of legislation, case-law, 
interpretive manuals, local experience and the political process of law reform through 
petitioning.911 Yet the matrices of legal and local power in terms of initiative and immunity and 
the experience of municipal councils suggest that agency, rather than autonomy, should be the 
goal for reformers. What is it that twenty-first century municipalities want to do? How much 
does it matter if they are able to do so directly, with their own levers of law?  How important is 
legal structure vis à vis political will? I do not argue that structure is unimportant, but I have 
attempted to show in this dissertation that agency within the system may be the better question. 
As the positive side of this argument, I suspect that it was in large part owing to their power of 
                                                          
909 City of Toronto Act, 2006, S.O. 2006 c.11, Schedule A. 
910 And as Andrew Sancton has argued, the variability of urban boundaries militates against structural reform. Any 
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initiative that mid-Victorian local governments had little power of immunity. The paucity of 
other agencies of government with the ability to initiate (such as central departments of civil 
service), and the amount of perceived demand for initiative, militated against immunity for low 
governments.  
There is much about these local governments and their legal environment that I have not 
explored. Nevertheless, I am confident in concluding that that during the years 1850-1880, the 
municipal corporations of Canada West/Ontario were not merely integrated in, but also integral 
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